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Abstract 
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES UNDER THE GATT 
AND THE WTO AND IN THE US LAW AND PRACTICE: PARALLEL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND INTERACTIONS 
Although the number of subsidy and counten, ailing duty cases, both at national 
and WTO level is declining, they still hold centre stage in the trade wars that are 
the hallmark of modem international economy. Suffice it to mention the "Foreign 
Sales Corporations" case, the "softwood lumber" cases and the ongoing *, US-EC 
large civil aircraft" dispute. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, 
the multilateral regulation of subsidies can strongly impinge on govemmental 
autonomy in the management of the national economy. On the other, the 
boundaries of subsidisation are often quite uncertain as subsidies can overlap with 
quite distinct areas in the public management of the economy, such as taxation. 
Probably as a result of the foregoing factors, the multilateral discipline on 
subsidies was slow to develop and it is only with the Uruguay Round that a fully 
fledged, wide-ranging regime took shape, while the identification of 
countervailable subsidies and the conditions under which they can be countered 
have been left for long to domestic countervailing duty proceedings. The United 
States, for a long time the main user of CVD proceedings. developed a much more 
sophisticated and detailed regime than the GATT's. The competitive margin 
provided by US administrative practice has enabled it to impose its perspective on 
the shaping of the multilateral regime, firstly as a result of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, and secondly because of the creative interpretation of the WTO 
rules, especially by the Appellate Body. On the other hand, in implementing the 
WTO regime the United States has often been able to withstand attempts to 
change its domestic regime, although some of its aspects are not necessarily 
consistent with the WTO rules. 
The success of the United States, however, has been far from complete, as the US 
has not been able to impose its viewpoint on decisk, 'e aspects of subsidy 
regulation in the GATT and in the WTO system, the most conspicuous example 
being the interface between taxation and subsidisation and, as expected, it has 
suffered the backlash of such failure. But here, as in other important cases, the 
Byrd Amendment being the most recent, the United States has been slow in 
complying with the WTO decisions. showing that states are not yet prepared to 
surrender their national autonomy without a fight. 
This thesis is compiled with material accurate to the 20 th May 2007 
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INTRODUCTION 
The context of the research 
Subsidies serve a variety of objectives. They can be used to improve the 
competitive position of national firms, to further industrial growth and to assist 
regional development. Subsidies, however, can alter the flow of international trade in 
favour of states that grant them. Likewise, measures designed to offset subsidies, such 
as countervailing duties, can also profoundly alter the level of protection fixed in the 
schedules of concessions. Thus rules governing subsidies and countervailing measures 
impinge deeply on state autonomy, arguably more so than tar-iff reduction or the 
removal of quotas. 
While there has been widespread awareness amongst economists and 
policyrnakers about the importance of regulating subsidies, it was only after the 
Uruguay Round approved the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement that there emerged a multilateral legal framework in this area. In contrast, 
the international trade Community has recognised the right of a country to impose 
countervailing measures since the close of the nineteenth century. It was therefore left 
to the countries concerned to establish - although since 1947 within the boundaries set 
by Art. VI: 3 of the GATT - what constitutes a subsidy for the purpose of national 
countervailing measures and the conditions and ways of its countervailability. Some 
states have actively exploited this possibility for a long time; many others have not 
been particularly concerned xvith this aspect of state support to their industries. 
Industrial subsidy rates in the OECD countries as well as in the developing 
countries after an upsurge in the 1970s went into decline f'rom the 1980s due to 
multiple factors, such as the need for budget stringency both in the industrial and 
developing -, vorld. the changed ideological climate and groxving public scepticism that 
industrial policy can revive declining industries. ' A similar trend characterises 
countervailing duty measures. In the period from 1980 to 1986,460 cases were 
reported, over 60 percent of which were initiated in the United States, followed by 
Chile and Australia. 2 In the United States, after a peak of 60 initiations and 26 
countervailing duty decisions in 1982, the number of proceedings has markedly 
declined from the early 1990s and it is presently dwarfed by antidumping proceedings. 
Yet, the economic and political impact of subsidies and countervailing measures is still 
prominent, as is borne out by the number of cases entertained by the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO, and by the relevance that quite a few such cases have in 
stirring up the economic relationship between trading partners. 
The regulation of subsidies and countervailing measures has attracted the 
attention of lawyers as well as economists and political scientists. The debate over the 
role of subsidies in promoting or inhibiting domestic and international welfare has been 
rather heated, with a prominent contribution of US scholars in particular with regard to 
the reasons and appropriate ways for countering subsidies. Already in the 1970s, 
American scholars, such as Barcelo' based their criticism of subsidisation on a Paretian 
efficiency rationale, arguing, with specific regard to export subsidies, that they 
decrease overall world welfare as they open up a price differential between the world 
price and the domestic price in the subsidising country, thus causing distribution 
inefficiencies. 3 Other scholars have argued that the CVD remedy can turn out to be 
counterproductive, as countervailing duties will often reduce the welfare of the 
1 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Subsidies", in Jeffrey J. SchoM ed., Completing the Uruguay Round A 
Result-Oriented Approach to the GA 7T Trade Negotiations (Washington DC, Institute for 
International Economics, 1990) p. 94. 
2 Patrick J. McDonough, "Subsidies", in Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GA 7T Uruguay Round A 
Negotiating History (1986-1992) V. I (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, 1993), p. 
818. 
3 J. J. Barcelo' 111, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal, Law & Pol ly 
Int I Bus., 9 (1977), p. 798-800. 
importing country by increasing costs for its consumers, without necessarily preventing 
the exporting country from subsidising ' 
However, theoretical analyses have two fundamental defects. Firsfly. they often 
overlook other factors that from a political and macroeconomic angle are not 
negligible. For example, it is likely that subsidies result in goods available at lower 
price for foreign consumers and that extra duties are a burden on domestic consumers. 
Yet, countervailing and antidumping duties can be a life-line for domestic industries 
sinking under aggressive, and sometimes unfair foreign competition. Secondly, valld 
theoretical observation can be simply ignored by the decisions of the players in 
international negotiations, which can be determined by more relevant political and 
economic factors. For instance subsidies from certain countries or for certain purposes 
can be exempted, but they are subsidies all the same. It is, therefore, consistent \, vith 
prudence and, perhaps, more interesting to focus on the process of creation of the 
multilateral rules., on the perspective of the main trade partners and parties to the 
negotiations, on the impact that the multilateral rules have on their domestic regime. 
This dissertation examines the interrelation between the US countervailing duty 
regime and trade policy and the multilateral subsidy and CVD discipline in the GATT 
and WTO system. The reasons why this research focuses on the United States are 
quite simple and have already been partially explained. They can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) As shown by the data above, the United States has preceded and outshone all other 
GATT/WTO members in developing domestic rules to apply counten, ailing duties and, 
therefore, to asscss subsidies. 
criticism of the efficlenc-', maximisation approach asJustification for counter-Nalling duties Is 
pro%lded by A. O'Sýkcs. Counter% ailing, Dutý Law: an Economic Perspective Colum. L. R.. 
89( 198Q), P. -, 14. 
2) The United States has been the most active in canvassing multilateral negotiations in 
the subsidy and countervailing duty area and in putting forward proposals that are 
mostly based on its paramount national background developed o, ý-er a lengthy period. 
3) The United States is among the main complainants and defendants in subsidy 
brought to the attention of the GATT and the WTO. It is far and away, the main 
defendant in countervailing measures complaints in cases that are at the same time 
considered by US courts in the light of domestic legislation, with rather different 
outcomes. 
The subject of the research 
This dissertation focuses on two set of issues: 1) The supposed impact of the 
legal perspective and of the economic goals of the United States on the multilateral 
regime on subsidies. 2)The allegedly protectionist bias of the US countervailing duty 
regime and of the multilateral rules established in particular by the Uruguay. 
The commentators of the Uruguay Round negotiations usually agree on the fact 
that for the United States the agreement should aim at controlling subsidies, whereas 
for the other parties it should be an instrument to control (US) countervailing duties. 5 
Subsidies and countervailing measures certainly are interlinked as the latter owe their 
"raison d'etre" to the former, but their discipline has long been separate. The scope of 
Art. VI of GATT 1947 was actually much wider than that of Article XVI, allowing 
proceedings against forms of subsidisation not captured by the text of the latter. And 
this gap was not filled by the Tokyo Round. It is only with the Uruguay Round SCM 
Agreement that a bridge between the regulation of subsidies and the discipline of 
counten-ailing measures was constructed. The first set, therefore, looks at subsidies 
and their multilateral discipline. The questions we are going to answer are: to what 
6 Ho%kard. P. Marvel. I d%%ard John RaN, "Countervailing Duties-, The Economic. Journal, 
105(1995), p. 1576. note 1. 
4 
extent did the United States as a dominant player in the sequence of negotiations 
directed to regulate subsidies and countervailing measures succeed in shaping the 
multilateral regime on subsidies? If the United States did not succeed or was not 
entirely successful in shaping the multilateral regime what were the consequences of its 
failure? The second strand concerns the interaction of the countervailing duty regime 
of the United States - for long the dominant user of such measures - Nvith the 
multilateral regime. The questions we want to answer are whether the US regime had 
protectionist roots and whether the uncontested influence of the United States brought 
about a more protectionist multilateral regime or whether the latter forced a reform of 
the more protectionist aspects of the US system. 
As regards the first strand some explanations must be given and certain myths 
must be dispelled. As noted above, the conventional wisdom is that the United States 
firmly opposed subsidies, which seems to imply that the United States had no interest 
in defending areas of public management of the economy beyond the strict boundaries 
drawn by the neoclassical political economy, such as monetary supply, interest rate, 
etc. This would imply in the first place that there is an agreement on what a subsidy is. 
That is, the multifaceted beast called subsidy must have, notwithstanding its multiple 
features, a unitary fixed identity that is or can be universally recognised. Secondly, it 
would suppose that there is a clear boundary between states, or customs territories, that 
have an interest in supporting their own industries through public measures and other 
trade partners, prominent among which the United States, which have an interest in 
withstanding such measures. 
The first difficulty with such a perspective is that a general agreement on the 
definition of subsidy is also absent in economic theory. As pointed out by the WTO 
Secretariat in a recent report on subsidies, even the globally adopted National Account 
SI.. tatistics (NACC) ignore transfers through tax breaks and soft loans which are 
considered as forms of subsidisation by most economi StS. 6 According to an often 
quoted statement of an American economist, 'My own starting point was an attempt to 
define subsidy. But in the course of doing so, I came to the conclusion that the concept 
of subsidy is just too elusive' 7 If economics is not able to provide an absolUte truth 
about the scope of subsidisation, from a legal angle it is imperative for the parties 
involved in negotiations on subsidies that certain measures fall within the purview of 
the multilateral regulation while others are excluded or treated in a less stringent ý. vay. 
Behind legal concerns lies the economic and political interest of the parties to the 
negotiations to secure a definition of what constitutes a subsidy that is most consistent 
with their perspectives and interests. 
With reference to the United States the question is, therefore, whether and how 
the United States succeeded in imposing the approach developed in its domestic CVD 
regime on the multilaterall definition of subsidy; whether it managed to exclude from it 
some fon-ns of tax relief aimed at promoting exports; whether it managed to exclude 
from the multilateral discipline measures directed at attracting investments, which are 
particularly widespread in a federal regime where states compete in creating a 
favourable environment for prospective investors; whether and to what extent it 
succeeded in excluding from the general discipline forms of public support of export 
credit largely utilized by industrial countries and regulated in international fora other 
than the GATT, within which the United States had a leading role. 
The other side of the inquiry concerns the countervai ling duty regime. In the 
United States, lawmakers, the executive and often the doctrine argue that 
countervailing measures are - or at least should be if correctly applied - an instrument 
against the disruptive effects of subsidies on international trade and a way to level the 
playing field for international competition. Their chtics. American and foreign 
6WTO. World Trade Report 2006 (Subsidics. Trade and tile I vTO) , p. 5 1. Ibid., p. 48. quoting Hendrik S. Houthak-ker. 
6 
scholars, and obviously an array of foreign governments, reply that CVDs are 
protectionist barriers. For the reasons examined in greater details in chapter I this thesis 
rejects the assumption that countervailing duties are white knights bent on slaying the 
trade-distorting subsidy dragon, as, in the words of Marvel and Ray, the protection cure 
for subsidies could be much more harmful, and, therefore, trade disruptive than the 
subsidies themselves! Nor, in the present unsophisticated form are they a means to 
level the playing field between self financing national finns and government-supported 
I foreign firms. On the other hand, the thesis is wary of the assumption that 
countervailing measures are a protectionist tool per se and that a single element of the 
CVD regime can be sufficient proof of such a feature. The fact that, as argued by 
Rugman, the members of the US authority entrusted with the ascertainment of one of 
the conditions for imposing countervailing measures, i. e., material injury, are likely to 
be sympathetic with domestic lobbies, does not necessarily imply that CVD 
proceedings result in protectionist decisions. 9 Nor are the high cost of such proceedings 
and of the 
subsequent actions before national trade courts necessarily a mark of protectionism. 
In contrast, the first question addressed by this research is whether some specific 
parts of the statutes and of the implementing administrative practices are actually 
biased towards protectionism, that is, whether they pursue protectionist goals or have 
protectionist effects. A series of factors justifies this approach. Firstly, protectionism is 
a relative concept. From an economic perspective a measure can be viewed as 
protectionist if it hinders the trade flow to a greater extent than trade would be 
hindered in its absence or than it would be if other criteria were applied in its 
implementation. From a legal perspective a measure can be also considered 
protectionist if it is more trade restrictive than the legal benchmark to which it should 
' Howard P. Marvel and Edward John Ray, "Countervailing"op. cit., p. 1576. 
9 Alan M. Rugman, U. S. Protectionism and Canadian Trade Policy, JWTL., 20(1986), p. 367. 
7 
conform, or if it is more restricti-ve than comparable measures applied by other trade 
partners. Secondly, a regime like the CVD regime is not monolithic, but has many 
component parts. To base a general judgment of a regime on just one its components is 
conceptually counterproductive and, perhaps, unfair. 
As regards the United States in particular the analysis must, therefore, go 
through different stages. First, with reference to the initial phase of the US 
countervailing duty regime it is necessary to ascertain whether its key components had 
a protectionist bias and if in the context of the existing statute alternative, more import- 
friendly, criteria could be adopted. Second, it is necessary to verify 1, N-hether the basic 
principles of the US regime have actually been incorporated into the multilateral 
regime as it took shape in the Uruguay Round negotiations. In a third stage the analysis 
must again focus on the US domestic regime to see whether it is completely in 
accordance with its multilateral counterpart and if its enforcement in countervailing 
duty investigations has more import restrictive results than those allowed by the WTO 
rules. 
The analysis developed in the following chapters will show that 
protectionist elements were already present in the US system prior to the Uruguay 
round, but were quite often the upshot of administrative practice rather than 
statute, though with some few exceptions like the still existing statutory criterion 
to calculate countervailable subsidy on certain processed agricultural products, 
whose farm inputs have been subsidised. This thesis also argues that the United 
States gained a strategic victory when in the Uruguay Round negotiations it 
managed to impose its viexvpoint, based, in accordance xvith the US regime, on the 
benefit for the producer rather than on the cost for the budget as suggested by the 
majority of the partics to the negotiations. The by-product of this approach. in 
accordance too with the LTIS O'D regime. was the prevailing of the idea that the 
8 
benchmark to ascertain the existence of the benefit and assess its amount should 
be the market. 
The predominance of the market paradigm could, however, entail greater 
leeway for protectionist ends. The budgetary cost criterion guarantees at least a 
verifiable assessment of the net costs of the measure under investigation. The principle 
of benefit from governmental measures relative to the market relies on a multiplicity 
of viewpoints and approaches. Which is the relevant market for the comparison, either 
from a geographic or economic angle? Is a domestic market strongly influenced by 
government policy still a reliable benchmark? If not, which other markets can be taken 
into consideration? Likewise, certain economic choices could be consistent with 
rational economic policy if the alternatives are considered from the angle of private 
group of companies strategy, whereas they are not rational from the perspective of an 
outsider investor. 
Therefore, there is no single cornerstone on which to rest in deciding whether 
countervailing measures are "per se" protectionist, but, acknowledging the fact that 
such measures can be used to shield domestic industries from foreign competition, as 
also bome out by their frequent union with antidumping measures, a case by cases 
analysis must be carried out. And this assessment must be conducted with reference 
both to national CVD laws and administrative practice, ascertaining whether the latter 
is inconsistent with the fonner or is fostered by it. 
related question concerns the consistency of domestic CVD law and 
administrative practice, and that of the United States in particular. with the WTO 
discipline. As already noted, the present multilateral regime, which arguably has 
espoused the US perspecti've. has increased the members' room for manoeuvre in 
assessing subsidies and this is potentially exploitable for protectionist ends. as is bome 
out by the growing number of CVD proceedings outside the United States after the 
9 
Marrakesh Agreement. However, as ýNith the animals in Orwel's farm, some are more 
equal than others. The question is, therefore, whether some CVD users - the US in 
particular - have trespassed the boundaries allowed by the present multilateral rules. 
The jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Body, and in particular the jurisprudence 
of the Appellate Body, has played a decisive role in interpreting rules %ýhich are far 
from precise and unambiguous, thus allowing great room for manoeuvre to pursue 
political goals which are actually the key to mediating the contrasting interests in the 
dispute. The question, however, is whether the Appellate Body has usurped the role of 
the lawmakers, i. e., the WTO members and, in doing so has ended up encouraging 
protectionist tendencies. Obviously, the analysis conducted in the following chapters, 
especially in chapter VII, refers exclusively to the subsidy and CVD regime and does 
not allow general conclusions, as countervailing measures cases are too small a sample 
of the population of cases addressed by the WTO panels and the Appellate Body. Yet, 
the evidence gathered by this research will show that, in the cloak of legalistic 
language, the Appellate Body has often taken on itself the responsibility of retCreeing 
between the apparently contrasting goals of countering subsidisation and preventing 
protectionist exploitation of the defences provided by the multilateral regime. In doing 
so it has given priority to the first goal, without realising that not only the subsidy 
disease but also the protection cure constitute major challenges to continuous 
liberalisation of the international trading system. 
The criteria underýving the research 
Two assumptions underlie this research: 
1) The analysis developed in the dissertation starts from the premise that the 
multilateral trade regime and the domestic regime are separate and that there is no 
direct effect of the former within the sphere of action of the latter. Indeed, both the 
Tokyo Round Agreements and the Uruguay Round Agreements have found a place in 
10 
the domestic legislation of their main parties through a dualistic approach. Ile Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 made it clear that the agreements negotiated in the Tokyo 
Round were not self-executing, and equally unequivocal was the Statement of 
Administrative Action on the MTN Agreementsio. A not less restrictive approach was 
followed by the US in implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements". As to the other 
main partner in multilateral trade negotiations, the European Communities, the same 
attitude towards the implementation of GATT agreements can be inferred from the 
European Court of Justice's case law. 12 
Moreover, a closer took at the implementation stage shows that there is room 
for departure from their provisions and this opportunity has been fully exploited, at 
least by the main user of countervailing measures, the United States. Leebron argues 
that, especially with regard to anti-dumping and countervailing duties the 
implementing provisions constituted a rewriting of the law in existence "in part to 
conform it to the Uruguay Round Agreements but also to make changes otherwise 
desired by the Congress (usually at the behest of certain industries)" 13 . Hudec draws 
our attention to the fact that the US Congress in adopting the Uruguay Subsidy 
Agreement modified its text with regard to subsidies granted through a funding 
mechanism, stating that the definition of subsidy provided by the CSM Agreement was 
to be understood as including regulatory subsidies in line with the approach followed 
14 by the US Department of Commerce . 
10 J. H. Jackson, United States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiations, in 
J. H. Jackson et all. (eds) Implementing the Tokyo Round (Ann Arbor: T"he University of Michigan 
Press, 1987), p. 169. 
11 D. W. Leebron, Implementation ofthe Uruguay Round Results in the United States, in 
J. H. Jackson and A. O. Sykes (eds. ) Implementing the Tokyo Round (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
F 211. iECJ, Case C- 280-93 Germany v. Council (1994) ECR I- 4973; 
ECJ, Case C- 469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA (1995), 
ECR 1-4558. ECJ, Case-C-149/96 Portugal v Council (1999) ECR 1-8395. 
13 D. W. Leebron, Implementation, op. cit.. p. 207. 
" R. E. Hudec. Essays in the Nature of International Trade Policy (London: Cameron May Ltd, 
1999), p. 268 
2) This dissertation does not aim at a static comparison of the multilateral discipline on 
subsidies and countervailing measures and the US domestic regime, but it aims at 
providing a dynamic analysis. Thus it focuses on a set of specific issues, involving the 
United States as well as the GATT/WTO and examines how a discipline gradually 
emerged in the two systems and hoxA- the respective regimes have interacted. 
The research is, therefore, divided into nine chapters. 
The first section analyses the political economy of subsidies and subsidisation 
remedies with particular reference to the countervailing duty system in the United 
States. 
2) The second chapter deals with the developments of the multilateral discipline 
on subsidies and countervailing measures in the forty years preceding the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. It argues, with no pretence of novelty, that the United 
States played a leading role in shaping the multilateral regime, but that its sNvay was 
not absolute. In particular, as regards the relationship between fiscal regimes and 
subsidy discipline it failed to secure to the US fiscal approach, prevalently based on 
direct taxation and characterised. by rather tight anti-avoidance rules, the same 
treatment as its Westem European trading partners, which relied mostly on indirect 
taxes and did not always follow the world-wide income principle for income and 
corporation axes. 
3) The third chapter examines the main concepts and perspectives of the US 
countervailing measures regime that took shape in particular in the 1980s. In this 
context particular attention is given to the specificity rule and to the idea that the 
market is the only benchmark against which to assess subsidisation and its amount. 
4) The fourth chapter provides an outline of the WTO subsidics and countervailing 
measures regime. focusing on the impact of concepts and perspectIN es of the US statute 
ýuid administrative practice on tile multilatcral regime. It argues that such influence 
L 
occurred not only because of the particularly active role played by the United States in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, but also as a result of the interpretation of sometimes 
equivocal multilateral rules by the WTO panels, and the Appellate Body in pailicular. 
5) The fifth chapter deals with the adjudications of the WTO panels and of the 
Appellate Body on the consistency of some aspects of the US tax law with the %ý70 
subsidies and CVD regime, that is, the world famous FSC-ETI cases. 
6) Chapter six re-examines the US countervailing duty discipline folloWing the 
implementation of the multilateral regime by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA). Two main ideas underlie this chapter: continuity between the present US 
CVD regime and the regime that took shape in the United States in the years preceding 
the establishment of the WTO; likelihood that in some cases the present US CVD 
regime is not perfectly in line with the WTO discipline in spite of the fact that formally 
the United States had implemented the multilateral regime, which was mostly shaped 
on the US pattern. 
7) Chapter seven reviews the countervailing measure cases involving the United 
States adjudicated by the DSB. 
8) Chapter VIII provides an overview of the ongoing debate in the Doha 
negotiation assessing the likelihood that the negotiations could significantly alter the 
pattern established by the previous round. 
The final part ascertains the existence of a common pattern based on the 
analyses carried out in the preceding chapters. 
I 
CHAPTERI 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES 
Introduction 
The interface between subsidies, countervailing measures and the other 
remedies that are available under the GATT/WTO regime are at the centre of the 
debate over protectionism, free trade, and fair trade that has been going on for the 
last thirty years among economists, political scientists as well as lawyers. Any 
analysis of the SCM GATT rules and their US counterpart calls for a theoretical 
sextant, that is, a conceptual framework that could shed light on the economic and 
political impact and rationale of such measures. Yet, the tools provided by 
political economy theory are far from possessing astronomical precision or, at 
least, the reading is not straightforward. Three questions, at any rate, are of 
particular prominence: 
First, the role and impact of subsidies and countervailing measures in the 
international economy. By this we have no pretence to an economic theory. What 
is relevant is an assessment of the function which they are actually assigned to by 
policyrnakers. Indeed, the changing perspective in their goal and usefulness can 
powerfully mould the legal fabric both at national and multinational levels. 
Second, the goal of countervailing measures with particular reference to US trade 
policy. 
Third, the influence that the institutional framework and its changes have on the 
trade policy of its main user, the United States, and in particular on the 
implementation of its countervailing duty regime. 
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1) Subsidies from an international political economy perspective 
The pefiod that immediately followed World War 11 saw state aids to 
national 
industries soar to unprecedented levels. The 1947 General Agreement on TantTs 
and Trade acknowledged the new phenomenon, and to a certain extent sanctioned 
its legitimacy, while at the same time recognising the right for a Contracting Party 
to adopt counterrneasures aimed at neutralising their effects on the importing 
country's economy. These aids were, and still are, mostly used as contingent 
measures aimed at assisting particular industries in temporary difficulties or at 
enhancing their ability to compete in the domestic and foreign market. Sometimes 
these measures were part of a wider industrial policy directed at creating the hot 
bed for particular industries which were to act as spearhead of national economic 
development as a whole, even though it is difficult to draw the borderline with 
fonner case: the aid bestowed to the Italian private car industry and to the IRI 
(Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) steel sector, pri'vate in structure but 
indirectly owned by the state, are one of the earliest and main examples in Europe, 
but certainly not the only one. ' Since the 1950s Japan adopted a managed trade 
model for over 4 decades - later followed by some of East Asia NICs - to foster 
the rise of globally competitive firms in selected sectors that promised long-term 
growth. This policy coupled credit control and imports with direct subsidies, tax 
relief, and other fonns of public support to private firms. 2 
On the other hand, the aftennath of the first oil shock, 'which ushered in a 
long spell of deteriorating economic environment in the western industrialised 
world witnessed the gro\\Ih of the so-called non-tariff barriers (N"FBs) directed at 
' See Mat-thia Kipping. Ru&,, -, ero Ranieri and Joost Dankers "The Emergence of Neýk Competitor 
nations in the European Steel Industry: Italy and the Netherlands. 194- - ,; -6ý. Business Histon-, 
43(2()02), p. 6Q- 
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protecting clining industries. Bhagwati distinguished two kinds of non-tariff 
barriers: high- track NTBs that bypass GATT's rules of law by negotiating 
restraints on exports, such as Orderly Marketing Agreements and Voluntary 
Export Restraints, and low- track restraints that, although GATT consistent in 
nature, are exploited to hinder import flows, such as antidumping and 
3 
countervai mg measures. 
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement antidumping duties were adopted 
by most industrialised countries, whereas countervailing duties were mainly the 
preserve of the United States which, obviously, considered them not as a trade 
distorting measure but as the bulwark of fair trade against state interventionism in 
the rest of the industrialised world and in developing countries. Indeed, some 
commentators have argued that since the Tokyo Round, the United States has 
focused on controlling subsidies whereas its counterparts have aimed at creating a 
legal framework to keep US countervailing duties in check. 
The identification of countervailing measures is quite straightforward, as 
Al- - they come down to an extra duty imposed on imported goods found to have 
received a subsidy. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework of subsidies is less 
clear. Economists tend to agree on identifying four elements, with reference at 
least to industrial subsidies .4 First, there must be a transfer from the governmental 
sector, which directly or indirectly benefits some concerns, either in terms of 
5 
expenditure or forgone revenue . Second, the recipient must be outside the 
administrative sector. That, however, does not mean that public owned companies 
2 Bruce E. Moon, "Ideas and Policies", in Brian Hocking and Stuart McGuire, eds., Trade 
Politics. International, Domestic and regional Perspectives (London: Routiedge, 1999), p. 47. 
3 Jadish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Tbe MIT7 Press, 1988), p. 43 
Anne 0. Kruger American Trade Policy. A Tragedy in the Making (Washington D. C.: The AEI 
Press, 1995) p. 37 
4 Colin Wren, Industrial Subsidies (London McMillan, 1990), p. 5 
3 Direct subsidies can be bestowed through price and income support. These subsidies are 
prevalently used to lend assistance to agricultural producers but are not limited to this sector. 
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cannot be counted among the beneficiaries of a subsidy. Third, the government 
must receive no equivalent compensation in return for the transfer. Finally, the 
intervention must aim at affecting a given or expected outcome of the market 
through a change in the relative price in favour of the subsidised product. 
Economists, however, differ on the relevance of certain aspects of the 
broad picture and on the inclusion of particular cases within the subsidy frame. 
Thus, some scholars have argued - and we shall see that this assumption has a 
range of effects on domestic countervailing case law and on GATT/WTO cases - 
that a subsidy can still exist if a benefit is conferred, even though there is no 
budgetary consequence. An often quoted example is the provision of credit by a 
govenunental agency at rates above those paid by the agency when borrowing, 
but below those likely to be charged to a loan recipient if forced to borrow on the 
open market. Likewise, as shown by the CAP of the European Union prior to the 
MacSherry reform, price support to producers does not necessarily result in a 
burden for government budgets as the weight of higher prices is quite often 
prevalently borne by consumers. There is, however, a benefit for the producer and 
the consumer bears the cost only through a complex mechanism that insulates the 
economy from foreign competition. 6 
Also, public procurements and defence spending are often viewed as a 
potential form of public support to domestic firms 7. The argument that public 
procurements and defence programmes entail compensation is counteracted by 
pointing to the exclusion of foreign competitors in bidding or to actions that 
6 Total transfers to farmers equal transfers from both taxpayers and consumers (less any budget 
revenue earned from government). Notably in the pre-Uruguay Round context, the weight of the 
second was particularly great due to the complementary effect of price support in the internal 
market (coupled with direct income support) and variable import levies that insulated the 
Community's markets. 
' See Daniel M. Malkin, Assistance to industry and industrial adjustment: an overview of the 
economic effects of industrial subsidies, in Ronald Gerritse, ed, Producer Subsidies 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 52. 
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discriminate against them when they are able to offer better terms. It is argued 
that in such instances the contract price is far from the price which would prevail 
in a free market. The inclusion or exclusion of such forms of hidden support 
within the scope of subsidy is of particular relevance. It has been observed that, in 
contrast with the EU and Japan, the involvement of a number of high technology 
companies in military programmes has been the main tool used in the US to 
secure public R&D financing and to provide a lifeline to firms in difficult times. 8 
Finally, the well-established distinction between export and domestic 
subsidies turns out to be rather blurred as both the intent and the effect of many 
goverment actions cannot be easily segregated between purely export oriented 
and domestic industrial aid, as is borne out by the support offered to national 
champions and strategic industries. 9 
Many economists tend to consider subsidies and countervailing measures 
as two sides of the same coin, that is, as forms of state intervention which 
interfere with the functioning of free trade, limiting the "invisible hand's" 
benefits. Subsidies in particular, according to classical economic theory, can be 
expected to have two principal effects: they will reduce either the costs of a 
product to the manufacturer, or the cost of a product to the consumer. In either 
case more of the product will be sold or produced than an efficient marketplace 
would have allowed. As a result resources are diverted from efficient concerns 
where they would yield the highest return in the market to the subsidised industry 
where they yield an artificially high return. Thus, conventional wisdom dating 
back to Adam Smith's " the Wealth of Nations" considers them as harmful to the 
1A good illustration of this argument is provided by Robert O'Brien, Subsidy Regulation and State 
7ýansformation in North America, the GA TT and the EU (Houndmills and London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd, 1997) p. 46 and p. 142. 
9 See Ronald A. Cass and Stephen J. Narkin. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Lawl"he 
United States and the GATT' in Richard Boltuck et al., eds, Down in the Dumps (Washington 
D. C. Brooking Institution, 1991). p. 221 
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subsidising country, beneficial to other countries and harmful to the world 
economy as a whole. ' 0 Specifically, export subsidies are viewed as specular to 
tariffs as the latter direct too many productive factors into domestically produced 
goods while the former divert too many resources into foreign trade items. 
Therefore, according to the viewpoint of classic theory, they cause a misallocation 
of world resources as they encourage producers to expand export production to 
levels that are above the marginal social cost in the subsidising country and at the 
same time undercut foreign competitors by providing goods at prices lower than 
the real market value". Likewise, domestic subsidies, and selective domestic 
subsidies in particular, are deemed to cause an increase in the subsidising 
country's export schedule and a decrease in its import demand schedule as they 
compel foreign producers to accept a lower price and a smaller volume of sales 12 . 
Moreover, according to some scholars, they are not apt to offset the underlying 
market distortions they are sometimes supposed to counterbalance, and, on the 
contrary, they tend to increase such problems by postponing market adjustments. 13 
Some scholars rest on public choice theory to explain public authorities' 
willingness to accept, with regard to subsidies, a burden for the budget without 
any reasonable prospect of an increase in the country's welfare, or, with regard to 
countervailing duties, a reduction in consumer welfare. Public actors, whether 
lawmakers or members of the executive at various levels, subordinate their 
choices to the demand of interest groups able to exercise lobbying and to which 
10 T"his conclusion, however, seems to rely on a perfect competition premise which is rather 
unrealistic in modem economy. Modem developments point out that in an oligopolistic market, 
below a certain level, subsidies to exporting firms reduce the welfare of the importing countries. 
1"his occurs because exporting firms are able to capture more profit in the importing country 
without causing a decrease in import price sufficient to bring about an offsetting enhancement of 
consumer surplus. See Avinash Dixit, "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industry 
Economic Journal-Conference Papers 94 (1984), p. 14. 
11 See Robert E. Baldwin. Non Tariff Distortion of International Trade (Washington D. C.: The 
Brooking Institution, 197 1), p. 46. 
12 Ibid., p. III- 
13 See, with specific reference to the UK experience, Colin Wren, op. cit., p. 2 10. 
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A- - their perspectives of re-election or career improvement are linked. On the other 
hand, competing groups that are not able to make their voice heard through a 
significant pressure on decision-makers will not receive corresponding protection 
in spite of the fact that the satisfaction of their interests could better contribute to 
the general welfare. 14 In this context subsidies and other political instruments that 
are used to raise the welfare of more influential interest groups result from and 
encourage rent seeking behaviour by market actors. 
Public choice analysis, however, is not able to explain some recent 
tendencies in world economy. For instance, pressure of interest groups should 
lead to continuous high levels of subsidisation to provide a competitive edge to 
domestic industries vis-A-vis foreign competitors. Yet, due probably to the 
mounting pressure of debts on government, in recent decades there has been a net 
decrease in rates of subsidisation, which has not been confined to western 
economies. Public choice theory explains why industrial pressure prevails over 
the claims of consumers. It fails, however, to disaggregate complex competing 
interests between finns and even within firms'5 Thus, subsidies and 
countervailing measures favoured by industries that aim at increasing their share 
in the domestic market could be opposed by export-oriented industries. The same 
firm that benefits from the imposition of countervailing duties on foreign 
competitors can be disadvantaged by retaliatory restrictions imposed by trading 
partners. 
Other scholars propose a rather less particularistic view of public actors' 
choices. For instance, some economists, especially prior to the 1980s lost decade, 
have contended that subsidies, and export subsidies in particular, can play a useful 
" An analysis of the US institutional trade policy from a public choice perspective is provided by 
Robert Baldwin, The Political Economy of US import Policy (Cambridge, MA. The MIT Pres, 
1985). 
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role in the development process by increasing the absorbing capacity of industries 
where developing countries can have a competitive advantage in the future; by 
offsetting disadvantages which exporting industries have to face due to the 
hindrances inherent in a backward economy, such as inferior infrastructures and 
limited financing facilities; and by fostering, through sales in foreign markets, the 
achievement of scale economies for key industries. ' 6 More recent theories argue 
that, at least in some fields deemed to have a pivotal role for the national 
economy, the rationale for state intervention rests on an economic environment 
quite different from the one suggested by classic theory, in which subsidies and 
countervailing duties are irrelevant or even counterproductive measures. In an 
environment where scale economies, R&D and interest rate differentials are a 
decisive factor in competition between firms and, by their intermediaries, between 
national economies, state intervention,, either by subsidies or other forms of 
protection, considers trade as a variable that cannot be ignored: the increase in the 
share of international trade expands market size, allowing scale economies and 
improving the ability to compete in an imperfectly competitive market. On the 
other hand, the interventionist state must take into account the reaction of other 
players in trade competition, which, however, does not coincide necessarily with 
retWiation. 
17 
13 See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation ofInternational Trade (London: 
Routledge, 1999) p. 16. 
16 Lorenzo, L. Perez, Export Subsidies in Developing Countries and the GATT, 10 J W. T L. (1976), 
p. 53 1. 
For an analysis of the pros and cons of export subsidies with reference to developing countries see 
Bela Balassa and Michael Sharpston, Export Subsidies by Developing Countries: Issues of Policy, 
(Geneva: Graduate Institute of International studies, 1977). 
The idea that subsidies are needed to correct market imbalances still seems to underlie the stance 
of many developing countries in the current Doha Round debate. See, for instance: Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures/Anti- Dumping Agreement. Submission by India 
(TN/RUW4,25 April 2002). 
17 James A. Bauder, Rationale for Strategic Trade and International Policy, in Paul R. Krugman 
(ed. ) Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economy (Cambridge Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1988), p. 43 
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Further refining this approach, Busch has recently argued that policy 
makers in deciding whether to subsidise strategic industries or to react to foreign 
subsidies take into account not only the interests of the industries directly 
concerned, but their externalities too. Therefore in shaping public intervention 
policies two variables are considered: the "consumption" variable and the 
"internalisation" variable. These variables determine the choice between 
intervention, non- intervention and limited intervention 18 The consumption 
variable refers to the capacity of the economy to absorb the external benefits 
provided by a strategic industry either through upstream or downstream flows. 
The internalisation variable concerns the scope of the externalities provided by the 
leader industry, that is, whether and to what extent they spread beyond national 
borders. In deciding their policy, potentially competing states will, therefore, 
assess first whether each economy can consume the externalities, and second 
whether these externalities spread beyond national borders to the advantage of 
foreign industries. It follows that a state whose economy can both consume and 
internalise the externalities exhibited by national champions is likely to subsidise 
these industries, whereas if the national economy is not able to consume these 
extemalities it will opt for non-intervention. Finally, if the economy can consume 
but cannot internalise, it will be likely to adopt a policy of limited intervention. 
On the other hand, potentially competing states are likely to react, either by way 
of countervailing duties or by demanding the end of subsidisation in international 
fora, when they cannot absorb the external benefits in question, while they will 
not react when their economy is able to absorb a quota of the externalities. 19 
" Marc L. Bush, Trade Warriors(Cambridge: University Press, 1999), p. 16. 
19 Ibid. The author applies this scheme to a series of cases, some of which have come under GATT 
attention. Tbus, in a structure. such as civil aircrak characterised by a high level of externalities 
which can be intemalised, states have lavishly supplied export and R&D subsidies, concurrently 
contrasting subsidising measures adopted by their rivals. The Agreement reached in the early 
1990s (and respected for over ten years) between the US and the European Communities just put a 
2 12' 
It can be argued that, in contrast with public choice theory, the strategic 
trade policy approach assigns a more active role to the Executive, which does not 
confine itself to reacting to the lobbying of specific economic sectors, but takes 
into account sectors that apparently are not direct beneficiaries of its support. 
Secondly, the options left open to a state when another economic actor is 
subsidising are not limited to either countervailing or pursuing the repeal of the 
measure in question, but can extend to non-intervention. The availability of this 
option, however, could be limited by the automatism that at present characterises 
countervailing measure procedures. In practice, the decision by the Executive to 
A. 
i 
follow a non-intervention policy in view of the benefit that could accrue to sectors 
of the economy other than those competing with subsidised industries could be 
frustrated by the latter's decision to start a countervailing procedure. 
The foregoing analysis does not exclude that in sectors other than those of 
strategic importance the political economy choice can be determined by other 
factors, among which lobbying of various economic groups figures prominently. 
Therefore, it could be safely argued that govenunent support, either by subsidies 
or countervailing measures, is not based on a single rationale. The underlying 
motivation can vary according to the economic bearing of the industries 
concerned and the role they play in the national economy. 
2) The Role of countervailing measures with particular regard to US trade 
policy 
ceiling on state intervention and made it more transparent. On the other hand, the High Definition 
Television (HDTV) market, which is characterised by strong externalities, by a low Japanese 
internalisation capacity and by a low US consumption variable has been marked by limited 
intervention by the two main players. In the semi-conductor market where high externalities are 
coupled with low internalisation capacity for all competitors, the prevailing tune has been co- 
operation established through bilateral agreements. 
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As with subsidies, two opposite outlooks compete in assessing the nature 
and function of countervailing duties: those that consider counten, ailing measures 
as non- tariff barriers and those that view them as an instrument to redress the 
distortions brought about by subsidies. The first step, therefore, is to examine, 
with particular regard to the United States, the role of counten, ailing duties as is 
borne out by statutes and their administrative implementation. 
As their name suggests, the alleged goal of countervailing measures is to 
contrast subsidies and their effects. 20 That, however, provides no details on the 
aim actually pursued in counteracting subsidies and, consequently, on the extent 
of the countermeasure. 
Two rationales for countervailing measures have been offered by US 
scholars and policyrnakers who deny the accusation of protectionism: 1) to fight 
inefficient practises that prevent the optimal allocation of resources, thus 
decreasing world welfare; 2) to help domestic producers vie against forms of 
foreign competition considered unfair because they do not stem from autonomous 
advantages but are rooted in public intervention, that is, interference with the 
market. 
As regards Congress, if the Uruguay Round Agreements Act does not 
offer a judgement on subsidies, the Senate Report on its predecessor, the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, states that "subsidies are bounties or grants bestowed 
(usually by governments) on the production, manufacture or export of products, 
often with the effect of providing some competitive advantage in relation to the 
product of another company .... Subsidised competition may 
harm US producers in 
our own market or in foreign markets',.. 21 LIS lawmakers, therefore, stress in their 
20 See Tariff Act of 1910. ýection 167 1. 
21 U. S. Congressional and Administrative \ews. 96 th Congress - First session. 1979. Trade 
Agreements Act. ( P. L. 96-39), p. 37. 
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statement the defence from unfair competition. The Executive does not provide a 
definitive definition of what should be the purpose of US countervailing duty law. 
The "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comment circulated 
in 1989-), )22 _ to which the present "Countervailing Duty Final Rule" of 1998 
referS23 - defined subsidies as a "distortion of the market process for allocating an 
economy's resources". The USTR - DOC joint report for the year 2002 refers to 
the deterrence of distortive subsidisation and to the prevention or remedy of harms 
caused to US workers and producers 24 . The emphasis seems, therefore, to be 
placed on the misallocation of trade resources as well as on the protection of US 
industry. 
What is really relevant, however, is the regulation that the administering 
authority applies in countervailing duty investigations. As Diamond remarks, the 
International Trade Agency's basic approach to the assessment of a subsidy, and 
consequently of the countervailing measure, centres on the difference between the 




Some scholars have argued that such an approach is inconsistent with a 
progressive reading of US law which aims at providing protection to domestic 
industries which, due to foreign governments' intervention, are forced to compete 
on terms far from a level playing field. These scholars contrast the "deterrence 
approach", adopted, in their view, by the US Administration with the 
"neutralisation approach" which, they argue, fulfils the task at present assigned by 
the law to countervailing measures offsetting the effect of the grant bestowed on 
2254 FR. 23,366. 
2363 FR 65347. 
24 Subsidies Enforcement. Annual Report to the Congress. February 2003. 
http: //ia. ita. doc. gov/esel/reports/seo2002/2002. htrnl 
25 See Richard Diamond, "A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration 
of United States Countervailing Duty, Law & Pol: y Int. Bus. 21 (1990), p. 520. 
25 
foreign CoMpetitorS26 . According to this argument, the 
deterrence approach aims 
at overbalancing the advantage of the subsidy by erasing the value of the grant, 
thus discouraging foreign firms from accepting it, and has as its rationale the 
alleged interference of the subsidy with the efficient allocation of productive 
resources. Starting from this assumption it is argued that the deterrence rationale 
is inconsistent both with economic theory, as it does not take into account the 
corrective aims of the grant, in particular when the market fails to acknowledge 
the social value of some productive activities, and with the GATT itself which 
rejects claims that all subsidies are per se improper. 27 A refinement of this 
criticism also argues that the measures grounded on this rationale are sometimes 
ineffective as they can either overshoot or not completely cancel the advantage the 
subsidies confer on foreign competitors. On the other hand, the neutralisation 
approach is claimed to offer the means of dovetailing the effects of a subsidy on 
the power of foreign competitors to sell either more goods or goods at a lower 
price, thus displacing domestic producers. It is, therefore, argued that 
countervailing measures consistent with US law should offset the decrease in 
marginal costs allowed by the grant. 28 
26 Charles J. Goetz et All., "The Meaning of Subsidy and Injury in the Countervailing Duty Law", 
Int'l Rev. L&Econ. 6( 1986), p. 520. 
27 Richard Diamond, Economic Foundation of Countervailing Duty Law, Va. JIntTL. 29 (1989), 
779 
Ibid., p. 778. 
The article provides a mathematical demonstration of the availability of countervailing measures 
that offset subsidised competition against domestic producers. As they are essential in 
understanding the author's reasoning, we report the equations concerning 
a) quantification of duty when payments have a constant effect on marginal cost of production 
dV = (M'/M'- C') x dS; and 
b) calculation of duty where the effect of payments on marginal costs varies with production: 
dV = (M'/M'- C'+ S') x de 
Where M, is the revenue function of the subsidised firm; X, the quantity which it sells in the 
market; C, the firm's marginal cost of production; S, the per unit amount of government 
payments; V, the per unit amount of countervailing duties; and c is a variable added to allow small 
changes in the value of S without changing the slope of its function. 
In both cases the model determines the needed amount of countervailing duty once we know the 
amount of subsidisation, market price, and the firm's marginal costs. The model, however, is not 
concerned with fixed costs. 
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This theory, though well argued, presents a series of drawbacks both from 
the economic and the legal angle. From the economic angle. if it provides an 
instrument to counteract the decrease in variable costs, it fails to provide an 
equivalently reliable means when subsidies are directed to fixed costs, as the latter 
only affect the marginal cost curve indirectly. Certainly, subsidies that increase 
capital investments lower the marginal cost of production and lead to an increase 
in output. 29 The question, however, is: how far do they affect the marginal cost 
function? Secondly, while subsidisation of variable costs is necessarily directed 
to ongoing production, subsidies to capital investments can aim at offsetting costs 
already incurred, and in such a case they do not influence ongoing variable costs. 
In short, with regard to the subsidisation of capital investments, the neutrallsation 
approach would require a knowledge of finns' choices which present 
countervailing duty investigations are not prepared for and could only be achieved 
through a thorough reassessment of such measures and, perhaps, their integration 
with other policies such as international competition. 
From the legal angle the "neutral i sati on approach" does not take into 
account the text of the law at the time the analysis was formulated and as it stands 
now. Indeed, section 1671 of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended, provides that -if 
the administering authorities determine that the government of a country is 
providing ... a countervailing subsidy... there shall 
be imposed upon such 
merchandise a countervailing duty equal to the net amount of the countervailable 
subsidy", leaving no room for manoeuvre to the Administering Authority if it 
Nvished to apply a countervailing duty that differs from the assessed amount of the 
2() 11e CompetitiNe See, Barbara J. SI-micer, -Countervai ling Duty Laws ind Subs dies to Imperf ctIN 
Industries". in Robert E. Bald%k in et A 11.. eds. Asues in (. S-EC Tratle Relations (Chicago: The 
126. University of Chicago Press. 1988). p. I- 
" 
grant. 30 In turn, the ITA Final Rule makes it clear that "in analysing whether a 
benefit exists we are concerned with what goes into a company such as enhanced 
revenue or reduced costs..... not with what the company does with the subsidy". 31 
On the other hand, those who support the "neutralisation approach" have 
succeeded in showing the limits of the present US countervailing duty regime 
either in contrasting international trade distortion or in securing a level playing 
field for US firms besieged by unfair foreign competition, as countervailing duties 
are unsophisticated measures, concerned with average total costs rather than 
marginal costs, which can decrease domestic consumers' welfare and often 
overbalance foreign subsidies without being able at times to completely neutralise 
their impact on domestic producers. 32 
30 A more flexible provision is embodied in Art VI: 2 of the GATT which states that "no 
countervailing duty shall be levied in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty 
determined to have been granted", thus leaving open the door for an amount of duty lower than the 
Fmt, if that is considered appropriate by the administering authority. 
Federal Register 65347,65361. 
32 A simple numerical example can help clarify this argument: 
Imagine that country A's firms produce 1,000 widgets per year. All of them are exported from 
country A to country B which applies a 3% ad valorem duty. 
The exchange rate between country A and B is EU I= $L 
Without subsidisation the cost of production would be 
1) Plant and machinery (fixed cost) EU 10,000,000, with a 10 year 
depreciation period. Applying a straight-line method, the cost in year X is EU 1,000,000 
2) workers costs (variable) EU 200,000 
3) cost of materials EU 300,000 
Total Cost EU 1,500,000 
Unit cost EU 1,500 
In country B, after having paid the duty the average cost is S 1,545 
Now, suppose that EU 1,000,000 are bestowed to country A's companies for plant and machinery 
purchases. This reduces the cost to EU 9,000,000. 
To avoid lay-offs a 10% subsidy is granted to offset workers costs. 
Supposing, for sake of simplicity, that the effect of the grant is spread over a period equivalent to 
the depreciation period in year Y, the production costs are as follows. 
1) Plant and machinery EU 900,000 
2) workers costs EU 180,000 
3) cost of materials EU 300,000 
Total cost EU 1,380,000 
Unit cost EU 1,380 
As there is a cost reduction of EU 120 (8.695% of EU 1,380) due to country A's subsidisation, 
country B applies a 8,695% countervailing duty. The unit cost of the widgets in country B will be. 
S 1,380, plus 8.695% countervailing duty, plus 3% import duty-- S 1,541.4. 
Countervailing measures, therefore, neutralise any reduction of tariff protection, surreptitiously 
achieved by the exporting country because of the provision of public aid. 
The current regime, however, is unconcerned by the fact that subsidised purchases of new plants 
and machinery could boost productivity in country A, which, for instance, could now produce 
28 
The inability of countervailing measures to fulfil the above-mentioned 
goals brings us to look elsewhere to find their real rationale. The answer to the 
quest can be found if we look at their historical background, and such a 
background points to the idea of reciprocity which is still a landmark of American 
trade policy and finds full recognition in the multilateral regime. Indeed 
countervailing measures are an unsophisticated tool to re-establish, at face value, 
the balance of benefits accruing either under a bilateral or a multilateral agreement 
in which any concession is presumed to have a counterweight. 
Reciprocity, which had played a role in US trade policy since the end of 
the nineteenth century, became pivotal in US trade relations starting with the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. The act, while confirming the 
unconditional MFN principle, required trade concessions to be conditional on the 
receipt of equivalent concessions from the trading partner in bilateral 
negotiations. 33 Expectation for reciprocity was later extended to the GATT 
multilateral regime as a counterweight to the MFN and National treatment 
principles. 34 Contrary to what has been often stated, the requirement finds explicit 
recognition in the GATT/WTO architecture. Acknowledgement of this principle 
can be found, for instance, in the Preamble of GATT which speaks of "reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements". Art. XXXVI states that "the 
Contracting Parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of the 
1,200 widgets per year decreasing the average cost of exports to country B to just 1,150 thus 
displacing country B's domestic producers. Indeed, the countervailing dutý on each imported item, 
%khich amounts to the gap rate between the original cost per unit and the cost net of subsidy, is not 
enough to offset the price decrease: 
Subsidy on item sold: EU 100 -- S 100 8-6950fo of S 1.150-, 
CIVD = 8.695* o. S1,150 =S 100-, 
Import price =S1.150 -S 100 - 34.50 S 1,284.5: a far cry from the original, unsubsidised, cost 
of the%k'1d, -, ets. See Carolyn Rhodes, Recipro, -ity, U, ý- Trade PofiLy and the GA 7T Regime (Itaka : Cornell 
University Press, 1993) p. 51 et seq.. 
ý4 Ibid. p. 1-7. 
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less developed Contracting Parties", thus implying that they do expect reciprocity 
for commitments to Parties other than less developed countries. Congress has 
constantly asserted the reciprocity requirement as a condition for granting the 
Executive trade authority in multilateral negotiations. 35 
However, reciprocity is a multifaceted concept. Swan argues that in the 
t 
changing pattern of modem economy two forms of reciprocity have taken shape: 
diffuse and specific reciprocity. 36 The fonner, which is at the basis of section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974, aims at a general balance of concessions and is, 
therefore, characterised by a less precise definition of equivalence. The latter, 
examples of which are provided by the successive Rounds of Trade negotiation 
under the aegis of the GATT, implies a simultaneous exchange of concessions, 
either bilateral or multilateral, which gives rise to obligations clearly specified in 
terms of gains and duties. Within its scope a commitment received is always a 
commitment paid for. The goal of countervailing duties can be understood in the 
frame of specific reciprocity 
As Feller notes, at the outset the countervailing duty law was intended as a 
repair mechanism to ensure the integrity of the trade wall. Its aim was to protect 
the interests behind that barrier rather than competition as such. 37 Twenty five 
years later another scholar observed that the International Trade Administration 
does not focus on the competitive disadvantage felt by US business but on the 
33 With regard to the Omnibus Trade Act and Competitiveness Act of 1988, bestowing the 
negotiating authority for the Uruguay Round to the President, see David W. Leebron, 
"Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results in the United States" in John H. Jackson and Alan 
O. Sykes, eds., Implementing the Uruguay Round (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p. 185. 
36 Alan C. Swan, "' Fairness' and 'Reciprocity' in International Trade. Section 301 and the Rule of 
Law", Ar&J1nt'l & Comp. Law 39 (1999). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
37 Peter B. Feller, "Mutiny against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies Border Tax 
Adjustments", Law &Pol. Int'l. Bus. I (1969). p. 22. Feller, however, argued that the goal of 
countervailing measures was gradually replaced by competition enforcement, as the tariff wall 
became increasingly lower. History does not seem to uphold his statement. 
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effects of the subsidy on foreign business transactions abroad . In short, the idea 
of a concession that still pervades multilateral trade relations requires the lowering 
of the protection wall by a country be concurrently matched by a corresponding 
increase in market access for its exporters. Since subsidies, whether purposefully 
or as a sideline effect, lower the trade wall without paying for it, as shown above, 
countervailing measures rebuild the fence by way of an extra duty offsetting the 
amount of the grant. 
39 
The early stage of GATT indirectly support this interpretation. For 
instance, a GATT working party in 1955 agreed that subsidies "which might 
affect the practical effects of tariff concessions" could be the subject of 
negotiation in tariffs and trade Rounds . 
40 Likewise, the working party that 
entertained the Australian Subsidy case, which concerned the effect on tariff 
concessions of the repeal of a subsidy on imported goods previously granted by 
the Australian authorities, concluded - though with reference to disparity in 
domestic subsidy treatment - that the change in the Australian subsidy policy did 
create a situation of "non violation nullification and impairment", agreeing, 
therefore, with the Chilean claim that the new subsidy policy "annuls or seriously 
threatens" the tariff concession received by Chile. 41 
38 David McPherson, "Is the North America Free Trade Agreement Entitled to an Economically 
Rational Countervailing Duty Scheme? ", B. U. L. K 73 (1993), p. 54. 
39 During the Doha Round, in its "basic concepts and principles of the trade remedy rules" 
Communication (TN/RL/W/27,22 October 2002), the United States with reference to the role of 
subsidies in the context of concessions granted during multilateral trade negotiations stated: 
"Those negotiations set the balance of rights and obligations among the Contracting Parties and 
defined the Parties' reasonable expectation of market access. At the same time, the Contracting 
Parties established a wide variety of rules to ensure that the balance struck would not be 
nullified.... In the case of trade remedies, the Contracting Parties expressly provided for the 
application of trade remedies to ensure that neither government subsidy practices nor subsidies 
ýpset the balance struck at the negotiating table". 
' GATT, 3rd Supp. BISD para 13, p. 224,225 
"The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report Adopted by the Contracting Parties on 
2"d. P. April 1950 (GATT/CPA/39). 2 BISD, 188 
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3) The institutional pattern of US trade policy and the place of countervailing 
procedures in the new world trade regime. 
The fact that countervailing measures are not designed to secure a level 
playing field, and even less to protect the maximisation of international wealth, 
but are only suitable for reconstructing trade barriers, raises the question of 
whether they can be exploited for protectionist ends. Indeed, it has consistently 
been argued that the United States has increasingly adopted a protectionist stance 
in trade policy and that one of its main tools has been "administrative protection". 
Certainly we cannot overlook the question of whether protectionist pressure from 
interest groups has an impact, if any, on trade legislation and in particular on 
subsidy and countervailing duties rules. What is immediately relevant, however, is 
to decide whether changes in the domestic and international institutional context 
have affected US trade policy and its countervailing duty regime in particular, and 
how these institutional changes are brought about. In this context institutions are 
to be viewed not just as political or administrative bodies but include "formal 
rules, compliance procedures and customary practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in polity and econoMy,, 
42 
Thelen and Steimno identify four distinct sources of institutional 
dynamism. Firstly, changes in the socio-economic and political context can 
produce a situation in which previously latent institutions become relevant. 
Secondly, old institutions can be used for different ends, and thirdly exogenous 
changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within 
existing institutions. Finally, a more radical source of dynamism occurs when 
political actors adjust their actions to accommodate changes in the institution 
The Case is also reported in Robert Hudec, The GA TT Legal system and World Trade Diplomacy 
(New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 144. 
42 Peter A. Hall, "Tbe Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and 
British Economic policy in the 1970s", in Sven Steinmo et al. (eds. ) Structuring Policy. Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 96. 
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themselve s43 . Domestic institutional changes, 
however, are increasingly 
influenced by concurrent developments in the international regimes, that is, "the 
ept 0 
Yet f implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which players' expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations". 44 Indeed, it is arguable that the transformation that has taken place in 
the multilateral trade regime over the last ten years with the establishment of the 
WTO are bound to constrain and at the same time shape the institutional 
backstage of US trade policy as well as that of other member countries. 
Focusing first on the US domestic institutional developments, it appears 
that an assessment can be conducted on two levels: The general US trade policy 
and the institutional context in which countervailing measures are implemented. 
The institutional setting has witnessed no radical formal change in the 
distribution of powers between the two main agents, Congress and the Executive. 
Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution still confers upon Congress die 
power to regulate commerce. Since the 1930s there has been, however, a trend 
towards the delegation of authority from Congress to the President45. The 
bestowal of power, always limited in time, followed the disastrous experience of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, better known as the Smoot-Hawley Act, which increased 
the average rate of duties from 38.5% to 52,6%, triggering global retaliation and 
thereby exacerbating, the impending economic recession. The Tariff Act of 1930 
aimed at providing greater protection to the US economy as a whole but the 
original approach was overrun by logrolling among congressmen under the 
pressure of a multitude of lobbies. 
43 Kathleen Tbelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", in 
Sven Steinmo et al., op. cit., p. 16. 
" See Robert 0. Keohane, After HegemoW Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 57. 
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The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 gave the President not only 
the authority to negotiate tariff reductions but, even more importantly, the 
authority to implement them without ftu-ther legislative action by Congress as 
long as the rate cuts did not exceed the level determined by the latter. This 
authority was exercised at first in bilateral trade agreements, but later extended to 
multilateral agreements: for example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade is an executive agreement. This wide delegation of power in trade affairs 
has entailed a bias towards liberalism as the Executive is less susceptible to 
pressure and more likely to consider broader national interests. In this context, 
the establishment in 1964 of the Special Trade Representative, now the US Trade 
Representative, to deal with trade matters reporting directly to the President is 
viewed as an attempt by Congress to insulate itself further from pressure groups. 46 
It seems, therefore, that even without a formal abdication of power, exogenous 
changes, which can be identified first with the bitter lesson of the 1930s and with 
the commitments imposed upon the US by the newly acquired role of economic 
and political hegemon in the afterinath of World War II, have produced a shift in 
the strategies pursued within existing American institutions, which in turn impacts 
on the balance of power between the main political players. 
The so-called Fast Track, presently renamed as Trade Promotion 
Authority, has been considered a qualitative leap in this process. In particular, the 
procedure provides that bills approving and implementing multilateral trade 
agreements may not be amended, setting strict time limits for their scrutiny by the 
competent Committees and for the vote on each House floor. On the other hand, 
45 In 1934 Congress authorised the President to negotiate trade agreements with other countries 
and granted him the authority to reduce duties by as much as 50 per cent on a reciprocal basis. 
Subsequently this authority was periodically extended. 
4 J. H. Destler, American Trade Policy (Washington D. C. Institute for International Economics, 
1995) p. 14-16 
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the executive branch is requested to consult with Congress before signing an 
agreement, and the signing of the agreement must take place before the statutory 
deadline for the fast track to be available for the adoption of the implementing 
legislation. 47 
The trend, however, is not a straight one. From 1994 to 2002 Congress 
refused to grant the President trade authority. What is more relevant is that the 
granting of such authority has often been accompanied by clauses that restrict 
presidential leeway in implementing a liberal policy. Starting with the Trade Act 
of 1974, US lawmakers have taken care to include provisions that confine 
"Presidential Executive Agreements" to tariff barrier negotiations, securing their 
final control over matters that affect states' autonomy in the economic realm more 
deeply. Thus, taking into account that since the Tokyo Round the focus of 
multilateral negotiations has moved from tariff reduction to non- tariff barriers, it 
seems that, although the executive branch has increased its room for manoeuvring 
in international negotiations, overall its institutional autonomy has not been 
enhanced. Concurrently Congress has reinforced the automatism of those 
remedies that are available to domestic private interests that are affected by 
foreign competition, whether considered fair or unfair. In short, the US legislative 
power has traded off the removal of the threat of paralysing amendments in the 
phase of ratification, which undermined the power of the Executive branch in 
trade negotiations, with a set of measures that limit its discretion in providing 
protection to those domestic industries that cannot withstand the brunt of foreign 
competitors and would otherwise appeal for defence to their representatives in 
Congress. Three trade regimes have been affected by these changes: the relief 
47 John Jackson et AL. Legal Problems of International I conomic Relations. Cases. Materials and 
Text on theNational and International Regulation ol- Trawpiational Economic Relations (St 
Paul: \k'est Group, 200-2), p. 86. 
from injury caused by import competition, known as the escape clause; the unfair 
trade provisions: and the antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. 
The Trade Act of 1974 tried to make protection easier to obtain for import 
competing industries by modifying the provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 which required industries petitioning for the escape clause to prove that the 
44major" cause of injury was an increase in imPorts due to US concessions. The 
requirement was downgraded to "substantial" cause of injury, which is defined as 
(14a cause which is important and not less than any other cause', 48 . 
Likewise, what is now section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act was originally a 
much more flexible and open-ended mechanism to resolve trade disputes under 
section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In 1974, vvhen the fast track was 
introduced for the first time, Congress strengthened the authofity of the President 
in identifying and opposing unjustifiable, discriminatory, or unreasonable foreign 
practices, but since 1979 onwards any fast track renewal has rendered the 
investigation procedure and its outcome less flexible and has made the executive 
branch more accountable to lawmakers. Thus, the 1979 Act introduced a formal 
investigation requirement which must result in a determination and a 
recommendation for presidential action within specific time limits. The 1984 Act 
required the presentation of an annual national trade estimate on significant 
barriers to the export of US goods and services. The 1988 Trade Act transferred 
the authority to determine whether foreign practices fall within the provisions of 
section 301 and to decide on the appropriate kind of action from the President to 
the USTR, even though this would be "subject to direction, if any, from the 
President". thus making the response to foreign practices less influenced by 
concems other than trade interest. Although the 1988 Act maintained the 
36 
Executive's discretion in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, it limited 
its autonomy as to the outcome of the investigation by requiring mandatory action 
in the case of violation of trade agreements or unjustifiable acts . 
49 Finally, under W 
the 1988 Trade Act, the USTR was required to identify ', 'unfair" trade practices 
and the countries engaged in such practises, reporting to Congress by the end of 
May of each year. The Trade Representative was then to initiate an investigation 
within 21 days of the report, and to start negotiations with the designated 
countries to achieve the repeal of those practices. 
Accusations of protectionism have particularly been directed against unfair 
trade remedies, i. e. antidumping and countervailing duty as these procedures have 
taken over the safeguard clause as the means of protection preferred by domestic 
industries, becoming, in the words of Kruger, "the protectionist instrument of 
choice', 50. The accusation is grounded on the fact that the legal criteria that inform 
these proceedings are biased in favour of domestic producers as they sanction 
practices that do not fall foul when domestic competition is concerned. For 
instance, competition rules do not prevent sales below the average cost if the price 
covers variable costs, nor do they prevent the granting of incentives. either 
financial or fiscal, to attract investment inflows. A second factor that attracted the 
attention of those who consider antidumping and countervai ing measures as 
protectionist is their indefinite length once such measures are imposed by the 
administrative authority, whereas an escape clause can be implemented for limited 
'8 Ibid., p. 143. The modified provision is still present in the Trade Act of 1974 as subsequently 
amended, under sec. 202(b)( IX B). 
'9 See Julia C. Bliss, The Amendment of section AI- An Overview and Suggested Strategies for 
Foreign Response, LaN% &Pol. MO. Bus. 20 (1988). p. 504 
50 Anne O. Kruger. op. cit., p. 34 
Also I. M. Destler, op-cit.. p. 154 et ; eq. 
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periods. This argument, however. has lost some , veight due to the mandatory 
provision of a sunset review to extend the applicability of such measures ýj . 
Therefore, it has been contended that, though the -legal objective- of 
antidumping and countervailing duties is distinct from that of safeguards, their 
"economic objective", that is, protection from foreign competition through import 
restrictions, is the same. The protection they afford can, therefore, attract firms 
beset by unfair competition as well as those that simply are at a disadvantage in 
the race with foreign competitors. But, whereas the enactment of an escape clause 
is finally within the Executive's discretion, which must take into account a 
plurality of often competing interests, the quasi-judicial feature of the procedures 
in question ensures a binding result in case of positive findings 52 . According to 
some critics, the likelihood of positive findings was increased by changes in the 
institutional setting. For instance, in 1980 the assessment of both the existence and 
the amount of dumping and subsidisation was withdrawn from the Department of 
Treasury, considered to be not responsive enough to the interests of domestic 
industries and transferred to the Department of Commerce. It is consequently 
argued that due to the foregoing features, antidumping and countervailing 
measures afford a less costly remedy to domestic industries and above all a 
remedy that does not attract the attention of competing interest groups. They are, 
therefore, viewed as "functionally the poor (or small) man's escape clause". 53 
The criticisms of economists and political scientists is shared by prominent 
lawyers, such as John Barcelo NN-ho points to the weakness in the injury test, the 
expedited procedure, the availability of provisional remedies and the reduced 
discretion of the administering agency as factors that are likely to result in 
, \greement on Implementation of 
Art. VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994. 
art 11.3. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. art. 2 1.33 
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antidumping and countervailing duty procedures which are biased towards 
protectionism. 54 Indeed, the 1979 Act introduced a stricter timetable for the 
assessment of subsidy and injury and for the adoption of countervailing duties, 
and definitely deprived the Executive of the right to apply waivers. Others, 
however, have defended not only the political advisability of antidumping and 
countervailing duties as a suitable means of preventing Congressional moves to 
provide trade distorting compensation to affected domestic industries but also they 
55 have defended their economic and legal rationale. 
Actually, the argument put forward by those indicting antidumping and 
countervailing measures of protectionism proves less than it would seem. 
I 
Certainly, it shows that such measures are more attractive to domestic industries 
than safeguards; it shows that firms besieged by unfair competitors can be helped 
as can firms that simply do not perform well; it does not show that they aim at 
providing indiscriminate protection. After all, the criticisms give no proof that 
dumping and subsidisation are illegitimate from an economic viewpoint, and 
certainly domestic industries would usually be better off if they were not obliged 
to compete with foreign firms that dump or receive public grants. It can be argued 
that the protection of non-competitive domestic firms is just a by-product of the 
reasonable defence afforded to well performing industries. It is just a question of 
adjusting the net, not of abandoning it. In short, the accusation that the overall 
picture points to protectionism is rather controversial. Instead, as will be shown in 
later chapters, criticisms of the US regime are well grounded when they point out 
52 J. M. Finger et Al, "The Political Economy of Administered Protection", The American 
Economic Review, 72 (1982) n. 3, p. 455. 
53 Ibid., p. 465. 
"" John J. Barcelo'1111, "Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping" after the Tokyo 
Round", Cornell International Law Journal 13 (1980), p. 270 
" For a defence of US antidumping measures see Terence P Stewart, "' Adrn in istration of 
Antidumping Law: A Different Perspective", In Richard Boltuck et al., eds, Down, op. cit., p. 288 
et seq. 
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that some specific rules or their implementation by the administering authorities 
can run foul of economic logic and multilateral commitments and can therefore be 
exploited for protectionist purposes. 
On the other hand, the transfomiation that has taken place at a multilateral 
level counteracts the bias towards protectionism inherent in domestic institutions. 
Two elements of salience have emerged in the Uruguay Round. Firstly. a more 
precise concept of what constitutes subsidy, and in particular prohibited subsidy 
has been set forth, which limits a state's leeway in applying countervailing 
measures. Secondly 9the legal and political pressure stemming from the 
establishment of a new dispute settlement system that has replaced the consensus 
principle both for the establishment of a panel and the adoption of a WTO report 
with that of the negative consensus to block either of these stages. 
Certainly, contrary to other international tribunal proceedings, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) is rather ambiguous over the issue of the 
international legal obligation to follow the determinations of the panel or the 
Appellate Body. Withdrawal of the measure concerned is usually required and in 
addition the panel and Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the member 
could implement the recommendation. However, if compliance is not achieved 
within a reasonable period of time, the defaulting member can offer 
compensation, and if no satisfactory compensation can be agreed upon, the 
prevailing member can request authorisation to take countervailing measures.. 
Some scholars, therefore, have argued that "compliance with the WTO. as 
interpreted through dispute settlement panels remains elective". since the only I 
factor that really matters is the balance of benefits and burdens achieved among w 
40 
members through negotiation . 
56 This approach would result in the possibility of 
maintaining protectionist measures that are not found to be in conformity with 
WTO provisions as long as the balance of benefits is preserA ed. Such a "realist" 
approach, however, puts economically weak countries at a disadvantage , ý-Is-a-vis 
a strong non-compliant, especially with regard to the suspension of concessions. 
as the balance of interests is tilted in favour of countries 'with greater -welght in the 
international economy and whose bargaining power is correspondingly greater. 
Others point to a set of articles in the DSU, which taken in context seem to ImpIv 
an obligation to conform to the report in case of violation of the WTO Agreement 
and any of its components. Thus, article 21.1 provides for "compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in order to ensure the 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all members", while art. 22 states 
that "neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation" . 
57 
However, as far as subsidy and countervailing measures are concerned this 
optimistic outlook, based on a legalistic interpretation of the WTO texts, is not 
entirely bome out by the ugly facts of international trade relations. In quite a few 
cases WTO member states (and not only the US) have implemented the reports in 
ways that still preserve the underlying objectives of those measures declared 
inconsistent with WTO rules, thus triggering a series of DSU art. 21.5 (non- 
compliance) disputes. In some instances, as the FSG'ETI case illustrates. the 
partial repeal of the measure has been due more to a wide ranging overhaul of the 
concerned regime for domestic reasons than to prompt compliance v6th the 
56 Judith. H. Bello. "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is Nlore ", AJIL 90 (1996), p. 
417 
5, See John H. Jackson, -The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - %li,; understandings on the 
Nature of the Legal Obligation. 4.11L 91 (199-). p. 63. 
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recommendations of the panels and of the Appellate Body. Finally, in other cases 
WTO members have simply ignored the decisions of the Dispute Settlement 
Body. The issue is made more complex by the fact that subsidies and CV 
measures are not confined to programmes under the direct control of the 
Executive, but involve statutes and lawmakers. If governments, aware of the risk 
of backlash for not playing by the rules of the game, have political self-interest in 
the preservation of the multilateral system, public choice theory attitudes still hold 
sway in determining lawmakers' decisions. As we shall see in man), cases 
involving the US, we can find strong resistance to compliance, both with regard to 
subsidies and countervailing duties, when compliance implies the repeal of rules 
that favour influential interest groups. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing reflections allow for a first tentative judgement which can 
provide the basis for a better understanding of the legal analysis in the following 
chapters. There are more caveats than firm rules, but just because of this we can 
draw a lesson: to mistrust clear cut conclusions, as the nature of subsidies and 
countering measures is much more complex than appears at first sight. 
The question whether countervailing measures per se are protectionist can 
be answered stating that they are not more protectionist than the duties whose 
effect they aim to preserve. Rather, the protectionist bias stems from the different 
weight domestic producers, foreign exporters and authorities have in the 
proceeding and from an identification and assessment of subsidising measures 
xvhich often is not consistent xvith economic analysis and sometimes, as shown in 
Also, Geert A. Zonnekekeý n, "The Bed Linen Case and its Aftermath. Some Comments on the 




later chapters, with international commitments. Domestic proceedings, ho%vever, 
are more and more constrained by the emerging multilateral institutional setting, 
which provides common principles for circumscribing go,,, ernment actions that 
constitute countervailable subsidies, while at the same times making it easier to 
obtain the repeal of such actions through a multilateral dispute settlement 
procedure. 
On the other hand, subsidies do not always have the same impact on 
international competition and can have, at least indirectly. a beneficial effect for 
importing countries, thus prompting non-uniform reactions. 58 In particular. the 
United States is not as hostile to subsidisation as might seem at first sight, and its 
decision to countervail and the modulation of countervailing investigations do not 
follow a one track pattern but are influenced by contingent factors. 
5' Supra note 18. 
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CHAPTERII 
THE MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES XND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURIFS PRIOR TO THE URUGUAY ROUND 
SCM AGREEMENT 
Introduction 
Fragmented and limited in scope as it was, the subsidy and countervailing 
measures multilateral discipline in the period from 1947 to the Uruguay Round 
shows a clear trend towards more stringent rules and a widening of their scope. 
In principle the US supported the establishment of a trading system that 
would strengthen the free play of market forces and reduce the influence of 
government on economic affairs. In particular, the United States set its sights on 
export subsidies viewed as trade disruptive. Other countries, including Britain, 
gave priority to such objectives as full employment and external payment balance 
and asserted the legitimacy of governmental support to domestic industries. On 
the other hand, the United States had difficulties with any proposals to govern 
subsidies on primary products as its legislation provided lavish price and income 
support to its farmers, joined later by export support for American produce. 
Thus the discipline of subsidies and countervailing measures set by GATT 
1947 relied on two articles, whose links, at least at the outset, were far from clear. 
except for the fact that countervailing measures under Art. VI were directed to 
subsidised products, which were also addressed by the quite vague rules in Art. 
xvi. 
Art. VI of the General Agreement acknowledged the right of any I 
Contracting Party to impose counten-ailing duties. described as extra duties levied 
to offset any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly. subject to two 
basic constraints: countervai ling duties must not exceed the estimated direct or 
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indirect subsidy on the manufacture, production or export of a commodity and 
&I- - they may not be levied until the importing country has determined that the 
subsidisation causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry, 
or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. ' The Article 
provided no definition of what a subsidy or bounty is nor did it give any clue as to 
how to assess it. It was also silent on the nature of material injury. On the other 
hand, Art. XVI just proVided for notification of subsidies that could affect either 
exports or imports and provided for discussions on the possibility of limiting the 
subsidisation whenever the subsidy in question could cause or threaten serious 
prejudice, a factor whose features were not defined. Later the article was 
expanded to include a more specific provision on export subsidies, 
distinguishing, however, between primary and non-primary products. As regards 
the former the Agreement required its Parties to avoid the use of subsidies 
resulting in the acquisition of a more than equitable share of the world market for 
the subsidised product, whereas for the latter it prohibited the use of subsidies 
resulting in export sales at prices below those charged for the like product in the 
domestic market. 
By the early seventies, however, the United States had pressed for stricter 
rules for agricultural subsidies, more in line with the regulation of subsidies on 
non-primary products, and for the extension of the discipline to domestic 
subsidies. 
Within this trend, the period under review witnessed the emergence of 
some discrepancies in the multilateral regime, which "de facto" favoured certain 
countries to the detriment of others. Of particular concern for the US was the 
impact of different tax regimes on the implementation of the multilateral subsidy 
' The United States was exempted from complying with the material injury test under the Protocol 
of Provisional Application, as section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930. which did not provide for this 
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and CVD regime. The US tax system burdened prevalently the factors of 
production through income and corporation tax. whereas the European countries 
taxed more heavily production and trade of goods. As the GATT allov, -s only the 
exemption or deduction of indirect taxes, the United States tried to obtain a 
regime that equated for subsidisation purposes direct and indirect taxation. Later 
the United States focused on alleged disparities in the taxation of corporate 
income, complaining that the income tax regime of some EC member states gave 
to their exporters some advantages relative to their US trading partners. With 
regard to export financing an arrangement had been agreed on officially supported 
export credits under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Here the United States had an interest in creating a link between the 
rules worked out within the General Agreement and the Paris Organisation in both 
of which it played a dominant role. 
The following sections, therefore, outline the evolution of the multilateral 
regime on subsidies and countervailing measures prior to the Uruguay Round, but 
concentrate on those issues that would have an impact on the future course of the 
negotiations and were destined to be at the centre of important disputes related to 
the WTO discipline. 
I)Art. VI and Art. XVI of GATT 1947 
Despite its loopholes and its ambi-valence the first text of Art. XVI of the 
Gcneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the result of lengthy discussions 
leading up to the negotiations on the foundation of an International Trade 
Organization (ITO). 
test, antedated the GATT. 
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According to O'Cleireacain, the historical roots of the articles can be 
traced back to the American Commercial Policy Proposal of late 1945 which, in 
. 11 
turn, to obtain the support of the other main partner in shaping the new world 
economic order, reflected the work of a British inter-departmental Committee on 
post-war commercial policy, the Overton Committee. 2 In particular, the American 
proposal provided for the notification of any subsidy which operates to increase 
exports or reduce imports, and for consultation on possible limitation of the 
quantity of the product subsidised, in case of serious injury to international trade. 
It also prohibited export subsidies (either on primary or non- primary products) 
which result in a sale at a price lower than the comparative one in the domestic 
market. 
3 
The provision concerning the ban on export subsidies was not included in 
the GATT draft, being left to the more encompassing International Trade 
Organization Draft Agreement (the Havana Charter). The original text of GATT 
Art XVI, therefore, provided only for a reporting requirement and for 
consultations. The limited scope of GATT Art. XVI entailed, therefore, a rift with 
the provision of Art. VI which in its turn was silent on the question of which 
subsidy can be countervailed. The result was that any decision on imposing 
countervailing measures was left to the importing countries, iffespective of the 
nature of the subsidy to be offset. On the other hand, subsidies could be 
challenged under GATT Art. XXIII as measures causing nullification or 
impainnent of a benefit accruing directly or indirectly under the General 
Agreement, and under GATT Art. III regarding national treatment. 
2 Seamus O'Cleireacain -Towards a Code on Subsidy and Countervailing Duties". World 
Economy I (1977-78), p. 438.. 
3 , proposal for Expansion of World Trade and Employment - for Consideration by an 
International Conference", US Department ofState Bulletiný 13 (July-December 1945), p. 913. 
4 Early examples are provided by 
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The discrepancy became more pronounced when, after it was certain that 
the ITO would not be ratified by the US Congress, the Review Conference in 
1955 added a section B to Art. XVI which was concerned with export subsidies, 
distinguishing, however, export subsidies on primary products (paragraph 3) and 
export subsidies on non-primary products (paragraph 4). The former subsidies 
were simply subject to a vague requirement that the Contracting Parties "should 
seek to avoid" to grant them and shall not apply them so as to get "more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in that product", whereas the latter were 
banned if they resulted in export prices lower than the price charged for the like 
product to buyers in the domestic market. The deadline for the prohibition was 
originally set on I January 1958 but was extended. A Declaration giving effect to 
the provision of Article XVI: 4 was eventually adopted on 19 November 1960, 
providing, however, for its entry into force only with reference to those 
governments that had accepted it and following acceptance by the more 
developed European Contracting Parties, the United States and Canada. The 
developing countries did not accede to the declaration, and, therefore, were not 
bound to the ban on non-primary products' export subsidies. 5 Thus, in the 
period that preceded the closure of the Tokyo Round, the main difficulty that 
confronted the contracting parties was the identification of what constitutes export 
subsidy, along with the identification of "equitable share" and "previous 
representative period" with specific regard to primary products 
I)T'he Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report Adopted by the Contracting Parties on 
2'd. P. April 1950 (GATT/CP. 4/39), 2 BISD, 188. 
2)ltalian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Report Adopted by the 
Contracting Parties on 23 October 1958 ( U833), Vh Supp.. BISD, 60 
3)Better known to the public is the more recent "oil-seed dispute" between the US and the EC. 
Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed 
Proteins. Report by the Panel adopted on 25 January 1990 (L/6627), 37th Supp. BISD, 86. 
Follow-up on the Panel Report of the Members of the Original Oilseed Panel (DS28/R),. 39h 
Supp. BISD, p. 91. 
5 See John H Jackson, World Trade and the Law ofGA 7T A Legal Analysis of the General 
Agreement (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 375 
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])primary products 
The separate regime for primary products responded to the desire of a 
number of agricultural commodities exporting countries, especially the United 
States, to secure their existing practices in support of growers. 6 Phegan comparing 
par. 3 of GATT Art. XVI and the corresponding provisions of the Havana Charter 
argues that the ambiguity pervading the GATT regime for primary products 
results from the lack of a clear place within the general export subsidies 
framework. The Havana Charter envisaged a general ban for export subsidies. On 
the other hand, by exempting domestic price stabilisation schemes and 
encouraging the negotiations of commodity agreements secured special treatment 
for primary products, while a separate article provided for the overriding 
obligation not to apply any form of subsidies which operate to maintain or acquire 
"more than an equitable share". The obligation not to exceed the "equitable share" 
was, therefore, "just one aspect of an extensive set of obligation concerning export 
subsidies". 7 On the contrary, the 1955 addition to GATT Art. XVI prevented 
subsidies only if they resulted in "more than an equitable share", thus making the 
result, rather than the alleged purpose, the yardstick of a contracting party's 
obligation, At any rate the likely effect of paragraph 3 was to render the 
assessment of any causal link between subsidisation and acquisition of a "more 
than equitable share" particularly difficult, as is borne out by the overwhelming 
majority of Panel and Working Group reports that have dealt with this problem. 
The ambiguity of the text opened the door to a series of contrasting decisions and 
" Note Ad Art. XVI, section B pro,, ided that -a primary product is understood to be any product of 
fann, forest, or fisherý. or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone onlý such 
processing as it is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial -olume in 
international trade. 
The Tokýo Round Subsldý Code e\cluded minerals from the scope of primarý products. 
See Colin Phean, -G. -\TrArt. X\'I: '. F\port Subsidies and Equitable Shares' j W. TL. 
16(1982), p. -25-ý 
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was not destined to find a satisfactory solution in the provisions of the Tokyo 
i, t. Round Subsidies Code addressing subsidisation of primary products. 
2) non- primary products 
A conspicuous difficulty with paragraph 4 of GATT Art. XVI was that it 
shed no light on the variety of banned export subsidies. Actually, Art. XVI, as it 
stood in 1955, limited itself to giving some hints as to what does not constitute a 
subsidy. An interpretative note to the original section of the article excluded from 
the set of subsidising measures the exemption of exported products from duties 
and taxes borne by like products when destined for domestic consumption or the 
remission of such duties or taxes "in amounts not in excess of those that have 
accrued". Likewise, a note to Art. XVI, section B stated that nothing should 
preclude the use by a Contracting Party of a multiple rate of exchange in 
accordance with the articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
However, the Working Party report adopted on 19 November 1960 (which 
became the basis of the eventual Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties' 
illustrative list of export subsidies) itemised measures which should considered a 
form of export subsidies, emphasising, nevertheless, that the list should not be 
8 
considered exhaustive. 
8 Report adopted on 19'h. November 1960.9hSupp. BISD, p. 185 
The list itemised: 
a) currency retention schemes or any similar practices that involve a bonus on exports or re- 
exports; 
b) the provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters; 
c) the remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges on 
industrial or commercial enterprises; 
d) the exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than charges in 
connection with importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods if 
sold for internal consumption; or the payment, in respect of exported goods, of amounts exceeding 
those effectively levied at one or several stages on these goods in the form of indirect taxes or of 
charges in connection with the importation or in both forms. 
e) in respect of deliveries by governments or governmental agencies of imported raw materials for 
export business, the charging of prices below world prices; 
f)in respect of government exports credit guarantees. the charging of premiums which are 
manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the credit insurance 
institutions; 
50 
A ftu-ther difficulty of the GATT text stemmed from the dual price 
condition for the right to impose countervailing duties in Article VI. The 
provision, which oddly equated subsidisation with dumping, relied on the 
assumption that the cost reduction must be passed on to consumers to gain a 
competitive edge. The dual price test, however, proved unworkable for two 
reasons: firstly, because in a less than perfectly competitive market subsidy 
programmes may not result in a lower export price, being utilised to improve the 
cash-flow position of a firm or to encourage economies of scale, thus increasing in 
the long run its export capacity; secondly, because production statistics are seldom 
available for a detailed comparison between domestic and export prices. 9 
Border tax adjustment was the main cause of conflict in the GATT forum, 
where the United States urged equal treatment for direct and indirect taxation, as 
well as of potential divergence between US domestic rules and multilateral 
provisions. ' 0 The United States did not have a corresponding provision to those of 
GATT Art. XVIA and note Ad Art. XVI, but the Treasury Department, which 
was the administering authority until 1980, had constantly limited the imposition 
of countervailing duties to the remission of indirect domestic taxes in excess of 
the amount of tax paid or otherwise due. This administrative practice was 
contested by a US firm in a case concerning the exemPtion or remission upon 
exportation from Japan of a single stage consumption tax, usually levied at 
manufacturing level on electronic goods. The case went up to the Supreme Court, 
which upheld the Department's negative ruling on the petition for countervailing 
g) the grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credits at 
rates below those which they have to pay in order to obtain the funds so employed; 
h) the government bearing all or part of the cost incurred by exporters in obtaining credit. 
9 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Johanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p. 47 
10 An overview of the main points at stake in the negotiations on border tax adjustment is provided 
by the Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 (1-3464). 18& BI SD, p. 97 
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duties, in what seems to be a highly political decision. " The Supreme Court, 
which contradicted the broad construction of sect. 303 of the 1930 Trade Act 
applied by earlier decisions without explicitly oven-Wing them, predicated its 
decision on five factors. First, the legislative history of the statutes on 
countervailing measures since the Tariff Act of 1930, which, in its opinion, 
overall appears to confirm that lawmakers did not intend that duties were to be 
"assessed where the "bounty" does not exceed the amount of taxes already paid". 
Second, the fact that the Treasury Department had maintained its statutory 
interpretation for over 80 years since the very onset of the legislation concerned. 
Third, the fact that, also in light of the legislative history, this interpretation is 
reasonable and as such must be upheld by reviewing courts. Fourth, the 
incorporation of the US administrative position into the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and, therefore, the establishment of "foreign tax systems as well 
as private expectations on the assumption that countervailing duties would not be 
imposed on non-excessive remission of indirect taxes" in the United States. 
Finally, the Supreme Court, distinguished Zenith from its first decision on border 
tax adjustment, Downs v. United States, noting that the grant involved in Downs 
was not the remitted tax but the certificates issued by the Russian government to 
sugar exporters. 
12 
The decision, however, attracted doubts and criticisms from a strictly legal 
angle. The criticisms focused prevalently on two aspects: the Supreme Court had 
failed to distinguish Zenith from other previous cases, such as Nicholas which had 
followed a broader construction of bounty and grant, which, apparently, 
encompassed indirect tax refund; 13 the decision had not taken into account that the 
GATT, having been implemented in the United States by an executive agreement, 
11 Zenith Radio Corp. v United States, U. S. S. C. Rep. 437 U. S. 443 (1978). 
12 Robert E. Downs v United States, U. S. S. C. Rep. 187 U. S. 496 (1903). 
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cannot prevail over contrasting US statutes as they are constructed, in a common 
law system, by the courts. 
14 
The decision, though controversial, marked, at any rate, the definite falling 
into line of the United States' legislation with the provision of GATT. On the 
other hand, the United States pressed for the amendment of GATT Art. VIA and 
note Ad Art XVI to obtain equal treatment for direct taxes. The above-mentioned 
provisions are based on the partial adoption of the destination principle whereby 
sales taxes are collected by the country in which goods are consumed. Not 
permitting exemption or remission of taxes or duties already paid would, 
therefore, result in a double tax burden on exported goods. However, as they refer 
to taxes and duties on products, they leave aside those on factors of production, 
which are subject to direct taxation. 15 
The system favoured the EC member states whose main share of tax 
receipts was provided by indirect taxes. On the contrary, the United States relied 
mostly on direct taxation. The US contended, therefore, that the GATT regime 
caused disparity among different forms of taxation, as it was inconsistent with 
economic analysis being based on the false premise that only indirect taxes are 
shifted to consumers, whereas direct as well as indirect taxes can be shifted either 
13 Nicholas (G. S) & Co. v United States, U. S. S. C. Rep. 249 U. S. 34 (1919).. 
" For a rather critical analysis of Zenith see Robert D. Arkin, "The Countervailing Duty Law after 
Zenith. Unanimity can be Beguiling", Va. JIWIL. 18 (1978) n. 2, p. 245. 
Another critical assessment - with reference to the 1977 decision of the US Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (C. C. P. A. July 28,1977) upheld by the Supreme Court - is provided by 
Craig M. Brown, " "Bounty or Grant". A Call for Redefinition in Light of the Zenith Decision" 
Law &Pol'Y Int 7 Bus. 9 (1977), p. 1229 
13 See Melvin B. Krauss, "Border Tax Adjustments: A Potential Trans-Atlantic Trade Dispute", 
J W. TL 10 (1976), p. 145,148 
Krauss points out that taxation of export products can be based either on the "location of 
consumption" principle (also called destination principle) or the "location of production" principle 
(also called origin principle). To implement the former imports must be taxed at the same rate as 
domestically produced goods, while exports must leave the taxing jurisdiction tax free. To 
implement the latter all exports must be taxed at the same rate as domestically consumed goods, 
while imports must enter the taxing jurisdiction tax free as they are not produced domestically. 
Border Tax adjustments (BTA) based on the destination principle are neutral with respect to 
international trade so long as import compensatory duties and export rebates equal the tax carried 
by domestically produced goods. 
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forwards or backwards according to the interplay of factor supply and product 
demand. 16 The United States, however, did not succeed in obtaining equal 
treatment for direct taxes levied on production factors. The illustrative list of 
export subsidies annexed to the so called Tokyo Round Subsidies Code of 1979 
confirmed the ban on the remission of direct taxes and social welfare charges. 17 
On the other hand, the illustrative list of the 1979 Subsidies Code introduced a 
distinction with regard to exported goods which was not included in the list made 
out by the report adopted on November 19,1960 and which arose from the 
difficulty in assessing the tax burden on some of the inputs of the exported goods. 
Items h) and i) of the new list distinguished between goods that are physically 
incorporated in the exported goods and goods that are not physically incorporated, 
differentiating within to the latter category between value added tax (VAT) and 
cumulative taxes and import charges. Cumulative indirect taxes (also known as 
cascade system taxes) are multi-staged taxes levied without a mechanism for 
subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to taxation at one 
stage of production are used in a later stage. Contrary to the cascade system, the 
VAT, which is known as an input tax, entitles taxable persons to recover the tax 
incurred on acquiring goods or services in the preceding stage. 18 The "physical 
incorporation" principle, which has been substantially retained by the Uruguay 
Dý 
Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, permits the rebate of 
every kind of indirect tax and import duties on inputs that are physically 
incorporated in the final product, such as raw materials and intermediate products. 
The rebate is not allowed on so-called "taxes occultes", that is, the hidden 
" Ibid., p. 152. 
Also Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Johanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies, op. cit., p. 5 1. 
17 See infrasection 2). 
" On the EC VAT mechanism, see, in particular, Paul Fanner, Richard Lyal, EC Tax Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) p. 161 et seq. and p. 190 et seq.. 
Also David W. Williams, EC Tax Law (London: Longrnan, 1998). 
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element of taxation that by the cascade system falls on other goods and services 
used in the production process. They include multi-staged taxes on capital 
equipment, services and such inputs as fuel and electricity. 19 VAT, on the other 
hand, is excluded from the physical incorporation requirement, as at each stage 
previously incurred taxes are recovered. For goods whose stages of production are 
subject to VAT, therefore, it is only a question of replacing the domestic rate of 
taxation applied by the exporting countries at the final stage with that applied by 
the importing country. Also in this case the GATT regime favoured the European 
Communities that since I January 1978 had adopted a common system of value 
added tax. 
3) The question of disparity in direct tax regimes 
The difficulty caused by the absence of a clear legal framework is ftuther 
illustrated by the dispute over taxation of corporate income in the United States, 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands and its use as subsidisation. Prior to 1962 
the United States did not tax the income of corporations organised outside the US 
until its repatriation by way of dividends. Subpart F of the Revenue Act of 1962 
taxed US shareholders on the income of controlled foreign corporations in the 
fiscal year in which income accrues to the subsidiary, through the "fictio iuris" of 
considering, for fiscal purposes, such an income as distributed dividend. Very 
quickly, however, the United States realised that the stringent anti-avoidance 
provisions of Subpart F put US corporations at a disadvantage relative to their 
trading partners, especially those resident in some EC member states that had 
adopted the exemption method. Under this principle the state of residence of the 
19 Patrick Law, "The Definition of "Export Subsides" in GATT, JW TL. 16 (1982), p. 378. 
On the potential problems caused to some developing countries by the differential regime on 
exported goods, see Vijay Laxman Kelkar. GATT, Export Subsidies and Developing Countries, 
JWTL. 14 (1980), p. 3 72 
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taxpayer does not include in the tax base those profits from activities carried out 
abroad (usually, but not necessarily through a permanent establishment). Besides, 
the EC member states in question did not tax the whole or a substantial "chunk"' 
of the dividends distributed by foreign subsidiaries. 
From an export subsidy angle the simplest thing for the US to level the 
playing field with its competitors would have been to repeal subpart F. But from a 
fiscal angle, such a solution would mean a significant curtailment of Treasury's 
revenues by cutting the net that allowed the imposition of undistributed foreign 
income directly on the US parent company. We must not forget that at that time 
MNCs were predominantly a US phenomenon. The solution worked out by the 
US Treasury was to carve out a special tax regime in favour of those companies 
engaging in export activities. Under the 1971 DISC legislation exporters were 
allowed to create domestic paper shell affiliates, known as "Domestic 
International Sales Corporations (DISC)", to be used as the conduit for exporting 
goods actually sold by the parent company. The export profits were apportioned 
according to various formulas between the shell company and its parent company. 
One half of the DISC's profits were deemed distributed back to the parent 
exporter, while the other half would be deferred until distribution to the parent. 
As intended by the American Executive, very soon tax experts and accountants 
understood that the deferral could be infinitely extended, thus actually coinciding 
with an exemption, as no interests accrued on the deferred tax. In practice, the 
scheme allowed a deferral/exemption on 25 percent of the exporter's total export 
profits, later reduced to 17-18 percent. 20 
20 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law. The Evolution of the Modern GA 7T Legal 
System (Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), p 60 
Also, Thomas Kwako, "Tax Incenfives for Exports, Permissible and Proscribed ? An Analysis of 
the Corporate Income Tax Implications of the NITA Subsidies Code", Law & Pol ýy Int'l Bus. 12 
(1980), p. 687. 
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After the failure of bilateral consultations, in 1973 the European 
Community lodged a complaint with the GATT arguing in particular, that the 
DISC provisions violated Art. XVIA of the General Agreement, with reference to 
items c) and d) of the 1960 illustrative list, as the regime conferred an export 
subsidy to US producers by allowing a continuous deferral of their foreign sale 
income tax liability, or in any case, by the exemption of the compound interest 
rate on the deferred tax .21 The United States promptly countered arguing that the 
tax exemption of foreign profits led to equivalent economic distortions as it 
allowed European producers to reduce their overall tax liability by organising 
foreign branches or subsidiaries in low-tax countries and using transfer price 22 . 
The US accepted the creation of the panel, but on condition that a single panel 
should entertain the three European complaints together with the American one. It 
was a clever tactic, which worked in the short run. Professor Hudec, who seems 
rather sympathetic to the economic equivalence argument, noted that "although 
the European defendants convincingly denied the intent to subsidise and the 
occurrence of harmful economic effects, they never made a serious effort to 
23 dispute the United States' argument as such". In a highly politicised report, the 
panel, in a Solomonian way, held that neither the DISC regime nor the 
territoriality principle were fully consistent with GATT Art. 'WI. 
24 This gave the 
US substantial diplomatic leeway, as the repeal of the recently adopted DISC 
provisions was conditional on the surrender of the long-standing territoriality 
approach by its EC counterparts. The argument, however, had two main flaws: 
21 23rdSupp. BISD. United States Tax legislation (DISC). Report of the Panel presented to the 
Council of Representatives on 12 November 1976 (LJ4422), paras II- 12.. 
22 23rdSupp. BISD. Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, (U4423), paras. 18-19. 
23rdSupp. BISD. Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, (U4424), paras. 15-17. 
23rdSupp. BISD. Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, (L/4425), paras. 14-16. 
T"he term "'exemption method" is more appropriate but the parties to the dispute and the panel 
preferred the less technical term "territorial igy principle" 
.3 Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing, op. cit., p. 84. 
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1) In the first place, it caused a splintering of the economic law discipline 
provided by multilateral regimes. From the 1963 OECD model convention 
against double imposition, the exemption method is one of the only two systems 
allowed by the Paris Organisation to avoid double taxation, the other being the tax 
credit method, applied with reference to the worldwide regime of taxation. 25 
Therefore, we are confronted with the paradox of a tax regime recognised by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - of which the US is 
a 
one of the most prominent members - that becomes a prohibited subsidy under the 
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of which the US is a party. 
2) Secondly, the equivalence argument fails to notice that, notwithstanding their 
economic similarities, the two fiscal rules operate on quite a different legal 
canvas. The exemption principle was an integral part of the French, Belgian and 
Dutch tax systems, going as far back as the early 1900S. 
26 The system was 
initially a criterion for the assessment of income, under which not only profits 
generated abroad, but also costs linked to a foreign undertaking are not taken into 
account to establish the corporation's tax base. 27 Thus, the method had its pros 
for the company but could also have its cons. For instance, a permanent 
establishment abroad could run high costs of production which are not offset by 
sales revenues, and yet such costs cannot be taken into consideration in assessing 
the income of the firm. Also the exemption of dividends from controlled 
24 23rdSupp. BISD. L/4422, paras. 67-74. U4423, paras. 4749. L/4424, paras. 32-37. U4424, 
34-37. 
See Integrated Texts of the OECD Commentaries of the 1977 and 1992 Commentary on Articles 
23A and 23B concerning the methods for the elimination of double taxation. Reprinted in 
Materials on International &EC Tax Law, selected and edited by Kees Van Raad - 2002/2003 
(International Tax Center Leiden, 2002). 
The Commentary states: "Under the principle of exemption state R (the state of residence the state 
of residence) does not tax the income which according to the convention may be taxed in state E 
(the state where a permanent establishment is situated) or S (the state of source or situs). 
Also, Brian J. Arnold and Michael J. Mcintyre. International Tax Primer (The Hague: Kleuwer 
Law International, 2002) p. 33. 
26 John H. Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT',, 4. J[L. 
72(1978)., p. 775. 
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companies was a long-standing general rule, which, at least in the case of France, 
14& 
extended to nationally controlled companies. 28 On the contrary, the DISC regime 
was just a method to exempt a quota of already determined income, which would 
otherwise be taxed under the anti-avoidance rules. As the exemption was linked to 
export revenue, it perfectly matched the provision of item (c) of the illustrative 
list of 1960.29 
This simple truth was finally recognised by the Parties to the General 
Agreement. After a five year stalemate, in December 1981 the Council adopted 
ý1- - the four reports but with the understanding that "with respect to these cases, and 
in general, economic processes (including transactions involving export goods) 
located outside the territorial limits of the exporting country need not be subject to 
taxation by the exporting country and should not be regarded as export activities 
in terms of Article XVI: 4 of the general Agreement", thus implicitly acquitting 
the mentioned European countries' regime based on territorial Principle. 30 By 
contrast, no acquittal could be inferred for the US DISC regime. However, by way 
of consolation for the United States, the Understanding also stated that "Article 
XVIA requires that arm's length prices be observed", making it, therefore, clear 
that territoriality was legitimate as long as it was not exploited for transfer price 
schemes between parent companies, and either their foreign subsidiaries or their 
permanent establishments. 
After a last attempt to defend the legitimacy of the DISC measure in the 
light of the Understanding in October 1982 the US announced that it would pass 
legislation to correct the complaints made about the regime and two years later 
replaced it with a new type of tax exemption, conditional this time on the 
27 See Lionel Halpern, Taxes in France (Adaptedftom Franvis Lefebvre's Les Imp6ts en France) 
(London: Butterworths, 1980) p. 11. 
" Ibid. p. 40. 
29 See note 13 supm. 
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establishment of a foreign subsidiary, the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC). As we 
know the reform did not clear up the problem but only made its ascertainment 
more difficult. 
2)The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code 
The Tokyo Round negotiations had among their core topics a stricter and 
clearer regulation of subsidies and countervailing measures than those provided 
by the rather patchy set of rules described in the previous section. In spite of its 
ambitious goals the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, 
XVI and XXIII of the GATT (commonly referred to as the Subsidies Code) was 
not an unqualified success. It had three main faults. The Code did not succeed in 
binding all Contracting Parties and, therefore, fostered the adoption of a plurality 
of regimes whose implementation was of doubtful conformity with basic GATT 
principles, such as the unconditional MFN clause. Secondly, it failed to provide a 
definition of subsidy for national countervailing duty purposes and this allowed 
the United States in particular to keep its leeway in applying countervailing 
measures 31 Thirdly, given the disagreement over the liberalisation of trade in 
agriculture between the US and the European Community, it failed to address the 
controversial question of subsidisation of primary products whether by equating 
their treatment to that of non-primary products or by clearly defining the causal 
30 Tax Legislation (L/5271). 27* BISD, p. 114 
31 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System. Law and Policy ofInternational Economic 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass. And London: The MIT Press, 1997) p. 288. 
Professor Jackson's remark seems to be grounded on the premise that the General Provisions in 
Art. 8 of Part II of the Code do not extend to Part. I which refers to the application of Article VI of 
the General agreement. 
Also, Richard R. Rivers and John D. Greenwald, "The Negotiations of a Code on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences" Law and Pol ýv Int 7 Buss., 
II (1979), p. 1463. 
60 
I 
link between subsidising activities and acquisition of more than a fair share of the 
market. On the other hand, the Code provided a set of specific and stricter ndes to 
apply domestic countervailing measures and to contrast subsidisation in 
multilateral fora, which paved the way to the Uruguay Round SCM Agreement. 
1) Track I and Track 11 
To a certain extent the Subsidies Code satisfied the opposite aims of the 
US and of the majority of the other Contracting Parties. The US were pressing for 
stricter rules to curtail subsidies, strengthening the ban on export subsidies and 
attracting domestic subsidies in the regulatory framework. On the other hand, the 
majority of GATT Contracting Parties were concerned with restricting US 
Z-- - iTeedom in applying countervailing measures. One of their main preoccupations 
arose from the absence of a "material" injury test in the US statutes as the United 
States had taken advantage of the grandfather clause not to modify its legislation 
on countervailing measures previous to the General Agreement. 32 
In light of the foregoing political framework, the Code envisaged two 
forms of remedial action, usually called Track I and Track Il. Progress was 
especially realised with respect to procedural aspects, filling the gaps of the 
General Agreement by working out a detailed road map both for the imposition of 
countervailing duties and for the settlement of disputes. Advances, however, were 
also realised on the substantive side, in particular with regard to a more detailed 
identification of types of export subsidy and the question of injury. 
For the first time in GATT history, the Code clearly stipulated the 
conditions under which countervailing duties may be imposed against subsidised 
Rivers and Greenwald seem to share Professor's Jackson opinion, arguing that "Art. VI and Art. 
XVI of GATT are conceptually unrelated.... It makes little difference whether the subsidy in 
question is legal or illegal". 
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imports. In particular, the Code provided that a government may begin an 
investigation into the existence of a subsidy only when it has sufficient e-, ý'idence 
of the likelihood that a subsidy exists, that there may be material injury to 
domestic industry, and that there is a causal link between the alleged subsidy and 
the injury to the industry. This provision was a compromise. The United States 
opposed a proposal to adopt the wording of the 1967 International Antidumping 
Code according to which subsidy would have been demonstrably the principal 
cause of injury. It agreed, however, on a less stringent causality requirement in 
Art. 6.4 of the Code providing that "subsidized imports are, through the effect of 
the subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of this agreement" and that 
"injuries caused by other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports". 
Normally investigations were to be initiated upon written request by or on 
behalf of the industry affected, but in special circumstances they could be started 
without a request if there is sufficient evidence of injury caused by subsidised 
imports. 33 During the period of investigation signatory states were to be given the 
opportunity to consult with the state conducting the investigation. The Subsidies 
Code also provided for the imposition of provisional measures if after sufficient 
investigation a preliminary positive determination is reached that a subsidy does 
exist and if there is sufficient evidence of injury. Definitive countervailing duties 
could be imposed only after a final determination had been reached that a subsidy 
exists and that subsidised imports are causing or threatening material injury. -" 
As will be seen in Chapter IV, these detailed provisions were in large part 
reproduced by the Uruguay Agreement on Subsidies and Countervai ling 
See John W. Evans, 
1. T L. J., 197-. p. 2- 




Countervai ling Duties in the GATT. Present Laý% and Future Prospects" 
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Measures. They failed, however, to identify the exact nature of their object: 
subsidised exports. 
On the other hand, this not minor problem was tackled by Track 11 ývhich 
addressed the substantive obligations concerning the prevention of subsidies that 
affect goods in international trade and provided procedural remedies to counteract 
them within the multilateral framework. The substantive obligations gave 
substance to the provisions of GATT Art, XVI. In particular, Art. 8 of the 
Agreement condemned subsidies which resulted in three sorts of adverse effects: 
injury to the domestic industry of another signatory; nullification or impairment of 
the benefits accruing to another signatory under the General Agreement, and 
serious prejudice to the interest of another signatory. What is relevant is that, in 
contrast to GATT Art. XXIII, the Code subjected to dispute settlement procedure, 
not only the violation of an obligation under the General Agreement, that is, the 
ban on export subsidies under GATT Art. XVIA, or the nullification or 
impainnent of previous benefits, but also serious prejudice which previously only 
gave rise to a commitment to consult with the affected party. The Code under Art. 
9 reaffirmed the ban on export subsidies, but the United States achieved limited 
success by bringing domestic subsidies within the framework of Track 11. The US 
had proposed a "supplementary understanding" which included an -illustrative list 
of internal subsidy practices" that can have adverse effects on trade. This list v,, as 
not retained, but article II recognised that "subsidies other than export subsidies 
may cause or threaten to cause... injury to a domestic industry of another signatory 
or serious prejudice to the interests of another signatorý, or may nullify or impair 
benefits accruing to another signatory under the General Agreement-. 
The Code no longer referred to the bi-level pricing criterion provided b-,, 
GATT Art. XVI: 4. I'lic United '-, 4ates had argued that the criterion should be 
6-1 
dropped, whereas the European Community had supported it. The absence of any 
reference to the bi-level price criterion in the Code has been interpreted in various 
ways. Hufbauer and Shelton Erb argue that the "the burden of disproving bi-le-,,, -el 
pricing has been shifted to the proponent of the practice, that is, the defendant". 35 
Seyoum suggests that in cases where a signatory is using a practice not included 
in the illustrative list, "a complainant could only prove that a practice amounts to 
an export subsidy by evidencing the fact that it results in dual pricing". On the 
other hand, he points out that dual pricing remains a yardstick in any controversy 
between a signatory of the Code and any other Party of the General Agreement. 36 
In this context the Code, under Articles 12 and 13, provided for a dispute 
settlement mechanism governed by a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures made up of representatives of each of the countries adhering to the 
agreement. Any country under the Code could request consultations with the 
signatory thought to be granting a subsidy inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Code. If no solution was achieved within 30 days in the case of export subsidies 
and within 60 days in the case of any other subsidy, the country alleging an 
inconsistent subsidy could request that a panel of experts be established by the 
Committee with the purpose of reviewing the facts of the dispute. The panel was 
to be established within 30 days and had 60 days to present its findings to the 
Committee. The Committee could make recommendations on a solution to the 
dispute within 30 days of its receipt of the report. If the recommendations were 
not followed within a reasonable period of time, the Committee xvas empowered 
to authorise appropriate retaliatory countermeasures against the offending party. 
ý5 Gary C. flutbauer and Joanna Shelton Erb. Subsidies. op. cit.. p. 48. 
36 Belayneh SeNourn. -Bporl SLibsidies under the M I-N. An Analysis %ý ith particular emphasis on 
developing countries".. 1 WTL. 18 (1984), P. ; 16. 
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Special treatment was granted to developing countries. 3- This benefit, 
however, did not extend to the greatest item of interest to those countries that 
were in the course of industrial i sation: the exclusion from counter,,. -ailing 
measures regulated under Track 1.38 With regard to Track 11, developing countries 
were only subject to quite a vague obligation not to use export subsidies in a 
manner which causes serious prejudice to the trade or production of another 
signatory. A developing country was also requested to endeavour to enter into a 
commitment to reduce or eliminate export subsidies when their use ,, vas 
"inconsistent with its competitive and developmental needs". The Code, however, 
did not specify at which stage of industrial development subsidisation was no 
I longer consistent with the developing country's needs. With respect to non-export 
subsidies, no countermeasures were permitted (obviously under Track 11) unless 
nullification and impairment was found to exist "in such a way as to displace or 
impede imports of like products into the market of the subsidizing country, or 
unless injury to domestic industry in the importing market of a signatory 
occurs v)39 . 
Export credits and the relationship between the Code and the OECD Arrangement 
We have already referred to some of the main amendments introduced 
with regard to the 1960 list by the Code's illustrative list of export subsidies. One 
of the main changes concerns export credits. 
The Report adopted on I gth November 1960, under item g) of the list 
considered as a forni of export subsidy the grant of credits by governments or 
special institutions controlled by govemments at interest rates below those ý, vhich 
the latter have to pay to obtain the funds. Here the benchmark to assess the 
A rt. 14. 
Belaynch Seyourn. F\PL)rt. ('P. cit-. P. ., - 
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existence and amount of subsidisation. is the difference between the rate of interest 
charged by the govemment and the cost bome by it. Part of the subsidy, therefore, 
remains hidden, as government authorities are usually able to borrow at rates 
lower than those charged to any commercial borrower. Item h) of the list provided 
that subsidisation occurs when governments make up the . k-hole or part of the 
costs incurred by exporters in obtaining credit. 
Item ( k) of the Subsidies Code list (which unified items g and h of the 
1960 list) introduced three relevant specifications. Firstly, the grant is bestowed 
not only when governments or governmental agencies have actually paid an 
interest rate higher than that charged on the export credit, but also when they 
would have to pay such interest if they borrowed on international capital markets 
to obtain funds of the same maturity and denominated in the same currency as the 
export credit. This addition simply acknowledges that govenunents and their 
agencies need not turn to the market as they can directly tap into their own 
budgets. Secondly, it specifies that both the provision of credit by government 
authorities and the covering by them of the cost of credit are fon-ns of 
subsidisation only -in so far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the 
field of export credit terms". It remains to be seen what is meant by material 
advantage in the field of export credit. Is it merely diplomatic fog bank or does 
the term have -a technical meaning? This question, however, had to wait until the 
Uruguay Round SCM Agreement to get an answer and will therefore be examined 
in a subsequent chapter. 
40 
Of greater relevance is the addition of a second paragraph by which the 
negotiators, without referring to it by name. deferred to the provisions of the 
Xrt. 14.7 
40 See in particular, Brazil - [. -\port Financing Programme forAircraft - AB 1999-1 Report of the 
Appellate Body. WT DS46 AB R 
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OECD Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits .41 Ile 
Arrangement set maturity terms and minimum interest rates for officially 
supported export credits. The maturity terms varied according to the per capita 
income of the importing countries which were divided into three categories. 
Minimum interest rates originally varied according to country classification and 
repayment terms within the so-called "matrix". 42 At a later stage Commercial 
Interest Reference Rates (CIRRs) for each credit currency replaced the matrix 
interest rates approaching the OECD discipline to the ongoing market 
conditions. 
43 
The partial incorporation of the OECD Arrangement by the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies Code through this safe harbour provision created a set of problems. 
Firstly, the Arrangement, which, not having been submitted to the OECD Council 
for approval, is not an "act of the Organisation", is not intended to have legal 
force; rather, it is a political commitment which falls within the "soft law" class of 
international rules. Secondly, as the title suggests, the Arrangement did not aim at 
eliminating subsidisation in export financing, being instead designed to create a 
level playing field for export credit agencies in industrialised countries. It is, 
therefore, easy to argue that the safe harbour provision gave an advantage to those 
Subsidies Code signatories who were also parties to the Arrangement. The 
incorporation, however, entailed two main questions: 
41 && Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertaking on official 
export credit to which at least twelve original signatories to this Agreement are parties as of 1. 
January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original signatories), or 
if in practice a signatory applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export 
credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export 
subsidy prohibited by this Agreement". 
42 See John M. Duff Jr., "The Outlook for Official Export Credits", Law&Pol ý Int'l Bus. 
13(198 1 
90 1. 
For an in-depth history of the various stage of the OECD Arrangement see John E. Ray, 
Managing Official Export Credit. The Questfor a Global Regime (Washington D. C.: Institute for 
International Economics 1995). 
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what is the scope of the safe harbour? That is, does it encompass all the 
provisions of the Arrangement or is it limited to a specific sector. i. e. interest rates 
and if so, to what extent? 
2) Does the safe harbour provision extend to countervailing proceedings? 
The prevailing doctrine of the period called for strict adherence to the text 
of item (k) which refers to interest rates, arguing that if the drafters of the 
Subsidies Code list had meant to incorporate the entire OECD Arrangement they 
would not have made explicit reference to interest rates, and that an open-handed 
reference to the whole Arrangement would render the safe harbour provision 
rather opaque. 44 There was, however., the question of defining the interest rates 
covered by the Arrangement. Indeed, the Arrangement on Guidelines for 
Officially Supported Export Credits establishes the minimum interest rates OECD 
members must apply but, under specific circumstances, allows them to offer rates 
below the minimum fixed by the general rules of the Arrangement. One of the 
main types of authorised waiver, matching, was the subject of a countervailing 
investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce in 1982. In this case a 
governmental export credit agency, EDC, financed the tender made by a Canadian 
corporation, Bombardier, for the provision of railcars to the Metropolitan 
Transport Authority of New York. The offered interest rate was below the OECD 
minimum but it matched the terms of the financial offer made by the French 
government to support the bid of the French competitor. The US Department of 
Commerce in its affirmative final determination held that, regardless of whether 
the Canadian agency was matching a prior commitment under the OECD 
., krrangement, the 
finaricial offer was in derogation of the OECD Arrangement on 
several points and, therefore. item (k) was not relevant. Specifically. according to 
" Gary Cly-de Hutbaucrand Joanna Shelton Erb. Subsidies. op. cit.. p. -). 
68 
the Department, the item referred only to an export credit tansaction which is in 
conformity with the minimum interest rate provisions of the Arrangement, 
whereas the matching provisions deal exclusively with offers that are not in 
confoffnity with the Affangement. 45 
As to the extent of the exemption the European Community argued that so 
long as an export credit is within the OECD guidelines it is not a subsidy at all 
and, therefore, cannot be countered. In response the United States contended that, 
though subsidised credits which are in conformity with the OECD Arrangement 
cannot be countered within the Subsidies Code, they still constitute export 
subsidies and, therefore, can be countervailed within the domestic legislation of 
the signatories. 
46 
In defence of the US approach de Kieffer resorted to a literal construction 
of item (k) of the illustrative list noting that its text states that "an export credit 
practice which is in confonnity with those provisions shall not be considered an 
export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement". He, therefore, argued that the list 
does not say that such practices do not constitute subsidies at all, but it simply 
excludes them from the Code ban. 47 Frenkel and Fontheirn reached a similar 
45 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination Railcars from Canada. 48FR6569 
(February 14,1983) web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
A summary of the case in question sheds light on the apparently esoteric concept of matching, as 
this concept will re-emerge in cases entertained by the Dispute Settlement Body under the WTO 
rules. 
A Canadian company, Bombardier, negotiated with a Canadian governmental export credit 
agency, EDC, financing for its bid in a tender to provide railcars to the Metropolitan Transport 
Authority of New York. EDC offered a buying credit to the New York authority, making it clear 
that it was prepared to offer financing terms not less favourable than those offered by any 
competing governmental agency. The French government offered to provide financial assistance 
to the French competitor, Franco rail, with an export credit whose interest rate was 9.7%, that is 
below the minimum established by the OECD Arrangement at that time. The Canadian authority 
provided the same credit terms, i. e. matched the French loan, neutralising the prospective financial 
advantage of the French bid. The provision of the cars was thus awarded to Bombardier, to the 
feat disdain of an American competitor, Budd, which promptly filed a CVD petition. 
Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination Railcars, from Canada. 43 FR 53760, 
1993)web. lex is-nex is. com/profess ion al - 
See Donal E. de Kieffer, "The Role of Export Credits in International Trade", in John H. Jackson 
et al., eds., international Trade Policy. The Lawyer's Perspective (New York: Matthew Bender. 
1986)chap. 17, p. 2 
47 Ibid., p. 2. 
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.I 
conclusion arguing that item k of the list does not supersede GATT Art. XVIA 
which bans export subsidies. 48 
These arguments, however, fail to note that the Subsidies Code cannot be 
considered apart from the General Agreement. Indeed, the Code had the ambitious 
. i. title of Agreement of Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the General agreement on Tariffs and Trade and as such it aimed at 
defining the content of the above-mentioned GATT provisions. In so doing it 
claimed authority for entirely excluding practices in conformity with the 
Arrangement from the General Agreement's sanctions, though with its effect 
limited to the signatories. 
The claim of the United States to have a right to countervail practices 
consistent with the OECD Arrangement would probably be valid at that time, but 
only if grounded on another factor. As already noted, there is no cross-flow 
between Track I and Track II of the Code and, therefore, it is arguable that the 
illustrative list refers only to export subsidies for the purposes of multilateral legal 
remedies without limiting the domestic legislation's response. The question, 
however, was never put to a panel report test when the Code was in force. 
Conclusions 
On balance, the United States succeeded in establishing, especially as a 
result of the Tokyo Round, a stricter regulatory fi-amework for subsidies, closing 
up the loopholes it had contributed to create some thirty years earlier. The main 
achievements, however, referred to the procedural aspects by the establishment of 
a clear path to solve disputes on subsidies and imposing countervailing measures. 
On the other hand, the Tokyo Agreements bound few parties to the GATT, and 
contributed to the compartmentalisation of the General Agreement. The Subsidies 
48 Orit Frenkel and Claude G. B. Fontheim, "Export Credits. An International and Domestic Legal 
Analysis", Law & Pol ý Int YBus. 13 (198 1 ), p. 1079. 
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Code, together with the Government Procurement Agreement, is commonly 
a 
considered to derogate from the unconditional MIFN principle. 49 The approach 
adopted by the Code allowed a signatory to make its extension of trade benefits 
conditional on the acceptance of the Code obligations by beneficiary countries. In 
particular, articles 1,8,11 and 19 restricted benefits and obligations imposed by the 
Agreement to the. signatories. In implementing the subsidies Code, section 10 1 of 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 applied the new US countervailing duty law 
providing for a material injury test only to countries that had also accepted the 
MTN subsidies Code, along with countries that had assumed substantially 
equivalent obligations with respect to the United States. 50 
At any rate,, the success of the United States in shaping the non-procedural 
aspects of the subsidy and countervailing measure multilateral regime was far 
P-- - from complete. Apart from agriculture, which substantially remained outside the 
GATT framework, no precise link between article VI and XVI of the General 
Agreement was established. Domestic subsidies were brought within the 
framework of the General Agreement but no specific criteria were established to 
detennine the conditions under which they could be banned and subject to 
countervailing duties. As regards the treatment of tax regimes for subsidy 
purposes the United States failed to bring to the same level direct and indirect 
taxation. Only the former escaped the ban on export subsidies, although only 
partially, whereas the latter, which was the main source of revenue for the US 
Treasury, was caught in the net of the prohibition. At a later stage the US tried 
unsuccessfully to equate its scheme on corporation tax deferral to the exemption 
'9 See Gary C. Hufbauer et al, "The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most Favoured-Nation 
Principle", Law& Pol ýv Int 7 Bus., 12 (1980). p. 70. Also John H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System, op. cit., p. 137. 
-" See John H. Jackson, -United States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation" 
in John H. Jackson et al.. eds, Implementing the Tokyo Round, (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1987) p. 170. 
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of foreign profits principle adopted by some EC member states. A success for the 
United States, along with the other industrialised countries members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, was the inclusion of a 
safe harbour for export financing consistent with the provision of the OECD 
Arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export credits. The exception, 
however, was considered to only apply to interest rates and the United States itself 
did not acknowledge the Arrangement as a limit to its power of imposing 
countervailing measures on the import of subsidised products. 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED STATES' COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW AFTER THE 
TOKYO ROUND 
Introduction 
From the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 through the end of the 
Kennedy Round successive statutes authorised the Executive to negotiate 
reductions in the US tariff in exchange for reductions by its trading partners and to 
implement the agreement simply by presidential proclamation, that is without 
further recourse to Congress. There was no comparable system of advance 
authorisation when non-tariff trade barriers were at issue, and they became more 
and more relevant when the success of the subsequent GATT rounds gradually 
dismantled the tariff wall. The solution - already described in Chapter I- was to 
grant negotiating authority to the Executive also on non-tariff matters and to 
provide an up-or-down vote within a specified period of time on any legislation 
implementing a non-tariff agreement. The Trade Act of 1974 initiated this practice. 
There were, however, important differences with the previous system of trade 
authority delegation. In particular, from 1974 onwards Congress had to pass 
legislation at both ends of the negotiation. This meant that during the multilateral 
talks US negotiators had to take into account the lawmakers' opinion and, thus, the 
often contrasting opinions of the interest groups they represented, which could 
either be more favourable to trade expansion or to protection from foreign 
competition. On the other hand, although Congress form, 'ent the right to pass 
amendments on the agreements reached by the Fxecutive, it was urilvilling to have 
no sav in the implementing legislation. When in 1979 the moment came to make 
US law conform to the agreements reached in Geneva, the Carter Administration, 
in order to ensure congressional support. accepted the proposal of the Senate 
/ 
Finance Committee to have the implementing bill drafted by the lawmakers rather 
than by the Executive. And Congress, which could not ignore the lobbying of keý' 
industries like steel, made it clear that it saw the trade-remedy law as the 
cornerstone of the implementing legislation. ' 
The Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979, thus, stands as a cornerstone 
in the interactive process between multilateral trade rules and US domestic la-ýv. 
As Cohen points out, the TAA can be viewed as an effort to harmonise domestic 
law with the MTN Tokyo Agreements, concurrently trying to reconcile a wide 
variety of competing domestic interests. 2 In line with the Tokyo Round 
compromise, the legislation drafters took into account the interests of those who 
favoured a reduction of domestic barriers to foreign trade. At the same time, 
however, they could not neglect the interests of those who considered the passing 
of the new legislation as an opportunity to strengthen the protection of US industry 
against increasing foreign competition often helped by public support. 
In particular, with regard to countervailing measures the Act did not limit 
itself to encompassing the Subsidies Code provisions, given the much richer 
heritage of the US legislation. The Act to comply with the Subsidies Code 
commitments adopted wide-ranging, but not general, provisions for injury 
determination. The procedure was largely drawn from that developed in 
antidumping investigation. The concept of domestic subsidy, which in the 
multilateral framework appears for the first time in the Tokyo Round Code, was 
already present in the US countenailing duty legislation and had already been 
tested in a controversial case. The idea of specificity - requiring that a subsidy to 
1 I. M. Destler, American Trade PohcN ('A"ashington D. C.: Institute for Intemational Economics, 
1995), P. 149. 
' Richard A. Cohen, " Fhe Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Executiý e . ý\greements, 
Subsidies. and 
Counten, ailing, Duties ". Tcx- Int. 1 LJ, 15 ( 1971)), p. 103). 
74 
be countervailable must be directed to a limited number of beneficiaries - finds its 
own place in the framework of the 1979 TAA. 
The TAA, however, was just a moment, albeit crucial in the de-ý, -elopment 
of the US countervailing measures legislation. Other important stages can be found 
in the Acts of 1984 and 1988. In addition, the creative process of both 
administrative practice and case law played a central role. 
In the following sections we will. therefore, focus on those concepts ývhich 
either had a major impact on multilateral negotiations or did not coincide ý. vith 
existing multilateral rules. In particular we look at domestic subsidies, specificity, 
at the idea of benefit to the recipient as opposed to that of charge on the public 
account, and finally at material injury to domestic industry. Some of these 
subjects will be reconsidered in subsequent chapters to assess the change in 
domestic law brought about by the Uruguay Round Agreement. We also postpone 
to these later chapters the analysis of rules, such as those regarding the allocation 
of government grants and privatisation, which, though already present prior to the 
Uruguay Round completion, underwent changes or had a greater international 
relevance in the period which followed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 
1994. 
1) Domestic Subsidies 
The first general US countervailing duty statute applicable to all imports 
otherwise dutiable. the Tariff Act of 1897. only provided for the imposition of 
countervailing duties whenever a foreign goverment bestowed, directl-y or 
indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise. 
The Tariff Act of 19-22. however, widened the scope for counten-ailing measures, 
covering aily bounty or in, ant -on manufacture or production as well as on 
exPortation, regardless of whether such gratuities were derived from 
goverrunental or private sources". Since 1922, therefore, subsidies that were not 
export-related were also considered countervailable. 
Governments as well as local authorities can grant forgiveness of debts 
and tax deferral or exemption to companies that open plants and create jobs in 
underdeveloped regions. Grants and tax benefits are offered to shore up firms that 
accept not to lay off employees during a reconstruction phase. Likewise, many 
govenunents provide loans at low-interest rates especially to government-owned 
companies to help the entire firm operations and not just its export-related 
activities. Until the 1960s the US administering authority 3 had refrained from 
imposing duties to offset such forms of public help. 4 Things changed radically a 
few years later. The watershed is commonly found in the Michelin decision 
concerning the imposition of countervailing measures on tires produced by a 
French company, Michelin S. A., in a factory located in the Canadian Province of 
Nova Scotia to benefit from a series of incentives offered by the provincial 
government. Although at that time the administering authority did not disclose the 
reason upon which it relied in determining whether to countervail, and it is, 
therefore, possible that the duty was imposed on the basis of export subsidisation, 
the program at issue was clearly designed to attract industry to economically 
underdeveloped regions of Canada through the offer of development assistance 
grantS5 
As Guido and Morrone point out, although most of the products would 
ultimately compete in the US market, the Canadian statutory provisions that 
3 To avoi d repetition we use various terms to indicate the authority entrusted with countervailing 
duty proceedings: 1) Department of Commerce; 2) Commerce; 3) DOC; 4) USDOC; 5) 
International Trade Administration, 6) ITA; 7)administering Authority: 8)investigating Authority 
(term which also applies to the International Trade Commission - ITC) 
4 D. B. King, "Countervailing Duties - An old Remedy with a New Appeal". Bus. Law. 24(1969), 
P. 1 181. 
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allowed the countervailed subsidies in question had no requirement of export 
capability for programme eligibility. 6 The autonomous countervailability of 
domestic subsidies gets, however, full recognition after the entry into force of the 
TAA. Thus, in a case dating back to 1982 the Department of Commerce's 
International Trade Administration (ITA), countervailing a domestic programme 
aimed at promoting regional decentralisation, industrial investment and small and 
medium-sized firms, stated that the certificate of fiscal promotion (CEPROFI) 
issued by the Mexican government had not the primary purpose of promoting 
exports, but "may be expected to benefit the entire production of the firm and not 
export alone". 7 
On the other hand, domestic subsidy countervailability was made 
dependent on their specificity. 
2) Speciflcity 
The 1979 TAA added a new section, 771, to the Tariff Act of 1930, 
applicable to the countries that subscribe to the provisions of the Subsidies Code 
or assume substantially equivalent obligations. Subsection (5), which introduced 
the term "subsidy", though stating that it has the same meaning as "bounty or 
grant" under section 303 of the Tariff Act, broke down countervailable subsidies 
into export and domestic subsidies. For the first category the subsection refeffed 
to the illustrative list in Annex A to the Subsidies Code, whereas for the second 
category it gave a non- exhaustive list which referred to subsidies provided or 
required by government action to "a specific enterprise or industry, or group of 
3 See Robert V. Guido and Michael M. Morrone"Tbe Michelin Decision: A Possible New 
Direction for U. S. Countervailing Duty Law". Law & Polýv Intl Bus. 6 (1974) p. 25 1. 
61bid. p. 258 
7 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Ceramic Tile from Mexico, 47 F. R. 2001'7 
(May, 10,1982). web. lexis-nexis. com, ýprofessional/. 
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enterprises or industries". 8 Although the new section was not directed to those 
countries outside the scope of the Subsidies Code, to which section 303 of the 
1930 Trade Act still applied, both legislative history and subsequent case law 
statements made it clear that articles 303 and 771 should be read together and, 
therefore, the requirements of section 771 (5) extended to sect. 303.9 From the 
wording of the section, the International Trade Administration of the Department 
of Commerce developed a test to assess whether bounties or grants bestowed on 
foreign firms are countervailable by the US. A reading of various Commerce 
countervailing duties decisions shows that two policy goals underlay the test: 1) to 
limit the number of claims and, therefore, alleviate tensions with US trading 
partner, as all industries receive some direct or indirect government benefits; 2) to 
minimise the distortive economic effects of countervailing duties, positing that 
specific subsidies misallocate resources from a country's more efficient industries 
thus interfering with relative advantage in international trade. 10 It is not clear I 
whether this rational was just worked out by the administering authority or was at 
the root of the text of subsection. Bello and Holmer argue that these aims were 
8 Section 771 (5) read: 
"The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that term is used in 
section 303 of this title, and includes, but is not limited, to the following: 
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to illustrative list of 
export subsidies). 
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a specific 
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, 
and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of 
any class or kind of merchandise: 
(I) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial 
considerations. 
(II) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates. 
(111) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific 
industry. 
(IV) Tlhe assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production or distribution. " 
9 1979 US Code Congressional and Administrative News. Legislative History, p. 38 1. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States. 7 C. I. T. 339,590 F. Supp. 1237 (1984). web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professionaV. 
The Court of International Trade stated that "the primary purpose of the definition of subsidy in 
section 771(5) of the Act is to make it plain that the term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the 
term -, bounty or grant" and that that there is a complete harmony and continuity between the two 
provisions". 
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present in the congressional debate. " Greenwald casts doubts over granting 
Congress such aims, as, in his opinion, when the lawmakers adopted the TAA the 
term "specific enterprises or industries" was included in a provision which was 
merely illustrative and was never meant to restrict the reach of countervailing duty P. -O -I 
law. 12 Greenwald's argument could find some support in the fact that the 
Subsidies Code did not refer to specificity and the EC rules on countervailing 
measures did not address this issue, even though both the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice expressed the view that measures of a general 
nature are not subsidies. ' 3 
The aeneral availabilitv test 
Taking to its logical extremes the idea of "specificity", in the early 1980s 
the Department of Commerce based its countervailable subsidy test on the 
concept of "general availability" whereby, except for export subsidies, benefits 
that are available to all industries do not confer a subsidy for the purposes of 
countervailing duty law, even though the number of actual beneficiaries can be 
limited. What was relevant for the ITA was the objective of the measure, which 
must not be targeted to a limited number of users or beneficiaries. Thus, with 
regard to natural resources, the limited number of beneficiaries did not imply 
specificity if it was the result of the inherent characteristics of the goods covered 
by the measure. This approach is best illustrated by the so-called "Softwood 
Lumber I" case concerning the setting of stumpage fees - i. e., the price charged 
10 See James D. Southwick, "The Lingering Problem with the Specificity Test in the United States 
Countervailing Duty Law", Minn. L. Rev., 72(1988), p. 1173. 
" Judith Hippler Bello and Alan F. Holmer, "Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a 
Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test", Geo. Wask J. Int 7 L. &Econ., 18(1984), p. 309. 
12 J. D. Greenwald, "US Law and Practice", in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois (ed. ) Subsidies and 
International trade. A European Lawyer Perspective (Deventer-Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publisher, 1991) p. 37. 
Greenwald argues, on the other hand, that the specificity requirement was definitely codified by 
Congress when the Omnibus Trade Act added to the previous text of section 771(5) a 
subparagraph which required the ITA to assess whether a "bounty, grant, or subsidy is in law or in 




for logging -at artificially low levels by Canadian federal and provincial 
authorities. Rejecting the petition, Commerce stated that the stumpage at issue 
was available on similar terms regardless of the industry or enterprise of the 
recipient. The only limitation as to the type of industries that use stumpage 
reflects the inherent characteristic of this natural resource and the current level of 
technology". 14 Similarly, Commerce found in "Carbon Black from Mexico" that 
the Mexican Goverment's provision of natural gas and carbon black feedstock 
was non-specific as these resources were available to all Mexican industries, 
though there were only two users of carbon black. 15 
The general availability principle, however, did not apply only to the 
provision of raw materials or intermediate products. Thus, with regard to 
investment tax benefits provided by the Korean legislation to all domestic 
industries, but benefiting in particular the capital intensive steel industry, the 
Department held that benefits "available to all industries in the manufacturing and 
mining sector are not limited to a specific enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries... thus, they do not provide domestic subsidies". 16 
The CIT's apvroach in the Cabot case 
Commerce's liberal approach caused strong opposition from the US 
industry and from the beginning raised doubts among the judges of the Court of 
International Trade (CIT). It was finally reversed in the Cabot case, which was an 
appeal against the negative determination in Carbon Black from Mexico. In its 
opinion the Court started from the premise that, contrary to Commerce's view, not 
13 See Kostantinos Adarnantopoulos, Subsidies in External Trade Law of the EEC, E. L. Rey, 15 
( 1980), p. 43 8. 
14 Final Negative Countervailing Duty determination, Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 
FR 24159 (May, 31,1983). web. lexis-nexis-com/professional/. 
's Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order; Carbon 
Black from Mexico, 48 F. R. 29564 (June 27,1983). web. lexis-nexis. comiprofessional. 
'6 Final affirmative determination, Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Korea, 
and final negative countervailing duty determination. Carbon Steel Structural Shapes from Korea, 
49 FR 47284 (December 3,1984). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional/. 
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all generally available benefits are alike, as "some are accruing generally to all 
citizens, while others are benefits that when actually conferred accrue to specific 
individuals or classes". To the first category belongs the provision of so-called 
public goods, such as national defence, education, and infrastructures, which are 
not conferred to any specific individual or class. On the other hand, generally 
available benefits "when actually bestowed may constitute specific grants 
conferred upon any specific identifiable entities". Secondly, the Court pointed out 
that what is relevant are the actual results or effects of assistance provided by 
foreign governments and not their purpose or intention. Considering these 
premises together, the CIT argued that the appropriate standard must focus on the 
de-facto case-by-case effects of the benefits provided to recipients rather than on 
their nominal availability. In the case at issue the Court concluded that the 
Mexican programme, by providing quantifiable competitive advantages to 
specific identifiable enterprises, constituted a countervailable benefit, regardless 
of the possibility for other industries to participate in the programme. 17 
As the case in question illustrates, the reasoning of the Court not only 
denies the approach followed by the administering authority, but also leads, by 
necessity, to opposite results. The fact that participation in the programme is 
actually and not only theoretically opened to other industries is not relevant; the 
decisive factor is the limited number of enterprises or industries which actually 
obtain a competitive advantage by means of a governmental subsidy. 
Applying the CIT"s approach in Cabot, some scholars have argued that 
Commerce in its investigation should proceed by successive steps. Firstly, it 
should check if there are de-facto exclusive beneficiaries, and where the number 
of beneficiaries is too broad it must assess whether a specific industry is a 
I C. ibot Corp. N- United States. 9 CIT 481). 620 F. Supp. 1985) ý%Cb. lexls- 
nexis. com, profe-, sional . 
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dominant user of the progranune, or otherwise receives a disproportionate amount 
of benefit. 18 The second sotuation occurs either when the industry's share of the 
total use of the programme is far greater than its contribution to the economy or 
when it receives a disproportionate amount of benefits from the programme 
compared with other users because of its economic structure, as it could result 
from a subsidised. input which accounts for 80 percent of industry A's production 
costs but only a small share of the costs of other industries. 19 
The alternative criterion to "general availability" was fin-ther developed by 
Cameron and Berg, who, however, looked for a more specific parameter from an 
economic viewpoint. Remarking that generally available subsidies do not benefit 
all industries uniformly, the two economists suggested that the specificity of the 
effects be measured by estimating the percentage of the total subsidy absorbed by 
the industry under investigation relative to that industry's share of gross national 
product. 20 The closer to I the ratio is, the less specific is the grant received by the 
f t. 21 industry. The higher the percentage, the more specific is the bene I 
This approach, however, has two faults. Firstly, it relies on a static 
perspective which, in turn, has a protectionist bias, especially against developing 
countries, as benefits that today are concentrated on an industry, tomorrow could 
spread to other sectors due to economic progress. Secondly, the criterion does not 
tell where to draw the line. Certainly a ratio of I or lower indicates the absence of 
specificity, but what about a ratio of 1.2 or 1.5? Are they a definitive index of 
specificity or do they approach a tolerable amount of concentration? 
18 John A. Ragosta and Thomas Shanker, Specificity of Subsidy Benefits in U. S. Department of 
Commerce Countervailing Duty Determinations", Law & Poly Int'l Bus., 25(1994), p. 665 
19 lbid. p 667 
20 Laurie A. Cameron and Gerald C. Berg "The U. S. Countervailing Duty Law and the principle of 
General Availability", J W. TL., 19 (1985). p. 505. 
21 The parameter is given by a double ratio: (S I /S)/(X I /X ), where SI is the value of the subsidy 
received by the umpteenth industry, S is the subsidy total value, XI is the value of production in 
the umpteenth industry; and X is the Gross National Product. 
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Following the CIT decision in Cabot, the ITA, while confirming its 
adherence to the specificity test, abandoned its general availability approach in 
10--- favour of a distinction between nominal and de-facto availability which must be 
assessed case-by-case. 
22 
The case-bv-case avvroach 
The perspectives of the Court and of the Department, however,, do not 
coincide, as the CIT in Cabot emphasised the effective results whereas the ITA 
seems to take as a yardstick the "de facto availability" in contrast to a "de iure. 
availability". Thus, in the second stage of the never ending dispute over "certain 
softwood lumber products from Canada", the administering agency held that in 
determining specificity a variety of factors must be taken into account, such as the 
extent to which a foreign government acts to limit the availability of a 
programme; the extent to which it exercises discretion in making the programme 
available; and, on the other hand, the number of enterprises or industries that 
actually use the programme. 23 
In a subsequent case, concerning this time a Mexican programme to 
restructure private firms and to provide natural gas below market rates, the Court 
of International Trade upheld ITA's determination affmning the need for a case- 
by-case approach to assess specificity. 24 In PPG Industries v. U. S. the Court, 
whose decision was affinned in the appeal , 
25 while confimfing that general 
availability is not the "statutory test", held that it can be considered a 
"manifestation that a programme has not conferred a benefit upon a specific 
22As one might expect, in the "Carbon Black from Mexico" administrative review Commerce 
came to the conclusion that there were too few users of the Mexican programme, which, therefore, 
was countervailable: Final Results of Countervailing Duties Administrative Review, Carbon Black 
from Mexico, 51 F. R. 30385 (August 26,1986). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional/. 
23 Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Certain Softwood Products from 
Canada, 51 FR 37453 (October. 24,1986). web. lexis-nexis. com/professionaU 
24 PPG Industries Inc. v. United States, II CIT 344,662 F. Supp. 258 (1987). web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional/. 
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finn". In the opinion of the Court, therefore, the standard to be followed by the 
i 
I 
administering authority is a case-by-case approach in which general availability is 
66 
one of several factors in determining whether or not a benefit or competitive 
advantage has been confeffed upon a specific firm". The CIT also held that the 
fact that a programme contains certain eligibility requirements for participation 
does not make it countervailable as long as the requirements are not too narrowly 
drawn. 
It seems, therefore, that the Court of Interriational Trade followed two 
I, 
approaches in assessing specificity. The first was the "effects test" whereby a 
(countervailable) subsidy exists if the benefit alters the competitive position of the 
producer in the exporting country. The second test, which, at least nominally, was 
adopted by the ITA, and was upheld by the CIT in "PPG Industries" and in 
subsequent cases, distinguishes between "de facto specificity" and "de iure 
specificity", grounded on a case-by-case analysis. 26 
In the aftermath of "PPG Industries", Congress, which had already shown its 
uneasiness with the ITA's "general availability" approach during the 1984 Trade 
and Tariff Act debate, introduced in the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 a subsection 
B to section 771(5) of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended. This subsection provided 
that the administering authority in assessing specificity must look not only to its 
"de iure availability" but also to its "de facto availability"'. 27 
25 PPG Industries Inc. v. United States, 928 F. 213 1568 (Fed. Circ. 199 1). web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professionaU. 
26 Can-Am Corp. v. United States. II CIT 424,664 F. Supp. 1444 (1987). web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional/. 
27 Section 771(5)(B): "in applying subparagraph (A) the administering authority, in each 
investigation, shall determine whether the bounty, grant, or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to 
a specific enterprise or industry. or group of enterprises or industries. Nominal general availability. 
under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule establishing a bounty, grant or subsidy, of 
the benefits thereunder is not a basis for determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or 
has not been, in fact, provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group thereof'. 
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The main difficulty with the case-by-case approach lies in the lack of a 
general parameter to assess specificity and of a rule to establish the priority 
among the various criteria available. 
The dangers inherent in the case-by-case approach are shown by some 
panel reports under Chapter 19 of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. For 
instance, in "Live Swine from Canada" and in "Softwood Lumber from Canada 
III" the Panel noted that the ITA's determination resulted from an application of 
the above listed criteria of Commerce's proposed regulation, i. e., that the number 
of programme recipients was small relative to the universe of potential 
beneficiaries, thus actually coinciding with a "result" test. 28 
A hypothetical example can also give an idea of the uncertainty that results 
. r_. - from the absence of a single, unequivocal criterion. Let us imagine that the 
exporting country, as in "Certain steel flat rolled products from Korea", passes a 
law allowing accelerated amortisation for fiscal purposes which is available to all 
domestic manufacturing enterprises. The law, however, benefits in particular 
capital intensive firms which, moreover, are concentrated in a developing industry 
which is expanding its presence in the US market. This tax benefit would not be 
countervailed under the "general availability" principle, but, almost certainly, 
would be countervailed under the "result test". With the case-by-case approach 
the outcome is uncertain. On the one hand, the administration in the exporting 
country does not exercise any particular discretion as it applies the law. On the 
other hand, those firms which, at that particular stage of industrialisation in the 
exporting country, can actually benefit from the fiscal provision are quite few. 
Moreover, it can be easily argued that the exporting country's lawmakers in 
passing the law certainly had in mind the advantages to the industry, which 
21 J. M. Mercury, "Chapter 19 of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95: A 
Check on Administered Protection. NorthWest. J. Int. Law & Buss.. 15 (1995). p. 58 l, p. 59 1. 
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actually is receiving the main share of fiscal benefits. As Tandlo remarks, "the 
problem with a specificity test is that nearly any government program may be 
plausibly characterised as either "generally available" or "specifically targeted". 29 
The difficulties inherent in the concrete application of the specificity test 
have caused some scholars to doubt its consistency with the efficient allocation of 
resources, which, in their view, should be the benchmark of countervailing 
measures. Thus Lay argues that general availability of subsidised inputs does not 
prevent users from shifting resources into comparatively inefficient directions, nor 
does the test take into account the fact that subsidies are sometimes aimed at 
offsetting efficiency-reducing externalities. 30 An example of the latter could be 
found in the treatment of subsidies to channel investments towards economically 
depressed areas. The US considered a foreign government subsidy made 
available only to business located in a particular state or region of the foreign 
country to be specific and therefore countervailable, even though it was generally 
available within that province. Commerce, starting from a set of investigations 
concerning domestic subsidies to European steel industries, 31 considered that 
subsidies used to alter the comparative advantage of certain regions are by 
definition a distortion to resources and trade . 
32 In turn, Congress did not include 
the disadvantage of locating in an underdeveloped region among the few specific 
"offsets" that can be taken into account in the calculation of the "'net" subsidy. 33 
The outcome, legitimate as it may be in the multilateral environment prior to the 
Uruguay Round SCM Agreement, partakes of biased formalism, if one considers 
29 Daniel K. Tarullo, "Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade", Harv. L. Rev., 
100 (1986-7), p. 561 
30 William Lay, " Redefining Actionable Subsidies under U. S. Countervailing Duty Law", Col 
L. Rev., 91 (199 1)p. 15 10. 
31 See, e. g., Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Certain Steel Products from 
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39304. (September 7,1982) 
32 For a critical analysis of the US viewpoint on regional subsidies see Pieter Matthijs Alexander, 
The Specificity Test under US Countervailing Law"', MckJInt11,10 (1989), p. 833. 
33 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy, op. cit., p. 565. 
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that under the US regime benefits granted by local authorities to all enterprises 
that locate their investments in their territory, whatever the place of incorporation, 
are not countervailable. 
The foregoing provides a first example of what was said in chapter I about 
the extent and features of the alleged protectionist bias in the US administrative 
protection regime. Here the law does not contain any inherent limitation on 
I. mports from a third country. On the contrary, it goes beyond the provisions of the 
General Agreement and of the Subsidy Code. On the other hand, specificity does 
not provide waterproof protection against protectionist bending of countervailing 
measures. In reply to Greenwald's praise of US moderation in enforcing 
countervailing law, due, in his opinion, primarily to Commerce's adoption of the 
specificity test Vermulst remarks that "it is misleading to focus excessively on the 
Commerce Department as the law is made by a multitude of actors, including in 
addition to the Commerce Department the International Trade Commission, the 
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit". 34 
Here, the ITA applied a liberal construction of the law, but its approach was 
countered by the Court of International Trade which preferred a more restrictive 
construction. The end result is quite ambiguous and does not provide a clear 
guidance for foreign exporters. In certain cases, such as regional subsidies, its 
application, in the absence of corrective provisions, could penalise otherwise 
legitimate foreign programmes. 
3)Upstream subsidies 
Some of the cases in which the concept of specificity was tested and 
developed concerned the supply of inputs by public entities to national industries 
34 E. Vermulst, "Comment". in Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, ed., Slwbsidies, Op. cit. p. 49 
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at subsidised prices . 
35 In such cases the subsidisation is direct and the only 
beneficiary is the end producer. Similar but more complex is the case of a subsidy 
bestowed on the production of an intermediate domestic product which is used as 
the input of an unsubsidised product exported to the US, where the latter is subject 
to a countervailing measure investigation because alleged competitive benefits, in 
A- - me form of lower costs of production, accrue to the exporter. 
Counteravai lability of upstream subsidies, which are the dominant form of 
indirect subsidies, posits, therefore, a flow-down effect from the intermediate 
product to the final one. No TAA provision expressly dealt with this issue, and, 
therefore, investigations of upstream subsidies were initially based on the 
interpretation of sections 701 (5) and 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which 
provided for countervailabilty of indirect subsidisation. The administering 
authority in assessing upstream subsidies was careful not to exploit the potential 
for countervailing measures to the outmost extent. Thus, in the 1982 steel cases 
against European Community producers the Department of Commerce made the 0 
imposition of countervailing duties conditional on the absence of an ann's length 
transaction, arguing that if a sale is transacted at arm's length, benefits bestowed 
to the manufacturer of an input do not flow-down to the purchaser as the former 
attempts to maximise its total revenues by charging as high a price as the market 
would bear. 36 Moreover, in the opinion of the Department, the fact that the input 
producer and the consumer are related companies does not prevent an arm's 
length transaction whenever the former sells to the latter at the prevailing market 
33 See Final Negative determination, Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 F. R. 28522 
(June 22,1983). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
Carbon Black from Mexico, note 13. 
For an analysis of the case law and the legislative response to subsidisation of intermediate 
products, see Janet Zoe Barsy, "Upstream Subsidies and US Countervailing Duty Law,: The 
Mexican Ammonia Decision and the Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984", Law &Pol'Y Int 7 
Bus., 16 (1984), p. 263-298. 
36 Final Affirmative Countervailin Duty Determination Certain Steel Products From Belgium, 47 
F. R. 39304 (September 27.1982). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
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. i, price, or at least at a price not different from that charged to unrelated 
purchasers. 
37 
Quite surprisingly, given the frequent accusation of administrative 
protectionism levelled against the investigation of subsidised imports, two 
scholars have contended that the ITA's assumption that in most cases sellers of 
intennediate products do not pass subsidisation benefits to their clients except 
when price elasticity is higher than unity does not withstand the scrutiny of 
38 
economic theory. Both Koenig and Giesen argue that economic theory shows 
that subsidies are, at least, partially passed through and that the benefit transfer is 
the greater the more unelastic the demand curve is. 
This argument would have justified a much greater number of positive 
determinations in upstream subsidy investigations. It can be argued, however, 
that the geometric demonstration on which the criticism is based ignores, in a 
simplistic way, the assumption which Commerce's investigations relied on: it is 
rather likely that intermediate input producing enterprises maximise their profits 
not by passing benefits through lower prices and concurrently increasing supply, 
but by keeping prices fixed and controlling supply, especially when demand does 
not fully react to price variation. In technical wording, in this instance supply 
tends to become unelastic. That would not result just in the shift of the supply 
curve downward due to the cost reducing effect of subsidisation, but concurrently 
in an alteration of the supply slope which becomes steeper, thus meeting the 
demand curve at a higher price level and at a lower quantity. 
37 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determiation Certain Steel Products from the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 47 F. R. 39345 (September 7,1982). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination Certain Steel Products from France 47 F. R. 
39332 (September 7,1982). web. lexis-nex is. com/professional. 
38 Peter J. Koenig, "Upstream Subsidies and U. S. Countervailing Duty Law", in John H. Jackson 
et al., eds., International Trade Policy: The Lawyer's Perspective (New York : Matthew Bender, 
1985), p. 9-9 - 9-15. 
Hans-Michael Giesen, "Upstream Subsidies: Policy and Enforcement Questions after the Trade 
and Tariff Act of 1984", Law &Pol'Y Int'l Bus., 17 (1985), p. 268-278 
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Commerce's moderate approach was incorporated in the 1984 Trade and 
Tariff Act which makes the imposition of countervailing duties on the exported 
merchandise conditional on three elements: the input supplier must receive 
domestic subsidies; the subsidy must confer a competitive benefit on the exported 
output; and it must have a significant effect on the cost of the product under 
investigation. 
The 1984 Act added a new section 771 A to the Tariff Act of 1930. This 
section limited upstream subsidy countervailability only to those domestic 
subsidies, as opposed to export subsidies, which are listed in section 771(5) 
(I), (II), and (III). 
39Thus, 
the provision of capital, loans, and loan guarantees, the 
provision of goods and services, and the grant of funds or debt forgiveness to 
cover operating losses are covered. On the other hand, subsidies in the form of 
fiscal acknowledgement of accelerated depreciation for certain sectors of the 
I 
national economy are excluded from the provision. 40 
The term competitive benefit has a non-technical meaning, as benefit is 
considered to be bestowed when the input product price is lower than the price the 
producer of the merchandise under investigation would pay to another seller in an 
ann's length transaction. The provision, therefore, substantially reproduced, and 
went even fin-ther than, the above-mentioned practice of Commerce which 
required proof of the passing on of the benefit derived from subsidisation. Indeed, 
under the section, even though the whole subsidy is passed on but the price to the 
exporter is higher than the price offered by an independent producer, no 
countervailing duty can be levied on the final product. For instance, in "Cold- 
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Korea", the ITA found that no 
competitive advantage had been conferred on the Korean steel producers as they 
39 See Supra section 2. note 8. 
40 Hans-Michael Giesen, Upstream, op. cit., p. 288. 
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had bought the bulk of the allegedly subsidised iron ore production at prices 
higher than what they paid to foreign unsubsidised suppliers. 41 On the other hand, 
the 1984 Act allows the administering agency to use alternative benchmarks to 
assess a competitive advantage when it has determined in previous proceedings 
that the independent producer input that is used for comparison is subsidised too. 
In such a case Commerce may adjust the price to reflect the effect of the subsidy, 
or select a price from another, non-subsidised, source. 
The third element to be considered by the ITA in its determination is the 
effect of the input subsidy on the product under investigation, which must be 
significant. The effect in question also determines the maximum amount of 
countervailing duty that can be imposed on the exported product. Thus, if, for 
instance, the competitive benefit brought about by the difference in price between 
the subsidised input and a product obtainable in an ann's length transaction is ten, 
and the flow-down subsidy totals five, the countervailing duty cannot exceed the 
latter amount. 
Section 771 A made it clear that it is not the input itself but the subsidy 
that must have a significant effect on the cost of the final merchandise. A three- 
step assessment was, ) therefore, required. Firstly, the ITA must calculate the 
subsidy on the input, expressed in "ad valorem" terms; secondly, it must establish 
the share of the input on the cost of production of the final good, expressed as a 
percentage; thirdly, it must multiply the two percentages. 42 
The section, however, provided no benchmark to determine whether the 
effect is relevant., leaving it to the administering authority. In one of the earlier 
cases Commerce created a rule of thumb to determine the relevance of passed-on 
subsidisation: if the input subsidy allocated to the final product exceeds five 
" Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 F. R. 47284 (1984). 
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percent, a rebuttable presumption of significant effect is established. If the 
amount is less than one percent, there is a rebuttable presumption that the subsidy 
has no significant impact. 
43 
So far it seems that the United States has only developed a concept, 
indirect subsidisation, already present in the General Agreement, just establishing 
the benchmarks for its assessment, also in the interest of exporters under 
investigation. The parameters worked out in the aftermath of the Tokyo Round 
turned out to be too narrow to offer a wide enough buffer against foreign 
competition,, at least in the sector of agricultural produce and its processed 
products. Thus, Canadian swine, primary commodity for the production of pork, 
provided the dominant quota of the value added of the final product. Yet, it would 
have been very difficult for the US pork industry to prove that the subsidised 
commodity conferred a competitive benefit to the Canadian pork producers. 
Commerce decided to overcome the obstacle by considering the breeding of pigs 
and pork production as two parts of a single production process. ITA justified its 
decision arguing that little value was added at the processing stage and, therefore, 
A- - me demand for the raw product was substantially based on the demand for the 
processed product. 44 The decision to consider pork export as the fmal stage of a 
single process also entailed higher countervailing duties, as the subsidy granted to 
swine breeders was not viewed as an indirect benefit but as a direct subsidy to be, 
therefore, countervailed for its total amount rather than just according to the 
45 
percentage share of the input in the final product value. The Court of 
International Trade, however, rejected this approach, asserting that no exception 
42 If the subsidy comes to 10 percent of the input's value and the input weight on the total cost of 
the product under investigation is 20 percent the effect of the flowed-down subsidy is 2 percent. 
43 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Certain Agricultural Tillage Tools from 
Brazil. 50 F. R. 34525 (August 6,1985). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
44Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination. Live Swine and Fresh Chilied and Frozen 
Pork Products from Canada, 50 F. R. 25097 (June 17.1985). web. lex is-nexis. com, professional. 
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had been provided in the 1984 upstream subsidy rules with reference to 
agriculucal products. 46 
Lawmakers soon came to the rescue of domestic industry. Section 1313 
of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act introduced section 771 B to 
the Tariff Act of 1930 which provides that when the demand for unprocessed 
agricultural products is substantially dependent on the demand for processed 
agricultural products and when processing adds only limited value to the 
commodity, subsidies to the raw agricultural products are deemed to be provided 
with respect to the exported manufactured products. 47 The US National Pork 
Producer's Council filed another countervailing duty petition and Commerce 
imposed countervailing duties to offset the total amount of the subsidy bestowed 
to Canadian swine producers. 48 
The consistency of the new US approach was, however, questioned by the 
GATT to which Canada lodged a complaint. The Panel maintained that with 
regard to upstream subsidies proof must be given that the exporter of the final 
product has received a benefit as long as it is a separate industry operating at 
arm's length with the intermediate product industry to which a subsidy has been 
granted. In the case in question, therefore, detennination that pork production had 
been subsidised required an examination of the impact of the subsidy on the price 
of swine . 
49The 
question was whether the price Canadian pork producers paid to 
swine breeders was lower than the price they had to pay to other available 
45 See Marc Ben itah, The Law qfSubsidies under the GA 7TIWTO System (Hague, London: Kluwer 
Law International. 200 1) p. 207 
46 Canadian Meat Council v. United States, II CIT 362; 661 F. Supp. 623 (1987) web. lexis- 
nexis. com/profess ion al. 
47 See Gilbert B. Kaplan, Susan Haggerty Kuhback and Ronald Lorentsen, "Antidumping, 
Countervailing Duty and National Security Provisions in the 1988 Trade Act", Geo. WaskJ Int'l. 
L. &Econ., 22(1989). p. 607. 
"8 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Fresh Chilled and Frozen Pork from 
Canada, 54 F. R. 30774 (July 24,1989). web. lexis-nexis-com/professional. 
'9 Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada. Report by the Panel 
Adopted on II July 1991 (DS7-R). 38 Supp. BISD. p. 30, para. 4.9. 
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sources. ne answer to this question could not be premised, as the US law 
assumed, just on the dependence of the demand for swine on the demand for pork 
and on the limited value added in the production of swine into pork. so 
4)Market as the primary benchmark for subsidisation assessment. 
GATT art. VI provides that no countervailing duty shall be levied in 
excess of the estimated subsidy. However, neither the General Agreement nor the 
Subsidies Code defines what constitutes a subsidy and, therefore, which is the 
benchmark to ascertain its existence and to assess its amount. The answers given 
to this question by the main GATT parties differed. To understand the US 
approach one must compare it with the EC approach. 
The European Community linked subsidy to a charge on the public 
account. The Community's position was stated in a series of complaints lodged by 
the Seed Crushers and Oil Processors Federation (FEDIOL) against the European 
Commission's failure to impose countervailing duties on imports of processed 
soya products from Argentina and Brazil .51 According to the Federation, 
Argentina and Brazil indirectly subsidised soy meal and oil by imposing a lower 
export tax on soy products than on the unprocessed produce, thus reducing raw 
commodity exports and concurrently increasing domestic supply with the result of 
lowering prices for producers of soy-based products. The Commission considered 
that this practice was not a subsidy, particularly because it did not involve a 
charge on the public account, as the differential system of taxation did not 
constitute an exemption from taxes otherwise due to government. The European 
Court of Justice upheld the decision on the ground that the last paragraph of the 
501bid. para. 4.10. 
51 ECJ Case 187/85 EEC Seed Crushers and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol) v Commission of 
the European Union(1988) E. C. R. 4155; 
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illustrative list annexed to Regulation 2176/84 on countervailing measures, which 
reproduced paragraph I of the annex to the Subsidies Code, read "any other 
charge on the public accounf. It has been remarked, however, that in the first 
place other items in the EC illustrative list did not necessarily involve a cost to 
govenunen14 and that, at any rate, the Regulation itself stated explicitly that the 
practices listed in the illustrative list were not exhaustive. 52 
The United States administrative practice and case law lie at the opposite 
end of the spectrum focusing on the benefit to the recipient relative to the 
condition prevailing on the market. The US viewpoint is stated clearly in the 1992 
"Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada" final affirmative 
deten, nination. Commerce justified its decision to impose countervailing duties on 
the imports of Canadian softwood lumber products by pointing out that neither the 
GATT nor the Subsidies Code requires proof of govenunent financial 
contribution. In this context the ITA argued that even export restrictions imposed 
by a local authority can constitute a countervailable domestic subsidy. Likewise, 
the provision by a government of a good or service at differential rates confers a 
countervailable benefit even though the programme does not involve a charge on 
AL - me public account. In this particular instance the only thing required to trigger the 
imposition of countervailing duties is that the price charged for goods or services 
is "less than the benchmark price which normally will be the non-selective prices 
the government charges the same or other users of the goods or services within the 
same political jurisdiction" 53 
ECJ Case 188/85 EEC Seed Crushers and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol) v Commission of 
the European Union (1988) E. C. R. 4193 
52 See in particular M Bronckers and R. Quick, "What is a Countervailable Subsidy under EEC 
Trade J W. T, 23 (1989) 6, p. 13. 
53 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, 57 F. R. 22570 (May 28,1992). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
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1) Facilitated loans 
Tle American approach is illustrated by the treatment of govemment 
supported loans. Section 771 (5) of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended by the TAA, 
included as countervailing subsidies the provision of capital, loans, and loan 
guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial consideration. Wide use of this 
provision was made in the steel cases of the early 1980s. In particular. with regard 
to government supported loans subsidy was computed by comparing what the 
company would pay in principal and interest on a normal commercial loan to what 
the company actually paid on the preferential loan. The treatment reserved to so- 
called uncreditworthy companies was particularly severe. Companies were 
considered uncreditworthy when it would have been extremely difficult for them 
to borrow in the commercial market as they lacked sufficient revenues or 
resources to meet their costs and fixed financial obligations. Such a condition was 
particularly associated with persistent losses. Government loans to such 
enterprises were equated to contributions to capital, measured by the difference 
between the enterprise's rate of return on equity and the country's average rate of 
return on equity. Commerce justified this approach by the low probability of 
repayment of these loans. 
54 
This extremely penalising approach was later abandoned when the ITA 
laid down more detailed rules for the assessment of loan and loan guarantee 
subsidies in the appendix to the final determination in the "Cold-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Products from Argentina" case. ii 
For long ten-n loans subsidy assessment was carried out in three stages. 
First, a comparison Nvas made between what a company would pay a normal 
54 Final Affir7natke Countervailing Duv, Determinations: Certain Steel Products from Belgium 
"Appendix 2". 47 FR 3930-4 (September 7,1 Q82). %veh. lex Is-ne \is. com, 'profess ion al. 
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commercial lender in principal, interest and other charges in any given year and 
what it actually pays on the preferential loan in a given year. The benchmark 
usually used was company specific, in order to take into account the riskiness of 
each enterprise. If the company had not taken out comparable commercial loans, 
Commerce resorted to a national average loan interest rate or to the interest rate 
and other conditions applied to a comparable company. After calculating the 
payment differential between the benchmark loan and the loan under 
investigation, the present value of the stream of benefits was determined using a 
discount rate, given by the weighted cost of capital in the country concerned. 
Finally, the discounted amount was allocated over the life of the loan. 
I 
For long-term loans to companies considered uncreditworthy a risk 
premium was added, which was calculated as the difference between the bond 
ratings of the least and most creditworthy companies in the country in question. 
The assessment of the benefit for short-term loans was more direct as 
credits whose redemption date does not exceed one year were considered less 
risky than long-term loans. The benchmark used by Commerce is the national 
average short- term interest rate. As the loans in question are repaid within a year, 
benefits were allocated to one year only. 
2) Provision ofcapital 
Reference to the market is also at the basis of the treatment of government 
equity investments. According to section 771(5), provision of capital 
countervailability results from its inconsistency with commercial consideration. 
No light is shed, however, on the precise meaning of the latter term. 
In the early stages of the steel cases Commerce focused on the recurrence 
and amount of losses to determine whether the investment were inconsistent with 
55 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty order: Cold- 
Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina "Appendix", 49 F. R. 18006 (Apfil 26,1994). 
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sound business criteria. 56Later, however, the administering agency concluded that 
a firm's lack of profitability in the past was just a factor in assessing whether an 
investment is consistent with commercial consideration, as companies that suffer 
economic vicissitudes could show losses, and still represent sound investments if 
they can revert to profitability. 57 
Commerce, therefore, assessed commercial consideration from the 
perspective of an investor at the time the investment was undertaken: the so-called 
"outside reasonable investor test". According to this approach, the ITA first 
considered the value of the stock as detennined by the market. To the extent that a 
.I 
government Procures stock at market price, there is no subsidy. If it pays a 
premium price for shares, the investment is alleged to be inconsistent with 
commercial consideration. When there is no market-determined price, the 
government must act as an outside investor, weighing a variety of factors, such as 
the company's ongoing financial situation, its profit and loss records, and its 
future prospects, taking into account studies and forecasts of the market and in 
particular of the industry of which the company is a part. If government equity 
purchases are deemed inconsistent with commercial consideration, the benefit is 
measured by multiplying the difference between the company's rate of return on 
equity and the national average rate for the review period by the total amount of 
equity purchases made in years in which the company was 44unequityworthy"58 
ITA's reliance on the reasonable investor parameter, however, is not free 
from risks, some of which have been recognised, in principle, by Commerce itself. 
web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
*" See, e. g., Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Certain Steel Products 
from Belgium 47 F. R. 26300 (June 17,1982). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
57 See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Carbon-Steel Structural Shapes, Hot- 
Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Bars from the United Kingdom 47 F. R. 
39384 (September 7,1982). web. lexis-nex is. com/professional. 
" Ibid. 
Also Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products From Argentina, 49 F. R. 18006 (April 26,1984), note 49. 
web. lexis-nexis. com/professional 
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For instance, investment in ailing industries can be consistent with commercial 
consideration in the context of reorganisation, especially if they do not aim at 
increasing production capacity but at preventing negative social effects such as 
extensive redundancy of workers. 59 
D'CO'co 
Re. gnition in principle, however, is not the same as actual recognition, 
I whose occurrence is made very unlikely by the reasonable investor approach 
established by Commerce. The limits and faults of this approach are shown by 
the "British Steel Corporation" case in which the Court of International Trade 
(CIT) partially upheld Commerce's positive determination of subsidisation by 
equity infusion in a state-owned British steel enterprise. 60 
The plaintiff, British Steel Corporation, contended that government equity 
infusion in loss-incurring companies is consistent with commercial consideration 
on two foundations: 
1) Firms should continue operations and their owners, whether private or public, 
should continue to cover operating losses as long as revenues exceed variable 
costs. 
2) Investors should undertake investment schemes or fund the completion of 
ongoing schemes where the discounted cash-flow of the investment exceeds its 
costs. 
The Court did not accept British Steel's arguments. Though taking care to 
stress that equity infusion in loss-incurring companies does not per se confer a 
subsidy, the CIT pointed out that prospective excess of revenue over operating 
costs can be a useful analytical tool for the owner/manager to decide whether to 
continue operating a loss-incurring company,, but the test is inappropriate to 
59 See Charlene Barshefsky. Alice L. Mattice, William L. Martin 11, "Government Equity 
Participation in State Owned Enterprises: An Analysis of the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty 
Cans", Law &Pol'Y Int I Bus., 14 (1982-83). p. 1134. 
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investment decisions by private in-,, -estors. For the latter it ý%-ould not be 
commercially reasonable to provide funds without adequate assurance of the 
future profitability of the enterprise and return of its investments xxithin a 
reasonable time. With regard to the second point, the Court remarked that 
comparison between present discounted value of revenues and costs of a capital 
project can be usefully applied to appraise individual projects but it is not apt to 
appraise the company's overall condition, which is relevant in deciding xvhether to 
inject fresh capital. On the other hand, it allowed that decisions on individual 
capital projects can be of relevance for the overall health of the company and, 
therefore, for equity investment decisions. 
The fault with these arguments is their restrictive identification of commercial 
consideration with the private investor's viewpoint whose main aim is the pursuit 
of profit within a reasonable time. Other elements, perfectly consistent with 
commercial reasonableness, can be taken into account by the owner/manager or 
by the parent company in a group. In deciding whether it is worthwhile to buoy up 
ailing companies, corporate reorganisation does not only entail weeding-out but 
can call for new investments. In short, an investment decision that is inconsistent 
with commercial consideration from the angle of the investor in the capital market 
can be perfectly reasonable if viewed from the perspective of the firm concerned 
or of the group to which the company belongs. Paradoxically the exclusive 
reliance on the market benchmark ends up discriminating against state-owned 
enterprises just because capital infusion necessarily involves a charge on the 
public account. 
5) Material injury 
60 British Steel Corp. %. United Statcs. 10 CIT 6', -' F. Supp. 59 (1986). %keb. lexk- 
nevs. com, professional 
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The gap between multilateral and domestic regulation remained quite vvide 
II 
with reference to injury determination. Unlike antidumping, prior to the Trade 
Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979, the injury requirement provided by GATT art. 
VI did not apply to countervailing duty cases in the United States because of the 
grand-father clause under which a Party to the General Agreement was not 
required to change pre-existing laws. The only exceptions concerned non dutiable 
imported goods which until the beginning of the 1970s were not subject to 
countervailing measures. The extension of countervailing procedures to these 
imports, therefore, was not covered by the grandfather clause and the Trade Act of 
1974 introduced an injury deten-nination provision limited to such goods. 
Applying the antidumping regime, the 1974 Act required the US International 
Trade Commission (ITC) to carry out the injury test while subsidy assessment was 
entrusted to the Department of Treasury, later replaced by Commerce. 
The split responsibility regime was extended by the TAA of 1979 to 
dutiable goods. However, as already noted in chapter 11, the injury test only 
applied to goods from countries which were signatories to the Subsidies Code or 
which had assumed substantially equivalent obligations, whereas the regime 
previously in place still applied to all other countries for which the finding of 
subsidisation was the only requirement to imposing countervailing duties. 
In line with the Subsidies Code, sect. 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
added by the 1979 TAA, provided that if the ITC determines that an industry in 
the United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the 
establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded by reason 
of imports of the merchandise under investigation, a countervailing cluty should 
be imposed upon that merchandise. The US industrv was defined as either the 
whole of domestic producers of a like product or those producers ý, Nhose collective 
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output constitutes a major proportion of the domestic production of the product in 
question. With a wording rather inelegant but substantially equivalent to the 
Subsidies Code, "like product" was defined by the mentioned section as a product 
which is like or, in the absence of like, more similar in characteristics and uses 
with the article subject to investigation. 
The Court of International Trade - whose judgement was affirmed by the 
Federal Circuit - held that the determination of domestic industry by the ITC can 
differ not only from the petition but also from the findings of the administering 
authority in the Department of Commerce, thus stressing the independence of the 
investigations. 61 
In line with the General Agreement, the new section allowed partition of 
the US affected industry into regional industries whenever the producers in a 
regional market sell all or almost all of the production of the like product in that 
market and the local demand is not supplied, to any substantial degree, by 
producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the United States. 
1) The assessment ofsubsidy impact 
The real problem lay, however, in the assessment of causation. It is here 
that the US rules often seem to be out of line with the relevant provision of the 
Subsidies Code which explicitly provides for a causal link between subsidy and 
injury, and, therefore, can be bent to protectionist ends. The United States at first 
tried to avoid reproducing the term "material injury" provided by the General 
Agreement and by the Subsidies Code, and only accepted its encompassment in 
the TAA on the insistence of the other signatories. The other parties contended 
6'Torrington Company v. United States, 14CIT 648,747 F 
nexis. com/professional. 
Torrington Company v. United States 938 F. 2D 
nexis. com/professional. 
Supp. 744 (CIT 1990). web. lexis- 
1278 (Fed. Circ. 1991). web-lexis- 
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that material injury is greater than mere injury while the US argued that the verbal 
difference was meaningless. The Tariff Act. as amended. provided that material 
injury means harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant. 62 . In 
practice the TAA extended to the new regime the interpretation of the term 
"injury" developed under the preceding antidumping statute, that is. something 
more than "de minimis" harm to domestic industry. That was to contrast the term 
in question with "substantial cause of injury" used in the escape clause 
implementing article XIX of GATT 1947, which according to art. 201 of the 
Tariff act implied that imports are to be considered "a cause of injury v, -hich is as 
important and not less important than any other cause". Legislative history also 
makes it clear that in countervailing measure and antisubsidy investigation the 
ITC is not requested to weigh the causal factors that determine injury. What is 
relevant is merely that subsidised imports are one of the causes. 63 
Under section 771 (7) (B) the Commission in making its injury 
determination was to consider: the volume of imports of the merchandise under 
investigation; their effect on the price of like products in the United States; and 
their impact on domestic producers of like products. The text focuses, therefore, 
on the volume of the imported merchandise and on its impact on domestic 
producers of like products. 
A first question that confronted US administrative bodies and courts was 
the sequence of steps to be adopted in injury determination. There were two 
competing approaches - the -bifurcated analysis- and the -single determination 
analysis". According to the first approach. prevalently followed by the 
International Trade Commission, the first step is to determine whether the US 
industry has been materially injured and, if the answer is in the affirmative. to 
Sect. --1(7) (A) 
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make a determination as to whether material injury has been caused by the 
subsidised or dumped imports. It follows that if the domestic industry is in good 
health no causal test will be carried out with regard to the allegedly subsidised 
goods. In contrast, single determination analysis directly looks at the impact of 
the imports on the performance of domestic industry which could lead to an 
affirmative detennination even though the domestic industry is not unhealthy. 64 
The requirement of an analysis of the effects of the imports under 
0 investigation, especially if carried out according to the single determination 
approach, highlights a potential discrepancy between the Subsidies Code and the 
enforcing TAA provisions. The fonner provided for proof that subsidised 
imports are causing injury, through the effect of subsidy, 65 whereas the latter 
merely provided that the ITC should determine whether injury occurs by reason of 
imports of the merchandise under investigation. The distinction is not an 
irrelevant one as the impact of the imported goods can stem not only from 
subsidisation but also from a variety of competitive advantages which are not 
necessarily linked to the former. The gap between the wording of the texts is 
made even more relevant by the fact that, as we have seen, the Commission is not 
required to weigh the factors that concur in the causal process 66 . 
63 David Palmeter, "Injury Determination in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases. A 
Commentary on US Practice". J W. T L, 21 (1987), p. 31 - 64 Paul W. Jameson "Recent International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the Material 
Injury Standard. A Critique, Law &Pol'Y Int 7 Bus., 18 (1986), p. 526. 
63 Art. 6.4 
66 The difference between the approaches in question is clearly illustrated by Vice Chairman 
Ronald Cass in his dissenting opinion in New Steel Rail from Canada (Investigation n. 70 1 -TA- 
297 - Final - 1989): "'... Rather the difference is between two approaches that look at imports. One 
examines the way unfairly traded imports affect the US industry, in contrast to the effects that 
would be felt if the unfair practice did not exist. The other approach examines the effect of imports 
regardless of the degree to which they are unfairly traded. In this latter view, the effect of a . 05 
percent subsidy to imported widgets is not distinguishable from that of a 50 percent subsidy. The 
critical factor for this view is the total number of widgets imported" 
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I Contrary to what Granet suggests, US legislative history does not support 
the idea of a complete alignment of the TAA with the Subsides Code. 67 In 
particular, if the Senate Finance Committee seems to have interpreted the relevant 
provisions of the Trade Agreements Act in the light of the Code requirement of a 
causal link between subsidy and injury, the report of the House Ways and Means 
Committee is more ambiguous, simply stating that the TAA draft contains the 
same causation element as the previous law, i. e., that "material injury must be by 
reason of the subsidised or less than fair value imports". Granet also argues that 
the timing provisions of the TAA imply that the ITC must take into account the 
antidumping and subsidy assessment carried out by the Department of Commerce 
either under a preliminary or final determination, and, therefore, the Commission 
should refer to the assessment of subsidy in its determination of causality. 68 
However, as noted above, the courts have affirmed the independence of the 
investigations carried out by the administering authority and by the ITC, even 
stating that the domestic industry determination carried out by the two bodies can 
differ. This casts doubts on the suggestion that the assessment of subsidisation is a 
necessary component in detenrnining the link between subsidised imports and 
injury to a domestic industry. 
2) Cumulation 
On the other hand, the subsequent legislative history, with just one 
relevant statutory exception, bears out that US lawmakers focused on the impact 
of imPOrts rather than on the effects of subsidisation. Thus, a 1984 amendment to 
the Tariff Act, going far beyond the provisions of the General Agreement and the 
Subsidies Code, provided that in its investigation the ITC must "cumulatively 
67 Lloyd Granet, "ITC Injury Determination in Countervailing Duty Investigations", Law &Pol'Y 
Int'l Bus. 15 (1983), p. 992. 
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assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries of like 
products subject to investigation if such products compete with each other and 
with like products of the domestic industry of the United States"' . 
69 The provision, 
which made a practice intermittently followed by the ITC in antidumping 
proceedings since the early 1960s compulsory for both subsidy and countervailing 
duty procedures 70 . lent itself to the accusation of being biased against minor 
producers, especially those in developing countries, as it did not take into account 
the different impact of imports from major suppliers, which dominate an import 
trade, and imports from minor sources. 71 
The protectionist bias of ctunulation is particularly noticeable with regard 
to cross-cumulation and "de minimis" import volume. 
Cross-cumulation implies that imports alleged to be sold at less than fair 
value are to be cumulated with imports alleged to be subsidised in assessing 
material injury to domestic industries. The Commission refused to apply cross- 
cumulation in its investigations, arguing that the Trade Agreements Act had 
implemented two separate multilateral agreements, the Subsidies and 
Antidumping Codes, requiring, therefore, two separate injury tests. The Court, 
however, rejected the ITC's opinion pointing out that in passing the 1984 Act, 
Congress had expressed concern with the combined effects of all unfairly traded 
imports upon domestic industries and that "the definition of material injury and 
the causal link between injury and the unfairly traded imports are identical for 
subsidy and antidumping investigations and are outlined in a common statutory 
" Ibid., p. 996. 
69 Sect. 771 (c ) (7) (iv) 
'0 The first reported case is Portland Cement from Portugal. Inv. N. AA 1921-16, TC Pub. 37 
(oct. 196 1) 
71 See N. David Palmeter, Injury Determination, op. cit., p. 38. Palmeter contends that mandatory 
cumulation turns countervailing and antidumping investigations into a substitute for escape clause 
relief, without containing the procedural and substantive standards of that law. 
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provision ), )72 The decision was affmned by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
DiStriCt. 73 
ITA's attitude over the question of the cumulation of imports from 
different countries, some of which have minimal bearing on the product market 
under examination was much stricter, also because the text of the 1984 Act left 
very little room for flexibility. Here it was the legislator that in a subsequent 
statute tried to make the effects of cumulating less severe and, therefore, less 
protectionist. Section 1330 (b) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 established an exception for countries with minimum amounts of exports in 
the product market. The Act, however, did not specify the level under which 
imports are to be considered "de minimis", thus increasing ITA's leeway in 
assessing the impact of importation. On the other hand, legislative history shows 
that Congress intended the exception to be applied narrowly so as not to subvert 
the purpose of cumulation. 
74 
Conclusion 
Even after the closure of the Tokyo Round, countervailing duty regulation 
and, therefore, the identification of countervailable subsidies, remained entrusted 
to the importing state. 
Rule making and its administrative implementation were particularly 
dynamic in the United States. Sometimes US insh-uments, and administrative 
practice develop concepts, which were already present in the General Agreement 
and in the Subsidies Code. Frequently they go beyond what can be drawn from 
7213ingharn & Taylor Division, Virginia Industries Inc. v. United States. 10 CIT 67,627 F. Supp. 
796 (1986). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
3 815 F. 2d 1482(Fed. Circ. 1987). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
74Gary N. Horlick and Geoffirey D. Oliver, "Antidumping and Duty Law Provisions of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988". JWT, 23 (1989) n. 3. p. 37. 
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multilateral rules. Finally, in some cases, a divergence between US regulations 
and multilateral rules can be detected. 
Domestic subsidies had been considered as potentially countervailable in 
the US long before the Tokyo Round closure. Hence, the acknowledgement that 
domestic subsidies can be trade distorting was one of the objectives of the US 
negotiators during the Round. The concept of specificity is developed by US 
statutes, by ITA's implementation and by case law with no exact reference to 
multilateral rules. The regulation of upstream subsidies develops and specifies the 
indirect subsidy concept already present in the General Agreement. Similar 
remarks can be made for the extension of loans on preferential terms by 
goverment or on governmental behest, as well as with equity provision to state- 
owned firms. However, in this case the United States outlook, xhich focuses on 
consistency with market parameters, does not coincide with the perspecti-ve of 
other GATT parties. 
With regard to material injury the implementing US legislation is much 
more detailed and complex than its multilateral counterpart. In some key points, 
however, relevant divergences emerge between the two sets of rules, as in the case 
of the causation process between subsidies, exported merchandise, and their 
impact on the domestic industry. Also the concept of cumulation is not present in 
the multilateral regulation of injury. 
The foregoing sections bring us to the question of whether the US statutes 
since the 1979 TAA and their implementation represented a drift towards 
protectionism. 
The analysis of US laws, administrative practice, and case lavv does not 
bear out a radical change in that direction in the institutional setting. Firstly. the 
US law was mostly in line NNith the General Agreement and the Subsidies Code. 
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Secondly, the US's most prominent additions to multilateral rules, such as 
specificity, were advantageous to foreign exporters. Thirdly, the introduction of 
the material injury test meant, at least at first sight, a tardy fulfilment of 
international commitments. 
The devil is in the detail and the role of each of the three actors - 
lawmakers, Executive, and courts - in causing that evil is not uniform. 
As regards specificity, it was the Executive that adopted a free market 
stance through the "general availability" approach. The Court of International 
Trade gave a more restrictive interpretation to the law, and Congress codified the 
CIT's perspective by adding a new subsection to section 701 (5). 
As far as upstream subsidies are concemed, Commerce and the CIT 
I 
interpreted the rules in a non-protectionist way. Only later the administering 
authority adopted a more protectionist stance to support a particular sector of the 
economy, agricultural produce and its processed output, and this approach was 
codified by Congress. It should be noted that a protectionist bias becomes quickly 
more pronounced when the need arises to protect domestic industries that find 
themselves at a disadvantage which they blame on government support for 
foreign competitors. 
With regards to government supported loans and to equity capital infusion I 
in state-owned companies, the American viewpoint, Nvhose landmark is the 
market, is probably more in line xvith economic analysis than its EC counterpart 
which makes subsidisation assessment conditional on a burden on the public 
budget. Reliance on the market as the only gauge to assess subsidies can, 
however, result in undue, that is, protectionist. penalisation of f-Oreign 
competitors. This can be said for the later abandoned equalisation of loans on 
preferential terms to uncreditworthy companies to equity proN ision. which was the 
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approach followed by the ITA in the early stage of the steel cases. The same can 
be said of equity capital infusion in loss making state-owned companies, where 
the decision to invest, which can be perfectly consistent with commercial 
consideration, becomes countervailable if the owner happens to be a government 
or a public authority. 
As regards the material injury test, the divergence with the Subsidies Code 
wording over the role of subsidy and exported merchandises in the injury to 
domestic industry causal process makes an injury determination much easier in 
the United States. Cumulation introduced, or at least codified, by the 1984 Act 
adversely affects foreign exporters. Here Commerce would have preferred a less 
protectionist approach but its leeway was limited by lawmakers. The latter, 
however, in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act tried to limit the 
worst abuses of its creature. 
In short, the implementation of multilateral law, which can be considered a 
drift towards a less unilateral regime, was accompanied by a multitude of unholy 
details. We leave unanswered the question as to whether these details changed the 
institutional setting in a protectionist direction "by cumulation" 
CHAPTERIV 
US TRADE POLICY AND THE WTO SCM REGIME AS INTERPRETED 
BY THE WTO JURISPRUDENCE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have examined the developments in US 
legislation and practice on CVD measures and the various phases of the 
international regulation of subsidies and countervailing measures culminating 
with the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. This chapteritries to answer the question 
whether the results of the Uruguay Round reflected or departed from the 
objectives pursued by the United States and the pattern that had emerged in its 
countervailing duty regime. 
The United States pressed for much stronger discipline on subsidies, as 
well as measures having similar effects, arguing that they, in most forms, if not 
all, distort resources allocation and hamper economic efficiency, while most of 
the other participants viewed countervailing measures as the main culprit, 
considering it a covert protectionist tool. ' Depayre has a point in noting that the 
negotiating parties' outlooks were for so long opposed and it was so difficult to 
find a common ground that in the end the standstill was overcome only through 
the provision of draft texts, first by the Chairman of the Subsidies group and later 
by the GATT Director General, Dunke12 ; and it is arguable that such draft texts 
were not the exact balance of the contrasting viewpoints of the participants. 
However, the United States was not alone in asking for more stringent and wide- 
ranging rules to contrast the use of subsidies. Indeed, the Uruguay Round history 
1 Patrick J. McDonough, "Subsidies and Countervailing Measures", in Terence P. Stewart, ed., The 
Uruguay Round A Negotiating History (1986-92 (Deventer: Klewer Law and Taxation Publ ishers, 
1993), p. 854. 
2 Gdrard Depayre, "Subsidies and Countervailing Measures after the Uruguay Round: an 
Overview", in Jacque H. J. Bourgeois et aL, ed., The Uruguay Round Results: A European 
Lawyer's Perspective (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995), p. 249. 
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shows that many proposals that reflected established US practice were put 
forward by other parties to the General Agreement belonging to the industrial 
world, while, perhaps for tactical reasons, the United States seemed to have had 
second thoughts on the usefulness of including in the Agreement some 
cornerstones of its most recent countervailing measures regime, the most striking 
example being the US doubts on the inclusion of the specificity test in the final 
text. 3 On the other hand, history and, therefore, the difficult balance between 
contrasting interests and outlooks did not stop with the end of the Round. Firstly, 
some pivotal provisions of the SCM Agreement, such as those concerning non- 
actionable subsidies, were "de facto" repealed as they were not extended after the 
five year term provided by the article on provisional application. Secondly, the 
contribution of the WTO case law has been of particular importance in shedding 
light on, and quite often closing the loopholes of, the SCM text. 
The research. therefore, focuses on the stance of the United States in the 
Uruguay Round and on its links with practice and doctrine developed in the US. 
And compares it with the Uruguay Round results, that is, the text that emerged 
from the negotiations, especially as interpreted by the WTO jurisprudence. The 
analysis, thus, concentrates on those aspects of the new multilateral SCD regime 
that are particularly relevant for the comparison, such as the identification of what 
constitutes a subsidy; the classification of subsidies. the identification and 
discipline of export subsidies and import substitution subsidies and the legal 
relevance of the illustrative list with particular reference to export credits, the 
actionable subsidies regime, and finally the countervai ling duty multilateral 
discipline. The question as to whether the VFO rules, as applied by the DSU 
bodies. has prevalently restricted or widened the importing countries' room for 
III Patick J. McDonough. Subidics. op. cit.. p. 900, note 526. 
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manoeuvTe, thus allowing exploitation for protectionist goals, is mainly left to 
chapter VII after an analysis of the post- U. R. US regime carried out in the same 
light. 
1)The Uruguay Round Negotiations on subsidies and countervailing 
measures: issues on the negotiating table and the parties' perspectives 
One of the main omissions of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, along 
with the General Agreement, was the definition of what constitutes a subsidy. 
The participants to the Uruguay Round had to address this problem as "the 
inevitable first step on the road to agreed rules and disciplines". 4 Indeed the 
definition of subsidy and the factors that originate it appeared instrmental in the 
assessment of subsidisation as well as in drawing the line between different 
categories of subsidies. Two opposite philosophies clashed. The United States 
supported, in keeping with its domestic practice, the benefit to recipient approach, 
arguing that injurious subsidisation should be looked at from the perspective of 
competing industries in the importing country. For these industries costs borne by 
the subsidising government in providing fimds were irrelevant, as what really 
mattered in economic terms was the economic benefit for the recipient. Other 
participants supported the cost to government approach, pointing out that the 
former method could lead to abnormal results as the subsidy found could be much 
higher than the subsidy actually paid. In their view, the approach suggested by the 
United States could even result in the finding of subsidisation where no subsidy 
5 had been granted. As a logical development of the benefit to recipient approach, 
the United States also suggested that so-called private subsidies, wherein benefits 
4 Jacques Bourgeois, "'The GATT Rules for Industrial Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the 
New Round. The Weather and the Seeds", in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Meinhard Hilf, eds., 
The New Gatt Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic Problems 
(Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Plublishers, 1995), p. 228 
5 See Uruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Meeting of 
19-20 October 1989. MTN/GNG/NG 10/ 14. para 5. 
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are conferred from private sources at the mandate of government, be actionable. 6 
The US did not press, however, for a general definition of subsidy, which was 
instead the subject of an EC request. The definition provided by the United States 
referred specifically to domestic subsidy, although it was finally adopted as a 
general rule. Nor did the United States put forward any proposal for the adoption 
of any rule on specificity, which was pushed forward by Switzerland. 
The second main question concerned the classification of subsidies and, 
therefore, their treatment. The United States adopted a pragmatic approach to the 
negotiations, aiming to enlarge as much as possible the scope of prohibited 
subsidies, by attracting some domestic subsidies, and impose more stringent rules 
on the remaining domestic subsidies. On the other hand, the United States tried to 
extend the safe harbour for sectors, like export credit, of particular interest for the 
United States. In its proposals the United States provided two categories of 
prohibited subsidies: export subsidies and trade related subsidies. 7 
As regards export subsidies - for which the American delegates did not 
suggest any definition, thus, implicitly accepting the rather open-ended wording 
of GATT 1947 Art. XVI and of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, refening to the 
simple fact that exported goods are subsidised - the United States proposed some 
modification to strengthen their discipline, calling in particular for the prohibition 
of governmental provision of exchange rate risk insurance or insurance agairw 
increases in the cost of exported goods. On the other hand, the United States 
suggested that the exclusive reference to "interest rate" in item (K) of the list 
attached to the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code be deleted, so that lending practices, 
6 See Patrick McDonough, Subsidies, op. cit. p. 899. 
7Uruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Communication 
from the United States. MTN/GNGING I OIW/120 (June 5,1988). 
Uruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.. Elements of the 
Framework for Negotiations. Submission from the United States. MTN/GNG/NG I O/W129 
(November 22,1989). 
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conforin in all respects to the provisions of the international undertaking on 
official export credits, which, obviously would increase the scope of the safe 
harbor provision for those countries participating to the OECD Arrangement. 
The new category of prohibited subsidies, envisaged by the US, i. e. trade- 
I 
related subsidies, included those subsidies conditional on the use of domestic 
rather than imported goods, or the fulfillment of a local content requirement, or 
the attainment of certain net surpluses, as well as subsidies to firms predominantly 
engaged in export trade and, finally, domestic subsidies exceeding a given 
percentage of the finns' total sales. 8 The first subgroup had already attracted the 
attention of US lawmakers and scholars as they affected the position of the United 
States both as exporter and investor. 9 For instance, the subsidiary of a 
multinational corporation could find it convenient, according the economic logic 
of the group, to purchase goods from its parent company, but if it wanted to 
receive a subsidy, it would be compelled to opt for domestic sources of supply; 
even more so if, as often happens, the subsidy were part of a package which had 
as its dominant component the permission to invest in the host country. With 
regard to the second subgroup the United States justified its request arguing that 
subsidies to firms that are engaged predominantly in exportation will necessarily 
have effects similar to export subsidies and, hence, like export subsidies, should 
be prohibited. For the third group the United States pointed out that big subsidies 
necessarily distort the allocation of resources and the commerce that results from 
those resource allocations. 
In a subsequent stage the United States also called for the banning of a set of 
subsidies that it deemed bound to result in a net cost to government, such as grants 
8 MTN/GNG/NG I O/W/29 (November 22,1989) Sect. 1 
9 See C. G. B. Fontheim and R. M. Gadbaw. -Trade-Related Performance Requirements under the 
GATT - MTN System and U. S. Law", Law & Pol'v Ini'l Bu, 14(1982) p. 13 1. 
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to cover operating losses, direct forgiveness of debts, provision of equity capital 
with an expected rate of return lower than the cost of obtaining funds and 
administering the investment, loans at interest rates lower than the government's 
cost of obtaining the funds and administering the loans, and loan guarantees with 
premium rates insufficient to cover the mentioned costs. ' 0 
Two kinds of remedies were suggested against prohibited subsidies. On the 
one hand, the imposition of countervailing duties on subsidized imports equaling 
the amount of subsidy. No mention of material injury was made. On the other 
hand., the initiation of a multilateral review of the contested practice aimed at 
prompt elimination of the programmes granting a prohibited subsidy. If the 
programmes were not eliminated within a reasonable time period countermeasures 
should be authorized. 
The United States claimed that the identification of actionable subsidies 
implies their definition and their assessment. Subsidies would result from any 
government action or combination of government actions that confers a benefit on 
the recipient firm, while actionable subsidies would be all subsidies that are not 
prohibited or non-actionable. Consequently, the value of a subsidy, and of an 
actionable subsidy in particular, was to be measured by reference to the benefit to 
the recipient. 11 The importing country would be authorised to impose 
countervailing duties, subject, however, to proof of material injury, while in the 
multilateral context the first obligation of the subsidizing country would be to 
terminate the violative programmes immediately upon a finding of adverse 
effects. If they Nvere not terminated promptly, the complaining country might 
1'ruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and CounterNailing Duties. Elements of the 
Ne, gotiating Framework. Submission from the United States. MTN GNGAG 10 W39 (27 
September 1990). 
11 \IT-N, C, \,, (-, N'610,, \ý 29 ýNovemhcr 22,1989) Sect. 11 
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demand compensation or seek authority to retaliate according to the adverse 
effect. 
During the better part of the negotiations the United States was rather 
doubtfiA of any justification for an exempted, or green light, category, pointing 
out that the fangibility of money makes it possible to channel funds apparently 
destined to unsuspected goals towards sectors and fonns of production that can 
have trade- distorting effects. Besides, in the US opinion, the creation of an 
exempted category could prove an incitement to rename subsidies so that they can 
move from the prohibited to the non-actionable category. 12 Only after the 
stalemate in the December 1990 Brussels Conference, did the Bush 
Administration seem prepared to consider a limited and careftdly controlled 
allowance for green light subsidies. Things changed,, though only with regard to 
one green light sub-group, R&D, when the Clinton Administration took over and 
the United States even pressed for an increase of the ceiling for Research and 
Development spending over the threshold established in the Dunkel Text. 13 
In contrast, the European Communities along with most other 
industrialised countries contended that a wide range of govenunent support 
practices should be considered non-actionable. In particular the Community, 
together with Canada, Switzerland, the Nordic Countries and Japan, suggested 
that, apart from generally available programmes, governmental aid for research 
and development as well as regional development assistance constitute non- 
actionable subsidies. The EC also suggested that aids to energy savings should be 
12MTN/GNG/NG I O/W/29 (November 22,1989) Sect. 111. 
13 See George Kleinfeld and David Kaye, "Red Light, Green Light. The 1994 Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Research and Development Assistance, and US Policy, 
J W. T, 28(1994), n. 2, p. 44. 
The change in attitude by the US as regards the treatment of R&D subsidies casts further doubts 
on the assumption that the efficiency rationale underpins the SCM Agreement. Indeed, it is 
difficult to argue that this kind of subsidy does not significantly affect the competitive edge of 
their beneficiaries in the international market at least as long as there is no substantial spill-over to 
other competitors. 
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non-actionable, while S,, vitzerland and the Nordic Countries made a more 'ýNide- 
ranging proposal, encompassing the exception of environmental schemes. 14 
The United States tried to preserve its leeway in countervailing duty 
proceedings and, along with Australia, Switzerland and the Nordic Countries, 
suggested that the importing country be allowed to take action against prohibited 
subsidies without proof of injury. It also argued in favour of extending the scope 
of countervailing measures where subsidies cause adverse effect in third country 
markets and in the home market of the subsidising government. 1i Other countries, 
both industrial and developing, strove to counter the US attempt by stressing the 
need for a more flexible and, at the same time, more detailed regulation of 
countervailing measures. In particular, the European Community opposed the 
elimination of the serious injury test and called for a public interest clause for the 
imposition of countervailing measures, consequently suggesting that the amount 
of countervailing duties should be lower than the subsidy amount if the lesser duty 
were able to remove injury. ' 6 
The initiative to bridge the gap between the conflicting outlooks of the 
negotiators was taken by the GATT Secretariat in 1991. As pointed out by the 
Di rector- General of GATT himself, the Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of 
the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations, subsequently better known 
as the Dunkel Text, was the outcome of "both intensive negotiations and of 
arbitration and conciliation", the latter being provided with the aim of striking the 
best possible balance across the board of the whole Uruguay Round agenda. 17 
4 Patrick I ', \, IcDonough, Subsidies. op. clt., p. 904. 
151bid., p. 891. 
Uruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Counter-, alling Du t ies. Commun i cation from 
the EC. NITN, 'GNG. V! 10, W7 (June 11.1987). 
"'Patrick 
. 
1. McDonough, Subsidies. op. cit., p. 847. 
, ý;, ee John Croome, Reslyping the 4'Cr! d Tr, iding., ýi-steln (Geneva: World Trade Organization. 
199i), P. 203. 
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With regard to subsidies the "draft final act" was reproduced largely unchanged in 
the final SCMA text. 
2) The SCM Agreement text as interpreted by the NNTO panels and the 
Appellate Body and its consistency with the US perspective and goals. 
In contrast with the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and in line , vith the 
General fabric of the WTO Agreement, the Subsidies and Countervailing Duty 
(SCM) Agreement is binding on all WTO members. Like the Dunkel Text, the 
SCM Agreement is divided into eleven parts and has six Annexes. The first five 
parts lay out the basic rules of the Agreement: Part I defines the term -subsidy" 
and the concept of specificity. Parts 11,111 and IV divide subsidies into three 
categories: prohibited, actionable and non-actionable. Part V establishes the 
substantial and procedural requirements for the imposition of countervailing 
measures. Parts VI and VII concern the institutions specifically charged with the 
administration of the agreement and the arrangements for notification and 
supervision. Parts VIII and IX lay out differential provisions for various 
categories of developing countries and for countries in the process of 
transformation into a market economy. Part X deals with dispute settlement and 
Part XI contains final provisions. 
As is usual with international agreements, the SCM Agreement sometimes 
leaves out the definition of some concepts, or fundamental parts of them, xvhich 
are pivotal in implementing the text. The battle of ideas and interests and, 
therefore, the effective prevalence of the outlook of a member over those of its 
trading partners are. thus, fought within the framework of the Dispute Settlement 
mechanism. 
119 
I)Relaflon between the SCVf Agreement and GA TT 1994 
A preliminary question concerns the relationship of the SCNI Agreement 
with Arts. VI and XVI of GATT 1994. The question . vas exwnined by a WTO 
panel and by the Appellate Body in a case referring to the applicability of the 
SCM Agreement to countervailing duty investigations started prior to the entry 
into force of the Agreement. In the -Brazil - Desiccated Coconut" case, which 
originated from the imposition of countervailing duties by Brazil against imports 
of the desiccated product from the Philippines, the defendant, Brazil, contended 
that only the provisions of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code were applicable to 
the dispute, and that no provision of GATT 1994 could be invoked. In this context 
the WTO panel entertained the question of whether Article VI of GATT 1994 
creates rules which are separate from those of the SCM Agreement, and xhich 
can be applied without reference to that Agreement. The panel and later the 
Appellate Body based their answer on Art. 10 and Art 32.1 of the SCM 
Agreement. The first provides that the imposition of a countervailing duty must be 
in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of 
the Agreement, while the second requires that no specific action against a subsidy 
be taken except in accordance with the provision of GATT 1994 as interpreted by 
the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body, affirming the conclusion reached by 
the panel, held that the ordinary meaning of these provisions taken in their context 
leads to the conclusion that the negotiators of the SCM Agreement clearly 
intended that, under the integrated WTO Agreement, countervai ling duties may 
only be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the SCNI 
Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, taken together. On the other hand, 
if there is a conflict between the provisions of the S'C. %f Agreement and Article \1 
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of GATT 1994, the provisions of the SCM Agreement would prevail as a result of 
the general interpretative note to Annex IA. 18 
More uncertain is the relationship between the SCM Agreement and Art. 
XVI of GATT 1994. Some commentators have gone so far as to assert that "the 
regime established by the Subsidies Agreement is of such width and complexity 
that it leaves little if any room for the operation of the scheme established by 
GATT Article XVI". 19 Certainly the general principle of the inseparable package 
of rights and disciplines applies. However most of the provisions of Art. XVI, 
such as the double price criterion or the vague category of export subsidies, are 
rendered obsolete by the detailed regulations of the new Agreement, and, 
therefore, fall within the scope of the "general interpretative note". On the other 
hand, Art. 1.1 of the SCM Agreement in defining the core of its regime expressly 
refers to GATT Art. XVI with regard to "any form of income and price support". 
D- 
Recognition in principle of the unbroken validity of article XVI of GATT 
could be found in the Foreign Sales Corporations (SCM) case where, as we shall 
see in greater detail in the following chapter, the US argued, among other things, 
that Art. XVI and the 1981 Understanding following the adoption of the DISC 
panel reports were relevant in interpreting certain provisions of the Agreement. 
Here the panel stated that, in principle, article XVI of GATT 1994 has not ceased 
to be legally operative and that "the SCM Agreement and article XVI are not to be 
construed in isolation from each other". However, the SCM decision does not 
illustrate the general point, as the panel also held that in the case in question the 
language of the SCM Agreement to be interpreted in the dispute had no 
'a Brazil - Measures Affecting Dessiccated Coconut-AB1996-4- Report of the Appelate Body 
(21.7.1997)). WT/DS22/AB/R, para. E, 2 
19 Edmond McGovern, International Trade Regulation (Exeter, Globefield Press, 1995) p. 11.38-1. 
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counterpart in article XVI: 4 of the GATT and, therefore, the latter had no bearing 
in its interpretation. 20 
2) Subsidy deflnition 
For the first time in over forty years Art. I of the SCM Agreements fills 
the main conceptual gap in the subsidies and countervailing measures discipline 
by providing a definition of subsidy. The definition contains two basic elements: 
A) A financial contribution provided by a government or a public body . vIthin the 
territory of a WTO member. 21 Reference to public bodies within the temtory of a 
member implies that the Agreement does not only cover the actions of national 
governments but extends to sub-national governments and even to state-owned 
companies. The contribution can take various forms: 
1) a goverrurnent practice which involves direct transfer of funds (e. g., grants, 
loans and equity infusion) or potential direct transfer of funds along with 
the underwriting of liabilities (e. g. loan guarantees); 
2) remission of otherwise due government revenue; 
3) provision of goods and services other than general infrastructures, or 
purchase of goods; 
4) situations where a gover-nment makes payments to a funding mechanism 
or entrusts a private body to provide a direct contribution. 
In addition the Agreement applies where there is any form of income or price 
support under Art. XVI of Gatt 1994.22 
B) A benefit to the recipient. 23 
20 See Marc Benitah, The Law ot'Subsidies under the GATT RTO Si-st,, m (Hague- Klu%ker Law 
Intemational, 2001 ). p. 158- 
21 
22 Art. 1.1 (a)(2) 
23 
,% rt. I. I 
A first comparison between the text of SCMA Art. I on the one hand and 
the outlook of the United States and its opponents, on the other, shows much 
greater proximity with the US perspective. Indeed Art. I by providing for a 
financial contribution or a form of price and income support, which confer a 
benefit has strong similarity with the American proposal, according to which 
subsidies result from a government action or combination of government actions 
resulting in a benefit. In contrast the charge to the budget principle is not a 
necessary component. Certainly, release of government re-venue implies by 
necessity a net cost for the public budget, but this is not so for the other 
hypotheses of financial contribution. For instance, the provision of goods for 
which appropriate consideration is received does not result in a charge for the 
budget. Facilitated loans do not entail a net cost if the interest and other charges 
paid by the private borrower are higher than what is paid by the public body to 
obtain the funds. Price and income support schemes can be easily financed by 
sources other than the public budget. 
The SCM text, however, does not provide a definition of what constitutes 
benefit. Besides some hypotheses of financial contribution lend themselves to 
contrasting interpretations. The task of shedding light, or rather to give meaning to 
the wording of the article was, therefore, left to the panel and the Appellate Body. 
Benýfit 
In -Canada -Aircraft" the WTO panel focused on the interpretation of the 
tenn "benefit". Its interpretation, however. also sheds light on the identification of 
the first component of the terin -subsidy", that is, financial conti-ibution. The 
complainant, Brazil. alle(ged that some benefits granted by Canadian national and 
provincial authorities constituted subsidies contingent on export performance and, 
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A- - therefore, were in violation of Art. 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement The measures 
I 
complained about by Brazil were financing and loan guarantees provided by the 
Export Development Corporation, which included liquidity infusion for 
corporations specially established to assist the export of civil aircraft, funds 
provided by Technology Partnership of Canada, and various benefits provided by 
provincial authorities. 
Obviously, violation of Art. 3.1 posits the existence of a subsidy, which 
implies financial contributions and benefit. The defendant, Canada, argued, 
however, that benefit had two components: the first is an advantage; the second a 
net cost to government. In defence of its thesis Canada argued that if we rely just 
on the ordinary meaning of benefit, the scope of the term benefit would be too 
broad as it could include normal commercial activity, such as a commercial 
contract entered into by a government that accords an advantage to a firm. Its 
meaning must, therefore, be restricted by taking into account the cost to the 
granting government. This approach, in Canada's opinion, was supported by the 
fact that paragraph I of Annex IV to the SCM Agreement (concerning total ad 
valorem subsidisation for the purpose of establishing a presumption of serious 
prejudice under art 6.1 of the Agreement) provides that "any calculation of the 
amount of a subsidy... shall be done in terms of the cost for the granting 
govemment 59 . 
24 
The question that immediately arises is why Canada resorted to such a 
daring and convoluted interpretation of Art. 1.1 (b) of the SCM Agreement. ne 
likely explanation is that Canada believed that its system of financial support did 
not imply a burden to the budget - as the export credits were not provided at rates 
24 Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft. Report of the Panel (14.4.199,9) 
WT/DS70/R, paras. 5.31-5.38. 
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below the cost of funding paid by governmental financial institutions - but feared. 
rightly, that the absence of a net cost was not relevant under the heading of the 
first part of Art. 1.1 (a), that is, financial contribution. ý\s noted above under Art. 
1.1(a)(1) what is needed is only a direct transfer of funds (e. g. grants, loans, and 
equity infusion) and Canada could not deny that it had lavishly provided the 
programmes in question. The only way to give relevance to the absence of cost to 
the budget, therefore, was to try to find a link with the existence of a benefit. 
The panel, whose report was upheld by the Appellate Body, firrnl,,, 
withstood such an attempt, noting that the ordinary meaning of benefit 
encompasses some form of advantage but does not "per se" include any notion of 
net cost to government. The only thing needed to determine the bestowing of 
benefit is whether "the financial contribution places the recipient in a more 
advantageous position than would have been the case without the financial 
contribution"; and, in the panel's view, the yardstick is the market. 25 The panel 
found support for its viewpoint in Art. 14 of the Agreement, ývhich provides 
guidelines for "calculation of the amount of subsidy in terms of the benefit to the 
recipient". The panel pointed out that, although the article expressly applies to 
countervailing measures, regulated in part V of the Agreement, by referring to 
Art. 1.1 it acquires wider scope serving as a relevant context for determining when 
a benefit arises, no matter the remedy that is ultimately applied. '16 On the other 
hand, the panel did not accept Canada's suggestion that Annex IV of the SCM 
Agreement should be taken into account, as its goal was just the identification of 
1ý 'A*T'DS70,, R. paras 
26 1bid., pwa. 9.11 -'. 
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serious prejudice, i. e. a particular hypothesis of actionable subsidy, whereas 
benefit was the hardcore of subsidy assessment. 27 
Finally, in line with what we have noted above, the panel argued that the 
inclusion of net cost to government in the notion of benefit could exclude from the 
notion of a subsidy situation explicitly identified in Art. 1.1 (a), though it 
specifically referred only to situations where a goverment directs a private body 
to make a financial contribution, noting that in such a case "the net cost could be 
incurred entirely by the private body". 28 
The report gainsaid the viewpoint of some commentators of the SCM text 
I 
at an earlier stage. Collins-Williams and Salembier had argued that, though the 
concept of benefit is related to the provisions of Art. 14 on the calculation of the 
amount of a subsidy, the latter concerned only countervailing measures. 29 Such an 
interpretation would cause the splintering of the conceptual framework of the 
Agreement, thus contradicting one of the major aims of the negotiations, which 
was to concurrently address subsidies and countervailing duties. Indeed, as its 
heading makes clear, article 14 sets the criteria to measure the amount of 
subsidisation with reference to the benefit for the recipient and, in its turn, the 
yardstick for the latter is the difference between what is offered and requested by 
the market and the conditions available to the recipient enterprise as a result of 
government intervention. It would be rather odd to confine the identification of 
benefit in Art. 14 to countervailing measures, leaving the question open to 
contrasting solutions where other remedies, i. e. multilateral remedies, are 
concemed. 
271bid., para. 9.116. 
I's Ibid., paras. 9.111-9.116. 
29 Terry Collins-Williams and Gerry Salembier, "International Disciplines on Subsidies. The Gatt, 
the WTO and the Future Agenda ". J W. T. 30 (/ 996) a /, p. 10. 
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It must be noted, at any rate, that reference to the market, whatever its 
type, does not cover all forms of benefit. That is, the benchmark can vary 
according to the kind of financial contribution from which it derives. In particular, 
as we shall see in detail in the following chapter, as regards the forgoing of 
government revenue, benefit is not assessed with reference to the market but with 
reference to the burden that would more generally apply, absent the measure 
under investigation. 
Financial contribution 
The first component of the term "benefit", financial contribution, has been 
examined with reference to the US attempt to widen the hypothesis of provision 
of goods and services and the hypothesis of entrustment of governmental function 
to private bodies to make them consistent with US domestic legislation. 
In "US - Export Restraints" Canada complained to the WTO about a 
provision of the US countervailing duty law that treated restraint on exports of a 
product as a subsidy to other products using or incorporating the restricted product 
if the domestic price of the restricted product is affected by the restraint. The 
United States argued that export restraints could, at least in some factual 
circumstances,, constitute a government-entrusted or government-directed 
provision of goods by a private body in the sense of Art. 1.1 (a)(1)(iii) and (iv) of 
the SCM Agreement. The US contended that if a limitation or prohibition of 
export compels a producer to sell in the domestic market, it results in increasing 
supply and, thus, in a lower equilibrium price. Therefore, it confers a benefit on 
domestic users of the product. 30 In such a case, for the US, limitation or 
30 United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidy. Report of the Panel 
29.6.200 1 ). WTIDS 194, para. 8.26 
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prohibition of export is only semantically different from an affirmative direction 
to a private entity to provide goods to domestic producers .31 As noted by the 
panel this approach reflected US administrative practice which treated as 
countervailable benefits arising from government action, regardless of the nature 
of that action. 
The panel did not follow this course, holding that the terms "entrust and 
direct" in the text of the article clearly imply an affirmative action by the 
government, which entails three elements: 1) a delegation or command; 2) 
addressed to a particular party: 3) the object of which is a particular task or duty. 32 
This situation, in the opinion of the panel, is very different from ordinary 
governmental intervention in the market, with various policy objectives, which 
have various results, some of which are not intended or even desired by the 
I 
government. 33 Thus, in contrast with the US approach the existence of a financial 
contribution does not depend on the reaction of the producer of the restrained 
good; rather it must be proven by reference to the action of the government. 
It must be noted, however, that the US was not requested to repeal or 
arnend the relevant section, 771(5), of the Trade Act of 1930 as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, as the statute was to be read in the light of the 
Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) which permits but does not expressly 
require the treatment of export restraints as financial contributions in 
countervailing investigations. Therefore, only countervailing measures in 
individual cases could be reviewed according to the above- developed reasoning. 
3' Ibid., para. 8.27. 
Ibid., para 8.29. 
33 Ibid., pam 8.31 
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3)Specykity 
Art. 2 of the SCM Agreement introduces a specificity requirement which 
tracks the US model. Specificity can be either "de iure" or "de facto". In the 
former case a subsidy is specific if the granting authority, or the legislation 
pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a 
subsidy to certain enterprises. The subsidy, however, is not "de iure" specific if 
eligibility is based on explicit, verifiable, objective criteria, i. e., not favourable to 
certain enterprises over others. 
On the other hand, even if the subsidy is not specific by law but there are 
reasons to believe that the subsidising programme may in fact be specific, other 
factors may be consiOered, which closely correspond to those used by the United 
States in the previous decade. They include the exclusive, or predominant, use of 
a subsidy programme by a limited number of enterprises, the granting of 
disproportionately large amount of subsidies to certain enterprises and the 
exercise of discretion by the granting authority. Some American scholars have 
noted, however, that the SCM article provides for certain factors that were not 
considered by preceding US practice. 34 In particular, the Agreement provides that 
the investigating authorities should take into account the diversification of 
economic activity in the subsidising country and the length of time the programme 
has been in operation. The first requirement may prevent the finding of 
specificity for a developing country's programme if its economy is not diversified. 
The longevity of a subsidy programme may also prevent the finding of specificity 
3' Gary N. Horlick and Peggy A. Clarke, -The 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement", W Comp., 17 
(1994), 4, p. 43. 
M. Jean Anderson and Gregory Husisian, "The Subsidies Agreement". in Terence P. Stewart, ed., 
The World Trade Organization: the multilateral tradeframeworkfor the 21" centurv and US. 
implementing legislation (Washington D. C.: American Bar Association-Section of International 
Law and Practice, 1996), p. 308. 
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because the programme is too new to be used by a large number of enterprises. 
Finally, in contrast with previous US practice, Art. 2.4 provides that "any 
determination of specificity ... shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of 
positive evidence", thus establishing a presumption of non-specificity unless proof 
of its occurrence is given by the investigating authority. 35 
Art. 2 establishes two instances in which subsidies are deemed to be 
I 
specific: export and import substitution subsidies, defined in Art. 3 of the 
Agreement, and regional subsidies. With regard to the latter it must be remarked 
that the US obtained a last minute victory as the text of the SCM Agreement on 
this point represents a significant departure from the Dunkel Draft. Indeed, 
whereas according to the Dunkel Text "a subsidy which is available to all 
enterprises located within a designated geographical region shall be specific 
irrespective of the granting authority", Art. 2.2 of the SCM Agreement provides 
that subsidies "limited to certain enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be 
specific". This slight change in the text makes non-actionable those subsidies 
granted by federal states or provinces on a generally available basis within their 
territory. This is in line with US rules and thus creates, in spite of geographical 
coincidence, a disparity between subsidies granted by local authorities and 
subsidies bestowed by national authorities to economic initiatives located in a 
sub-national territory. 
4) Prohibited subsidies 
Following the Dunkel Text's pattern, the SCM Agreement has adopted the 
traffic light approach. as subsidies are divided into three categories: prohibited, 
35 Gary N. Horlick and Peggy A. Clarke, op. cit., p. 44. 
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actionable and non-actionable. Prohibited (red light) subsidies are those subsidies 
I. 
which are more clearly designed to affect trade and, therefore. to have adverse 
effects on the interests of other WTO members. 
Art. 3 of the Agreement divides prohibited subsidies into Mo categories: 
subsidies contingent on export performance, whether in law or in fact and whether 
wholly or as one condition among several, and import substitution subsidies. 
Subsidies contingent on export performance 
Art. 3.1 (a) of the Agreement deals with subsidies contingent, in 
law or in fact, on export perfonnance, whether wholly or as one condition among 
several. Subsidies that are not explicitel export subsidies nonetheless will be 
deemed export subsidies if they are in fact contingent on actual or anticipated 
export earnings. 36 On the other hand, a subsidy is not to be necessarily considered 
an export subsidy merely because it is granted to an exporting enterprise. 37 The 
main questions, therefore, concern the interpretation of what is meant by 
46 contingent" and the distinction between "in law" and "in fact" subsidisation 
In the "Australia - Automotive Leather 11" case the United States 
suggested a rather broad interpretation of the terin -contingent in fact on export". 
The case concerned the relevance of article 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement with 
regard to a grant contract and a loan contract signed by the Australian government 
with the only dedicated producer and exporter of automotive leather in Australia. 
Australian Leather Holding Ltd, and its subsidiary, Howe. The grant subsidy 
provided for payments totalling up to a maximum ofAU $30 million. to be paid in 1 -1 
three instalments. the second and the third of which Nvere made conditional on 
Art. 3.1 (a), note 
Ibid. 
perfomiance targets set out in the contract. The loan contract provided for a 
fourteen-year loan of AU S 25 million, with a five-year grace period and interest 
rate below that prevailing in the financial market. 
The United States argued that a subsidy can be contingent in fact on export 
even though actual or anticipated exportation is merely one of several potential 
criteria influencing the bestowal of benefits. According to the United States, the 
Uruguay Round had expanded the scope of a prohibited subsidy and rather than 
requiring that export performance be the "only" or the "most important" element, 
Article 3.1 (a) provided that export performance might be either the sole 
contingency for the subsidy or merely "one of several other conditions". The 
export requirement therefore did not need to carry preponderant weight in the 
approval of benefits to qualify as an export subsidy. On the other hand, footnote 4 
of the SCM Agreement did not preclude taking into account the impact on the 
level of exports, as it simply excluded that the finding of a prohibited export 
subsidy could be based solely upon the level of exports. 38 The defendant, 
Australia, contended that the facts must demonstrate that the granting of the 
subsidy is actually tied to export performance, i. e., actual or anticipated 
exportation or export earnings and, therefore, favours export over domestic 
sales". 
39 
The panel solved the case without providing an in-depth conceptual 
fiwnework, preferring a pragmatic approach. On the one hand, it argued that the 
determination'of whether a subsidy is contingent in fact upon export performance 
requires an assessment of all the facts concerning the grant or maintenance of the 
challenged subsidy, including the nature of the subsidy, its structure and 
38 Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather. Report of the 
Panel (25.5.1999). WT/DS/ 126/11, para. 7.82. 
39 Ibid., para. 7.85 
131 
operation, and the circumstances in which it is bestowed. It suggested, however, 
that taken together, the facts considered must demonstrate that the grant of the 
subsidy is conditional on actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. 40 
On the other hand, the panel noted that Art. 3.1 (a) recognises that there might be 
multiple conditions for the granting of a subsidy, but "explicitly prohibits a 
subsidy if one of the conditions is that a subsidy is in fact contingent upon export 
performance". 
41 
While recognising that the repayment of the loan was not conditional on 
export profits,, the panel argued that the grant was in fact tied to Howe's actual or 
anticipated exportation or export earnings, because it was conditioned on the 
company's agreement to satisfy aggregate performance targets, which, given the 
export-dependent nature of Howe's business, and the size of the Australian 
market, were actually export performance targets. 42 Thus, the panel's opinion 
actually leads, partially at least, to the same results aimed at by the US proposals 
in the U. R. negotiations envisaging an extension of the prohibition to certain 
categories of trade related subsidies, among which those bestowed on firms 
predominantly engaged in export trade. 43 
The need for a direct link between the granting of a subsidy and exports is, 
however, clearly expressed in the above-mentioned "Canada-Aircraft" case, in 
which the Panel emphasised that there must be a clear connection, in the form of a 
finalistic relationship, between subsidy and exports. The Appellate Body, 
substantially upholding the Panel's report, argued that the term "contingent" 
implies a relationship of conditionality . This relationship 
is borne out by the 
wording of Art. 3.1 (a) which states that 4.6export contingency can be the sole or 
"0 Ibid., Para 9.57. 
Ibid., para. 9.63. 
Ibid., paras 9.66-9.67 and paras. 9.74-9.75. 
43 See Section 1. 
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one of several other conditions". 44 In the opinion of the Appellate Body the legal 
standard expressed by the word ", contingenf' is the sarne for both "'in law" or "in 
facf' contingency,. However, whereas "de iure" export contingency can be 
0 inferred from the wording of the relevant legal instrument, "de facto" export 
contingency "must be inferred from the total configuration of the facts 
surrounding the granting of the subsidy, none of which on its own is likely to be 
decisive in any given case". To overcome this difficulty with regard to "de facto" 
export subsidies the word contingent must be read in conjunction with the 
wording of footnote 4, which provides that "the granting of a subsidy ... is in fact 
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export performance". In particular, 
according to the Appellate Body, the word "tied" underlines the link of 
contingency upon actual or expected exports. The need for such a link is fta-ther 
proved by the second sentence of footnote 4 which states that the sole fact that a 
subsidy is granted to exporting enterprises is not enough to make it a prohibited 
subsidy. 
Consequently, the Appellate Body rejected the Canadian contention that a 
subsidy is contingent in fact upon export performance when the circumstances are 
such that the recipient would reasonably know that there is a requirement to 
export, as what is relevant is not the expectation of the beneficiary but the fact that 
public authorities make the granting of the subsidy conditional on export. 
Likewise, the expectation of an increase in exports is not enough to render the 
subsidy prohibited in the absence of a causal link between actual or foreseen 
exports and the granting of public aid. 
It seems, therefore, that the Canada-Aircraft philosophy, in contrast to 
Automotive Leather 11, is at loggerheads with the outlook underlying the US 
44Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft. Report of the Appellate Body 
(2.8.1999). WTIDS70/AB/R, paras 166-174. 
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proposal on the prohibited subsidies discipline in the course of the Uruguay 
Round, which labelled subsidies as prohibited according to their presumed trade 
I distorting effect, banning them "ex ante". 45 Indeed, the Appellate Body's opinion 
a rejects unambiguously the "ex ante" approach, calling, instead, for a case-by-case 
analysis in which the examination goes well beyond the subsidy's effect and 
focuses on the subsidisation goal, that is, on the straight link between the bestowal 
of subsidy and trade performance. 
The distinction between contingency "in law" and "in fact" was ftu-ther 
explained in Canada-Autos. Under the Motor-vehicles Tariff Order (MVTO 
1988) and the Special Review Orders (SROs), Canada - in line with Canadian i. 
obligations under the Canada-US auto pact, and later the CUSFTA and the 
NAFTA - granted import duty exemptions for automobiles, commercial vehicles 
and buses to foreign producers other than US firms, provided that they met 
specific value added ratio requirements. The Appellate Body, which upheld the 
panel's opinion, condemned Canada in the light of Art. 1.1 and 3.1 (a) for giving 
up revenue that it could otherwise have raised, as it had ignored the nonnative 
benchmark it had established for import duties on motor vehicles under its normal 
MIFN rate. 46 On this occasion the Appellate Body noted that 66contingency in law 
can be demonstrated on the basis of the very words of the relevant legislation, 
regulation or other legal instruments", which sometimes expressly set out the 
conditions for the granting of the subsidy. It emphasised, however, that more 
often the condition to export can be implicitly comprised in the underlying legal 
45 See in particular, Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Meeting of 
30November- I December 1989. MTN/GNG/NGIO/15. 
46Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry . Report of the Appellate Body 
(31.5.2000). WT/DS139-I42/AB/R, paras87-94. 
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instrument and, therefore, "can be derived by necessary implication from the 
words actually used in the measure". 47 
0 Import substitution subsidies 
Art. 3.1 (b) refers to subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over 
imported goods. The inclusion of such subsidies in the red-light category was a 
success for the US as prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement such subsidies had 
escaped direct prohibition and, therefore, it was necessary to prove that they 
caused serious prejudice. The achievement, however, risked being spoiled by a 
little omission in the text, whatever the real intention of its drafters. In contrast 
with article 3.1 (a), Art. 3.1 (b) contains no reference to "de facto" contingency. In 
the "Canada-Autos" case the panel, noticing the proximity of the two provisions, 
argued that the only reasonable meaning of the omission of such a reference is 
that the prohibition in Art. 3.1 (b) extends only to "de iure" contingency. 48 nat 
would have left the bulk of the subsidies in question out of the reach of remedies. 
The Appellate Body overturned the panel's opinion. The opposite opinion 
of the Appellate Body, especially if viewed in the wider context of a case 
involving a review of some fundamental articles of GATT 1994 (i. e. Art. I and 
3), as well as GATS Arts. 1: 1 and 11: 1 and the SCMA, has been considered as an 
example of the political power that the AB is naturally, if not explicitly, called to 
exercise. The AB's opinion has been viewed as an example of constructive 
interpretation of the text of WTO rules, reflecting legal-political concerns. 49 
Indeed, the Appellate Body chose, as the panel, between two possible meanings of 
a text, or rather an omission in the text compared to related rules. The first 
'7 WT/DS 139/A B/R - WT/DS I 42/ABIR, para. 100. 48 WT/DS 139/11 - WT/DS 142/11, paras. 10.220 - 10.222. "Niall P. Meagher, "The Sound of Silence: Giving Meaning to Omission in Provisions of World 
Trade Organization Agreements. A Note on The World Trade Organizafion Appellate Body 
Decision in United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel 
Flat Products from Germany", J W. T., 37 (2003), p. 427. 
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question, however, is whether the AB overstepped its powers in interpreting the 
text. The answer should be negative. In contrast to the apparently similar "US- 
I 
German Steel CVD" case - analysed in detail in chapter VII, with regard to the 
presence of a "de minimis" threshold provision in the SCMA article addressing 
new investigations and its absence in the SCMA article concerning sunset review 
procedures - art. 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement provides two alternatives under 
which an export subsidy can be ascertained, i. e., contingency in law and 
contingency in fact, while art. 3.1 (b) is silent on both. Though accepting the 
panel's point of view that "omission must have some meaning" the AB, pointing 
out that omissions in different contexts may have different meaning, remarked in 
the first place that the text of Art. 3.1 (b) is not conclusive as, if there is nothing 
that specifically includes subsidies contingent in fact, nor does the text 
specifically exclude them. The Appellate Body thus argued that the omission in 
the text of Art. 3.1 (b) text was to be read not only with reference to Art. 3.1 (a) but 
also in the wider context of the WTO multilateral agreements on Trade in Goods, 
noting that the panel's interpretation would make Art. 3.1 (b) of the SCM 
Agreement conflict with Art. III of GATT 1994 (National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation) which also addresses measures that favour the use of 
domestic over imported goods, without making any distinction between "de facto" 
and "de iure" causes of treatment inequality. Finally, the Appellate Body 
submitted that the exclusion of in fact contingency would run afoul of the 
purposes of the SCM Agreement, thus facilitating circumvention of the 
obligations . 
50 It seems, therefore, that the Appellate Body adopted an extensive 
interpretation of the SCM text, without trespassing its borders, with the politically 
relevant aim of preventing the possibility that the discipline of Art. 3.1 (b) could 
m WT/DS 139/A B/R - WT/DS 142/A B/R. paras. 13 7-142. 
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be freely undennined by the use of subsidies contingent in fact on the use of 
domestic over imported goods. 
The new hypothesis of prohibited subsidies had many point in common 
with the measures prohibited under the Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
measures and in particular with those envisaged by Item I of the Illustrative List 
annexed to the Agreement. Thus, as happened in the "Canada-Autos" case and in 
the "Indonesia Autos" case complaints were lodged against the same measures 
both under SCMA Art. 3.1 (b) and under the TRIMs Agreement. In Indonesia 
Autos the analysis was provided with regard to a set of measures established by 
the Indonesian government to support production and marketing of cars in the 
Republic, some of which were conditional on the fulfilment of local content 
requirements. The panel considered the relationship between the Agreements 
reaching quite a restrictive conclusion. In particular, the panel argued that 
regarding local content requirements, the SCM Agreement and the TRIMs 
Agreement are concerned with different types of obligations and cover different 
subject matters, as the SCM Agreement prohibits the grant of a subsidy contingent 
on use of domestic goods, not the requirement to use domestic goods as such, 
whereas the TRIMs prohibits trade-related investment measures in the form of 
51 local content requirements, not the grant of an advantage, such as a subsidy. 
Thus, according to the panel, inconsistency with SCMA Article 3.1 (b) can be 
remedied by removal of the subsidy, even if the local content requirement remains 
applicable, while inconsistency with the TRIMs Agreement can be remedied by 
repealing the local content requirement even if the subsidy continues to be 
granted. Consequently, if the content requirements were dropped, the subsidy 
51 Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry - Report of the Panel 
(2.7.1988). WT/DS 54/R., para. 14.50. 
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would continue to be subject to the SCM Agreement, although the nature of the 
relevant discipline under the Agreement might be affected. 52 
The panel's point of view, however, seems only partially correct, as it 
gives the idea that CSMA Art. 3.1 (b) and the TRIMs agreement are just casual 
companions of a journey to different destinations, although on the same highway. 
As admitted by the panel, the relevant discipline under the Agreement might be 
affected and actually is deeply affected. Indeed, a subsidy conditional upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods is not only a subsidy, but a prohibited 
subsidy, which implies a non- rebuttable presumption of specificity and more 
stringent multilateral remedies than simple domestic subsidies, and the treatment 
applied by the SCM Agreement results from the subsidy in question being 
conditional on a trade-related measure, quite often aimed at promoting 
investments. 
5) The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies and the question of the relationship between the SCH 
Agreement and the OECD Arrangement on Guidellnesfor Offlcially Supported Credits. 
In chapter II we reported the controversy on the relationship between the 
Tokyo Round Subsidies Agreement and the Arrangement on Guidelines for 
Officially Supported Credits between the industrial countries which are members 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
controversy was triggered by the inclusion in the export subsidies list of an item, 
k, which, though indirectly, referred to the OECD Arrangement, creating a safe 
harbour for those credits whose interest rates are consistent with the 
Arrangementqs interest rate provisions. The quarrel has reappeared under Annex I 
to the SCM Agreement providing an illustrative list of export subsidies, among 
521bid., para. 14.5 1. 
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which item (k) reproduces the provisions of the Subsidies Code. The disputes, at 
the centre of which have been some Brazilian and Canadian programmes designed 
to support civil aircraft exports, concern the following points: 1) the impact of the 
OECD Arrangement on the SCM Agreement. 2) the individuation of the relevant 
articles of the Arrangement. 3) the fate of those export practices which do not 
meet one of the conditions for the ban set out in an item of the list, but which are 
not explicitly excluded by the wording of any item. 
Most of the above-listed contentious points are exemplified by the Brazil- 
Aircraft case. The dispute hinged upon certain export subsidies granted under the 
Brazilian Programa de Financiamento As Exportaq6es (PROEX), under which the 
government of Brazil provided interest rate equalization subsidies for sale by 
Brazilian exporters, including an aircraft company, Embraer. Under the scheme 
the Brazilian lending bank that provided a buyer credit to assist the sale of 
Brazilian aircrafts charged its normal interest rate for the transaction, but received 
payment from two sources - the purchaser and the Government of Brazil. In this 
way, the export programme reduced the purchaser's financing costs and, thus, the 
overall cost of buying an Embraer aircraft. 53 
Before proceeding, it must be briefly remembered that the so-called 
commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs) had replaced in the course of the 
1980s the matrix system, which provided minimum subsidised interest rates 
varying according to the per-capita income of the importing country, in an effort 
to create a more level playing field for the participants in the OECD Arrangement, 
which are industrial countries and some newly-industrialised countries, and to 
bring interest rates for officially supported credits closer to the market. 
"In pardcular, the Brazilian interest equalization programme provided that the National Treasury 
grant to the fmancing party an "equalization payment" to cover, at most, the difference between 




The present Arrangement, therefore, provides that CIRRs should closely 
correspond to the rate for first class domestic, as well as foreign, borrowers and 
should not distort competitive conditions. 54 To achieve this end, unless the 
participants to the Arrangement have agreed otherwise, CIRRs shall be set at a 
fixed margin of 100 basis points above their respective base rates, the latter being 
equal to the yields of various long-term bonds in the national currencies of the 
country providing the credit. A special regime however, is established for the 
Japanese Yen, 55 
The Arrangement allows the participants to match credit terms and 
conditions, whether notified or not notified, as well as credits supported by non- 
participants. In such cases the terms and conditions for the matching may not 
comply with the Arrangement if the initiating bid is not in compliance with it 
either. 
56 
Brazil as defendant contended that, although PROEX payments were 
export subsidies, they were nevertheless Permitted by the first paragraph of item 
(k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. Brazil argued that pursuant to item kXV 
k, such payments are prohibited only "in so far as they are used to secure a 
material advantage in the field of export credit terms", and that "a contrario" such 
payments are permitted in so far as they are not used to secure a material 
advantage in the field of export credit terms. " In Brazil's opHUon, PROEX 
payments did not secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms, 
because they were merely used to offset the so-called "Brazil risk" that made the 
provision of credit to Brazilian firms more costly than Canada's subsidies to 
Bombardier, Embraer's Canadian competitor, which was one of the major 
-4 Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Credits (1998) article 15. 
53 Ibid., Art. 16. 
-'6 Ibid., Art. 29. 
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beneficiaries of the progranunes referred to in the Canada-aircraft case. 57 
Therefore for Brazil, the absence of material advantage rose from the need to 
offset the higher cost of credit for developing countries (and Brazil in particular) 
and by the need to match the subsidies bestowed by the Canadian government to 
Bombardier, which affected, along with the interest rates and the duration of the 
loans, that is the financial package, the price of the aircrafts. Thus the idea of 
permitted matching for Brazil differs from the technical meaning of the OECD 
Arrangement as it goes beyond the financial terms of the bid. 58 
Until now the United States has not been a party to any disputes 
concerning these complex questions. However, it has actively intervened as a 
third participant, broadly expressing the view of the industrial countries 
participating in the OECD Arrangement. 
can be summarised as follows: 
The viewpoint of the United States 
1) In contrast with Brazil's viewpoint, item (k) refers exclusively to export credits 
and not to export subsidies in general. 59 
2) The term "interest rate provisions" in item (k) encompasses all the terms and 
conditions of the OECD Affangement. 60 
3) The matching of supported rates in accordance with Art. 29 of the Arrangement 
falls within the scope of the item, even though the matched conditions are not 
consistent with CIFJRs. 
61 
4) Finally, in the US view, the Illustrative List, in addition to listing practices that 
constitute prohibited export subsidies, also lists certain practices that do not 
constitute prohibited export subsidies, and, therefore, no ftulher proof of the 
57 Brazfl-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Report of the Panel (14/4/1999). 
WT/DS/46/R, para. 7.2 
58 WVDS/46/1; ý para. 7.2 
59 See in particular WVDS46/1; ý para. 5.18 
'0 Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 
of the DSU. Report of the Panel (26.7.2001). WT/DS46/RW/2, annex c-3 paras 22,23. 
61 lbid, paras 22-23. 
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absence of contingency on export is required. The United States has pointed out 
6 
that, where an item of the Illustrative List does address a particular type of 
practice, that item sets forth the standard for determining whether that practice is, 
or is not, a prohibited export subsidy. In particular, according to the US, when 
item (k) provides that export credits constitute prohibited export subsidies "in so 
far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit 
terms", the mentioned item, by necessary implication, also provides, "a contrario" 
that export credits do not constitute prohibited export subsidies if they are not 
"used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms". In short, 
not only should those credit tenns that are covered by the "interest rate" 
provisions of the OECD Agreement be excluded from the prohibited category, but 
also other credit practices, such as matching, as long as they do not secure 
"material advantage". 
62 
The panel disagreed with Brazil's suggestion that a consideration whether 
an item (k) payment is used to secure a material advantage in the field of export 
credit terms involves a comparison between the export credit terms of the 
transaction supported by the payment and the export credit terms of potentially 
competing transactions, arguing that a material advantage occurs when 
government payment "is used to secure export credit terms that are materially 
more favourable than the terms that would have been available in the absence of 
the payment". 
63 
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's reasoning, even though it finally 
upheld its findings, pointing out that its interpretation of "'material advantage" in 
62 WT/E)S46/AB/R, para. 90. 
63 Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Report of the Panel (14/411999). 
WVDS/46/1; tý para. 7.23 
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item (k) boils down to "benefit". thus making the "material advantage" clause 
superfluous in relation to Art. 1.1 (b) of the Agreement. 64 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body did not provide a definition of what 
constitutes "material advantage", but just noted that the second paragraph of item 
(k), which refers to the OECD Arrangement, is a "useful context for interpreting 
the "material advantage" clause in the paragraph", arguing, therefore, that the 
"Arrangemenf' can "provide a specific market benchmark by which to assess 
whether payment by governments ... are used to secure a material advantage in the 
field of export credit terms". From this the Appellate Body inferred that the 
ascertainment of whether a government payment is used to secure a "material 
advantage" as opposed to an "advantage that is not material" may depend on 
whether the actual interest rate applicable in a particular export sale transaction 
after deduction of the government subsidy (the net interest rate) is lower than the 
so-called "commercial interest reference rate (CIRR)", which under the OECD 
Arrangement is the minimum commercial rate available, according to the length 
6 of maturity, 
for a particular currency. 65 . Finally, the Appellate Body 
denied the 
possibility that the Brazilian practice could be considered an instance of 
46matching" under the OECD Arrangement as the latter does not allow "a 
comparison between the net interest rate applied as the consequence of subsidies 
granted by a particular member and the total amount of subsidies provided by 
another member", as in the case under review, but concerns just the equalisation 
of the terms of an export credit. 66 
It must be noted, however, that from the statement of the Appellate Body it 
appears that the CIRR benchmark is just a first sight indication for the occurrence 
"Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Report of the Appellate Body (20/8/1999). 
WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 179. 
651bid., paras. 181-82. 
661bid., para. 185. 
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of "material advantage". Actually, the Appellate Body, in a subsequent Art. 21.5 
case, concerning the implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings on 
Brazil-Aircraft", explained that the CIRR is "one example of a market benchmark 
that may be used to determine whether a payment is used to secure a material 
advantage" and that "where the CIRR does not, in fact, reflect the rates available 
in the marketplace, "a Member should be able, in principle, to rely on evidence 
from the marketplace itself in order to establish an alternative "market 
benchmark", on which it might rely in one or more transactions". 67 68 
The US outlook is only partially reflected in the WTO case law. 
Certainly, as illustrated by the above-outlined dispute, the panels and the 
Appellate Body have accepted that item (k) refers only to export credits, and that 
it should not be read in isolation. On the other hand, the US suggestion that the 
entire body of the Arrangement should be taken into account for SCM purposes 
has not been favourably considered. 
With regard to the first paragraph of item (k) - containing the "material 
advantage" clause - in a further Art. 21.5 case concerning "Brazil-Aircraft" the 
panel, stated, in line with the first panel report on the controversy in question, that 
only those measures explicitly referred to in the Illustrative List as not constituting 
export subsidy should not be prohibited under any provision of the Agreement, 
and, therefore, the absence of "material advantage" is not enough to definitely 
exclude the possibility of conflict between an export credit measure and the SCM 
Agreement provisions. 
69 
67 Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU. Report of the Appellate Body (21.7.2000). WT/DS46/RW/2., para. 64. 
68 Article 21.5 of the U. R. Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that "where there is 
disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to 
comply with the recommendation and rulings, such disputes shall be decided through recourse to 
these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible, resort to the original panel" 
69 Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 
of the DSU. Report of the Panel (26.7.200 1 ). WT/DS46/RW/2, para. 5.274 
145 
With regard to the second paragraph of item (k) - which provides for a 
safe harbour from the general ban on export subsidies to those export credits that 
conform to the interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement - both the 
"Canada-Aircraft" and the "Brazil-Aircraft" Art. 21.5 panels have argued that the 
interest rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement include not only those articles 
that directly or explicitly pertain to interest rates as such, i. e., those on minimum 
interest rates, as well as those on the construction of CIRRs and their application, 
but also those provisions that support or reinforce the former articles; in particular 
the provisions on minimum cash payments, on maximum repayment terms, or on 
maximum validity periods for export credits. The Art. 21.5 panels justified this 
broader interpretation pointing out that any financial transaction consists of a 
package of financing terms and conditions, many of which affect the interest rate. 
For instance, an interest rate in line with the CIRR would result in a much lower 
rate if joined with an abnormally long grace period for principal repayment, or 
with low down payments. However, the panels have pointed out that not all 
substantive provisions of the Arrangement, by the mere fact that they affect the 
minimum interest rate, "ipso facto become an interest rate provision". Therefore, 
all the provisions of the OECD Arrangement that do not support the minimum 
interest rate provision are outside the scope of the second paragraph of item (k) 
and, thus, can constitute a prohibited export subsidy. 70 Particularly with regard to 
matching, the Art. 21.5 panels distinguished between matched "permitted 
exceptions" and "matched derogations", arguing that only the former, which 
comply with the "minimum interest rate" provision and the supporting provisions 
of the Agreement, are covered by item (k). 71 
". 0 WT/DS46/RW/2, paras. 5.103-5.106. 
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft. Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU. Report of the Panel (9.5.2000). WT/DS70/RW, paras5.111-5.117. 
71 WTA: )S70/RW, paras. 5.124-5.126. 
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Ile Art. 21.5 reports have been criticised not only by the United States but 
also by other industrial countries which participate in the OECD Arrangement. 
Indeed, the "Canada -Aircraft" reports do not seem free from flaws. In particular, 
A- - me interpretation of item (k) seems to result in a partition between the SCM 
Agreement and the OECD Arrangement, in contrast with the rationale for the 
inclusion of item (k) in the Export Subsidy List which aimed at recognising the 
efforts of the Arrangement to regulate competition among the major export credit 
providers, and at the same time create a more level playing field, by allowing a 
safe harbour to export credits complying with the OECD provisions. 
kd 6) Actionable subsidies 
Art. 5 of the SCM Agreement places a third category between prohibited 
and non-actionable subsidies: actionable, or yellow light subsidies. Actionable 
subsidies are often viewed as a default category, consisting of subsidies other than 
those prohibited and non-actionable. 72 Actually, there are specific requirements 
for a subsidy to belong to this category. Basically, the subsidy must be, 1) specific 
and 2) injurious to the domestic industry of another WTO member, or must cause 
nullific ation or impairment of benefits accruing to it, or serious prejudice to its 
interests. The main difference with article 3, therefore, seems to lie in the fact that 
whereas prohibition results from the goal of subsidisation, i. e., from its link with 
trade distorting objectives, actionability comes from the "adverse effect" of the 
subsidy. 
The first form of adverse effect, injury to the domestic industry of another 
WTO member, is defined in the same way as for countervailing measures. and, 
WT/DS46/RW/2, paras. 5.113-5.116. 
72See Mitsuo Matsushita. Thomas J. Schoembaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organisation Law Practice and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 279. 
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therefore, must be based upon the objective examination of the impact of 
subsidised imports on prices in the domestic market for like products and on the 
domestic producers' performance. 73 
The term "nullification and impairment" is used in the same sense as in the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1994.74 Adverse effect could, in particular, occur in 
keeping with GATT Art, Y. XIII: I(b) non-violation cases, where the following 
I conditions are realised: 1) a concession has been negotiated resulting in tariff 
binding: and 2) the introduction into the territory of the country that has bound its 
tariff of a subsidy scheme which impairs the benefit of the concession for the 
addressee country of the promise of binding. 
According to SCMA Art. 6.3, the third hypothesis, serious prejudice, can 
arise when: 
1) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede imports of like products into 
A. 1- - 
me subsidising member's market, or exports of like products to a third-country 
market; 
2) the subsidy causes significant price undercutting or significant price 
suppression of a like product; 
3) in the case of primary products, the subsidy increases the world market share of 
the subsidising country over its previous three-year average. 
Art. 6.1 created a rebuttable presumption of serious prejudice for so-called 
dark amber cases if the total subsidisation amounts to more than 5 percent of the 
product value, if subsidies are extended to cover the operating losses of an 
industry or of an enterprise, or if they are provided in the form of debt forgiveness 
or debt repayment. Paragraph I of Annex IV provided that total ad valorem 
subsidisation must be calculated with reference to the cost to the government. 
73 Art. 5, footnote II- 
74Art. 5, footnote 12. 
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However, dark amber cases are no longer applicable as, under Art. 31 (Final 
provisions), they only apply for a period of five years from the date of entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement, i. e., the end of 1999, and the WTO members did 
not agree to extend their application. 
As usual the WTO junsprudence has shed light on some of the 
controversial aspects contained in Part IV of the SCMA. The "US- Upland 
Cotton" case, which probably is going to be the first volley in a series of attacks 
carried out by Latin American countries against the US farm policy along with the 
EU's CAP, concerned a set of agricultural programmes designed either to boost 
American exports or to protect farmers' incomes in the domestic market. As 
regards domestic subsidies, the panel and the Appellate body considered their 
ability to cause serious prejudice, focusing on three specific topics - 1) the 
relationship between the effects of a subsidy and the constituent blocks of the 
subsidy concept and, therefore, the autonomy of the actionable subsidy discipline 
under Part III of the SCMA from other titles of the Agreement; 2) the concept of 
market and its relevance with regard to the various subsections of SCMA Art. 6.3; 
and 3) the concept of world market share. 
The subsidies under review were "captured" by the provisions of the 
SCMA - Part III, because, contrary to US opinion, they were considered related to 
the type of production undertaken, and as such they were not decoupled subsidies 
falling in the so-called "green box". Thus, they were not sheltered from challenge 
75 by virtue of paragraph 13 (a) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
In keeping with its countervailing duty pmctice (examined in depth in 
Chapter VI), the United States contended that recurring subsidies provided in 
marketing years prior to the period under review cannot be considered to cause 
75 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton - Ab-22004-5-Report of the Appellate Body 
(3.3.2005) WT/D267/AB/R., paras. 341-342. 
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serious prejudice in that period. The US noted that non-recurring subsidies, such 
as those bestowed for capital investment can be allocated over a number of years, 
while recurring subsidies must be allocated to the year to which they relate, that 
is, the year for which the payment is made. In the United States' view, subsidies 
provided for a marketing year cease to exist when the benefit is used up for 
production in that year and the eventual effects of these subsidies (, whether as 
price undercutting or a greater market share) cannot be the subject of claims in 
years other than the year in which the subsidy was expended. 76 
The Appellate Body, upholding the opinion of the panel, held that the 
effect of a subsidy under Arts. 5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement should not be 
confused with the benefit flowing from a financial contribution, ývhich is a 
component part of the subsidy. The text of Art. 6.3 does not suggest that the effect 
of a subsidy is limited to or continues only for a specified period of time, and it 
applies to a subsidy whether it is recurring or non-recurring. The AB also found 
support for its argument in Art. 6.4 of the SCM Agreement which requires that the 
displacement or impeding of export be demonstrated over a representative period 
of at least one year so as to demonstrate clear trends in changes in market shares. 77 
The Appellate Body addressed the meaning of the terrns "market" and 
"same market" with reference to the specific case of price undercutting and 
depression in art. 6.3 (c) of the Agreement, but which is extendable to other 
cases of adverse effect. The United States, with a rather strained interpretation of 
the text ofthe article. argued that the relevant market under Art. 6.3 (c) must be a 
particular domestic market of a member and cannot be the -vvorld inarket because 
76 Ibid., para. 45. 
77 Ibid., paras. 474-480. 
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otherwise the subsidised product and the like product would necessaril-v be in the 
same market and, therefore, the term -same" would be redundant. 78 
Rejecting the United States' argument, the Appellate Body affirmed the 
opinion of the panel, according to which market is a geographical area of demand 
for commodities or services, and the area of economic activity in which buyers 
and sellers come together and the forces of supply and demand affect prices. In 
contrast with paragraphs (a), ( b) and (d) of art. 6.3, paragraph (c) does not 
qualify the market concemed, which, thus, can be a domestic market, a regional 
market, or the world market. 79 For the AB, therefore, the location of the market 
concerned is a question of fact and must be left to a case-by-case analysi S. 80 The 
only qualification provided by paragraph (c) is that the market must be the same. 
The ascertainment of the identity of the market concerned, in the opinion of the 
Appellate Body, can, however, rely on the above quoted definition of a place 
where demand meets supply. Thus, two products can be deemed to be in the same 
market "if they are engaged in actual or potential competition, even if they are not 
necessarily sold at the same time and in the same place or country". 81 
In defining the concept of market share in Art. 6.3 (d) for -serious 
prejudice" purposes, the panel (in a part of the opinion which was not considered 
in the appeal) rejected both the interpretation of Brazil, for which the relevant 
share is the -export share" and the relevant world market is the -export market" 
and the -viewpoint of the United States, according to vvhich the world market 
encompasses consumption of the agricultural produce in question, including 
consumption by a country ofits o\vn production. Noting that Part III of the SC%l 
Agreement not only includes those subsidies that. while not contingent upon 
-q Ibid- para. 409. 79 
Ibid- paras 404-405. 
qo Ibid.. para 410 
" Ibid., para. 41 33 
i -; I 
export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1 (a), may still incidentally 
0. 
facilitate or promote exportation but also embraces subsidies that promote 
production itself, whether or not increasing exportation, the panel argued that the 
phrase "world market share" should be read in a manner which takes into account 
both production and exports. 82 Consequently, it considered that "world market 
share" in the text of Article 6.3 (d) refers to the share of the world market supplied 
by the subsidizing Member. 
83 
On the other hand, the panel held that the US perspective which also took 
f 
into account the increase in consumption of the member granting the subsidy to 
determine the expansion of its share in the world market would run counter to the 
underlying purpose of the subsidy disciplines in the Agreement. Indeed, as the 
panel pointed out, increased consumption would lead to enhanced demand which, 
if satisfied from imports, is likely to benefit, rather than adversely affect, the 
interests of other WTO members. 84 
A WTO panel also shed light on the concept of "same product" in footriote 
46 to Art. 15 in a case in which the US was one of the complainants. The analysis 
was provided with regard to a set of measures established by the Indonesian 
government to support production and marketing of a low cost car produced in the 
D- 
Republic, some of which took the form of tariff and tax reductions and exemption. 
The European Communities and the United States claimed that such measures 
constituted subsidies, either prohibited under Art. 3.1 as import substitution 
subsidies or actionable as allegedly causing serious prejudice to foreign 
competitors producing like products. The panel interpreted the term "like 
product" narrowly, noting that according to footnote 46, it is not enough that the 
82 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton -Report of the Panel (8.9.2004) WT/D26TR., 
paras. 7.1447-1449. 
Ibid., para. 7.1450. 
Ibid. pams 7.1451-1453. 
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comp- 
-- ared products have similar characteristics. Rather, they must closely 
6.1 
resemble each other. 85 Thus, the fact that they belong to the same genus (in this 
case, cars) does not permit the inference that they are "like products" for serious 
prejudice purposes. Physical similarity is relevant, but cannot be viewed as an 
exclusive factor. 86 On the other hand, the panel suggested that price might be a 
relevant consideration, particularly where differences in price represent one way 
to assess the relative importance of differing physical characteristics to 
consumers. It noted, however, that excessive reliance on price differential could 
erroneously preclude an assessment of serious prejudice, in particular when it 
takes the form of price undercutting. Indeed, if the low price of the allegedly 
subsidised goods were to render them "unlike" competing products which are 
similar in physical characteristics but are priced higher, the result would be that 
the price undercutting claims under Article 6 could never prevail. 87 
7) Non-actionable subsidies 
Art. 8 of the SCM Agreement made non-actionable three kinds of specific 
subsidies, the so-called "green light" cases: 
1) subsidies granted to cover a portion of costs of research (up to a maximum of 
75 percent of the costs) and pre-competitive development (up to a maximum of 50 
percent). 
2) subsidies bestowed to assist disadvantaged regions, provided that the assistance 
is given as part of a general scheme of regional development, the assisted region 
is a clearly designated, contiguous geographical area with a definable economic 
85 Indonesia-Certain Measures AfTecting the Automobile Industry - Report of the Panel 
(2.7.1988). WT/DS 54/R., paras. 14.172. 
Ibid., para. 14.175. 
" lbid. para. 14.173 
87 Ibid. para. 14.192. 
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and administrative identity, and the assessment of disadvantage is based upon 
neutral and objective criteria. 
3) subsidies provided to adapt existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements, if the facilities have been operational for at least 2 years. the 
subsidy is a non- recurring measure and does not exceed 20 percent of total costs. 
While prohibited and actionable subsidies can be challenged under the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism or subject to domestic counten-ailing duties, 
the above listed subsidies, if duly notified, were immune from action under both 
remedies. If they had not been notified they were to be treated as non-actionable if 
found to conform to the standards set forth in the Agreement. 88 On the other hand, 
for non-actionable subsidies, which nonetheless result in serious advcrse effect to 
the domestic industry of a WTO member, a mutually acceptable solution should 
be sought, first by consultation and then by referring the question to the 
Committee on Subsidies. 
89 
Article 8 also provides that non-specific subsidies are non-actionable, but 
this may be considered as the result of the more general rule providing for 
" of the Agreement. specificity in Art. 2 
However, the time limit of the year 2000 under Art. 3 1, along with the end 
of the dark amber category supported by the US, meant the dismissal of the green 
light safe harbour, particularly dear to the European Communities. Already in 
1996, Anderson and I lusisisan cast doubts on the US Congress' vvillingness to 
extend the US green light provisions of the U. R. Agreements Act after July I" 
2000. Indeed, though the Clinton Administration looked favourably at least at one 
green light item - research & development, Congress, whose majority vvas 




I. Republican, went on 
formally opposing subsidisation, whether domestic or 
I 
foreien. 90 
8) MuNlateral remedies and proceedings 
Like the Tokyo Round Code, the SCM Agreement provides two kinds of 
remedies: WTO dispute settlement proceedings, i. e., consultation and dispute 
panel proceedings; and countervailing duty proceedings. In contrast with 
antidumping, which does not permit a complaint until a domestic measure is 
taken, WTO dispute resolutions on subsidies can serve as an alternative to CVD 
proceedings. Under footnote 36 to SCM Art. 10, the provisions of parts II and III 
(concerning "red light" and "yellow light" subsidies) may be invoked in parallel 
with the provisions of part V (concerning countervailing measures). However, as 
r_.. 
far as the effects of a subsidy in the domestic market of the importing member are 
concerned, only one form of relief will be available, that is, either a countervailing 
duty or a measure decided by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 91 
In dispute settlement proceedings a panel may provide relief in the form of 
a recommendation that the subsidy be withdrawn or that its adverse effect be 
eliminated, depending on whether a subsidy is "prohibited" or simply 
"actionable". 
In the first case, SCM article 7 provides a more expedite timetable than 
that provided by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU`). Consultations 
must be entered "as quickly as possible" upon the request of a member who has 
reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy has been granted or maintained by 
another member. In the absence of an agreed solution within 30 days, either of the 
90 M. Jean Anderson and Gregory Husisian, 6"Me Subsidies", op. cit, p. 571 
For a critical viewpoint on the "green light" subsidies regime see in particular William K. Wilcox, 
Gatt-Based Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy". B. U. Int'L. J. 16(1998) p. 161. 
91 See James R. Cannon. Jr., "Dispute Settlement", op. cit., p. 388. 
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two members may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which 
must immediately establish a panel, unless there is an opposite consensus. The 
Panel must circulate its final report within 90 days and, if the report is not 
appealed, the DSB must adopt it within 30 days. If the panel report is appealed, 
the Appellate Body must normally issue its report wid-iin 30 days. Secondly, SCM 
f 
Art. 4 provides for a more effective remedy than the usual WTO remedy, as, 
while DSU Art. 19 only provides that the losing party must bring its measures 
under compliance, SCM Art. 4.7 prescribes the withdrawal of the illicit subsidy. 
In controversies on "yellow light" subsidies the procedure is less expedite 
and remedies are less stringent. Under article 7 of the SCM Agreement, if 
consultations between the parties concerned do not result within 60 days in a 
mutually acceptable solution, the complaining party may request the DSB to 
establish a panel, which has 120 days to submit its report. The DSB has 30 days to 
adopt the report,, unless members decide by consensus not to adopt it, or one of 
the parties appeals. In the latter case the Appellate Body must issue its report 
within 60 days. Under Art. 7.8 members are required either to withdraw the 
subsidy or remove its effects. 
In both "red light" and "yellow light" subsidy cases if the subsidising 
member does not take appropriate steps to withdraw the subsidy or remove its 
effect the affected member can take countermeasures after authority has been 
granted by the DSB. 
9)Countervailing duty proceedinp 
Part V of the SCM Agreement largely reproduces the previous discipline 
set forth by the Subsidies Code. According to Art. 15 subsidies, whether 
prohibited or simply actionable, can be subject to countervailing measures only if 
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there is material injury or threat of material injury to domestic industries. 
Material injury also includes the threat of material injury, and the material 
retardation of the establishment of an industry. Domestic industry, as a general 
rule, includes domestic producers of like products or a major proportion of such 
producers. It can also be limited to a regional market, if there is a concentration 
of imports into that market causing injury to local producers. A note to article 15 
provides that the term "like product" shall be interpreted as a product ýxhich is 
alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a 
product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has 
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. 
The Agreement explicitly incorporates the US philosophy and 
methodology we examined in the preceding chapter as a minimum common 
denominator to assess benefit for countervailing duty purposes. Indeed, the 
heading of SCM article 14 is "calculation of the amount of subsidy in terms of the 
benefit to the recipient". In particular, the article provides that: 1) equity infusion 
by the goverrurnent will not be considered a benefit if it corresponds to a private 
investor's criteria; 2) in loans and loan guarantees by governments only the 2 
difference between commercial and governmental paid loans and guarantees 
qualifies as benefit; 3) with respect to the provision of goods and sen, ices or 
their purchase, the benefit is the difference between the prevailing market 
conditions (in the country of provision or purchase) and the price paid to 
glovemment. 
The Agreement, however, requires the investigating authorities to 
examine all known tactors that injure the domestic industry other than subsidised 
imports and not to attribute iRjury caused by them to the latter. 
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Investigations must be terminated if the amount of the subsidies is -de 
minimis", or if the volume of subsidised export is negligible. In the case of 
imports from industrialised countries subsidies are "de minimis" if less than I 
percent ad valorem, whereas for developing countries, subsidies of 2 percent ad 
valorem are considered -de minimis". 92 The volume of imports from developing 
countries is "negligible" if it is less than 4 percent of the total of imports of the 
like product into the importing country, unless the total amount of "negligible 
subsidies" exceeds 9 percent of the total imports of the like product. 93 
Following the US model the SCM Agreement permits an investigating 
authority to cumulatively assess the aggregate effects of imports from more than 
one country, if the subsidy from each country is more than -de minimis". if the 
volume of imports from each country is not negligible, and if the imports compete 
with each other. 
Going beyond US practice, Art. 21 of the Agreement created a sunset 
clause by which a duty shall remain in force only as long as necessary to 
counteract the injurious subsidisation. Duties shall be ten-ninated within five 
years, unless the investigating authority detennines that the expiry of the duty is 
likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of subsidisation and injury. 
At any rate, the SCM Agreement does not challenge the US statute and 
practice according to xNhich countervailing duties are imposed to the full amount 
of the estimated subsidy. Indeed, the first sentence of Art. 19.2 leaves to WTO 
members the choice between imposing duties matching, but not exceeding, the 
level of the subsidy and imposing lower duties if adequate to remove the injury to 
the domestic industry. The second sentence of Art. 19.2 favours the second 
alternative, but clcarlý it is simply hortatory. 
Q2 
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Conclusion 
Two American scholars, concluding a review of the WTO Antidumping 
and Subsides Agreements in the first five years since their entry into force, give a 
doubtful response to the question of whether the United States achieved its 
objectives in the Uruguay Round. In particular, they find factors of concem in the 
limited deference accorded by WTO panel reports to US decisions in 
countervailing duty inquiries and in the uncertain effectiveness of the new subsidy 
regime in securing the curtailment of subsidisation practices. 94 The foregoing 
sections bears out by and large their judgement, although not exactly for the same 
reasons. 
Certainly, the United States was able to impose its perspective in key 
sectors of the reformed subsidy and countervailing measures regime. 
Firstly, the definition of subsidy adopted the concept of benefit to the 
recipient rather than that of cost to goverment put forward by the European 
Communities along with other industrialised as well as developing countries. 
Besides, although the SCM Agreement does not provide a definition of benefit, 
WTO decisions have made it clear that the main yardstick to assess existence and 
amount of benefit is the market, in keeping with US legislation and administrative 
practice. And the US achievement with regard to Art. I is strengthened by the 
choice by Art. 14 of the relevant section of the Agreement of the US market- 
oriented practice as the minimum common denominator to assess the legitimacy 
of countervailing duty measures. 
Secondly, the US has secured the extension of the prohibited subsidies 
regime to those practices that do not foster imports but raise barriers to foreign 
94Paul C. Rosenthal and Robert T. C. Vermylen, "the WTO Antidumping" op. cit., p. 894. 
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goods imports, which was a recurrent preoccupation for the United States during 
the 1980s. 
Thirdly, as already noted with reference to SCM Art. 14, the countervailing 
proceeding discipline largely reproduces US legislation and administrative 
practice in the period that followed the Tokyo Round Agreements, the concept of 
cumulation being just one of the prominent examples. Certainly, thresholds and 
terms of reference provided by the SCM Agreement can offer better treatment to 
the exporter than the previous US practice, but in so doing they give recognition 
to such practices. 
The success is not complete, though. 
The DSB has rejected the US attempt to enlarge the financial contribution 
concept so as to encompass economic policy measures that depress the cost of 
inputs used in the production of goods for export, thus affording competitive 
advantage to exporters. As regards export subsidies, the WTO decisions run 
counter to the US broad interpretation of subsidies contingent upon export 
performance, requiring, instead, a relation of strict conditionality between 
subsidisation and exports. The United States has not secured full recognition of 
the role of the OECD Arrangement in regulating all aspects, that is, not only 
interest rates, of export credit subsidisation. 
If the United States has been able to definitely attract domestic subsidies into the 
WTO regime, it has failed to secure a particularly str-ingent discipline for some of 
them. Subsidies like debt forgiveness or those destined to cover operating losses 
of industries and firms are not considered prohibited -subsidies nor are they 
included anymore in a dark amber categor-y, as art. 6.1 of the Agreement expired 
in 1999. The interpretation by the United States of certain key concepts of serious 
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prejudice has been rejected in a recent case concerning US farm po cy. 95 It 
seems, however, that the US perspective in such a case was more tactical than 
V* 
strategic, as it aimed to defend some relevant measures of US farm policy rather 
than to assert a general viewpoint on the application of multilateral remedies 
with regard to actionable subsidies. 
Finally, the United States did not try to reopen the issue of equivalence of 
the various fiscal export regimes from the subsidisation angle during the Uruguay 
Round. Indeed, the rather vague wording used to address fiscal treatment as a 
form of financial contribution under art. I of the Agreement soon turned out to be 
a sword of Damocles on the US fiscal incentives to foster its exports. 
0 
95 See supm United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton -Report of the Panel (8.9.2004) 
WT/D267/R. United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton - Ab-2004-5-Report of the Appellate 
Body (3.3.2005) WTID267/AB/R 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF THE NIULTILATERAL REGINIE ON THE US 
LEGISLATION AND THE TAX ISSUE. THE US IN THE DOCK AS 
SUBSIDISER IN THE FSC-ETI CASES 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have prevalently focused on the impact that 
concepts, methods and approaches developed in the United States had on the 
establishment of the multilateral regime on subsidies and countervailing duties. In 
this last part we concentrate on the influence that the latter has on the evolution of 
the US regime. We examine this process from two angles, in accordance v, -Ith the 
approach of the WTO itself, in the WTO dispute website we find a heading for 
countervailing measures, while the other disputes concerning alleged 
subsidisation are placed separately. In the following chapters we shall focus on 
the US CTV regime. In this chapter we look at one case of alleged subsidisation, 
actually divided into two stages: the Foreign Sales Corporations dispute and its 
continuation under art. 21.5 of the DSU, the ETI dispute. 
The FSC dispute originates from the US attempt, already examined in 
chapter II, to create a level playing field between its tax regime, prevalently 
relying on income tax, and that of its European trading partners based on 
consumption taxes, and in particular the Value Added Tax (VAT), whose 
deduction firom exported goods is allowed by the GATT. Because of its roots the 
FSC dispute is rather different from other subsidy cases and such distinctiveness 
makes it one of the landmarks in the recent history of WTO controversies, 
together with the banana and hormones disputes. In other subsidisation cases we 
are confronted with measures which are often rather complex but can be anaIN'sed 
on the basis of the '-NC\f Agreement and of GATT 1994. The only thing the 
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interpreter has to do is to examine the measure in the light of the above-mentioned 
rules. The FSC - ETI measures are, instead, an integral part of the US taxation 
system. At least, the US grounded its defence on this notion. We cannot take as 
granted that the measures in question merely allow the foregoing of revenue that 
is "otherwise due" under US law. Rather, the question is firstly whether the FSC 
measure and its replacement are a separate tax scheme or are just a piece in the 
complex US fiscal fabric. In other words, is the FSC-ETI regime a waiver from 
what is "otherwise due", or is it an autonomous set of rules, that is, the "otherwise 
due" itself 
To have an in-depth view on this subject we cannot, therefore, leave aside 
the place and role of the FSC scheme and that of the ETI measure within the US 
tax regime. Based on this premise this chapter is divided into six sections. In the 
first section we examine the FSC measure trying to look at it with reference to 
other relevant US tax rules. Then we examine the DSB reports both with regard to 
the interpretation of the SCM Agreement and to the analysis of the FSC scheme. 
In the following two sections we repeat the exercise with regard to the ETI Act. 
Finally, we examine the last developments of the controversy until the second 
DSU Art. 21.5 panel report of September 2005 and review some of the proposals 
put forward by American scholars to find a satisfactory way-out. As regards the 
reports of the panel and of the Appellate Body the examination refers only to the 
SCM Agreement, leaving aside those aspects concerning the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
1) The subject of contention: Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) 
The FSC in the context ofthe US tax regime 
As noted in chapter III, the 1981 Council Decision which adopted the 
panel reports on the tax disputes between the US and some EEC member states 
qualified the reports in three ways: 
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1) by providing that a country is not required to tax economic processes located 
outside its territory; 
2) by stating that it may utilise measures to avoid double taxation of foreign 
source income; 
3) by providing for the application of the arm's length pricing principle between 
exporting companies and foreign traders. However, it cannot be viewed as an 
absolution for the DISC programme, as this measure was nothing but a tax 
deferral of income accruing from economic processes carried out in the US. 
Correctly, perhaps, in that particular phase of GATT history, the US 
interpreted the decision as allowing the Parties concerned not to tax some 
activities carried out outside their borders, without having to leave out the whole 
of the activities located outside their fiscal boundaries. In other words, in the 
opinion of the United States, the Decision did not prescribe an alternative between 
a fully-fledged exemption system and a tax credit system, but it allowed the co- 
existence of both regimes. To understand this approach we must provide an 
outline of the US tax regime, though certainly not a comprehensive one. 
Most American scholars who have written about the DISC-FSC- ETI saga, 
point out that US taxpayers - either citizens or residents or companies 
incorporated in the United States - are taxed on their worldwide income. Thus, as 
regards domestic corporations, that is, those organised under the law of one of the 
states or the District of Columbia, no distinction is made between income from 
sources inside or outside the United States, except that taxes on foreign income 
may be reduced by foreign tax credit. ' Much less straightforward, however, is the 
US fiscal treatment of foreign companies and of their relationship with their 
United States parent companies. According to section 881 of the Internal Revenue 
' In particular, IRC section 61 provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived". 
164 
Code (IRC), a foreign corporation is taxed on fixed or determinable periodical 
'. I income accrued in the US, such as interests, dividends and royalties, at a flat 
percent rate on gross income. Also, under IRC section 882, if a foreign 
corporations is engaged in trade or business in the United States, the net income 
that is effectively connected with the conduct of that trade or business will be 
taxed in the same manner as the income of a US company. Generally, in the case 
of business income, only income from US sources will be effectively connected 
income and, therefore, subject to taxation in the same way as the income of a US 
taxPayer. Foreign source income is treated as effectively connected income if it is 
attributable to a place of business in the United States. In the latter case, however, 
A- - diere can be the problem of allocating the income between the country of 
production and the country of sale, that is, the US. In most cases the allocation is 
detennined according to regulations worked out by the US tax authority. 2 
Generally, foreign income non-connected to trade or business in the United States, 
or not accruing from US sources, is only taxable if it is repatriated as dividend. 
From the foregoing it follows that under the system applying to US 
companies, if the corporation conducts business abroad through a branch, the 
income so produced is part of its tax base. Instead, if the business were carried out 
through a foreign corporation, there would nonnally be no US taxation until and 
unless the earnings of the foreign corporation were distributed to American 
shareholders. That would allow the latter to defer the moment of taxation on their 
foreign activities playing on the deferral of dividend distribution made possible by 
the fact that foreign subsidiaries are considered separate persons; and thanks to the 
2 To give a relevant example with respect to the FSC case, income from the sale of property 
manufactured abroad and sold in the United States by a US office of the foreign company is 
allocated under the relevant regulation by applying, in the first place, the sale price to an 
independent distributor (i. e., the am's length principle). If such a price cannot be ascertained, then 
one half of the taxable income is allocated on the basis of a comparison of the sales value within 
the US and in the foreign country. Either in the case of the application of the arm's length 
principle or in the case of the sale ratio rule, the basic point is the presence of a permanent 
establishment of the foreign company in the US. 
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accrual of compound interests tax deferred for many years can almost be the same 
as tax forgiven. 
In 1962, however, when capital account problems, rather than trade 
0 balance problems, were beginning to make themselves felt, Congress enacted 
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) piercing the fiscal veil between US 
S 
taxpayers and their foreign subsidiaries. 3 Where a foreign corporation is 
controlled for an uninterrupted period of 30 or more days by US shareholders, 
whether individuals or companies, such shareholders are taxed for their quota of 
the corporation's undistributed earnings as well as on its distributed earnings (IRC 
a sections 
951 and 958). It must be noted, however, that Subpart F provides for a 
specific, rather high, holding and does not necessarily apply to the whole of the 
income accrued to the subsidiary. In particular, with regard to "foreign base 
company sales income" - which is the hypothesis that has more points in common 
with the FSC rules, as it concems property purchase from, or sold to a related 
party - under IRC section 954, the income accrued to the foreign affiliate is 
attributed to its US shareholders, only if the foreign company is deemed to be 
used as an intermediary to channel income produced by a related party towards 
countries with a more favourable tax regime. On the other hand, income 
considered to be generated by genuine activity carried out by the affiliate is not 
4 directly taxable to US shareholders. The purpose of the provision, therefore, is to 
3 See, in particular, Paul McDaniel and Hugh S. Ault, Introduction to United States International 
Taxation (New York: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, 1989)p. 118 et seq. 
Also Eric T. Laity, "Defining Foreign Base Company Income: The Exclusions, Deductions and 
Limitations ", Berkley J Int'l L. 19(200 1) p. 94. 
'See in particular, Brian J. ArnoK "The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: Defining 
and Designating Tax Havens", B. TR., 1985, p. 2929 et seq. 
Also Boris J. Bittker, Laurence Stone, William Klein, Federal Income Taxation (Boston: Little 
Brown Company, 1984), p. 112 et seq.. Paul McDaniel and Hugh. S. Ault. Introduction, op. cit, p. 
175 et seq.. 
166 
deal both with deferral of US taxes and avoidance of taxes imposed by high-rate 
foreign countries. 5 
If Subpart F was advantageous for the US Executive from the income 
revenue perspective, from the subsidy rules angle, in the words of Hufbauer, it 
was "a self- inflicted injury". 6 Indeed, given the unavailability of rebates for 
income tax under GATT art. VI, the greater the scope of the US tax power, the 
greater the gap with the advantages made available to exporters from the other 
side of the Atlantic, in particular because of the VAT mechanism allowing them 
0. 
to deduct the tax paid in previous stages of production without having to bear 
further fiscal burdens at the export stage. 7 It must be noted, however, that many 
scholars at both sides of the Atlantic have seen the root of the Western European 
fiscal competitive edge in the direct tax regime of many European States, whether 
members of the EC or not, which, in their opinion, in contrast to the US approach, 
only assesses income generated territorially! The first attempt to fill the gap was 
5 Apart from "foreign personal holding company income", under section 954(a), which mainly 
consists of passive income, such as interest, dividends, rents and royalties and the net gains from 
the sale of assets producing these income flows, the main category of foreign base company 
income is that of "foreign base company sales income", under section 954 (d). This category 
includes income from property purchased from, or sold to, a related party - which needs not be a 
US corporation - if the property is manufactured and sold for use outside the country of 
incorporation of the foreign company controlled by US shareholders. On the other hand, if the 
goods sold by the controlled company are intended for use inside the country of its incorporation, 
the income is not considered as "foreign base company sales income". Likewise, if the controlled 
foreign company manufactures the product sold, the income is not considered as "foreign base 
company sales income" and, therefore, is not directly taxable to the shareholders according to 
subpart F. Analogous rules apply under section 954(e) to "foreign base company service income", 
that is, income deriving from services performed by controlled foreign companies. Thus Subpart F 
applies to services performed by or on behalf of a related person, outside the country of 
incorporation of the controlled company. If these services are performed within the country of 
incorporation or are directly related to the sale of goods manufactured by the company, the income 
is not directly taxable to the US shareholders. 
6 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "The Foreign Sales Corporation Drama: Reaching the Last Act? ", Int I 
Econ Pol ýv Brief, n. PB02-10 (2002), p 3. 
7See Chapter II, section I- 
a See for instance, Hale E. Sheppard, "Rethinking Tax-Based Export Incentives: Converting 
Repeated Defeats Before the WTO into Positive Tax Policy"', Tex. Int'l LJ, 39(2003) p. 122. 
Cecelia BB. Skeen, "'Knick-Knack Paddy Whack Leave the FSC Alone: An Analysis of the WTO 
Panel Ruling That the U. S. Foreign Sales Corporations Program is an Illegal Export Subsidy 
Under the GATM New Eng. L. Rev., 35 (2000-0 1). p 97. 
Also, Asif H. Qureshi and Roman Grynberg, "United States Tax Subsidies Under Domestic 
International Sales Corporation, Foreign Sales Corporation and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion 
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the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) legislation, but the United 
States had to accept the fact that the DISC scheme was not consistent with the 
GATT provisions. 
The solution to this long-lasting problem, in the US view, lay in applying 
the principle embodied in the 1981 Understanding in a selective way, exploiting 
the room for manoeuvre provided by the complex web of tax ndes and 
administrative regulations concerning foreign income. In keeping with the US 
interpretation of the 1981 Decision, the key to overcome this handicap was a well 
qualified exemption of income from sources outside the United States. 9 In line 
with the main features of the US tax system, a fundamental requirement was the 
establishment of "ad hoc" foreign corporations, as US companies remained 
subject to the worldwide tax basis principle of taxation. 
I Features of the FSC programme 
As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P. L. 98-369), Congress 
enacted the Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) programme to provide an export 
tax incentive "comparable to DISC in terms of benefit to exporters and cost to 
Treasury", while eliminating the controversy over the DISC regime. 10 This time 
the instrument for tax benefit provisions was no longer a domestic corporation but 
a company established outside the US fiscal borders, usually a shell subsidiary. 
Yet, according to US legislation, the FSC was a separate fiscal entity whose 
Act Legislation within the Framework of the World Trade Organization", JWT, 36 (2002) n. 5, p. 
980. 
9 Section 801 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 provided that "Part III of Subchapter N of 
Chapter I (referring to income from sources outside the United States) is amended by inserting 
after subpart B the following new chapter. 
10 Ronald D. Semau, "The Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation: AS 10 million Boondoggle 
Cornell L Rev. 71 (1986) p. 1190. 
Also Nicholas J. Minella -Note and Comment: Motives and Consequences of the FSC Dispute: 
Recent Salvo in a Long Standing Trade War or Fashioning a Bargaining Chip? " Brooklyn J Ini'l 
L. 27 (2002), p. 108 1. 
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recognition was conditional under strict requirements. " Under I. R. C. sect 922 (a) 
the FSC was a foreign corporation organised under the law of a qualified foreign 
country, or certain US possessions, like Guam or the Virgin Islands. A country 
was qualified if there was agreement for an exchange of information with the 
United States. The fact that the foreign country could, in turn, tax the FSC's 
earnings lessened the value of the incorporation of a foreign company. For that 
reason most US corporations organised their FSCs in countries with low or no 
income and dividend withholding taxes. The Virgin Islands were the preferred 
location. 12 
If a corporation qualified as FSC, a share of its "foreign trade income" was 
exempt from US corporate income tax,, and that portion could be distributed as a 
tax- free dividend to the US parent company. Under IRC sect. 924(a) the income 
of a given FSC, from any transaction,, was considered foreign trade income if 
three requirements were satisfied: the income was export-related, the management 
took place outside the US, and the economic process giving rise to foreign trade 
income took place outside the US. 
1) The income was to be export-related so as to make sure that the tax benefit was 
conferred only upon export income and not income the FSC might get from other 
activities, such as investments. Foreign Trade Income was defined by sect. 923(b) 
11 John M. Gray, "Foreign Sales Corporations Replace Domestic International Sales Corporations" 
HILJ26(1985) p. 302. 
12 Section 881 of the Internal Revenue Code states that for the purpose of determining whether 
foreign source income is connected or not connected with United States business, a corporation 
created or organised in Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana islands and the Virgin 
Islands or under the law of any such possession shall not be treated as a foreign corporation if the 
value of stocks beneficially owned (directly or indirectly) by foreign persons does not exceed a 
certain threshold. 
According to Stehman the fact that FSCs were predominantly located in US possessions, casts 
doubts on the foreign character of the FSCs, which is the rationale for their tax exemptions. 'Me 
scholar also points out that section 932 of the IRC provides that the United States will be treated as 
including the Virgin Islands for purposes of determining the US tax liability of US citizens or 
residents with Virgin Islands' income. Oliver Stehmann "Foreign Sales Corporations under the 
WTO. The Panel Ruling on US Export Subsidies", JWT., 34 (2000) 6, p. 94 
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as "the gross income from foreign trade gross receipC, i. e., receipts attrIbutable to 
the sale or leasing of export property outside the US, or services in connection 
with the sale or lease. Export property was defined by sect. 927(a) as property 
produced in the United States, no more than 50 percent of the fair amount of 
which was attributable to raw materials imported into the US. 
2) IRC sect. 924 (b) provided that for the management of the FSC to take place 
outside the US, the meetings of the board of directors had to be held abroad, the 
principal bank account was to be maintained outside the US and all the dividends, 
compensations of officers and legal and accounting fees were to be paid from 
foreign bank accounts. 
3) Pursuant to sect. 924(d), the foreign economic process requirement was 
satisfied if the FSC had participated outside the US in the solicitation, negotiation 
or the stipulation of a contract referring to an export transaction. This requirement, 
however, could be fulfilled if there was a contract between the foreign company 
and its US parent (or other US or foreign subsidiaries) pursuant to which all the 
export activities were perfonned by the related party. Secondly, a specified 
percentage of the transaction costs had to be borne by the FSC. The exempt 
portion of the FSCs foreign trade income was calculated on the basis of arrr. 's 
length pricing between the foreign company and its related supplier or on the 
basis of administrative pricing rules designed to determine the foreign trade 
income allocated to the FSC. 
21 (b), if arm's length pricing ývas used in a According to sect. 92 
transaction, 31 percent of the foreign trade income was treated as exempt foreign 
trade income. The administrative pricing rules could take two forms. If, according 
to section 9215 (a)(2), 23 percent of the combined t&xable income realised bv the 
FSC and its US parent company was allotted to the Foreign Sales Corporation 
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then, pursuant to sections 924 (a)(3) and 921 (b), 16'23 of such income was 
treated as exempt foreign trade income. This means that 16% of the combined 
income of the US trade company and its foreign subsidiary was exempt from 
taxation. The alternative administrative pricing rule under section 925(a)(3) would 
give the Foreign Sales Corporation a profit of 1.83 percent of the foreign trade 
gross receipts realised by the FSC on its resale of the product. We provide below a 
comparison of the alternatives available to US taxpayers (Table 1). The benefit 
was not limited to the foreign corporation but directly extended to its US parent 
company. Pursuant to section 245 (c) of the IRC, the US corporation that 
received a dividend distribution out of earnings and profits of its foreign affiliate 
was entitled to a 100 percent dividend received reduction. As a result there was no 
US corporate tax on the exempt foreign trade income. 
FISCAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS 
ASSUMPTIONS 
1) FSC's foreign trading gross receipts 1,000,000 
2) FSC's direct expenses 200,000 
3) Parent corporation's costs of good sold 450,000 
4) Parent corporation's direct expenses 150,000 
5) Combined foreign trade income (1-2-3-4) 200,000 
A) Arm's length method 
6) Transfer priice of goods sold by the parent company to 750,000 
its FSC assessed at arm's length value 
7) FSC's foreign trade income (1 -6) 250,000 
8) Exempt foreign trade income (31% x 7) 77,500 
9) Allocable direct expenses of FSC (31 %x 2) 62,000 




B) Combined taxable income method 
11) Deemed FSC's profits (23% x 5) 46,000 
12) Derived administrative transfer price for sales by 754,000 
parent company to FSC (1-2-11) 
13) FSC's foreign trade income (1-12) 246,000 
14) Exempt foreign trade income (16/23 x 13) 171,130 
15) Allocable FSC's expenses (16/23 2) 139,130 





FISCAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS 
C) Foreign trading gross receipts method 
17) Deemed FSC's profits (1,83% x 1) 18,300 
18) Derived administrative transfer price for 
Sales by parent company to FSC (1-2-17) 781,700 
19) FSC's foreign trade income (1-18) 218,300 
20) Exempt foreign trade income (16/23 x 19) 151,861 
21) Allocable FSC's expenses (16/23 x 2) 139,130 
22) Profit not subject to US tax 12,731 
These fiscal savings made FSCs very popular with exporting American 
companies. More than 6,000 US corporations benefited from the FSC tax regime, 
including large multinationals like Boeing, General Electric and Motorola. Boeing 
alone saved 130 million US $ in 1998. Also small and medium enterprises benefit 
from the scheme, saving on average 124.000 US $ annually. 13 
2) The rules of the game: the FSC provisions in the light of the SCM 
Agreement 
Even before the start of the Uruguay Round, the European Community 
expressed concern about some FSC provisions. In particular, the Community, by a 
rather extensive interpretation of the Understanding reached in 198 1, claimed that 
since a Party to the General Agreement is not required by the Understanding to 
tax economic events that occur outside its territorial limits, it is implicitly obliged 
to tax economic processes taking place within its boundaries. Thus, by not 
imposing taxes on the latter income the US bestowed illegal export subsidies. 14 
The Community also argued that the availability of administrative pricing 
methods runs counter to the arm's length principle in the assessment of 
transaction earnings between related parties. However, no complaint was lodged 
Sce James Joseph Shallue. "An Anak , Is of Foreign Sales Corporations and the Furopean Four 
Billion-Dollars Retaliation". Dem,. Jbit'l L (ý- Pol'v .3 1(2002), p. 201. 
, ce Jeffre, % F. RN an, "An Anak sis of the Gatt compatibilit-N of the Ne%k Foreh- Sn Sal I es 
Corporations" I; anta Claiv Lni, Review. 260986) p. -07. 
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dufing the negotiations for a new multilateral regime on subsidies and 
countervailing measures in the Uruguay Round. 
Many commentators have argued that the European Communities 
rekindled the controversy on the alleged US tax subsidy regime as it wanted to 
create a bargaining chip to reach a negotiating settlement on a senes of disputes it 
had already lost, such as the beef honnone dispute, and to forestall US challenges 
against a variety of EU practices, such as trade barriers against GMO, and 
subsidies to the European champion Airbus. ' 5 It is also arguable, however, that 
the Communities believed that the time was ripe for bringing the controversy to 
the WTO because the SCM Agreement had profoundly curtailed the room for 
manoeuvre afforded by the 1981 Understanding. 
In 1997, after mandated consultations had failed, the Communities filed a 
complaint challenging the US FSC programme. The Communities argued that the 
FSC programme granted two forms of subsidy that violated articles I and 3(l) of 
the SCM Agreement. Firstly the European Communities contended that the FSC 
provisions allowed exemptions to income tax otherwise due to both Foreign Sales 
Corporations and their US parent companies. Secondly, the Communities 
submitted that the administrative pricing rules in the United States FSC regime 
derogated from the normal transfer pricing rules and increased the income 
shielded from taxation. 16 Both hypotheses were prohibited subsidies pursuant to 
article 3(l)(a), being contingent on export performance, as they depended upon 
the existence and amount of -exempt foreign trade income" which can only be 
'5 See Gar), C. Hufbauer. "The Foreign Sales" op. cit., p. 5. 
Robert E. Hudec. *'Industrial Subsidies: Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations". in Ernest 
U. Petersmann and %lark Pollack (eds), Transnational Economic Disputes. The Et'. the LS and 
the IVTO (Oxford LIni% ersiv, Press, 2003) p. 18 1. 
Asif H. Qureshi and Roman Grýnberg. United Sates Fax Subsidies. op. cit.. p. 991. 
United States - Tax Treatment of Foreigm Sales Corporations. Report of the Panel (18 101/ 1999). 
W7, DS 10 8, R. para. -3 . -1 - 
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generated by the export of US products. 17 As such they fell within the scope of 
item " e" in the Illustrative List. 
18 
As regards the first group of claims, the Communities alleged, in the first 
place, that IRC section 923 (a), providing that "exempt foreign trade income be 
treated as foreign source income which is not effecti-vely connected with the 
conduct of trade or business within the United States", derogated from the rules 
set out in section 864 of the Code, taking as granted what must be proved case-by- 
case. 19 Section 864 provides, inter alia, that foreign companies must be taxed at 
the same rate as US companies on income effectively connected with the conduct 
of trade or business within the US. The second exemption alleged by the 
Communities related to the application to FSCs of the anti-deferral rules for 
controlled foreign corporations under subpart F of the US Internal Revenue 
Code . 
20 The third exemption related to the fact that FSC shareholders were 
eligible under section 245(c) of the US Code for a 100 percent dividend received 
deduction for distributions constituted by foreign trade income, whereas, usually, 
dividends received by US corporations from foreign source income of a foreign 
corporation were taxable. 
21 
The United States rejoined that the FSC measure was no export subsidy, 
simply because income generated from economic activities outside the territory of 
the country need not be taxed, as footnote 59 to the SCM Agreement specifies. 22 
The US claimed that footnote 59 qualified, that is, limited the scope of item -e" in 
the Illustrative List indicating that income generated from foreign economic 
processes need not be taxed, and that the exemption of such income from taxation 
17 WT'DS/108 R. paras 4.293-4.3,00. 
"Ibid- paras 4.163-4.31-79. 




'21bid., para. 4.36-3.4.379. 
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in any fonn was not inconsistent with GATT Art. XVI. 23 In particular, the United 
States remarked that the second sentence of footnote 59, by affuming the arm's 
length principle, makes it clear that foreign-source income may be exempted from 
tax or taxed at a lesser extent than domestic-source income, also implying that 
foreign-source income could be straightaway exempted from tax. 24 The US also 
noted that the fifth sentence of footnote 59, which excludes measures taken to 
avoid double taxation from the scope of the Illustrative List, functions as a tax 
exemption of foreign-source income. In the opinion of the United States, its 
reading of footnote 59 was confirmed by the 1981 Understanding of the GATT 
Council, which provided that the exemption from tax of income attributable to 
.I 
foreign economic processes does not constitute forgiveness from "otherwise due" 
revenue. 
As Carmichael points out, the approach of the US and that of the 
Communities differed in the order in which the SCMA provisions had to be taken 
into account. 25 The Communities started their analysis with Arts. I and 3, 
subsequently proceeding to the Illustrative List in Annex 1. The United States 
focused in the first place on footnote 59 to item (e) of the Illustrative List, arguing 
that the footnote made it legally impossible that the FSC programme could be an 
export subsidy. 
The WTO panel opted for the Communities' approach, and examined first 
whether the alleged tax exemption allowed by the FSC scheme constituted 
violation of articles I and 3(a) of the SCM Agreement. In its assessment the panel 
23Footnote 59 reads: The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy 
where, for example, appropfiate interest charges are collected. The Members reaffirm the principle 
that pfices for goods in transactions between exporting enterpfises and foreign buyers under their 
or under the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between 
independent enterprises acting at arm's length .... Paragraph (e) is not intended to 
limit a member 
from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income earned by its 
enterprises or the enterprises of another Member. 
24 WT/DS/108/1; ý para. 4.365. 
23 Candace Carmichael, "Foreign Sales Corporations - Subsidies, Sanctions and Trade Wars, 
Vand1j. Transnat U., 3 5(2002), p 174. 
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followed the so-called -but for" test, arguing that the term -otherwise due" refers 
to the situation that would prevail but for the measures in question. The question 
was, therefore, "'whether, if the FSC scheme did not exist, revenue would be due 
which is foregone by reason of that scheme ý, 26 Applying this approach, the panel 
held that although it is conceivable that "'a particular exemption may not in everý- 
case result in the foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due", the exemptions 
identified by the Communities, taken together, involved the foregoing of such 
revenue. 27 The foregoing, in the panel's opinion, also made the US argument 
irrelevant, according to which under footnote 59 a country is allowed to exclude 
from taxation foreign-source income. Indeed, according to the panel, any WTO 
member "is free to maintain a worldwide tax system, a territorial system, or any 
other type of system it sees fit", but "it is not free to establish a regime of direct 
taxation" and then "provide an exemption from direct taxes specifically related to 
expo s ), . 
28 
Having held that the FSC was a subsidy, the panel concluded that the FSC 
exemptions fall within the scope of art. 3.1(a) of the SCMA as their availability 
depended upon the sale or lease of export property which, under the relevant 
section of the US Internal revenue Code, is limited in effect to "goods 
manufactured, produced, grown or extracted in the United States and which were 
held for direct use, consumption or disposition outside the country ". 29 Having 
already condemned the measure, the panel abstained from considering the claim 
of inconsistency of the administrative pricing rules with the general principles 
governing transfer pricing. 
W'T DS 108, R., para. -A 
21 Ibid., paras 7.99-7.100. 
Ibid., para. 7.12 -1. 
IbId., para 7.106- 7 10 S. 
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The opinion of the panel vvas substantially upheld by the Appellate Bodý-, 
though with some reservations. On the one hand, the Appellate Body argued that 
the "but for" test employed by the panel, though fitted to the FSC controvers%,. 
was deprived of general validity as "it was easy to circumvent such a test by 
designing a tax regime under which there would be no general rule that applied 
formally to the revenues in question, without the contested measures". 30 On the 
other hand, the Appellate Body agreed with the kernel of the panel's interpretation 
of SCMA art. 1.1 (a), stressing that "the term "otherwise due" implies some kind of 
comparison between the revenue due under the contested measure and the revenue 
due in some other situation" and that "the basis of the comparison must be the tax 
rules applied by the member in question". 31 
The Appellate Body also affirmed the panel's reasoning rejecting the US 
contention that footnote 59 qualified item "e" of the Illustrative List and, 
therefore, removed the FSC scheme from the scope of art. 3.1 (a). In particular the 
Appellate Body noted that the arm's length principle is not relevant to the 
question at issue, as it "is unaffected by the choice a Member makes as to which 
categories of foreign-source income, if any, it will not tax, or will tax less. "... as 
well as by "the choice a Member might make to grant exemptions from the 
generally applicable rules of taxation of foreign-source income that it has selected 
for itsel f, 32. On the other hand, the Appellate Body refused to entertain the 
question as to whether the fifth sentence of footnote 59 allowed the FSC scheme 
as a measure to avoid double taxation of foreign- source income, arguing that the 
panel had not been requested to judge this issue. 33 
30 United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations .. AB 1999-99. Report ofthe 
Appellate Body (24 2 '000) WT DS, 108 AB R, para. 91. 
WT/DS, 108 ABR para. QO. 
WT DS, 108, ABR p-, u-, ls 98-99 
fbid. paras. 101-101. 
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Both panel and Appellate Body attributed no relevance to the 1981 
Decision with respect to the case under review. In particular, the Appellate Body 
noted that the 1981 Understanding, though a decision binding the parties directly 
concerned, cannot be ranked among those legal instruments that have entered into 
force before the date of entry into force of the WTO, which are listed in paragraph 
I(b) of the language of Annex IA incorporating GATT 1994 into the WTO 
Agreement, as it was not legally binding on all the Contracting Parties to GATT 
1947. This, in the opinion of the Appellate Body, results from the circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of the Understanding, and in particular from the 
statement of the chairman of the Council that adopted the panel reports on the 
"Tax Legislation" disputes between the US and some EC member states in 1981. 
The Appellate Body pointed out that the chairman had noted that the adoption of 
these reports together with the Understanding do not "modify the existing GATT 
rules in Article XVI: 4 as they relate to the taxation of exported goods ... and do 
not affect the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the General 
Agreement". Nor, in the Appellate Body's opinion, could the 1981 Decision 
provide guidance to the WTO in addressing the FSC dispute, as a "decision" 
within the meaning of Article XVI: I of the WTO Agreement, thus supporting the 
US interpretation of footnote 59. The Appellate Body noted that whereas the SCM 
Agreement has specific provisions that address the relationship between the 
provisions of GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement with regard to countervailing 
duties, they "do not provide explicit assistance as to the relationship between the 
export subsidy provisions of the SCM Agreement and ArticleXv, '1: 4 of GAT-F 
1994". In the absence of any specific textual guidance, the companson between 
the relevant provisions of the SC, %I Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. 
on the one hand, and of' GATT 1994 Art. XVI: 4, on the other. shows that the 
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scope of the latter differs substantially from that of the former. Ilie Appellate 
Body stressed that as regards the SCMA in particular, unlike GATT Art. XVIA, 
the Agreement contains an express definition of the term "subsidy" as well as a 
broad package of new export subsidy disciplines that "go well beyond merely 
applying and interpreting Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of GATT 1947". It also 
pointed out that the Agreement establishes a much broader prohibition against any 
I 
subsidy which is "contingent upon export performance", whereas Art. XVIA 
prohibits only those subsidies which result in a lower price for the exported 
product than the comparable price for that product when sold in the domestic 
market. 
In short, in the view of the panel and of the Appellate Body, the 1981 
Decision had been superseded by a new legal enviromnent. The principle it had 
espoused, in particular the exemption of foreign-source income, was, therefore, 
subject to the overarching "otherwise due" principle embodied in SCM Art. 1 (1). 
3) Play by the rules of the game: did the DSB provide a fair assessment of the 
FSC measures in light of the treatment of foreign companies in the US tax 
system? 
According to Wetzel, the FSC measures were nothing more than the 
Domestic International Sales Corporation revisited and the foreign presence 
requirement was just a "smoke screen" for activities carried out in the US by 
American companies. 34 However, it does not seem that the DSB's reasoning 
premised on the notion that FSCs were just US corporations. What was the 
outcome of such an approach? 
The exegesis of the relevant SCMA articles made by the panel and by the 
Appellate Body can be accepted. Open to question, however, is their application 
34 Misti L. Wetzel, "Notes & Comments: United StatesTax Treatment for Foreign Sales 
Corporations", Temp. Int'I. &Comp. LJ 16 (2002), p. 236. 
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to the US tax scheme at issue, though it seems that the assessment of the 
consistency of the FSC measures with the SCMA has a good chance of being the 
correct one, all facts "taken together", to quote the panel's words. 
As noted above, the panel - whose opinion on this particular point was not 
criticised by the Appellate Body - remarked that "though conceivable that a 
particular exemption may not in every case individually result in the foregoing of 
revenue that is otherwise due ... the various exemptions identified by the European 
Communities, taken together involve the foregoing of revenue that is otherwise 
due". This "taken together" approach is likely to ignore that thriving activity 
known as fiscal planning, which is based on seizing the opportunities offered by 
differentials within domestic tax systems and between national tax systems. Such 
an approach could have devastating results if extended from export-related 
subsidies to "actionable subsidies" with regard to the multitude of rules and 
waivers any national tax system provides, even though in such a case there is the 
buffer of the "specificity" requirement. 35 
The Appellate Body, though endorsing the panel's reasoning, stressed, 
correctly in our opinion, that there must be some "defined normative benchmark 
against which a comparison can be made". We submit that such a comparison 
should imply a three-step process: 
's A hypothetical example could give the idea of such difficulties. 
Let us suppose that national rules in country A provide that a 20 percent tax rate applies to small 
and medium enterprises, which are identified by strict requirements. . However, country A also 
allows accelerated depreciation and exempted reserves for companies engaging in high-tech 
activities. Given the stage of industrial development in country A, high-tech activities are carried 
out by few companies in a rather speciflc sector (e. g. those engaged in the production of PC 
components). Let us also assume that 1) most such companies are "de facto" small and medium 
enterprises; and 2) the availability of accelerated depreciation and tax-free reserves results in lower 
taxation than that generally imposed on small and medium enterprises. Applying the "taken 
together approach it is fairly possible that a competing country could successfully claim that the 
fiscal regime for high-tech companies, by providing a more favourable treatment to a group of 
companies, usually small and medium enterprises, results in a subsidy under art. 1.1 (a) (1) (ii) of 
the SCM and4 therefore, in an actionable" subsidy, even though the high-tech companies do not 
necessarily fall within the SME scope. Be that as it may, the least one can say is that the leeway 
for country A's fiscal authorities could be severely curtailed. 
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1) Identifying the tax regime that allegedly applies in the absence of the measure 
a at issue. 
2) Verifying whether the cases to which the measure under scrutiny applies would 
otherwise fall within the scope of the general regime. 
3) Assessing whether the presence of particular provisions and waivers in the 
regime that would otherwise apply allows the adoption of specific measures for 
particular cases without entailing an open contrast with the prevailing rules. 
Confronted with the maze of US international tax rules, the Dispute 
Settlement Body had, in our opinion, two options: 
A) The first option was to consider FSCs just as a tax scheme to grant US 
exporters a fiscal advantage. They were no foreign corporations but rather foreign 
establishments of American exporting companies. It would have been rather a 
challenging endeavour, but nor was it an impossible task, given the host of 
contradictions that emerge from the income taxation rules for FSCs, if we 
consider them as foreign corporations. Indeed, considering the FSCs as a sham 
was an argument put forward by the European Communities, which pointed out 
that most FSCs were incorporated in US possessions whose fiscal rules are 
embodied in the US Internal Revenue Code. 36 In such a case it would have been 
easy to prove that the FSC provisions were in violation of the worldwide principle 
underpinning the US regime for companies incorporated in the United States. ne 
syllogism would be as follows: 1) FSCs are not real foreign persons but just a 
fiscal scheme for US companies; 2) as such they should be subject to the general 
36 Further evidence could be drawn from a critical reading of art. 921 of the IRC. ]Me article does 
not only state, as the Communities complained, that "exempt foreign trade income shall be treated 
as foreign-source income". It also provides that all foreign trade income of an FSC other than 
"exempt foreign income and income determined without regard to administrative pricing rules... 
shall be treated as income effectively connected with a business conducted through a permanent 
establishment within the US", without allowing evidence to the contrary. Certainly not a 
favourable outcome from the angle of a real foreign company. It could be argued that the FSC 
regime does not care about the real existence of a foreign corporation but is just a legal 
arrangement designed to allow some fiscal advantages to US exporting companies, without giving 
in too great a portion of the revenue cake. 
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"worldwide income" principle: 3) the FSC measure was shielding some US 
corporations from "otherwise due" revenue tax. 
B) The second alternative would consider FSCs as real foreign persons. In such a 
case a thorough comparison between the FSC measure and the rules that 
otherwise apply to the taxation of income accrued to or distributed by foreign 
corporations is needed, which do not constitute a uniform regime. Such a 
comparison gives mixed results. 
The Communities claimed that the treatment by the FCNI scheme of 
exempt foreign trade as foreign-source income which is not effectively connected 
with the conduct of trade or business within the United States is inconsistent ý, vith 
the general rule that requires US tax authorities to verify such an occurrence case- 
by-case. It could be replied however, that the assumption that foreign sale 
corporations could actually have a trade or business within the US, and in 
particular a permanent establishment, is rather open to dispute, as, at first sight, 
they are just a springboard for the sale of US products abroad. 37 
The assessment of the second alleged exemption. should take into account 
the following elements: 
a) Subpart F is a host of anti-avoidance rules aimed at preventing the indefinite 
deferral of taxation of income connected to economic activities carried on abroad 
through foreign affiliates. As such it is not an all-encompassing regime and 
provides differential treatment for various hypotheses. Subpart F measures are far 
from being a necessary result of the worldwide income regime applied to resident 
companies, but "involve a further extension of residence taxation, which in a 
sense is extraterritorial" and "this opens them to Ole criticism that an excessive tax 
37 See P. I 
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jurisdiction is being claimed,,. 38 It seems, therefore, that such provisions are not 
open ended but must be applied within clearly fixed boundaries. 
b) Although both Subpart F and the FSC measures deal with foreign affiliates, 
FSC requirements do not coincide with the provisions of Subpart F that identify 
controlled foreign corporations for anti-avoidance purposes. In the latter case a 
foreign subsidiary becomes a subpart F foreign sale corporation if, according to 
IRC sect. 957 (a), United States shareholders own more than 50 percent of the 
total combined voting power of the foreign affiliate's stock or more than half of 
the stock's total value and if, according to sect. 951 (b), a United States' tax 
payer owns at least 10 percent of the total voting stock. Therefore, if eleven 
American individuals or companies own equal interests in a foreign corporation, 
the latter is not a controlled foreign corporation. To the contrary, pursuant to IRC 
sect. 922 (a) (B), the FSC could not have more than 25 shareholders. The gap 
between 10 and 25 is not a trifle. Actually, as Wetzel remarks, there is no 
statutory requirement that an FSC be affiliated or controlled by a US 
corporation. 
39 
Of major weight is the third exemption on which the Communities 
grounded their claim: under the FSC measure the parent of an FSC is not taxed on 
dividends received that are derived from the foreign trade income of the FSC. 
However, if we look at the economic impact of the exemption it must be noted 
that, except for foreign companies within the scope of Subpart F. US parent 
corporations can avoid taxation by US authorities provided that their foreign 
40 
affiliates' income is not repatnated as dividend . 
8 Sol Picciotto. Intemational bUsiness ta\ation: a study in the internationalization of business 
regulation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1992), p. 145. 39 
Ibid.. P. 229. 
'0 See Garýy Clycle HURauer. -Intemational-. op. cit.. p. 3. 
I Ul 
In short, the panel claimed to pursue a strictly legal analysis of the FSC 
measure in relation to the main blocks of US international revenue law: but it 
ended up relying on an economic comparison between the FSC measure and a 
lump of rules referring to the treatment of income connected with foreign 
activities. It recognised that FSC rules might not in all cases result in more 
favourable tax treatment than that outside the FSC scheme, but argued that taken 
together the "scheme" resulted in a situation where certain types of income are 
shielded from taxes that would be otherwise due . 
41 It failed, ho,, vever, to 
investigate whether there is just an occasional overlap of the FSC rules with other 
more stringent rules, as often happens in revenue law, or whether the hypotheses 
of income production and distribution covered by the FSC measure were entirely 
covered by other provisions (the source rules, the conduct of a business or trade 
within the US, Subpart F and so on) and whether the former was a derogation of 
the latter. 
It is also arguable that the failure to address these questions satisfactorily 
is the result of the inability of the DSB to provide an interpretation of the term 
"otherwise due" that could overcome the opaqueness of the SCM text. 42 
4) The third attempt: the ETI Act 
At any rate, the Dispute Settlement Body's verdict had already set the process in 
motion, as the deadline for the imposition of sanctions in the absence of 
compliance was approaching. Some few months after the decision the United 
States proposed to repeal the FSC legislation xvith an elective tax measure, known 
as Eligible Foreign Corporation (EFC). The proposed regime would subject all 
manufacturing income of US corporations and their affiliates, whether domestic 
" WT, DS 10 8 R, paras. 7.100- 7.101 
42 Roberi E. Hudec, Iridustrial" op-cit. p. 188 
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or foreign, to a reduced marginal rate of 29%, subject, however, to the option of 
the US parent company. Nonetheless, the new regime preserved the 50 percent 
domestic content requirement and the special administrative pricing rules. Sensing 
strong opposition on the part of the Communities, and unwilling to start a trade 
I war with the EU at the very end of the Clinton Presidency, the Democratic 
Administration put forward another tax reform to repeal and replace the FSC 
regime. 43 The FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (ETI Act) 
II was signed into law (P. L. 106-519) by President Clinton on November 15'h. 2000. 
This time, the key to comply with WTO requirements, while preserving 
the benefit afforded by the DISC and FSC regimes was found in the "selective" 
incorporation of the territorial principle in US tax law also with regard to US 
taxpayers. Relying on the statement of the Appellate Body holding that a WTO 
member is free not to tax any particular category of revenue it wishes, the US 
lawmakers envisaged a modification of the scope of "gross income", which 
defines the outer boundaries of US income taxation, excluding certain activities 
referred to as "extraterritorial income". The House Committee pointed out that 
"the activities giving rise to "extrateffitorial income" involve real economic 
activity, or economic processes performed outside the United States". On the 
other hand, the Committee expressed the view that "it is appropriate to exempt 
certain forms of extraterritorial income from the exclusion", having care, 
however, to emphasise that "the taxation of certain forms of extraterritorial 
income is an exception to the general rule of not taxing extraterritorial income'A4 
Thus, the ETI Act amended the Internal Revenue Code, first by inserting a 
new section 114, entitled extraterritorial income, which, under the heading 
43 See Harold S. Peckron, "Uniform Rules of Engagement: The New tax Regime for Foreign 
Sales", Hastings Int I Comp. L. Rev. 25(200 1) p. 14. 
44 US Code Congressional and Administrative News. Legislative History. FSC Repeal and 
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of2000. House Conference Report 106-845. 
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.4 exclusion" provided that gross income does not include extraterritorial income 
but under the heading -'exception" added that the exclusion "shall not apply to 
extraterritorial income which is not qualifying foreign trade income". Therefore, 
extraterritorial income results in the reduction of the taxpayer's taxable income 
only if it is "qualifying extraterritorial income". The latter was defined bv IRC 
sect. 941, as amended by the ETI Act, with respect to specific q-pe transactions, 
such as the taxpayer's choice of the following options: a) 30 percent of the foreign 
sale and leasing income derived by the taxpayer from the transaction: b) 1.2 
percent of the foreign trade gross receipts derived from the transaction; and c) 15 
percent of the foreign trade income derived from the transaction. Sect. 941 
provided that "foreign trade income" is the taxable income attributable to "foreign 
trade gross receipts". According to the same section, "foreign sale and leasing 
income" is income derived in connection with the lease or rental of "*qualifý, ing 
foreign trade property", or income allocable to the solicitation, the negotiation or 
the making of the sale or lease contract, if carried out outside the US, as well as to 
related activities, such as advertising, processing of customer orders and 
transportation of the goods outside the US. IRC sect. 942 defined "foreign sales 
gross receipts" as the gross receipts accruing from the sale or other form of 
disposition and from the lease or rental of "qualifying foreign trade property", as 
well as from some related activities. 
Two requirements, however, were to be fulfilled for the income to become 
qualified. Firstly, as noted above, it had to involve -qualiýying foreign trade 
property". According to sect. 943, the latter refers to: I) goods that are 
manufactured, produced, grov. -n or extracted within or outside the United States, 
2) that are held primarily for sale. lease or rental, in the ordinary course of trade 
or business for consumption or use outside the United States: 3) and provided that 
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-a 
no more than 50 percent of their fair market value is attributable to articles 
originated outside the United States, or to direct costs for labour performed 
outside the US. Hence, the requirement largely reproduced the FSC "export 
property" provision. On the other hand, pursuant to sect. 942 (b). qualification 
was subject to a -foreign economic process requirement- ý. vhich was fulfilled if 
the taxpayer (or any person acting under contract with the taxpayer) participated 
outside the US in the solicitation, negotiation or making of the contract relating to 
the transaction, and a specified portion of the "direct costs" of the transaction 
were attributable to activities performed outside the US. 
Unlike the FSC measure., the new legislation did not require the 
establishment of any foreign corporate person. The benefit was granted either to 
US taxpayers, whether natural persons, corporations, or partnerships, or to a 
foreign corporation. In the latter case the production process could be carried out 
entirely outside US borders. However, given the 50 percent domestic content 
requirement, it was to be expected that the manufacturing companies would 
mostly be foreign subsidiaries of US companies. 
As a result of the application of a principle other than that of worldwide 
income, no deductions or tax credits are permitted against exempted 
extraterritorial income. Finally, the benefit was optional, that is, the ETI measure 
permitted all the above-listed taxpayers to have qualifying income taxed 
according to the ETI provisions, or taxed according to the general pnnciples. 
5) The ETI Act under DSU Art. 21.5 scrutiny 
American scholars did not agree on the question of the ETI Act being 
consistent with WTO requirements. Peckron argued that the ETI Act was WTO 
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consistent, as it brought the territorial principle into US tax law. 45 On the other 
hand, Ostergaard warned that the FSC replacement legislation "still grants a tax 
break from payment of direct tax based on exports-, while as far as the US is 
concerned "in the category of exports, the fundamental principle is that tax breaks 
cannot be export contingent". 46 She proved to be right. 
Actually, an attentive observer, although not particularly familiar with the 
intricacy of US Revenue Code and the SCMA,, would not fail to notice two points: 
1) The refonn of the US IRC was based on a selective application of the 
extraterritoriality principle. In other words, the reformed concept of "gross 
income" embodied in section 114 was not entirely encompassing the territorial 
principle allegedly applied by the majority of European countries. Certain kinds of 
income were still subjected to the worldwide rule. Thus the keen observer would 
have the feeling that, paraphrasing Orwell's Animal Farm, some forms of income 
are more "extraterritorial" than others. 2) The attentive observer will also remark 
that the benefit conferred by the new regime is, at least to a certain extent, linked 
to some US content requirements for articles sold abroad, which, at first view, is 
n IL, akin to the FSC provision that contributed to the condemnation of such measures. 
Leaving aside legal reasoning and relying only on conventional wisdom, 
the keen observer could easily foresee that the ETI rules can run into trouble when 
they are vetted by an examiner who focuses on the implementation of a decision 
that claimed to be based on the banning of favourable discriminatory practices and 
on the ýprinciple of no public boost for export. 
The European Communities very soon claimed that the ETI Act Nýas 
inconsistent with US obligations under the ASCNI, the AA. and GATT 1994, and 
requested that the matter be referred to the original panel pursuant to Art. 2 1.5 of 
Jý Harold S. Peckron. -Uniforni Rules. op. cit.. p-36. 
Sarah Osteroaard, "The Third Strike: The United States' attempts at Achie% Ing Fax ParitY 
Between its Income Ta\ and European Value- Added Ta\**. /. Legis -27 (2001 ) p. 437. 
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With speci ic the Dispute Settlement Understmding. 47 i f-i regard to the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, first the panel and then the 
Appellate Body, focused on three issues: the -inconsistency of the Act with art. 1.1 
of the Agreement; its inconsistency with art. 3.1; and the role of footnote 59. 
Art. ]. I of the SCM Agreement 
The European Communities contended that the exclusion of certain 
extraterritorial income from gross income gives rise to a financial contribution in 
the form of foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due, as there is no general US 
taxation rule excluding extraterritorial income. On the contrary, in the 
Communities' view, section 114 was a limited exemption that confirms the US 
general rule of worldwide taxation of income, which is, thus, the benchmark for 
assessing the situation prevailing if the conditions established by the ETI Act are 
48 
not fulfilled . The United States replied that the 
ETI Act redefines the concept of 
gross income, providing the new domestic standard for US taxation since section 
114 must be viewed as an integral part of IRC sect. 61, thus replacing or at least 
limiting the worldwide rule. 
49 
The panel, having reasserted the validity of its "but for" approach, though, 
prudently, with specific reference to the FSC - ETI dispute, argued that the basis 
for comparison under SCMA article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii) must be the tax rules applied by 
the concerned WTO member. Starting from this remark, the panel noted that, by 
treating as non-taxable certain income on the basis of highly selecti've conditions, 
the Act effectively carves out such an income from the situation that would 
prevail where the Act's requirements are not fulfilled, in particular where the 
47 On the function of art. -11. _5 of the DSU see 
Chp. IV, note 722. 
49 United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations. Recourse to Article 2 1.5 of the 
DSU b-, the European Communities. Report of the Panel (20 8 2001). W'T DS108 R\k',, \nne\ A- 
paras 
49 WT IDS 108, R\V. Anne\ A-2 paras 166-169. 
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goods are for use within the United States or where they do not satisfy the foreign 
content Imiuitation. 50 As regards the US argument that the ETI Act's revised 
deffifition of gross income is the prevailing domestic standard, the panel noted 
that "taken to its logical extreme, this US argument would be that a government 
could opt to bestow financial contributions in the form of fiscal incentives simply 
by modulating the "outer boundary" of its tax jurisdiction or by manipulating the 
definition of the tax base "to accommodate any "exclusion" or "exemption" or 
"exception" it desired so that there could never be a foregoing of "otherwise due" 
revenue. 51 The panel also noted that the ETI measure confers a benefit as, being 
able to exclude qualifying foreign trade income from its gross income, the 
taxpayer is better off than in the situation where the conditions for obtaining the 
tax treatment under the Act are not fulfilled. 52 
The panel's finding was upheld by the Appellate Body. The latter, 
however, confirming its opinion that the "but for" test is not the only way of 
implementing art. 1.1 (a)( 1 )(4), nor, perhaps, the best one, argued that "given the 
variety and complexity of domestic tax systems, it would usually be very difficult 
to isolate a 'general rule' of taxation and 'exceptions' to that general rule" and, 
therefore, "the panels should seek to compare the fiscal treatment of legitimately 
comparable income". The AB explained the idea of comparability saying that it 
might not be appropriate to compare taxation of sales income with the taxation of 
employment income, or taxation of foreign-source income in the hands of a 
domestic corporation with taxation of such income in the hands of a foreign 
nbid., paras. 8.23 - 8.30. 
For a dissenting opinion of an American scholar see Ashley Redd Commins, "ne World Trade 
Organization's Decision in United States - Tax Treatment for "'Foreign Sales Corporations": 
Round T'hree in the Transatlantic Tax Dispute"', N. CJ Ini I L. &Com. Reg. 27(200 1), p. 379. 
M WT/DS108/RW. para. 8.39. 
52 [bid., para. 8.46.. 
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corporation. 53 The rather open-ended approach suggested by the Appellate Body 
raises, however, some doubts, as it fails to note that in the complex world of tax 
legislation legitimate comparability does not result only from objective 
(economic) factors, but is strongly influenced by the labels put by the fiscal 
legislator. In short it does not withstand analysis when it is confronted with 
complex fiscal schemes. One example could be the treatment of partnership in 
many legal systems, which in spite of strong similarities with a public company is 
not subject to corporate tax. Even greater doubts stem from the treatment of 
groups of companies. Many scholars have pointed out that groups are in effect one 
business, notwithstanding that as a matter of law each company has a separate 
I legal personality. 54 However, those national regimes that recognise groups of 
companies for fiscal purposes link their recognition, which entails fiscal benefits, 
to threshold rates in the relationship between member companies. Such thresholds 
(generally measured with reference to capital or voting rights) are established 
I according to a rule of thumb which varies from country to country: sometimes 75 
percent, sometimes 70 percent, sometimes less. Some countries, like the UK, have 
various thresholds to which are linked different forms of fiscal advantages. 
Below the threshold the companies are subject to the regime that would 
"otherwise apply". Are groups of companies, recognised for fiscal purposes, a 
covered form of fiscal subsidy, which falls within the scope of SCM art I(l) ? 
Hudec, who looks rather critically at both panel report and AB report, remarks 
that the Appellate Body's literal reading of the word "otherwise" seems to have 
no connection with other concepts of subsidy. He adds that the "but foe' test "did 
at least fit the common-sense notion of subsidy, by asking whether the 
33 United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the European Communities. Report of the Appellate Body (14rMO02). 
WT/DS I O8/AB/RW, paras 90-92. 
34 Adrian Sheepwright and Elisabeth Keeling Revenue Law (London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1997), 
p. 614. 
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govemment was handing over revenue that would normally have been collected" 
whereas the tax treatment of comparable income has no visible connection to such 
a question. 
55 
However, in spite of the ambiguity generated by the Appellate Body's 
approach, it appears from the foregoing examination that the DSB was correct in 
arguing that the new US fiscal scheme affords positive fiscal discrimination to a 
particular group of activities. 
A rt. 3.1 (a) of the SCM Agreement 
The European Communities contended that, with respect to goods entirely 
produced in the United States, the measure falls within the scope of art. 3.1 (a) of 
the SCM Agreement, as the subsidy is only granted to profits from export 
transactions and, therefore, is export contingent. 56 The United States on the other 
hand, argued that the Act's exclusion of "extraterritorial" income cannot be 
viewed as conditional on exports since such income can be earned in many ways 
besides exporting US goods. 57 
Upholding the panel's opinion, the Appellate Body recalled its statement 
in the "Canada-aircraft" case, according to which SCMA art. 3.1 (a) posits that the 
58 
granting of a subsidy must be conditional on export performance . The Appellate 
Body also noted that the ETI measure provides two forms of tax exemption, 
although both exemptions are conditional on direct use, consumption or 
disposition outside the United States. As regards property produced in the US, the 
requirement is necessarily tantamount to exporting the goods concerned. This is 
not, hoxvever, the case for property produced outside the US. Given the 
55 Robert E. Hudec, "Industrial Subsidies", op. cit p. 198. 
56 WTDS 108 A B, RW. para. A 
5, Ibid., para. 
ýq Ibid.. para. 112 
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independence of the hypotheses in section 943 of the IRC, the fact that subsidies 
granted to enterprises outside the US might not be export contingent does not 
prevent export contingency with regard to goods produced inside the US. 
Conversely, the export contingency for subsidies bestowed on US goods has no 
bearing on whether there is an export contingent subsidy on goods produced 
outside the US. 59 
Footnote 59 to A nneir I 
The United States also contended that the ETI Act falls within the scope of 
the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the SCM Agreement, which limits the scope of 
a. art. 3.1(a) carving-out from export subsidies those measures which are aimed at 
preventing double taxation of foreign-source income. 60 The US argued that 
d 
footnote 59 should be read in conjunction with footnote 5 to the SCMA which 
provides that "measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies 
shall not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement". In the 
US opinion, footnote 5 applies not only to those cases that are explicitly excluded 
from the Illustrative List of export subsidies, but also to those cases that turn out 
to be outside the scope of any of its items. 61 From the foregoing the US draws the 
conclusion that the burden of proving that the ETI measure is consistent with 
footnote 59 is not on the defendant. Instead, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff 
claiming violation of art. 3.1 (a). 62 Upholding the panel repoM the Appellate Body 
acknowledged that footnote 59 allows WTO members to grant special fiscal 
treatment to foreign-source income in order to alleviate the burden of double 
taxation on its taxpayers. However, as Von Hoff points out, the AB did not 
acknowledge that footnote 59 was an exception to the general definition of 
591bid., paras 115-119. 
60 WT/DS 1 O8/RW - Annex A-2, para. 170. 
611bid., pam 173 For an application of this viewpoint to other cases (Brazil- Export Finacing 
Cmgmmme for Aircraft), see Chp. IV, p. 343 et seq. 
WT/DS I Og/AB/RW. para 124. 
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subsidy. Rather, it viewed the fifth sentence only as a justification that prevents 
SCM Agreement's sanctions when applied to specific cases. 63 As such the fifth 
sentence of footnote 59 only constitutes an affirmative defence that justifies a 
prohibited export subsidy when the measure in question is taken to avoid the 
double taxation of foreign-source income64 It, therefore, held that the burden of 
such proof rests on the responding party. 65 
Finally, the Appellate Body addressed the question - negatively answered 
by the panel - as to whether the ETI Act aims at preventing double taxation. It 
maintained that the US had failed to provide comprehensive proof that the ETI 
Act falls within the scope of footnote 59. 
The Appellate Body pointed out, in the first place, that the tax benefit 
aflowed by the fifth sentence of footnote 59 must redress an objective 
disadvantage stemming from the fact that the same income is potentially subject 
a 
to double taxation. This results from the fact that the income in question is 
"foreign-source income", a term that in the Appellate Body's opinion, refers to 
activities conducted in a foreign state so that the income could properly be subject 
to tax in that state. 66 Turning to the ETI Act, the Appellate Body noted that, 
pursuant to IRC section 942 (b), recognition of "extraterritoriality" is conditional 
on the participation, outside the US, in activities such as solicitation, negotiation 
or contract stipulation, as well as on the fact that 50 percent of certain of 
transaction costs must be attributable to activities performed abroad. However, it 
also pointed out that in two of the three alternatives set out in section 941 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the ETI measure fails to distinguish between income 
originating abroad and income produced by activities carried out in the US. 
63 Canie Anne Von Hoff, "Avoiding a Nuclear Trade War- Strategies for Retaining Tax Incentives 
for U. S. Corporations in a post FSC World", Vand J Transnal I L., 35 (2002) p. 1362. 
64WT/DS108/AB/RW. paras. 131-133. 
631hid., paras. 134. 
66WT/DS I 08/AB/RW, paras. 140: 145. 
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Indeed. -foreign trading gross receipts" under section 942 (a) (1) and -net foreign 
trade income" under section 941 (a) (1) encompass proceeds arising both from 
activities carried out in the United States, such as R&D and manufacturing. and. 
in the final stage. from activities conducted abroad. In these cases. therefore. 
"qualifying foreign trade income- simply results in a -fixed percentage that 
bundles together both domestic and foreign-source income"6' Consequently. in 
such cases there is no objective criterion on which double taxation aN-oidance can 
rely. Only in the residual hypothesis providing. under sect 941 (a) (1) (A). the 
taxation of 30 percent of the income generated by activities carried out abroad for 
the sale of goods, is a proper partition between domestic and foreign activities. 
In short, the attempt of the United States to modify its tax regime while 
preserving its basic goals backfired. The Panel and the Appellate Body, engaging 
this time in a thorough analysis of the US tax reform, had an easy time in proving 
that headings are not enough to change legal substance. In their view the ETI 
reform was not the radical shift to the territorial regime the US had claimed. 
Instead, the extraterritorial income at the heart of the reform was, in their opinion. 
just a provision selectively carved out from the still dominant parameter of 
worldwide income. Since the exception was prevalently aimed at buoying 
exporters of US goods. it was not covered by footnote 59 as. in most cases, it was 
not directed at avoiding double taxation. 
6) The uncertain outcome of the controversy 
Despite the entry into force of the ETI Act, on 17 th . November 2000. the 
European Communities requested authorization from the DSB to suspend 
concessions to the amount of US S 4.043 million per year. The United States 
""Ibid.. paras. 154-156. 
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objected to the appropriateness of the level of suspension of concessions proposed 
by the European Communities and requested that the matter be referred to 
arbitration, under article 22.6 of the DSU and article 4.11 of the SCM 
th 2 Agreement. " On November 28 . . 000, however, the parties agreed to suspend the 
arbitration proceeding until the adoption of the DSU art. 21.5 panel Report. After 
the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports, on 29th. January 2002. the 
Arbitrator resumed its work and upheld the amount of countermeasures proposed 
by the European Communities. 69 
In the aftermath of the DSB defeat, American scholars and politicians 
examined the options for joining WTO compliance and fiscal incentives for 
exports. 
One of the proposals involved converting the corporate income tax into an 
indirect tax, thereby complying with the WTO rules that allow deduction of the 
latter on exports. Thus income tax would be partially replaced by a consumption 
tax or in particular Valued Added Tax (VAT), so as to align the US system to that 
of its European trading partners. It was noted, however, that replacing income tax 
with VAT would have enormous administrative costs as Congress would have to 
re-work the entire US tax system. It was also pointed out that the adoption of a 
VAT system would move away from the progressive nature of the American tax 
systern as VAT is a regressive tax having greater impact on those consumers who 
have a higher propensity to consume, that is the poor. 70 
(A Art. 4.11 of the SCM Agreement provides that -In the event a party to the dispute requests 
arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Dispute settlement Understanding ('*DSU'*). the 
arbitrator shall determine %%hether the countermeasures are appropriate". 
Art. 22.6 of the DSU provides in relevant parts that "when the situation described in paragraph 2 
occurs. the DSB. upon request. shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or other 
obligations .... However 
if the member concerned. objects to the level of suspension proposed ... the 
matter shall be referred to arbitration-. 
W) United States - Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporation - Recourse to Arbitration b% the 
k ýnited States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. DeciSion of 
the Arbitra. tor (330 8,2002). W*T., DS 108/ARB. para. 8.1. 
" See. Ronald D. Sernau. The Foreign Sales". op. cit. p. 1201. 
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A further option was for the US to adopt a fully-fledged territorial tax 
approach. It was argued. however. that the territorial regime could have t, %%-o 
drawbacks: 1) encouraging US companies to move their activities outside the US 
to lower tax jurisdictions, thus decreasing US exports and 2) reducing US revenue 
collection. On the other hand. the Republican administration could accept such an 
alternative as a means of decreasing the tax burden on US corporationS. 71 
In this context proposals were made for the introduction of safety valves. 
if not thorough amendments, in the current WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
In general terms it has been suggested that in the absence of established legislative 
rules governing an issue or where there is substantial ambiguity in the existing 
72 
rules. a non-binding recommendations process should be provided . Another 
possibility could be encouraging compensation in lieu of removing trading 
practice that a panel considers illegitimate. 73 
Not to comply with the WTO decision and to accept the imposition of 
sanctions was an option which was by and large discarded, at least officially. for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, preserving the status quo would attract legitimate 
retaliation from US trade partners. Secondly, not to abide by international rules 
would unden-nine US leadership not only in the economic field but first and 
foremost in the political one. 74 This solution, however, was not entirely rejected. 
As Von Hoff remarks, many tax experts submitted that until there was a new 
statute in force. corporations had no choice but to go on accepting the Foreign 
Sales Corporations Replacement Act. 75 An American commentator argued 
that it was unlikely that the US would accept to pay the sanctions imposed bý- the 
'I John Seiner. -Beating Them at Their Own Game: A Solution to the US Foreign Sales 
Corporation Crisis-. .1 finn. J Global 
Trade, 11 (2002), p. 413. 
Alan Wm Wolf. -Problems with the WTO Dispute Settlement-. Chi. J MCI L. 2(2001). p. 422. 
Ibid.. p. 423. 
John Seiner. -Beating Them- op. cit.. Minn. .1 Global Trade. 11(2002). p. 408. 
Also Marc Rosemberg. "How a Taxing Problem Has Taken its Toll: A Common Person*s Guide to 
an International Taxation Dispute*% B. U Int'l L. J. 20 (2002). p. 30. 
.1 , Carrie Anne Von HotT. -Avoiding a Nuclear". op. cit. p. 1370. 
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European Communities, quoting the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick 
who compared EU sanctions of the magnitude proposed to dropping a nuclear 
bomb on the global trading system . 
76 This means that at the time the US was 
sceptical about the willingness and ability of the EU to apply effective retaliatory 
measures. It was also foreseeable that even if at the end of the day the United 
States was going to comply with the decision of the DSB. compliance would take 
place after a long period in which the acceptance of sanctions would be weighed 
up as a possible best option, and above all just as part of a wider overhaul of the 
US fiscal regime, in which several interest groups would make their voice heard. 
As Showalter remarks, "the WTO's dispute resolution system was premised on 
the notion that legislatures are capable of making rational decisions". To the 
contrary, as public choice theory points out, policyrnaking -results from 
compromise, conflict and confusion among officials with diverse interests and 
UneqUal inflUence'". 
77 
The decisive factor was the determination showed by the European 
Communities in applying the sanctions, if necessary, and accepting their 
economic impact on both US exporters and EU consumers and producers. On 
March I ". '22004 the European Union started to impose extra duties, but at a rate of 
5 percent, escalating by I percent per month to a maximum of 17 percent to be 
reached in March 2005. The tariffs had the potential of amounting to $ 46 billion 
over a period of 10 years . 
78 The Communities thus showed that it was acting, but 
the threat of a progressive increase of the duties on American exports left the buck 
on the US side. 
." Candace Carmichael. "Foreign Sales Corporations-. op. cit.. p. 206. 
Michael Showalter. Cruel Trilemma: The Flawed Political Economý of Remedies to WTO 
Subsidies Disputes-. Trtitisnut'l L 37 (2004). p. 605 
See Colleen Klanchnik. -United States - European Union Dispute on Foreign-Source Income. 
Export Activit). and the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act. Hqfitra L. Rev. 33 (2004). p. 3363. 
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In September 2004. in the context of a wider overhaul of US tax policy. 
section 101 of the American Job Creation Act of 2004 (PL 108-357) repealed the 
711 
--exclusion for extraterritorial income" . Other provisions of the Act replaced the 
ETI benefit with US $ 138 billion in tax relief for domestic manufacturing. 
The repeal. however, was far from absolute. Firstly. pursuant to tile 
"transition provision" in section 101(d) of the Act in the period between 
I". January 2005 and 31". December 2006, the ETI scheme remained in place on 
a reduced basis (80 per cent in 2005 and 60 per cent in 2006). Secondly. the 
Conference Agreement introduced a subsection 101(t) which indefinitely 
grandfathered the ETI scheme in respect of those transactions carried out in the 
ordinary course of trade pursuant to a binding contract and an unrelated person. 
already in effect on 17 th . September 2003 (the last day before the introduction of 
the bill before the US Senate) and at all times thereafter. 80 Finally. Section 101 
of the Jobs Act didýnot repeal section 5(c)(1) of the ETI Act, thus indefinitely 
grandfathering FSC subsidies in respect of certain transactions which benefited 
I from FSC subsidies. In short, a grandfathering of a previous grandfathering. 
The European Communities moved to lift the sanctions it had imposed on 
US exporters while still arguing that the phase-out scheme and in particular the 
"grand fatheri n g" provisions favoured exporters of capital goods that had long 
delivery times including Boeing, Microsoft, Motorola and Caterpillar. Soon after 
a new Art. 21.5 complaint was lodged. 
The United States did not directly contest that the above-mentioned 
measures were not inconsistent with the SCMA but based its defence on 
-') See Internal Revenue Acts - 2004. Public Law 108-357 (H. R. 4520) October 22 nd . 2004. 
. 4111el-it-alljobs 
('realion. 4(. -t (? 1'2004.. 4n. 4(. -I to. 4inend the International Revenue ('ode t" remov(! 
inywiliment-v inwich (ode and make our manulkliffing, sen'ices and hýgh-technolpý- hu. vine. v, s 
and imi-kers more competitive and active hoth tit home and ahroad. 
1411 U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News. 108'h Congress - Second Session - "004. 
Legislative HistorN,.. 4inerican Jobs (realion. 4cl qj'2004. House Conference Report 108 - 755. p. 
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procedural points. In particular. the US argued that there was no recommendation 
or ruling under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement resulting from the 2002 Article 
2 1.5 compliance proceedings to withdraw the ETI subsidy. as on that occasion the 
Appellate Body recommendations did not pertain to the ETI Act but just called for 
tI ull implementation of the rulings in the original -Foreign Sales Corporations- 
proceedings, which were passed before the ETI Act tax exclusion. " SCMA Art. 
4.7 provides that a recommendation for the immediate withdrawal of a subsidy 
must specify the time period within which the measure must be withdrawn. 
The panel rejected the argument of the United States pointing out that the 
operative recommendations and rulings remained those adopted by the DSB in the 
original proceedings in 2000 with regard to the FSC statute and that the 2002 
Article 21.5 Panel and Appellate Body reports, as adopted by the DSB. found that 
the ETI scheme had failed to fully withdraw the prohibited subsidies. There was. 
therefore, no need for further recommendations and rulings. 82 
The panel also rejected the United States' defence that the purpose of 
fiscal transition provisions contained in sections 101(d) and (f) of the Jobs Act 
was to provide, like most transitional rules included in US tax legislation, a 
-smooth and orderly transition in order to prevent the repeal of tax legislation 
fI rom having a retroactive effect on taxpayers who entered into arrangements in 
reliance on pre-repeal law". 83 Giving no relevance to public choice theory with 
regard to international law commitments, the panel held that the WTO obligation 
to ivithdravv prohibited subsidies is unaffected by contractual obligations that 
Members may have assumed under their domestic legislation or regulation and 
X1 United States -Tax treatment for *Foreign Sales Corporations' - Second Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU b\ the European Communities - Report of the Panel ( )0.9.205). 
W` T IDS 108 R W2. para. 7.11. 
"2 Ibid.. paras 7.521-7.53. 
41, Ibid. para. 7.10. 
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that such an obligation cannot be affected by contractual arrangements made by 
private parties in reliance on laws conferring prohibited export subsidieS. 84 
History will tell if the United States will be willing to comply and. even 




The FSC - ETI dispute is a turning point in the history of multilateral trade 
agreements. Never before has the impingement of international rules on national 
regimes been so great, as for the first time it has reached the bedrock of state 
autonorny: tax legislation. 
It is debatable whether the U. R. parties, and the US in particular. realised 
that the SCM Agreement was to be the thin end of the wedge by including the 
foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due among the basic component elements 
of subsidy. It is true that item "e- in the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies dates 
back to the 1960s, but its scope seems to have been less wide. The reading of the 
item makes it clear in the first place that there must be a specific link with export 
activities. But above all the item appears to be concerried with specific measures 
which result in a waiver to specific rules. Its reference to "exemption. remission 
or deferral of direct taxes or social charges paid or payable by industrial or 
commercial enterprises" gives the idea that the amount due from the taxpayer is 
easily calculated. being based on rules that do not overlap or conflict with 
concurrent sets of provisions. The reference to what is -otherwise due- in art. 1.1 
(a) (1) (ii) of the SCMA is much more open-ended and could refer to wide-scope 
Ibid. para. 7.66. 
The panel*s finding %%as upheld b% the Appellate Body in Februar% 2006. 
Unked States - Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations - Second Recourse to Article 2 1. -; of* 
the DSU bý the European communities - AB - 2005-9 - Report of the Appellate Body 
(I'), 2.2006). W T, IDS 108 ABRW2. para. 100. 
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components of the often complex national taxation fabric. As noted. the challenge 
to national fiscal autonomy is not limited to export subsidies but could extend to 
actionable domestic subsidies under the cloak of fiscal benefits. 
The task that has confronted the DSB in the FSC-ETI dispute - and could 
confront it in the future - is the assessment of the scope of the fiscal rules under 
scrutiny: -whether the measures at issue are just a waiver from wider rules or are 
an autonomous basic element of the fiscal fabric. In the FSC case the DSB 
analysed the provisions of the SCM Agreement at length but. in our opinion. 
refrained from carrying out an in-depth assessment of FSC provisions vis-A-vis 
other US international taxation rules from which they were alleged to derogate. In 
its aftermath. the ETI case, panel and Appellate Body coupled the interpretation of 
the SCM Agreement with an in-depth analysis of the new American legislation. 
The -moral- of the reports is that we must look beyond the label provided by the 
government concerned and assess the real goal of the measure under review. 
Another lesson we can draw from the FSC-ETI saga is that WTO 
members. when it comes to questions that hit the hard core of national 
sovereignty. as in the case of taxation, are bound to engage in a last ditch defence 
of their autonomy over multilateral rules. After thirty years of legal dispute the 
DISC - FSC - ETI saga is not completely over. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE US COUNTERVAILING DUTY REGIME AFTER THE URUGUAY 
ROUND 
1) Introductory considerations. 
In chapter III we provided an overview of the concepts that have graduallý- 
moulded the US countervailing duty regime prior to the Uruguay Round and in 
the following chapter we focused on the process by which most of these concepts 
have been embodied in the new multilateral rules on subsidies and countervailing 
measures and on the impact of the American perspective on the interpretation of 
such rules by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. In this chapter we go back to 
the US CVD regime to assess whether it has changed after the adoption of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) and in which direction it has moved. 
Given that the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement, as shown in 
Chapter 111, largely track US legislation and administrative practice, the Uruguay 
Agreement Act made few significant changes with respect to CVD proceedings in 
the United States. On the other hand, it is arguable that the United States tried to 
preserve and sometimes develop its countervailing duty heritage also where WTO 
rules may be inconsistent with US practice, as borne out by the fact that the US 
has been the defendant in many countervailing measure cases entertained by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
The task for the analyst is not easy as the present US CVD regime relies 
not on a single instrument but on three, that is, the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Act (URAA), the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) and, at a lower 
level, the Final Countervailing Duty Regulations. 
The implementation of the new WTO rules on counten, ailing measures is 
embodied in the Tariff Act of 1910. as amended by the URAA. The URAA. 
however, includes, as an integral part. a Statement of Administrative Action 
(SAA). which not only describes relevant administrative actions aimed at 
"03 
implementing WTO Agreements, but also explains how the implementing bill and 
A- - me action carried out by the Executive affects prior US law. As stated in the 
introduction, the SAA "represents an authoritative expression by the 
Administration concerning its view regarding the interpretation and application of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, both for purposes of international obligations 
$ and domestic laW'. 1 But the Statement is not only binding for the Executive. 
Indeed, an SAA is typically required when the US Executive submits legislation 
implementing a trade agreement to the US Congress that will be considered under 
so-called "fast-track" procedures. Specifically, the SAA was a requirement of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, in which Congress granted 
negotiating authority to the President and provided for "fast-track" Congressional 
implementation of trade agreements. Congress approved the SAA in the URAA, 
providing that "the statement of administrative action approved by the Congress 
shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the United States concerning 
the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act 
in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such 
interpretation or application. tt2 As expected, in most cases the SAA stressed the 
contM*UI*ty of the new rules with the previous legislation. 
In the second place, though at a lower level, the analysis of the US regune 
must take into account the final countervailing duty regulations (also called final 
rule) adopted in 1998 by the Department of Commerce as administering authority 
"to conform to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act", and authorised by 
3 Congress. Previously there were no implementing regulations on countervailing 
measures. In its investigations the Department particularly relied on its 1988 
1 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News. The Uruguay Round Agreemew 
Act - Statement ofAdministrative Action (P. L. 103-465) p. 656 2 URAA, Section 102, codified at 19 USC, Section 3512(d) 
3CountervailingDuties, FinalRule-19CFR, Part-351-63FR65347. Nov. 1998. 
www. ia. ita. doc. gov/regs/98-30565. txt 
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Proposed Regulations, but they were never formally adopted. The final 
regulations of November 1998 codified previous administrative practices, but also 
established new criteria that Commerce had been working out in the ,,, -ears 
following the URAA. 
The interpretation of the US countervailing duty regime must, therefore, 
deal with a three-layer set of statutory rules, interpretative statements, and 
administrative regulations. As noted above, the analysis also assesses the 
continuity of the new countervailing regime with the CVD measures prior to the 
URAA and their actual consistency with the Uruguay Round rules they claim to 
implement in the United States. 
2) Definition of Subsidy in the US perspective. 
The interplay between the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the SAA and the 
regulations of the Department of Commerce is illustrated by the definition of 
subsidy. 
Tracking the language of SCMA Art. 1, section 771 (5) (B) of the Tariff 
ACt4 states that a subsidy exists when the government or any public body within 
the territory of a country provides a financial contribution; any fonn of price and 
income support; or makes payments to a funding mechanism or entrusts or directs 
a private body, where the provision of such a contribution normally would be 
vested in the government. With reference to the latter hypothesis, however, the 
SAA, referring to the distinction between direct and indirect subsidy in GATT art. 
VI, provides that the "entrust or direct" standard must be interpreted broadly and 
could encompass those situations in which a public authority, either through 
statutory or administrative action, imposes a measure from which a benefit results 
4 19 USCA ý 1677 (51-CD) 
`0 
for the industry under investigation. 5 Ilius, according to the Statement, where the 
government acts through a private party to provide a benefit, the law should be 
admillistered on a case-by-case basis but the standard should not be narrower than 
that of the prior US standard finding of indirect subsidisation as applied in 
investigations such as Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada and 
Leather from Argentina. 6 Therefore, in contrast with the European Union's 
I 
standpoint, * the US administration was still asserting that for CVD purposes a 
benefit to the exporter could result not from direct financial contributions but, for 
instance, from export restraints that cause a discernible decrease in domestic input 
costs. In turn, the preamble to the 1998 final Regulations did not state the 
Department of Commerce's approach to this question, but made express reference 
to the SAA. 
As reported in chapter IV, in "US - Export Restraints" the WTO panel 
denied that export restraints could be a cause of subsidisation. 7 However, the 
panel, quite leniently, concluded that the SAA does not require the DOC to treat 
export restraints as subsidising measures. On the contrary, in the panel's opinion, 
the SAA could even be read as preventing the administering authority from 
considering export restraint measures as a form of subsidisation because in other 
passages the Statement "indicates that the Administration's past practice will be 
pursued in future only to the extent that there is no inconsistency with the 
definition of subsidy under the URAA". It argued, therefore, that since Section 
771(5)(B)(iii)8 prescribes a new condition, including entrustment or direction to a 
5 Statement of Administrative Action, p. 926. 
6 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada. ( C- 122-816) 57 FR 22570. May 28,1992. web. lexis-nexis. com/professionaU 
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order: Leather 
from Argentina (C 357-803) 55 FR 402 1, October 2,1990. web. lex is-nex is. com/professionaU. 
7See Chapter IV, p. 127. 
119 USCA 6 1677 (5) (B) (111) 
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private entity to make a financial contribution, it is clear that the practice followed 
in the past cannot continue without modification". 9 
The panel's argument is rather strained. Arguably, in general terms, the 
SAA does not compel Commerce to treat export restraints as subsidies, requiring, 
instead, a case-by-case analysis. This, however, does not imply that according to 
the SAA the inclusion of export restraints among subsidy programmes is to be 
viewed as past practice inconsistent with the URAA. Certainly, such inclusion 
would be inconsistent with the SCMA, as correctly stated by the panel. 10 But the 
main authoritative interpretation of the URAA is the Statement of Administrative 
Action itself and, as noted above, the SAA clearly suggests that the measures in 
question could result in some form of subsidisation. Indeed, it is rather 
incomprehensible that the SAA, after going to great lengths to argue that "Article 
I -I (a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement and section 771(5)(B)(iii) encompass indirect 
subsidy practices like those which the DOC countervailed in the past", quoting the 
mentioned investigations as an example, could draw the conclusion, as maintained 
by the panel, that this is not the case for practices such as export restraints. 
However, it is likely that the SAA interpretation will never be put to the test. The 
panel entertained the Canadian complaint not with reference to specific measures 
but to general US rules, and as the report held that these potential US CVD 
practices would be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, the United States vvill 
prudently abstain from following them if the need arise, ývhatever the implication 
of the SAA language. 
Section 771 (5)(E)II provides that a benefit shall normalby, be treated as I 
conferred where there is a benefit to the recipient, and follows the pattern of Art. 
9 United States Measures Treating Expor-t Restraints as Subsiclý. Reporl of the Panel ( 29.6.2001 
A-F DS194, para-8-104. 
ý'Ibicl- paras. 8.228-8.44. 
11 19 USCA § 1677 (5) (E) 
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14 of the SCM Agreement with regard to cases of equity infusion, loans, loan 
guarantees and provision of goods and services. The SAA remarks that the SCM 
Agreement does not provide a definition of benefit but Article 14 of the 
Agreement sets guidelines for methods used to calculate benefits, which, the 
statement does not fail to point out, "follow the benefit to the recipient 
methodology used in US CVD proceedings". Section 351.503 of the 1998 final 
countervailing duty regulations brings the statutory text to its logical conclusion 
by providing that, except when specific rules apply, the Department of Commerce 
will normally consider a benefit to be conferred when a firm pays less for its 
inputs (e. g. money, goods or services) than it otherwise -vN'ould pay in the absence 
of the government programme, or receives more revenues than it otherwise would 
Section 771 (5)( C) of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended, 12 settles the 
controversy over the function and nature of countervailing duties, about which 
American scholars have long debated, by providing that the administering 
authority is not requested to consider the effect of the subsidy. 13 The statement is 
developed by section 351.503 of the 1998 regulations, which specifically states 
that the determination of whether a benefit has been conferred is completely 
separate from the examination of the effect of the subsidy. What is relevant is the 
assessment of the existence and amount of a benefit for the recipient, that is, 
whether costs have been reduced or revenue enhanced. Thus, as explained in the 
preamble to the regulations, if a foreign govemment establishes new 
enviromnental restrictions requiring firms to purchase new equipments and at the 
same time provides them xvith a grant, that grant xvill be countervailable for its 
total amount, even though it does not entirely offset the additional cost imposed 
12 19 USCA Ij 1677 (5) (C) 
13 See Chapter 1. section 2. p. 28. 
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by the environmental rules. " Likewise, if a subsidy causes a firrn to pay higher 
income tax the countervailable amount is still the whole subsidy, even if the 
heavier tax burden reduces its impact on the firm's income and cash flow. On the 
other hand, it is arguable that even if the financial benefit receix,, ed by the firm 
allows it to buy some equipment that enhances its productivity and, thus, its 
revenue for a multiple of the initial benefit, it is still the latter that establishes the 
amount of countervailing duties. 15 
3)Financial contribution. 
The same link with administrative practice and case law prior to the 
Uruguay Round Agreement characterises the regulation of the various hypotheses 
of financial contribution. 
71 -- Equity infusion 
The current US regime on equity infusion mostly tracks the regime prior to 
the URAA, though with some important modifications. The latter, however, do 
not stem from exogenous rules, that is, from the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, but are the result of the overhaul of its past practice 
conducted by the administering authority also in the light of certain decisions of 
the Court of International Trade (CIT) concerning particular aspects of the 
relationship between goverrument-provided equity infusion and subsidisation. 
Section 771 (5)(E) (i) of the Tariff Act of 1930 16, in accordance with 
SCMA Art 14 provides that a countervailable benefit is conferred if the 
investment decision is inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private 
investors, including the practice regarding the provision of risk capital in the 
" Countervailing Duties. Final Rule. p. 6-53,61. 
15 See Chapter 1, section 2. note 3322. 
16 19 USCA 4 1677 (5) (E)M 
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country in which the equity infusion is carried out. 17 However the Tariff Act, 
along with the SCMA, does not shed light on the criteria the private investor 
would follow in deciding whether to provide new capital. 
Section 351.507 of the 1998 regulations in providing these criteria relies 
I 
on past administrative practice and in particular on the methodology adopted in 
the General Issues Appendix to the 1993 "certain steel products from Austria7' 
affirmative determination. ' 8 Thus, as noted in chapter III, the methodology 
currently followed by the Department is divided along two lines according to the 
availability of private investors' prices. In the affinnative case the Department of 
Commerce would consider the equity infusion as conferring a benefit if the price 
paid by the government is higher than the price paid by private investors for the 
same new issue. 19 The amount of the subsidy is, therefore, produced by the 
difference between the two prices. In appropriate circumstances shares with 
similar characteristics may be compared, provided that appropriate adjustments 
are made. 20 The practice in question was upheld by the CIT in Geneva Steel v. 
United States . 
21 In this case two government-owned Belgian companies, Cockerill 
and Clabecq, had converted some of their "conditional and convertible 
participating bonds" into "parts beneficiaries", which were bought by the 
government. Both instruments fell within the category of "hybrid securities", so- 
called because they appear to be neither debt nor equity. Parts beneficiaries, 
however, prevalently presented similar features to shares and, therefore were 
equated to equities. On the other hand, they were not traded on the Belgian 
market. The Court agreed with the method used by Commerce to measure the 
"Chapter IV, p. 156 et seq.. 
" Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from Austria. 58 
FR 37217,37244. July 9,1993.. web. lex is-nexis. com/professional. 
19 Sec. 351.507, para. (a). (2) 
20 Sec. 351.507, para. (a) (2) (iv). 
21 Geneva Steel v. United States. 20 CIT 7,914 F. Supp. 563 (1996). web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional 
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benefit, which calculated the premium paid by the Belgian government as the 
.I 
difference between the price paid for the "parts beneficiaries" and the common 
shares of the two companies quoted in the market, although the former had only 
some of the characteristics of the latter. The Court held that if the marketplace is 
the 'Utimate arbiter" of economic valuation, then Commerce's preference to look 
to market-deterinined prices before resorting to its equityworthiness inquiry, 
viewed as a "reasonable surrogate" for valuation, is a proper exercise of its 
discretion. 
In the absence of a benchmark market price, the Department of Commerce 
since the early 1980s has focused on the equityworthiness of the firm receiving 
the capital infusion and concentrates on its ability to generate a reasonable rate of 
return within a reasonable amount of time when the investment capital is 
provided. The reasonable rate of return must be assessed in real terms, that is, 
taking into account the effects of inflation. Thus, in "Steel wire rod from 
Venezuela" Commerce, which in the preliminary decision held that the 
conversion of the Venezuelan company' s external debt into equity was not 
countervailable because the finn showed a sufficient return rate on capital, in its 
final decision considered such conversion as countervailable. Commerce argued 
that, although the company had engaged in a rationalisation process after the 
capital infusion, during the period of investigation it had a negative return on 
equity when adjusted for inflation and, therefore, could not have attracted capital 
from private investors. 
22 
As noted in Chapter III, the US approach is not exempt from the criticism 
that it is too narrowly focused on the firm's ability to provide profits. In "steel 
wire rod from Venezuela" the respondent argued that an inside investor might 
22 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Steel Wire Rod from Venezuela. 
62FR55014,55020. October, 20,1997, www. ia. ita. doc-gov/Wfrnoct97, 'c3O7814ahtm 
2,11 
have made the investment in spite of the negative return. The Department rejoined 
that it had never distinguished between -inside" and "outside" investors, as -it 
would be inappropriate, if not impossible, to fashion a unique inside investor 
standard as a variation of the Department's reasonable private investor". This 
argument reflects the approach used by the administering authority in -Certain 
steel products from Austria". In that case the respondent maintained that, in 
certain situations, an inside investor's decision to invest may reasonably reflect a 
desire to reduce or forestall an expected loss rather than to increase income, 
arguing that the effect of the investment could be to reduce the losses by an 
amount greater than the amount of the investment or the need to save the firm 
from insolvency and its costs. It also submitted that the inside investor is more 
advantageously situated than the outside investor because the former is likely to 
have access to better information concerning the firm's investment plans, the 
firm's past problems and the measures taken to correct them. The Department, 
following the viewpoint already held in previous cases, stated that for a rational 
investor the decision to invest is only dependent on the marginal return expected 
from each additional equity infusion. Thus, regardless of whether the investor is 
or is not an inside investor, the investment should only be made if the present 
value of the expected return is greater than the return from alternative 
investments. 23 
It is submitted that this argument is narrowly focused on a particular 
category of investors. Certainly, the provision of risk capital just with the aim of 
avoiding employee layoffs or to maintain employment levels or social services in 
a disadvantaged area can be accused of contradicting economic logic. But other 
factors directed at reducing losses or maintaining the economic presence of a 
'3 58 FR 37217. ', 7,249. Julý 1). 1 ()93. wcb. lexis-ne\ is. com, profeSslonal 
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group of companies in a trade area would be perfectly acceptable, from the 
economic viewpoint, if taken into consideration by pnvate firms in their 
investment decisions. 
Besides, even if this approach were consistent with previous US 
legislation, it is doubtful that it is consistent with the URAA reform and with the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Indeed, SCNIA art. 14, 
reproduced in section 771 (E) (i) of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended, makes 
reference to the "investment practices in the terr-itory" of the WTO members, thus 
implying that a multiplicity of patterns can be applied in assessing the consistency 
with the usual investment practices of private investors. 24 
The methodology applied by the Department in assessing the amount of 
the benefit once its existence has been ascertained is also subject to contention. 
If a company is found unequityworthy, DOC considers the whole amount 
of the equity infusion as countervailable subsidy, equating it to a grant. This 
practice was upheld by the Court of International Trade in British Steel plc v. 
United States 25 . Actually, as reported in the preamble of the 1998 regulations, the 
1997 proposed regulations changed the criterion, adopting a "constructed private 
investor price (CPIP)", that is, the price that a reasonable private investor would 
be willing to pay for the company's shares. Subsidy would be reckoned by the 
difference between the government purchase price and the Cplp. 26 The proposed 
reform, however, was abandoned because of the strong criticisms of many 
American commentators, also in light of the British Steel decision. The approach 
of the Department of Commerce, noxv codified by section 351.507, para. (a) (6) of 
the 1998 regulations, posits that the comparison is between xN hat the company has 
24 19 USCA 4 1677 (5) (EW) 
25 British Steel pic N. United States, 19 CIT 1-0.879 F. Supp. 1254 (19195). "eb. lexis- 
nexis. com,, professional p. 244. 
26 
%%ýW%% ia. ita. cloc. goý rcgs'I98_', O*; 65-te\t. p. 65-174. 
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actually received and what it would have received ý, 6thout govemment 
intervention, which in the opinion of the Department, is zero. Such an assumption, 
however, is questionable. Indeed, nothing prevents a pnvate investor from 
acquiring shares in a company, unequity-worthy as it may be, as long as their 
purchase price is low enough to allow a capital gain when re-sold on the 
secondary market. It is, therefore, arguable that the less strict method proposed by 
DOC in 1997 would provide a more reasonable and, thus, equitable, way to assess 
the benefit. 
The bias of the current approach is also proved by contrasting it with the 
method applied to equityworthy companies. In keeping with the treatment of 
unequityworthy firms, Commerce for a long time deemed that the provision of 
risk capital to an equityworthy company did not confer a benefit. However, in 
AIMCOR 11 the Court of International Trade ruled that because of restrictions 
imposed on the shares bought by the government, the purchase of the shares vvas 
inconsistent with commercial considerations, although the firm, under 
investigation was equityworthy. 27 Thus, sec. 351.507, para. (a)(5) now provides 
for further analysis to determine whether the purchase of equities in general by the 
government have special conditions which render the investment inconsistent with 
usual private investment practices. If so the administering authority is required to 
assess the benefit on a case-by-case basis. 
Loans 
Section 771 (5) (E) (ii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 28 , requires 
the administering authority to use a comparable commercial loan as a benchmark 
States. 19CIT 149 912F., -, upp. 549 ( 1995) AINICORAlabama Silicon Incirporation ý. United 
NN eb. lexis-nemsxom. - professional. 
29 19 USCA ! i-IEZ-OLLE1 U1, 
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in determining whether a government-provided loan confers a benefit or not. The 
section, thus, reproduces SCMA art. 14, which, in turn, adopted the American 
pattern to assess the benefit: the difference between what the borrower actually 
pays and the cost of a comparable commercial loan on the market, even though 
the cost for the government in providing funds is zero. 29 
Section 351.505, para. (a) (1) of the 1998 regulations confmns 
Commerce's practice of normally comparing effective interest rates rather than 
nominal rates. The former provide the actual cost of the loan, including the 
1. 
amount of any fee, commission and government charge in addition to the nominal 
rate. Only if effective rates are not available will the Department resort to nominal 
rates. Thus, in "Stainless steel plate in coils from Italy" the Department added the 
amount of fees, commissions and other expenses to the ABI (Italian Banking 
Association) rate used as a benchmark, as the latter did not include such additional 
costs. 30 
The commercial loan must be comparable. The administering authority 
will place primary emphasis on similarities in the structure of the loan (e. g., fixed 
interest rate v. variable interest rate), the maturity of the loan (e. g., short term v. 
0 
long tenn) and the currency. 3 1 This approach is elucidated by the "Cut to length 
carbon steel plate from Belgium" administrative review. 32 In this case a Belgian 
company had received, among others, a long-term loan from the Societd Nationale 
de Credit a I'Industrie, which the Department had not considered countervailable 
in the preliminary results, on the basis of a comparison with the average interest 
rates charged by another Belgian bank, Kreditbank, specialising in industrial 
29 In particular, Chapter IV, p. 123. 
30 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determ i nation: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Italy, 
64FRI 5508,15511 (March 31,1999) www. ia. ita. doc. gov/frn/9903fm/99-33 I h. txt 
31 Sec. 351.501 (a) (2). 
32 
. Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review: Cut to Length Carbon Steel Plate 
from Belgium. 64 FR 12982,12986 (March 16,1999) http: //www. ia. ita. doc. gov/fm/9903fim/99- 
316g. txt 
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credits. The petitioners argued that other benchmark rates should be used because 
throughout the period of investigation, the interests charged by Kreditbank had 
not kept pace with the rise of the Belgian prime interest rate reported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which represented the maximum rate charged 
by deposit banks to prime borrowers. The petitioners contended, therefore, that 
other interest rates should be used as a benchmark, in particular either the IMF 
rates or the LIBOR, applying on them a spread to equalise them to long-term 
rates. Commerce held that that IMF rates (and even more so the LIBOR) should 
not be used because they do not reflect market rates on long-term lending. In the 
absence of comparable commercial loans taken out by the company under 
investigation a national average long-term rate should be used. In this case the 
Kreditbank interest rate corresponded to national average interest rates in Belgian 
currency. 
The 1998 regulations have amended the previous practice with regard to 
the selection of the benchmark. Whereas in the period prior to the 1998 
Regulations, Commerce initially used national average interest rates to determine 
the benefit from goverriment-provided loans, for both short-term and long-ten-n 
loans, nowadays Commerce would normally use national averages only in the 
event that the firm did not take out any commercial loan during the period of 
investigation or if such loans were not comparable. For instance, in "Stainless 
steel bar from Italy" Commerce rejected the request of one of the Italian 
companies under investigation, Valbruna, to use as a long-term benchmark rate 
the interest rate it paid on three-mmith loans which it renewed at the end of every 
quarter. Valbruna suggested that large Italian companies preferred loans ývith 
three-month EURIBOR ratcs rather than with ABI (Italian Banking Association) 
prime rates because they allowed companies to borrow money in Italian lirc or 
2 16 
Euros at an effective rate below the ABI prime rate. Commerce held that the 
three-month EURIBOR rate should be viewed as a non-comparable short-term 
interest rate. The fact that the quarterly loans were periodically rolled over was 
not a sufficient reason to treat them as a substitute for an actual long-term loan. 33 
As in the past, particular rules apply to so-called uncreditworthy 
companies. The distinction between creditworthy and uncreditworthy companies 
applies only to long-term loans as, according to Commerce, short-term loans do 
not present default problems that warrant a specific methodology. The US 
methodology is based on the notion that, when a commercial lender makes a loan 
to a company considered uncreditworthy, there is a higher probability that the 
borrower may default and consequently the lender will charge a higher interest 
rate than that applied to creditworthy finns. Section 351.505 (a) (4) provides that 
a company is held uncreditworthy if information available at the time the terms of 
the government-provided loan were agreed upon indicates that the firm could not 
have obtained long-term financing from commercial sources, which encompass 
bank loans and the issue of non-speculative bonds. In the investigation the 
admU'Ustering authority looks in particular at the financial situation of the 
company, focusing on the following factors: receipt of comparable commercial 
long-term loans; present and past financial health as reflected by various financial 
indicators; past and present capacity to meet costs and fixed financial obligations 
with cash flow; evidence of future financial conditions provided by market 
studies, project and loan appraisal, and country and industry economic 
expectations. 
A detailed example of the methodology used by Commerce is provided 
by "Certain steel products from Brazil". The Department considered the 
33 Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Stainless Steel 
Bar from Italy. 66 FR 30414,30418 June 6,2001, www. ia. ita. dcoc. gov/ftm/0106ftmi. 
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companies under investigation, COSIPA and CSN, uncred1tworthy. In particular 
the investigation showed that although the former company had posted a yearly 
profit it soon reverted to a pattern of increasing losses and the latter after two 
years of losses had recovered to post a small profit. The relevant factor for both 
companies was their supposed inability to promptly meet their current liabilities 
with their assets, bome out by deteriorating current and quick ratios. 34 
An innovation introduced by the 1998 regulations is the extension of the 
creditworthiness concept, till then exclusively focused on the company, to 
individual projectS. 35 The Regulations now recognise that, though the firm that 
takes out the loan can be creditworthy, there are situations where the risk 
associated with a new project may be much higher than the average risk of the 
company's existing operations. In such cases the creditworthy analysis cannot be 
limited to the company, but can focus on the reliability of the project and its 
ability to repay the loan. 
Taxes 
The Tariff Act and the SAA do not shed great light on the treatment of 
either direct or indirect taxation for countervailing purposes, which, however, is 
an issue on which US practice and legislation has for long focused its attention. 
The task of filling the gap is met by the 1998 regulations. 
With regard to direct taxes section 351.509, codifying previous practice 
provides that a benefit exists to the extent that the tax paid by the firms as a result 
of the tax programme is less than the tax it would have paid in the absence of the 
programme. This can result either from partial exernption or remission of tax due 
34 Preliminary Affirmative CounterN ailing Duty Determination and Ali, -,, nment of Final 
Countervai ling Dutý Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Hot- 
Rolled Flat-Rolled Carbon Quality Steel Product from Brazil. 64FRU 13,83 19. FebruarN 19. 
1999. %vNk%N,. ia. ita. doc. go% frn 9902firn, 99-219b. txt. 
Sec. 3351.505 (a) (4). 
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or from a reduction in the income base used to assess the tax amount. nius, in 
"Stainless steel plate in coils from Belgium", where a Belgian company had been 
allowed under a regional programme to claim accelerated depreciation for 
investments located in a disadvantaged area, the DOC considered the tax saving, 
which resulted from a reduction in the tax base of the company, as tax exemption, 
rather than tax deferral, as it was uncertain that the benefits of the accelerated 
depreciation programme would be offset' by higher taxes in the future. 36 
Likewise, in "Certain pasta from Italy" Commerce countervailed the exemption 
from the Italian Local Revenue Tax (ILOR) granted for a period of ten years to 
companies located in disadvantaged regions on profits derived from new plants 
and equipments or from plant expansion and improvement. 37 
On the other hand, the deferral of taxes is deemed to produce a benefit 
only to the extent that appropriate interest charges are not collected. In such a case 
the deferral is treated as a government-provided. loan to the amount of the tax 
38 deferral. 
As a general rule the exemption or remission upon export of indirect 
taxes gives rise, under section 351.517, to a benefit to the extent that the amount 
remitted or exempted exceeds the amount levied with respect to the production 
and distribution of like products sold for domestic consumption. In accordance 
with Annex 11 to the SCMA, special rules apply under the following section to the 
exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes, that is, 
taxes levied at any stage of production and distribution without any set-off for 
36 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium 
64FRI 5567,15580, March 31,1999. www. ia. ita. doc. gov/fi-n/9903fm/99-33 lg. txt. 
37 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Pasta from Italy. 
62FR30287,30298. June 14.1996. www. ia. ita. doc-gov/fm/fmjun96/c475819. htmi 
38 Sm. 351.509 (a) (2). 
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prior stage taxes. 39 Value Added Tax (VAT) is, therefore, excluded from this tax 
group. 
As noted by Stanbrook and Bentley with reference to the EU regime, the 
cumulative tax system favours those producers that have a fully integrated 
production chain as against those whose production is divided into many stages. 40 
To reduce such discrimination, exemption or reimbursement is allowed in order to 
compensate for multi-stage taxation. ' One problem, however, results from the lack 
of transparency inherent to the system, which could entail a more favourable 
+V-10 
hLeatment for export sales. Under section 351.518, a countervailable benefit exists 
to the extent that the exemption or remission of prior stage cumulative taxes 
extends to inputs that are not consumed in the production of the exported product, 
making allowance for waste. There is, however, a snag for the exporter as the 
section also provides that if the government of the exporting country has not in 
place or does not apply a procedure to confirm which inputs are consumed in the 
production of the exported product or, if in the opinion of the administering 
authority, the system in place is not reasonable or is not applied effectively, then 
the entire amount of the exemption, remission, or even deferral is considered to 
confer a benefit. 
41 
Provision ofgoods and services 
In accordance with the SCMA text, section 771 (5)(E)(iV)42 provides that 
a subsidy exists when goods and services are provided by an authority in the 
exporting country for less than adequate remuneration, the latter being determined 
39 See Chapter II, p. 54. 
40 Clive Stanbrook and Philip Bentley, Dumping and subsidies: the law andprocedure governing 
the imposition ofanfidumping and countervailing duties in the European Community 
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1996) p. 92. 
41 Sec. 351.518 (aX4). 
42 19 USCA 6 1677 (5) (E)(Iv) 
"in relation to prevailing market conditions in the country Aich is subject to 
investigation or review". 43 The Act itself does not give an-.,,,, express answer to the 
following questions: 
1) What if the public authorities influence the behaviour of the market in the 
country under investigation? 
2) What if the public authority is the only supplier of the goods or services in 
question? 
In keeping with the US traditional market-oriented philosophy, the 1998 
regulations stress that the adequate remuneration benchmark must be based on 
prices that have not been distorted by government involvement in the market. The 
statutory term "prevailing market condition" is, therefore, interpreted as market- 
determined price, which, in turn, is, normally, viewed as the result of competition 
among private finns. Section 351.511 has adopted a hierarchical approach, 
according to the availability of such a benchmark. In the affinnative case, the 
administering authority relies on the comparison between government prices and 
market-determined prices stemming from transactions within the exporting 
country. The market-determined price can also include actual sales from 
government-run competitive bidding, open to everybody and based solely on 
price. In such a case, according to Commerce, even if the involvement of public 
bodies can have some impact on the prices of the goods or services, the distortion 
will normally be minimal. Apart from this strictly confined hypothesis, the 
presence of public entities is -viewed as market distorting. 
If consequently, there are no usable domestic market-determined prices, 
Commerce Nvill turn to world market prices available to purchasers in the countrý- 
under investigation . 
44 Commerce's reasoning and its way of proceeding are 
43 Chapter IV, p. 157. 
44 SeC. 351.511 (a)(2)(iii). 
1, 
illustrated by the investigation concerning exports of softwood timber from 
Canada, harvested at allegedly lower prices than adequate remuneration for 
govenunent and local authorities, which was the subject of a case decided by the 
45 WTO Dispute Settlement Body in 2004. The administering authority held that 
the point of comparison for measuring the benefit from these types of subsidies is 
the marketplace free from government interference. It pointed out, in the first 
place, that this is the benclunark established by both the US statute and the 
Subsidies Agreement for govemment-provided loans, loan guarantees and capital 
infusions, which refer to the "commercial loans that can actually be obtained on 
the market, ", to "comparable commercial loans if there were no guarantee by the 
authority" and to the " usual investment practice of private investors, ". The 
Department also noted that the US statute requires that the analysis be made "in 
relation to prevailing market conditions in the country under investigation", and 
not simply "in the country under investigation", thus excluding a comparison 
based on whatever the condition of the exporting market might be. Commerce 
found finther support for its opinion in the "chapeaus" of section 771(5)(E)46 and 
article 14 of the Subsidies Agreement which refer to benefit for the recipient. In 
A- - me Department's opinion such reference implies that the true measure of the 
benefit derived from any government largesse is by reference to what the recipient 
would have had to pay for the physical or financial goods or services in the 
marketplace without any government involvement. 
Proceeding to the assessment of the Canadian softwood market, 
Commerce noted that a large government presence in the market tends to make 
much smaller private suppliers price-takers since the government-dominated 
"5 Notice of Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary Affirmative Critical 
Circumstances Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada. 66FR43186, 
43193, August 17,2001. www. ia. ita. doc. gov/'fm/0108frTVOI-20674. txt. 
46 19 USCA ra 167715) (E) 
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market distorts the market as a whole if the government does not sell at market- 
determined prices. Because of provincial governmental control of the market 
through a system of administratively-set prices and other market distorting 
measures, there was no market-determined price for stumpage xithin Canada that 
was independent of the distortion caused by the govenunental interference in the 
mar et. 
47 
Having discarded private market prices in Canada as a suitable 
benchmark to assess the benefit, the Department relied on the world market, 
provided its conditions also applied to Canadian consumers. It consequently held 
that stumpage prices from the United States qualified as commercially available 
world market prices because U. S. lumber would be available to softwood lumber 
producers in Canada at the same prices available to U. S. lumber producers and 
because stumpage in the United States along the northern border was comparable 
to Canadian stumpage. 
The third hypothesis covered by the Regulations concerns the lack of 
alternative sources of supply for consumers in the country under investigation. In 
this case Commerce inquires whether the monopolistic public supplier fixes its 
offer price in accordance with market principles. In "Steel wire rod from Trinidad 
and Tobago" the Department held that the provision of gas by the National Gas 
Company (NGC), the sole supplier of natural gas to industrial and commercial 
users in the islands, did not grant a subsidy because the NGC had established a 
price policy that was able to entirely cover its production costs and to provide an 
41 As the reasonim-, of the aft'irmative determination was partially upheld bý the kkJO Appellate 
Bod,, in its Januar-, 204 report. -, ve refer to our remarks in Chapter V 11. section 1. 
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adequate return on its sales . 
4' This methodology was later codified in the 1998 
regWationS 49 
4) Specificity 
Section 771 (5A) of the Tariff Aceo mirrors the provisions of article 2 of 
urie SCM Agreement dealing with specificity, which, in turn, as the SAA is eager 
to point out, reflects US practice. 51 The Statement of Administrative Action 
stresses the intention of the Administration to apply the specificity test "as an 
initial screening mechanism to winnow out only those foreign subsidies which 
9 52 
a ... truly are broadly available and widely used throughout an economy". 
As with the SCMA, export and import substitution practices are deemed 
to be specific. Likewise, section 771(5A) (D) 53 distinguishes between "de iure" 
specificity and "de facto" specificity. The verification of the latter rests on four 
factors: 
1) munber of enterprises, industries or groups thereof which actually enjoy a 
subsidy; 
2) predominant use of a subsidy by an enterprise, industry or group of industries; 
3) receipt of disproportionately large amounts of a subsidy by an enterprise, 
industry or group; 
4) the manner in which the authority providing a subsidy has exercised discretion 
in its decision. 
" Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Steel Wire Rod from Trinidad and 
Tobago, 62FR55004,55009, October 22,1997, www. ia. ita. doc. gov/fm/fmoct97/c274803a. htm. 
49 Sect 351.511 (aX2Xiii). 
" 19 USCA 6 1677 (5 A) 
51 SAA, p. 929. 
See Chapter IV. section 2- 3) Specificity 
52 SAA, p. 930. 
53 19 USCA 
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The SAA points out that section 771(5A)(D)(i,., ) of the Tariff %Ct 
"corresponds to SCMA Article 2.2, while codifý-ing Commerce's current 
I specificity teSt55ýv. Under this test, subsidies granted by a state or province that are 
not limited to a specific enterprise, industry or group of industries are not 
considered specific, whereas subsidies provided by central governments to 
particular regions, including states or provinces, are considered specific regardless 
.I 
I of availability or use within that region. 
It is clear that this approach favours federal go-verrunents. The bias, 
arguably, was particularly evident with regard to the treatment of subsidies 
granted to promote the development of disadvantaged regions during the short 
period preceding the expiry of such provision. It is submitted that the US 
Administration was often able to implement the provisions of the SCMA 
concerning green light subsidies in too strict a way so as to limit as much as 
possible the alignment of its regime to measures that in many cases were not 
considered in line with the US economic outlook. The Statement of 
Administrative Action begins by pointing out that "in some instances the terms 
and conditions for detennining whether the subsidy is non-countervailable are 
I 
expressed ambiguously" and, therefore, "the Administration believes that certain 
tenns and conditions require clarification". As regards disadvantaged regions the 
SAA states "the green light provision governing assistance for disadvantaged 
regions must be strictly construed in order to prevent the circumvention of the 
intent of the provision '. 
The first victims of the strict US approach Nvere a set of Italian 
prograrnmcs under law 04186 for the promotion of gro-vNih in the so-called 
--Nje7zogjomo- (Southem Italy). The first investigation of this kind. conductcd 
54 19 USCA § 16 77 (5A)(D)(iv) 
SA A. P. 
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in 1995, concluded that the information submitted by the government of Italy did 
not support the claim that the programmes qualified as non-countervailable 
subsidies because, while section 771(5B)(C) of the Tariff ACt56 requires that 
regional subsidy programmes be part of a generally applicable regional 
development policy, law 64 provided benefits solely to the South of Italy . 
Besides, contrary to the provision of the Tariff Act, no infonnation had been 
provided to indicate that law 64 or its implementing regulations met the neutral 
and objective criteria, based on per capita income or unemployment, set out by the 
SCM Agreement and the US statute. On the other hand, since the "Mezzogiorno" 
was a specific area, the measures were specific. 57 
It must be acknowledged that the troubles of law 64/86 programmes 
were mostly self-inflicted pains. It is likely that the Italian lawmakers in drafting 
the law and the Italian executive in implementing it, unaware of impending 
multilateral obligations, took it as granted that the reality of a backward 
"Mezzogiorno" was internationally acknowledged. Yet, the economic problems of 
Southern Italy, both in terms of per capita income and unemployment, had been 
the subject of conspicuous economics literature and were real and well known. It 
must also be recognised that the law in question had problems with the European 
Communities too, since, apparently, the law had pushed the economic boundaries 
of the region northwards, including provinces whose level of economic 
development approached the Italian average, and some of the companies under 
investigation were located there. 
However, law 64/86 was replaced by law 488/92. The latter, which 
provided grants for industrial projects in depressed regions all over Italy and not 
only in the "Mezzogiorno", had been cleared by the European Commission. 
-" 19 USCA § 1677 (5B)Q 
57 Preliminary Afrirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Pasta from Italy. 
60FR53739,53742, October 18,1995, www. ia. ita. doc. gov/fi*fmoct95/c475819.001 
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Besides, the funds used to pay benefits under the law derived in part from the 
Italian government and in part from the Structural Funds of the European Union, 
es 
61 and to be eligible for benefits under the measure in question the enterprise had to 
be located in one of the regions in Italy identified as EU Structural Funds 
objective I (underdeveloped regions), 2(areas in industrial decline) or 5 (regions 
with very low populations). It is, thus arguable that, at least with reference to the 
European Community regime, the law in question provided neutral and objective 
criteria for assessing whether a region is or is not disadvantaged. It is also 
arguable that at least some of its benchmarks actually coincided with those 
provided by the SCMA and reproduced verbatim by the Tariff Act as amended. 
I Yet, this measure too was hastily considered countervailable within the meaning 
of section 771(5) of the Act 58 : as the assistance was limited to enterprises located 
in certain regions, the US administering authority determined that the programmes 
under law 488/92 were specific. 59 
5) Allocation of benefit over time. 
Section 351.524 of the 1998 countervailing duty regulations codifies the 
solution to a problem that had confronted Commerce for a long time before the 
URAA - the allocation of benefit over time. 60 Governments often grant subsidies 
to allow companies to build plants or to acquire other forms of capital equipment. 
In other cases the subsidy is provided to offset losses or to strengthen the financial 
structure of the company through capital infusion. If the benefit were allocated 
over the value of the company's production in a single year, the subsidisation rate 
58 19 USCA 6 1677 (5) 
59 Preliminary Results of the Second Countervailing Duty Administrative Review Certain Pasta 
From Italy, 64FR 17618,17620, April 12,1999. www. ia. ita. doc. gov/fm/9904fm/99-412a. txt 
Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Italy, 64FR15508,15515 March 31,1999, 
www. ia. ita. doc. gov/frn/9903fi-n/99-33 I h. txt 
60 For an overview of Commerce's methodologies prior to the URAA see John S. Sciortino, 
"Calculating Subsidy Values in Countervailing Duty Cases: 17he Use of the present Value 
Methodology", in John H. Jackson et al.. eds, International Trade, op. cit. p. 8-7 et seq. 
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for that year would be particularly high, while in the years following there would 
be no trace of the subsidy. 
A distinction must be made between the moment in which a firm is 
considered as having received a subsidy and the allocation of the benefit to a 
particular time period. For instance, in the case of a grant the subsidy is 
considered received on the date at which the firm receives the grant. Likewise, in 
the case of a debt or interest assumption or forgiveness the benefit is considered 
received as of the date in which the debt or interest is assumed or forgiven. 
However, according to the nature and destination of the subsidy the benefit must 
be allocated to a particular time period, which often is not restricted to the 
moment of bestowal but can span many years. GATT 1994 and the SCMA do not 
address allocation over time. Yet, since the benefit is a fundamental element of 
subsidy, proper allocation of benefit is a pre-requisite for ascertaining both the 
existence of subsidisation and the correct assessment of its amount. Art. VU of 
GATT 1994 provides that no countervailing duty "shall be levied ... in excess of 
an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been 
granted" and the subsidy is determined with reference to a specific period of 
invesfigation (poj). 61 
The US statute is silent on this issue. It was the administering authority 
that over twenty years developed several methodologies to determine whether a 
subsidy should be considered "recurring" or "non-recurring" and to assess its 
value in each year of the POI. 
The regulations issued by Commerce in 1998 modified the approach that 
was first developed in the General Issue Appendix to "certain steel products from 
Austria", according to which the Department would consider a benefit as non- 
61 The question of allocation of the benefit over time can also be appreciated with regard to the 
case of change in ownership of the subsidised company. as shown in the following chapter. 
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recurring if it is exceptional, that is, non-recurrent on a regular or predictable 
basis, or requires goverment approval. 62 According to section 351.524, in 
addition to examining whether the subsidy is exceptional or requires government 
approval, the administering authority shall also examine whether the subsidy was 
provided for, or tied up to the capital structure or capital assets of the firm. 63 
Capital assets are defined as plants and equipment used to produce other goods. 
Capital structure is the combination of common equity, preferred stock and long- 
term debt. The 1998 regulations add a non-binding list of subsidies which are 
normally treated as providing non-recurring benefits and subsidies treated as 
providing recurring benefits. Among the former are direct tax exemptions and 
deductions, provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration; 
export promotion assistance; and worker assistance and training. Among the latter 
we find equity infusions, grants, plant closure assistance, debt forgiveness, 




Commerce has not abandoned the long-established pattern of allocating 
a benefit over the average useful life (AUL) of the firm's physical assets as set 
forth in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Class Life asset Depreciation Range 
System. 65 In other words, the benefit is allocated according to the period of 
amortization allowed for fiscal purposes by the IRS. 66 Thus, the physical assets' 
62 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from Austria. 58 
FR 37217,37226 july 9,1993. web. lex is-nex is. com/professional 
63 Sec. 351.524 (c) (2). 
64 Sec. 351.524 (c XI). 
65 Sec. 351.524 (d) (2). 
66 In implementing the Average Useful Life criterion the US administering authority (as explained 
in details in the Doha Round - Negotiating Group on Rules, "Allocation of Subsidy Benefits over 
Time" Communication from the United States. TN/R]L/W/148 - 22 April 2004) assumes that the 
benefit is declining over time and that, therefore, the subsidy recepient receives greater benefit in 
the early years of the useful life of the asset according to the following formula: 
Ak -y/n+ly - (y/n) (k - 1)d 
1 +d 
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useful life is normally determined with reference to the US industrial structure 
even though the assets of the firm under investigation may be located in a very 
different productive envirorument. 
This methodology does not seem to be very consistent with the opinion 
of the Court of International Trade according to which in detennining the AUL 
the administering authority should follow a company specific approach. 67 Indeed, 
the US Executive has adopted a compromise solution which, however, casts the 
burden of proof on those that do not consider the AUL established by the US IRS 
as a proper assessment of the real useful life of a company's assets. To be 
allowed to use a company specific AUL, the firm must base its depreciation on an 
estimate of the actual useful life of the assets and must use straight-line 
depreciation, or demonstrate that its calculation is not distorted by irregular or 
uneven additions to the pool of fixed assets . 
68 Also a country-wide AUL for the 
industry under investigation could be accepted by the US administering authority 
if the respondent government demonstrates that it has a system to calculate AULs 
and if that system provides a reliable representation of the average life of the 
assets concerned . 
69 Even if these proofs are given - certainly not an easy task - 
Commerce can continue to apply the IRS tables AUL if the company specific 
AUL or the country-wide industry AUL differs from the former by less than one 
year. 
70 
A possible flaw in the US methodology is the exclusive link it 
establishes between the allocation of non-recuning subsidies, on the one hand, 
and the average useful life of the company's assets, on the other. In short, the US 
Where Ak is the amount countervailed in year K; Y is the face value of the grant; n is the average 
useful life of the assets in the industry being investigated; d is the discount rate; and K is the year 
of allocation. 
67 British Steel PLC v. United States, 19 C. I. T. 176; 879 F. Supp. 1254. (1995). 
61 Sec. 351.524 (dX2Xiii). 
69Sec. 351.524 (dX2Xiii). 
" Sec. 351.54 (d) (2)(iv). 
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method posits that the life of the assets closely approximates the duration of the 
benefit. This is logical when the grant is used for plant and equipment purchase, 
or other forms of new investments that increase the firm's capacity of production. 
However, the range of non-recurring benefits is much wider, encompassing 
hypotheses such as coverage for operating losses, debt-to-equitýý conversion and 
debt forgiveness, which in most cases do not finance future or actual fixed capital 
investments, but already incurred expenditures and losses originating from other 
operations. 
The methodology, which has been upheld by the CIT, relies on the 
guidelines on amortization and depreciation adopted on 25 April 1985 by the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 7 1 The Committee, 
however, was one of those placed under the authority of the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies Code, and, arguably, its opinion could bind only the Parties to the 1979 
Agreement. Besides, nothing indicates that the guidelines have been incorporated 
in the current WTO fabric. Actually, the European Union, which subscribed the 
Subsidies Code, has followed a more sophisticated approach drawing a line 
between subsidies that can be linked to the acquisition or future acquisition of 
fixed assets and subsidies that cannot be linked to the acquisition of depreciating 
assets, providing for the latter that "the amount of the benefit received during the 
investigative period shall in principle be attributed to this period, ... unless special 
circumstances arise justifying attribution over a different period". 72 
6) Injury 
Only marginal amendments to previous law and practice haN-e been 
introduced by the post UR-AA reginle with regard to injury. The Statement of 
71 B. I. S. D 32"dSuppl- k. S(Al 64). 
1 12 Council Regulation (EC) n. 20026 9. art. 7-4. 
23 1 
administrative Action holds that the SC. 'vI Agreement did not change the causation 
standard from that in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and that, as a 
consequence, the US law already implemented the Agreement provisions. In 
particular the SAA points out that although SCMA Articles 3.5 and 15 include 
new language requiring investigating authorities to examine all known factors 
injuring domestic industry to ensure against attributing injury from other factors 
to the subsidised imports, this does not imply that the investigating authority must 
isolate injury caused by the former factors from injury caused by the latter. 13 
The main statutory amendments concerned '*'de minimis" and 
"negligible" subsidies, cumulation and the introduction of the sunset review. 74 
In compliance with SCMA article 11.9, section 703(b)(4)(A) of the 
Tariff Act as amended 75 has raised the -de minimis" threshold to 1% advalorem 
for developed countries. For developing countries which are members of the 
WTO the threshold has been raised to 2%. The Statement of Administrative 
practice, however, points out that the new thresholds only apply to initial CVD 
investigations and do not extend to administrative reviews. 76 Likewise, in keeping 
with the SCM Agreement, in assessing negligibility the Tariff Act as amended 
relies on the share of all merchandise imports into the US rather than on the US 
market share, as was the criterion prior to the URAA. Section 771(24)77 provides 
that imports from industrial and developing countries are negligible if they 
account for less than 3% and 4% of total imports respectively. 
To comply ývith art. 15.3 of the SCMA, section 771(7)(G) of the Tanff 
Act 78 provides that an investigation can cumulate imports that compete ýkith other 
73 SAA p. 5 1. 
-4 
, As regards the SCNIA see Chapter 
IV, p. 156. 
19 USCA § 1671(b)fb-1(4L 
.6 SAA p. 919. '7 
19 USCA 5 1677 (24). 
-9 19 USCA ý 1677 (7)(G) 
imports and domestic like products only where the petitions are filed, or the 
investigations are self-initiated, the same day. In such cases, under sect. 771(24) 
imports are considered non-negligible if their share of total imports cumulatively 
exceeds 7% and 9%, respectively for industrial and developing countries. 
While prior to the URAA countervailing duty orders were potentially 
unlimited, in line with art. 21 of the SCM Agreement, section 75 1(c) of the Tariff 
ACt79 provides for a "sunset review", under which all countervailing duties ý. Nill 
lapse five years after the imposition, unless the administering authority determines 
that the expiry of the duty is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of 
subsidisation and injury. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing we can draw this morale: the secret to preserve your 
domestic regime in an increasingly interdependent trade environment is to secure 
a diplomatic victory at the multilateral table. Having withstood the uncoordinated 
assault of its trade partners the United States was able to impose its philosophy 
and methodology on the multilateral regime for countervailing measures. This 
having been done, only minor amendments had to be introduced into the US 
statute to appease trading partners, in particular developing countries - sunset 
review, higher "de minimis", stricter rules for cumulation. 
The conclusion Nve can draw from the comparison between the current 
US CVD regime and that in force before the UR-AA can be summarised in one 
word only - "continuity". If there are changes outside the statute, they are mostly 
endogenous, resulting from the overhaul of past practice carried out by Commerce 
LýS CA §-JU5-ýL. 
or from some CIT decisions.. This was possible because, as noted in chapter 111, 
the multilateral regime on countervailing measures reflects the American 
perspective which relies on the market as the only benchmark for assessing the 
existence and amount of a subsidy, rather than looking at budgetary costs. as 
previously argued by the European Community. The recognition of market 
predominance meant that no particular change was required with respect to the 
two pillars of the subsidy concept - benefit and financial contributions. Both 
revolve on the market and, according to the US uncompromising point of view, 
centred on the pursuit of maximum profit, coupled with minimum go'vernment 
presence. However, continuity with previous US rules and practices that held 
sway in shaping the new multilateral regime does not necessarily imply full 
consistency with the latter. 
In particular, with regard to financial contributions, the link with past 
administrative practice is illustrated by the approach of Commerce to equity 
infusion in unequityworthy companies, where the Department, continues to focus 
on the expected return of the investment vis-d-vis alternative investments. It is 
arguable, however, that the SCMA text lends itself to a more flexible 
interpretation. Likewise it is arguable that US methodology which equates to 
a grant the whole amount of the equity infusion in unequityworthy companies W 
could be out of keeping with the principle underlying Art. 6 of GATT 1994 and 
the SCM Agreement, according to which no duty can be imposed in excess of the 
correctly estimated subsidy. And yet, there is nothing in the Tariff Act, as 
amended that is in contrast with the text of the SCM Agreement, nor did the SAA 
foster such a strict interpretation of the US statute. The administering authority 
has just continued to Lise a methodology which pre-dates the URAA. The rather 
severe US approach has not been challenged until now in the WTO arena. On the 
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contrary, as regards the provision of goods and services, the Appellate Body has 
endorsed the quite stringent US viewpoint on the impact of govemment activities 
on the structure of the market. 
The US regime imposed its hallmark on key aspects of the third pillar of 
subsidy ascertaimnent - specificity. In particular, the SCMA enshrined the US 
outlook which favours federal states as regards the granting of regional subsidies. 
Later the United States, in keeping with the wishes of Congress, managed to 
exploit to the full in its countervailing duty proceedings the stringency of the 
multilateral rules it was able to impose on non-countervailable subsidies. 
Finally, the priority attributed to the US amortization criteria for revenue 
purposes in allocating benefit over time could result in an assessment of 
subsidisation which is not always perfectly consistent with WTO principles, and 
at the same time seems to run counter to some US judicial decisions. 
On the other hand, some of the changes introduced by the administrative 
regulations of 1998 and the US case law are in keeping with the spirit of the 
SCMA, relying on an approach that takes more into account the specific 
circumstances of the investigation. For instance, the Court of International Trade 
has ruled that even if the company under investigation is equityworthy it is 
necessary to look at the particular conditions under which the capital infusion has 
taken place. As regards loans, the 1998 regulations provide that interest rate 
comparison must be made, whenever possible, with other credits received by the 
company under investigation. In both cases, however. it is difficult to say whether 
such changes Nvere influenced by the awareness of a new multilateral approach or 
Nvere just the result of an endogenous reassessment of the US practice, which 
would have occurred notwithstanding the new multilateral environment. 
-" 35 
The foregoing demonstrates that there is still the possibility of a contrast 
between the US regime and WTO rules. We have already referred to the "US - 
Export Restraints" case which addresses general principles of subsidisation in the 
WTO rules and in the US CVD regime. In the next chapter we are going to focus 




THE US COUNTERVAILING DUTY REGIME UNDER VffO SCRUTINY 
Introduction 
The leitmotiv of the previous chapters, in which we have addressed the 
multilateral subsidy and countervailing duty discipline and the US CVD regime, 
has been the impact of the previous US system on the multilateral rules and, this 
notwithstanding, the possibility of some inconsistencies between the WTO regime 
and its US counterpart following the URAA. The latter proposition has been put 
to the test. Indeed, the US countervailing duty statutes and administrative practice 
has the lion share of the WTO CVD disputes. Leaving aside the multifaceted Byrd 
Amendment dispute, which extends to antidumping proceedings, nine out of the 
eleven countervailing duty cases that involve, at least, the establishment of a 
WTO panel concern the US CVD statute and administrative practice. The 
following sections concentrate on the WTO reports that deal with controversies 
involving the post 1995 reform countervailing duty regime of the United States. A 
common question underlies the examinations of the various disputes in which the 
US participated: were the measures evaluated by the panels and the Appellate 
Body protectionist? If so, did the WTO decisions deal effectively with the 
protectionist tendencies in the US system, of which the measures in question were 
an expression'? 
Although the subject of the disputes on the CVD regime are various and 
distinct they have a common feature: they address only specific aspects of the US 
statute and administrative practice and on the other side only specific aspects of 
the WTO discipline, rather than the general concepts underlying its rules on 
subsidies and countervailing measures. The WTO disputes appear to demonstrate 
the absence of a key stone to ascertaining protectionism and of general parameters 
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to verify its occurrence and its effects. llus, in chapter IV we gave the broad 
picture of the SCM Agreement as interpreted by the WTO panels and by the AB. 
In this chapter we must go ftu-ther into the details of the Agreement contrasting it 
to specific aspects the countervailing regime in force after the URAA in the 
Unites States. For instance, in chapter IV, describing the key feature of 
subsidisation we noted that the main benchmark is the market. Here, however, we 
must proceed in the analysis and inquire which kind of market we must refer to 
with reference to a specific case like the provision of goods and services by public 
authorities. Is the market in the exporting country the only available benchmark or 
can it replaced by other parameters and if so under which circumstances? 
Likewise, also with regard to US statute and administrative practice the question 
is whether the benefit once bestowed acquires an autonomous existence 
irrespective of different stages in the production process and of new ownership 
and terms of sale. From chapter IV we also know that the terms "entrust and 
direct" imply an affirmative action by the government, but which form can this 
affirmative action take? Finally, we have seen in the overview of the SCM 
Agreement that Art. 11.9 an investigation cannot be initiated if the "de minimis" 
requirement is not satisfied. However, must this requirement be ftilfilled in an 
Art. 21 sunset review despite the silence of the text, or does the omission in the 
text not allow the analogy, as argued by the SAA? 
The first three sections, therefore, deal with particular aspects of the 
building blocks of "subsidy", under Art I of the SCMA: benefit and financial 
contributions. 
In particular, section I focuses on the question of the geographical and 
economic features of the market of reference with regard to the provision of 
goods and services under Art. 1.1 (a)(iv). 
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Sections 2 and 3 deal with the question of subsidy pass-through. Pass- 
through can occur in two ways: a) when a subsidised. product is an input in the 
manufacture or production of a merchandise which, in turn, is the subject of a 
countervailing duty proceeding; b) when a subsidy is conferred on a company 
which is taken over wholly, or in part, by another company. In section 2 we 
examine, from the angle of the WTO rules, a case related to the upstream 
subsidisation rules analysed in chapter III with reference to the US regime prior to 
the URAA. The question is whether the administering authority can skip the pass- 
through assessment when it is allowed to avoid the upstream subsidies 
investigation requirements otherwise imposed by the US statute itself 
More complex is the question examined in section 3: can subsidies - 
specifically "non-recurring" subsidies - bestowed on companies (prevalently, 
government-owned corporations) taken over by private firms pass through to the 
acquiring company, even though the deal is at arm's length and at fair market 
value? The section gets the lion's share of the chapter firstly because the analysis 
deals with a two-level game, as the mostly Western European companies affected 
by never-ending countervailing duties have carried their battle on two fronts: 
directly before the US trade courts, and by the intermediary of their governments, 
and in particular of the European Communities in the WTO. Both the judgements 
of US courts and WTO reports look at the same issue, but the legal benchmarks in 
Al- - ine two systems do not coincide. Indeed, the US courts have focused on the 
consistency of Commerce's determinations with the principles of sect. 771(5)(F) 
of the Tariff Act as amended, according to which the sale of a firm at arm's length 
does not automatically extinguish the prior subsidy conferred. 
' On the other hand, 
the WTO reports assess the legality of the administering authority's determination 
1 USC§1677(5)(F) 
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as well as the legitimacy of the US statute itself in the light of the SCM 
Agreement and Art VI of GATT 1994. Secondly, the issue of the change in 
ownership has political relevance, because it is one of the main irritants in the 
relationship between the United States and the European Communities and 
because the US after having encouraged the privatisation drive both in industrial 
and developing countries, has failed to recognise, rightly or wrongly, the outcome 
of such policies when its countervailing regime is concerned. 
The fourth section addresses a particular hypothesis of indirect Fmancial 
contribution: the entrustment and direction of private parties. The case under 
review revolves around an example of "East Asian dirigisme", through which 
governmental authorities influence the decisions of entities outside the 
government sector, without recurring to explicit regulations or orders but 
impinging on the logic of the market. Two alternatives are at stake, both of which 
are potentially trade distorting: the failure to view as a subsidy heavy-handed 
governmental interference with market choice can allow an allocation of resources 
non-consistent with market orientation, which in turn could severely affect 
international trade to the advantage of the country resorting to such measures. On 
the other hand, viewing such policies as a form of subsidisation, even if they do 
belong to quite a different fon-n of government intervention, could provide the 
importing country with an easy protectionist tool. The choice between these 
alternatives depends on the interpretation of the relevant provision in Art. I of the 
SCM Agreement. In interpreting the Agreement the panel and the Appellate Body 
adopted quite different philosophies, and the AB's decision is likely to have a 
powerful impact on the relationship of the United States and of the European 
Communities xvith many trade partners particularly in the Far East. 
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The fifth section deals with the assessment of injury in countervailing duty 
investigations and, more in depth, with the parameters applied on "de minimis" 
subsidisation in initial investigations and in sunset reviews. Also in this case the 
interpretation of the relevant articles of the SCM Agreement can have a 
protectionist impact. What is at stake is the possibility of continuing to impose 
CVD duties in spite of the fact that the requirements for starting an investigation 
are no longer satisfied. 
In contrast with the previous sections, the dispute examined in section 6 
does not deal with a particular aspect of the relationship between the US CVD 
regime and the SCM Agreement but has a much wider, almost philosophical, 
scope: the boundary of what constitutes countervailing duty (and antidumping) 
proceedings. The Byrd Amendment case is relevant both because of its political 
impact and legal implications, as many WTO members, including the EU, Canada 
and Japan, have repeatedly announced that they are poised to withdraw 
concessions on the import of US products because of the protracted unwillingness 
of Congress to repeal the Act, The dispute has also put into question the 
effectiveness of multilateral remedies provided by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding in face of the unwillingness of a WTO member to conform its 
measures to the opinion of the competent WTO body. 
I)The market of reference in the in the provision or purchase of goods by 
governments 
The question of the geographical market to be used as benchmark and of 
the requirements for this market was raised in the last round (US-Softwood 
Lumber IV) of the never-ending quarrel between Canada and the United States 
over countervailability of exports of Canadian lumber wherein the Canadian 
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government and provincial authorities applied favourable stumpage prices %vhich, 
according to the US administering authority, resulted in subsidisation. 2 
The question is apparently solved by the cited Art. 14 of the Agreement, 
which, while providing for adequate remuneration in the provision or purchase of 
goods by governments as a condition to avoid the application of countervailing 
measures, states that "the adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in 
relation to prevailing market conditions... in the country of provision or purchase" 
The United States, however, in keeping with the 1988 Regulations, argued 
that it was impossible to apply the "in-country price- benchmark with reference to 
the Canadian market because timber market prices in Canada were not reflective 
of the fair market value due to the near-total dominance of the government in the 
Canadian timber trade, which forced private timber sellers to align their prices to 
the administered prices set by the government and provincial authorities. In the 
US view, therefore, the comparison to the market in order to establish the 
existence of benefit referred to a market undistorted by governmental practice. In 
the absence of such a market in the exporting country the yardstick was to be 
provided by the conditions prevailing in the importing country's market. 
The panel rejected the US argument referring first to Art. 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which the interpretation of a 
treaty must be based on the text. The panel argued that the sentence -in relation 
to prevailing market conditions" should be interpreted as in comparison . N-ith the 
conditions prevailing in the domestic market in the countr-N, of provision and. 
s , cc chapter VI, pp. 22 I :ts 
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consequently, the data to be used for the assessment of adequacy of remuneration 
were those reflecting the prevailing market conditions in that country. 3 
The panel acknowledged that the absence of an undistorted market in the 
exporting country created a significant loophole in Art. 14(d). However, it was of 
the opinion that such a discrepancy should be solved by further negotiations and 
that under the text of the article, which bound the parties as well as the judge, as 
long as there are prices determined by independent operators there is a market to 
which the comparison with price offered by public authorities must be referred, 
"even if supply and demand are affected by the government presence in the 
market". 
The Panel's interpretation of article 14, however, has been overturned by 
the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body started by dismissing the US approach 
according to which the term "market conditions" refers necessarily to a market 
undistorted by a goverment's financial contributions, as unwaffanted by the text 
of the article. On the other hand, with a rather daring interpretation of Art. 14(d), 
it argued that the text allows benchmarks other than private prices in the providing 
market. This possibility results from the fact that the expression "in relation to 
prevailing market conditions in the country of provision" may not be interpreted 
exclusively as "in comparison with" but rather "as regards" and "with respect to" 
the conditions of that particular market. 4 Such alternative interpretations, in the 
opinion of the Appellate Body, finds support in the chapeau of the article, which 
refers to "any method used by the investigating authority", thus implying that 
United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada. Report of the Panel (23.8.2003). WT'DS257/R. paras 7.57-7.59. 
' United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada. Report of the AppOlate BodN (19.1.2004). WTDS257/AB R.. para. 89. 
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more than one method consistent with article 14 is available. 5 The Appellate Body 
also argued that the panel's interpretation runs counter to the meaning of 
"benefit", a mainstay of the article, which implies that the financial contribution 
must make the recipient better-off than it would otherwise have been vvithout that 
contribution. Indeed, in a private market distorted by government interference the 
comparison to that particular market could result in a benefit nearing zero 6 From 
the foregoing the Appellate Body inferred that benchmarks other than prices in the 
exporting country's market can be used if the latter are severely distorted by the 
government's predominant role, and as long as the alternative benchmark, which 
could refer to the importing country's market, is related or connected to the 
market of export. 7 
In the case in question, therefore, the Appellate Body upheld, in principle, 
the US outlook, even though it rejected its reasoning as not being based on the 
text of the SCM Agreement, as required by Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. However, it did not deduce from the foregoing that the 
method actually applied in the Soft Lumber countervailing duty deten-nination 
was necessarily the right one. Indeed, the Appellate Body argued that the 
conditions for the application of an alternative method referring to private 
stumpage in the bordering states of the Northern United States have yet to be 
verified. In particular, the question of actual distortion of the Canadian private 
inarket as well as cross-border comparability between the US and Canadian 
markets need further proo f. 
8 
Ibid. para 91. 
Ibid. para. 95. 
Ibid. para. 102-103. 
Ibid. para. 117, 
'44 
The interpretation provided by the Appellate Body presents some 
difficulties. 
Firstly it seems that the Appellate Body considered the offset of "the eftects of the 
subsidy" as the pivotal objective of the agreement and, therefore, inferred that any 
benchmark in the assessment of the benefit must be bent to such an objective, 
coming to the conclusion that to achieve this end a plurality of yardsticks can be 
used if need arises. 9 On the contrary, the history of the SCM negotiations clearly 
bears out that the text of the agreement is the result of a lengthy. difficult and still 
uncertain bargaining of contrasting goals. It seems, therefore, more consistent 
with political prudence to abide by a single parameter, at least as long as a new 
consensus has not emerged. It must be remembered that the Panel honestly 
recognised the difficulties presented by the text of article 14, but thought that the 
overcoming of such difficulties was not a task for the interpreter but had to be left 
to a reform agreed by the parties. 
Nor does the interpretation put forward by the Appellate Body provide 
stable ground to deten-nine when one must consider the market as significantly 
distorted by the dominant position of public authorities, or when the importing 
country's market is sufficiently related to the export market. 
Secondly, the remedy could be worse than the illness. Even if the above- 
mentioned conditions are realised, there is the possibility that the market in the 
importing country is also affected by govemmental intervention. E,., -en worse, at 
least from the exporter's viewpoint, the relevant market in the importing country. 
though free from state intervention. could be dominated by a fev, - oligopolistic 
, -, cc para 95 
" 
firms v, -hose policies increase prices and, consequently, the margin of benefit 
assessed on the exporting competitor. 
Finally, it seems that the Appellate Body's reading of Art. 14 establishes 
an unwarranted link between the two sentences of the article"s chapeau. Contrarv 
to what the Appellate Body argues, the plurality of methods which the 
investigating authorities are allowed to use by the first sentence, as is natural 
given the plurality of members and domestic regimes, does not entail that each of 
the guidelines listed in the second sentence of the chapeau can assume different 
forms according to the circumstances of their implementation. 
2) Upstream Subsidies 
In Chapter III we have provided an outline of the US upstream subsidies 
regime prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement Act. In US - Softwood Lumber 
IV, Canada complained that the United States had failed to conduct a pass- 
through investigation in cases involving upstream subsidies. 
It must be noted for a starter that the present US statute referring to 
upstream subsidies, under section 771 A of the URAA, provides, inter alia, that the 
subsidised product must be used in the production of a merchandise which is the 
subject of a countervailing duty proceeding, and has a significant effect on the 
cost of the latter. ' 0 Thus in the US system, upstream subsidies proceedings whose 
requirements are further developed by section 351.523 of the final C'VD 
regulations of 1998 - turn on two factors: 1) the distinction betvveen subsidised 
input and merchandise suýject to a CVD investigation and 2) the bestowal of a 
competitive benefit on the latter. which cannot exceed the subsidy granted on the 
input, but can differ in amount. No equivalent specific rule can be found in the 
10 USC§ 1677-1. 
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SCNIA and in GATT 1994, which, however, more generally refer to indirect 
subsidisation. 
However, in its softwood lumber investigation the US administering 
authority left out of consideration USC § 1677-1, and its constraints, as it carried 
out its investigation on an aggregate base, which, in its opinion, renders 
unnecessary a distinction between output and final product. " Therefore, in its 
final affirmative determination it caught three cases in the same net: A) log sales 
to lumber producers by timber harvesters that do not manufacture lumber; B) sales 
of logs by a tenure-holding harvester-sawmill to another unrelated sawmill; 
sales of lumber by a tenure-holding harvester-sawmill to an unrelated lumber re- 
manufacturer. The aggregate investigation concerned both the lumber produced 
by sawmills owned by tenure holding harvesters and the lumber re-manufactured 
by independent sawmills that did not have a timber tenure holding, whereas the 
subsidy was directly bestowed by the stumpage programme on the timber 
harvesters, which sold and processed logs directly. 
Specifically, the US objected to the Canadian claim that since the 
investigation had been carried out on an aggregate basis, no pass-through analysis 
was required because the USDOC simply spread the total subsidy amount that it 
had calculated over the value of sales of the products produced from the lumber 
production process. According to the US, a pass-through analysis would 
effectively amount to requiring a company-specific analysis, whereas Art. 19.3 of 
the SCMA allows the imposition of countervailing duties also on uninvestigated 
exporters whenever an aggregate basis procedure is applied. 12 
11 Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Notice of Final Negative 
Critical Circrnstances Determnation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 
67FRI5545 (April 2.2002). ia. ita. doc. gow I fm/0204fm/02-7849. txt. 
12 United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada - Rcport of the Panel (29., '8/2003). WT/DS2571R. paras. 7.74-7.79. 
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The Appellate Body, mainly upholding the rationale of the panel report, 
noted that Art. VI: 3 of GATT 1994 by refening to "subsidies bestowed 
indirectly" implies that financial contributions by the government to the 
production of inputs used in products subject to an investigation are not, in 
principle, excluded from the amount of subsidies that may be offset through the 
imposition of countervailing duties on the processed product. On the other hand, 
since Art. VI: 3 forbids the imposition of countervailing duties in excess of the 
amount of the subsidy accrued on the imported product, where the producer of the 
input is not the same entity as the producer of the processed product, it cannot be 
presumed that the whole subsidy bestowed on the input passes through to the 
processed product. Thus, no countervailing duties can be assessed on the 
downstream product unless a pass-through of the benefit has been demonstrated. 13 
The AB found further support in the definition of a subsidy in Art. 1.1 of the SCM 
Agreement, which requires both a financial contribution and a benefit, arguing 
that if countervailing duties are to be imposed on the processed product, it is not 
sufficient for an investigating authority to establish only for the input product the 
existence of a financial contribution and the conferral of a benefit to the input 
producer. 
14 
As regards the three above-mentioned cases which triggered the 
imposition of countervailing duties on the imports of Canadian softwood lumber 
in the United States, the US did not appeal the panel's finding on sales of logs by 
tenured timber harvesters to unrelated lumber producers. The panel held that in 
such a situation the obligation under Art. VI: 3 of GATT 1994 and Art. 10 of the 
13 United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada - AB-2003-6- Report of the Appellate Body (19/1/2004). WTIDS257/AB/R, 
paras 140-14 1. 
" Ibid., para. 142. 
The need to establish that a subsidy has been granted on the investigated products and to assess its 
amount had already been stated by the WTO panel in -US - softwood lumber Ill-concerning the 
August 2001 USDOC's preliminary determination in the investigation on imports of Canadian 
softwood lumber (WT,, 'DS236/R. para. 7.79). 
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SCM Agreement to conduct a pass-through analysis in respect of production of 
softwood lumber from logs purchased from unrelated harvesters falls on the WTO 
member taking countervailing action-' 5 
With regard to the other two cases, objects of appeal by the United States, 
the Appellate Body distinguished between sales of logs by a tenure-holding 
harvester-sawmill to another unrelated sawmill and sales of lumber to an 
unrelated lumber re-manufacturer, contrasting the subsidisation of an input 
product outside the investigation and the situation in which a product under 
general investigation is the input of another product covered by the same 
investigation. 
In the first case, in keeping with the US viewpoint, the AB held that the 
carrying out of an investigation on an aggregate basis under Article 19.3 of the 
SCM Agreement legitimises the assessment of the overall subsidy amount, which 
was then distributed among the investigated products. This fact, however, does 
not exonerate a Member from playing by the rules of the game, that is, by 
assessing the total amount of subsidy and the countervailing duty rate consistently 
with the SCM Agreement and Article IV of GATT. Therefore, in determining the 
total amount of subsidy the investigating authority must check the occurrence of a 
pass-through between the subsidised input and the product under investigation and 
its amount. 
16 
On the other hand, reversing the panel' s opinion, the Appellate Body held 
that a pass-through analysis is not required in the case of all arm's length 
transactions affecting timber, sawmills and remanufacturers, as both the 
harvester/sawmills and the remanufacturers are subject to the investigation. In 
this situation, therefore, it is not necessary to calculate precisely how subsidy 
13 WTil[)S257/R, pam. 7.94 - 7.99. 16 WT/E)S257/AB/R, para. 156-159. 
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benefits are divided up between the producers of subject products in order to 
establish, on an aggregate basis, the total amount of subsidy and the country-wide 
countervailing duty rate for those subjects. 17 
As one should expect given the interests involved in the dispute, which is 
just a stage of a quarrel dating back to the 1980s, the story did not end here. 
Almost a year after the Appellate Body's report Canada requested the DSB to 
establish a panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU, claiming that the measures 
allegedly taken by the United States to comply with the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings were inconsistent with US obligations under relevant WTO 
Agreements. 
In particular, Canada claimed that the DOC completely excluded entire groups 
of transactions from the new investigation, on the basis that these were not arm's 
length sales. According to Canada, a transaction between unrelated parties is by 
definition an arm's length transaction and, therefore, requires a pass-through 
analysis. In contrast, the United States, pointing out that the Appellate Body had 
exclusively used the term arm's length transactions whereas the panel had 
prevalently referred to transactions between unrelated parties, asserted that sales 
between formally unrelated parties are not necessarily arm's length as other 
factors affecting the transaction must be taken into account: in particular, some 
government-mandated restrictions such as limitations on log sales that are 
contained in Crown tenure contracts and wood supply agreements. 
The panel did not entertain the question as to whether artn's length 
transactions are synonymous with transactions between unrelated parties, but 
upheld the Canadian claim just noting that, apart from sales to unrelated 
remanufacturers, the Appellate Body, though using another word in its reasoning, 
17 Ibid., para. 161-165. 
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had not overturned the panel report, either explicitly or implicitly. 18 Analogous 
reasoning was used by the DSU Art. 21.5 panel to ovemde the US defence, based 
on the wording of a footnote of the Appellate Body's report, that proof of pass- 
through is not required for sales of logs to sawmills that do not hold a stumpage 
contract, i. e., to sawmills that do not hold tenures. 19 
In this case the sequence of events and the moral we can draw from them are 
quite simple. Overall it is an uncomplicated illustration of what we argued in the 
first chapter: the US countervailing duty regime does not necessarily create a 
protectionist envirom-nent. However, there is room for manoeuvre to exploit its 
rules for protectionist ends when individual CVD investigations are carried out. 
In "US - Softwood Lumber IV" the US administering authority simply 
avoided the constraints imposed by the US statute, under USC § 1677- 1, 
legitimately exploiting a provision (Art. 19.3) of the SCM Agreement. Nor did 
the WTO reports contest the legitimacy of the US statute on upstream subsidies. 
However, the Department of Commerce could not resist the temptation to widen 
the net and catch producers whose exports did not necessarily benefit from 
subsidies, without carrying out a proper investigation. The WTO panel and, with 
more accuracy, the Appellate Body made it clear that this was unacceptable and, 
as expected, the US administering authority had difficulty in complying. 
Much more complex is the question of pass-through involving a change in 
ownership which we are going to examine in the following section. 
'a United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada - Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 (DS257) - Report of the Panel 
(1/8/2005). WTDS257/RW, paras 4.74 - 4.82). 19 [bid., paras 4.98-4.103. 
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Change in ownership and interaction between NN'TO reports and the 
evolving US case law and administrative practice 
In the previous chapter we examined how the US administering authority 
deals with allocating non-recurrent benefits over time. Linked to the above issue 
is the question of determining whether and to what extent change in ovvnership 
transactions eliminate previously conferred countervailable (non-recUrring) 
subsidies. 
Let us suppose that a company receives a subsidy kvhose benefit spreads 
over ten years and that after seven years the corporation is bought by new 
shareholders. Does the sale suffice to cancel the non-amortised quota of the 
subsidy bestowed? Mostly, the answer is negative, though the Department of 
Commerce has repeatedly conceded that the purchase price can be attributed "pro 
quota" to the repayment of the subsidy, which, therefore, does not entirely pass- 
through. 
What, however, if the purchase price is a fair-market price which has been 
agreed by non-related parties? It has been contended that in such a case the 
subsidy is entirely extinguished. Indeed, non-recurrent subsidies almost ahvays 
entail cost curtailments, which once capitalized reduce the book value of the fixed 
assets to which the subsidy is allocated below their real market value. There are, 
therefore, prospecti've capital gains if the assets are sold, along vvith an increase in 
the net worth of the subsidised company and its goodwill. In short, gains can be 
expected -when assets. or a permanent establishment, or the whole enterprise are 
sold. Things change once the fair market value sale has occurred, as there are no 
prospective capital -, ains. 
because the consideration paid by the bmer factors in 
the benefit inherent to the subsidy. 
-) ýI 
This point of view was originally accepted by the United States. In "Lime 
from Mexico", which dealt with the privatisation of a govemment-owned 
company, Sonocal, Commerce stated that to the extent that the pnice paid for a 
government-owned company reflects its market value there is the presumption 
that the previously bestowed countervailable benefits are fully reflected in the 
purchase price and, therefore, are not passed-through to the purchaser. 20 
Commerce's viewpoint, however, changed in the following years. In 
particular, in "Certain steel products from Austria", whose General Issues 
Appendix (GIA), as we know, was a benchmark for subsequent determinations, 
the administering authority held that privatization of a government-owned 
company, per se, cannot eliminate countervailability, since "the statute does not 
permit the amount of the subsidy, including the allocated subsidy stream, to be re- 
evaluated based upon subsequent events in the marketplace". The Department, 
A. 1- - 
therefore, argued that only a proportion of the purchase price can be attributed to 
prior subsidies, and estimated it according to the rate of the privatized company's 
subsidies relative to the company's net worth during the period prior to the 
privatisation. 
21 
Commerce applied the GIA approach with reference to the privatization of 
two subsidised government-owned companies: Saarstahl and British Steel. The 
Court of International Trade rejected this methodology, reasoning that the purpose 
of countervailing duty laws is not "to capture" a subsidy once bestowed, but to 
offset subsidies on goods entering the US market so that American producers of 
20 Preliminary Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Administrative Review. 
Lime from Mexico. 54Fr 1753. January 17,1989). web. lexis-nex is. com/professional - 21 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from Austria. 58 
FR 37217,37263. July 9,1993. web. lex is-nex is. com/profess ional. 
Commerce provided the following example: A company with S 60 in remaining subsidies is sold 
for S 72. Between 1977, first date of relevant subsidisation, and the date of privatisation, subsidies 
averaged % of the company's net worth. In this case. % of the purchase price (S 54) should be 
attributed to repaying those subsidies, reducing them fro S 6o to S 6. If the average subsidies to a 
company during the period from 1977 to the date of privatisation exceeded the average net worth 
of the company, then the entire purchase price would be treated as a repayment of those subsidies. 
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competing goods are not at a disadvantage. The CIT, therefore, argued that in the 
change of ownership at issue there was no countervailable subsidy because the 
buyer in a market-based, arm's-length transaction pays for all it receives and, 
therefore, obtains no competitive benefit. 22 
Congress promptly countered the threat caused by the Court's decision, 
introducing through the URAA a new subsection of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
Section 771(5)(F) provides that "a change in ownership of all or part of a foreign 
enterprise does not by itself require a determination by the administering authority 
that a past countervailable subsidy received by the enterprise no longer continues 
to be countervailable, even though the change in ownership is accomplished 
through an arm's length transaction". 23 The text, thus, lets us infer that an 
additional element could be required for the countervailable subsidy to be 
extinguished, though Congress refrained from specifying such an additional 
factor, leaving its identification to the investigations carried out by the 
administering authority. The Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) points 
out that "section 771 (5) (F) aims at preventing "any extreme interpretation" by 
which someone might argue that "all that would be required to eliminate any 
countervailing duty liability would be to sell subsidised productive assets to an 
unrelated party". However it must be emphasised that, as noted by the WTO 
panel in "US -Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products", although section 
771(5)(F) refers only to arm's length transactions, both the reports of Congress on 
A- - the relevant legislation and the US case law implied that arm's length transactions 
necessarily occur at fair market value. 24 
22 Saarstahl AG v. United States, 18 CIT 525,828 F. Supp. 187 (1994). 
23 19 USC § 1677 (5XF). 
24 United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities - Report of the Panel (31.7.2002). WT/DS212, R. para. 
7.130. 
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The CIT's decision in Saarstahl was reversed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit which stressed that the CIT had made an "improper equation 
of subsidy and competitive benefits, which was not the intention of Congress". On 
the contrary, in the opinion of the Federal Circuit, the lawmakers on many 
occasions expressed the view that "an effect test for subsidies has never been 
mandated by the law and is inconsistent with effective enforcement", the only 
requirements for the imposition of countervailing measures being the provision of 
subsidy and injury to a domestic industry. 25 From the foregoing the Federal 
Circuit drew the conclusion that the Court of Trade erred in holding that as a 
matter of law a subsidy cannot be passed through during an arm's length 
transaction, whereas Commerce's methodology correctly recognised that a 
number of scenarios are possible. 26 
However, in the first place the Appeal judges stressed that their decision 
was based on the statutory scheme prior to the Tariff Act amendment. Secondly, 
the Federal Circuit gave deference to the long established principle of the judicial 
review of administrative proceedings, according to which the reviewing court 
must respect policy choices made by US agencies in applying statutes, as long as 
they "fall within the range of permissible constructions", even though the 
construction applied by the agency is not the only reasonable one and does not 
coincide with the result that the court would have reached had the question arisen 
in the first instance in judicial proceedings. 27 
In the Final Regulations of 1998 there is no section assigned to the change 
in ownership issue. However, the preamble to the Regulations states that the 
23 Saarstahl AG v. United States, Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 78 F. 3d 1539,1543 
(1996). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional - 26 [bid.. 1544. 
27 Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. DefCouncil, inc, 467 US 837.84243 (1984). 
See Elizabeth C. Seastrum . -Chevron Deference and 
The Charming Betsy: Is There a Place for 
the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and Countervailing Duty. 
Determinations? ", Fed Or. B. J. 13 (2003-4), p. 230 et seq. web. lex is-nexis. com/ professional.. 
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language of section 771 (5)(F) neither requires nor prohibits a detennination that 
prior subsidies are no longer countervailable, but leaves the administering 
authority with the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis the impact of a 
change in ownership on the countervailability of past subsidies . 
28The 1998 Final 
Rule also adds that the above described repayment/real location methodology, 
adopted by Commerce achieved the objective of flexibility in assessing benefits in 
change in ownership cases. Commerce's methodology might have been flexible 
for US CVD purposes, but very soon it was found to contravene the new 
multilateral rules on subsidies and countervailing measures. 
Chane in ownership at arm's lenjeth, fair market value under WTO scrutLny: first sta-ge 
The first WTO test of the US approach on change in ownership involved 
the United Kingdom offshoots, in private holding, of the complex privatization of 
a government-owned company, British Steel Corporation (BSC), carried out in 
various stages, the last of which took place in 1995. 
In its 1993 final affirmative determination, Commerce, clarifying the 
principle underlying the repayment/reallocation methodology (also known as the 
Gamma method), claimed that the sale of a business or productive unit does not 
alter the effect of previously bestowed subsidies, which, therefore, at least in part, 
continue to be enjoyed by the productive unity, though under a new owner. 29 i-hiS 
approach was confirmed in subsequent administrative reviews. 30 
28 Countervailing Duties, Final Rule, 65354. ia. ita-doc. gov/regs/98-30565. txt. 
29 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products from the United Kingdom. 58FR6237,6240, January 27,1993. web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional. 
Among others, Commerce stated quite poetically that as the company disposes of its productive 
entities, these entities take a portion of the benefits with them when they "travel to their new 
home". 
30 Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 60FR54841 
(October 26,1995). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional 
Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 61 FR58377 
(November 14,1996). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional 
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The European Communities claimed that the affirmative determinations 
from 1995 (year of entry into force of the WTO Agreement) to 1998 were 
inconsistent with article 10 of the SCM Agreement read in conjunction with 
articles 1,14 and 19 of the Agreement and Art. VI: 3 of the GATT 1994, as they 
failed to take all the necessary steps to demonstrate the existence of a subsid Y. 31 
The European Communities did not deny that a financial contribution was 
made to the government-owned company BSC, which received a benefit, but 
contended that the reviews failed to inquire as to whether a benefit and, therefore, 
a subsidy was conferred or not on the privately-owned companies (BSC and 
BSplc/BSES) created in the course of the privatization process, whose products 
continued to be subjected to US countervailing duties. In the opinion of the 
European Communities, the bestowal of a benefit implies a comparison between 
the tenns of the financial contribution and those otherwise available to the 
recipient. 32 In this context, according to the EC, when a private buyer purchases a 
company or assets thereof in an arm's-length transaction at market value the 
payment of market price necessarily precludes, as a basic matter of economics, the 
passing through of any benefit to the new private owner. Indeed, the price paid 
necessarily values and incorporates within the transaction any subsidy previously 
Certain Hot Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 62FR53306 
(October 14,1997). web. lexis-nexis. com/professionaI 
Certain Hot Rol led Lead and Carbon Steel Products from the Un ited Kingdom, 63 FR 18367 (Apri 1 
15,1998). web. lexis-nexis. com/professional. 
31 Specifically, Article 10 of the SCM Agreement requires that a WTO Member should take all 
necessary steps to ensure that countervailing duties are imposed by its authorities only in 
conformity with the terms of the SCM Agreement; Article 19.1 establishes that a Member may 
impose countervailing duties only after making a final determination of the existence and amount 
of a subsidy; Article 19.4 ASCM requires that no countervailing duty shall be levied on any 
imported product in excess of the amount of the subsidy found to exist, and Article VI: 3 of GATT 
1994 sets forth the same obligation, requiring that no countervailing duty shall be levied on any 
product in excess of an amount equal to the subsidy determined to have been granted. 
32 United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products originating in the United Kingdom - Report of the Panel. WT/DS 138, 'R - 
Attachment 1.1 - First Submission of the European Communities - Legal Arguments, paras 81 et 
seq. 
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conferred; and if the subsidy increases the value of the company, so will it 
increase the price the purchaser must pay. 33 
The United States replied that the SCM Agreement only provides for the 
ascertaimnent of the existence of a subsidy, including a subsidy benefit, as of the 
time of the subsidy bestowal, but it says nothing as to whether the investigating 
authority should take account of a change in ownership. 34 On the other hand, it 
argued that the text of the Agreement, and in particular Art. 27.13, suggests that 
previously bestowed subsidies remain actionable and are allocable to a successor 
9 35 company s production. In the US view, therefore, in line with the approach 
followed in Commerce's investigations, the determinative factor is the productive 
asset, rather than the owner, as Art. 10 of the SCM Agreement and GATT 1994 
Art. VU refer to the subsidy as having been bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon 
the manufacture, production and export of the product. 
The panel based its opinion on some of the basic concepts underlying the 
nature of subsidy that had already been examined in previous cases, reported in 
chapter IV. In particular, the panel focused on the notion of benefit, recalling 
that in "Canada - Aircraft" the Appellate Body pointed out that such a notion 
implies both the existence of a recipient and a comparison with the marketplace, 
from which the conclusion can be drawn that the recipient has been made better- 
off by the financial contribution. 36 Relying on this premise the panel rejected the 
US viewpoint according to which the benefit is conferred on the production and 
export of merchandise, iffespective of the person producing and exporting the 
33 WT/DS 138/11 - Attachment 1.1 - First Submission of the European Communities - The 
Economics of Privatization, paras 50-61. 
34 WT/DS138/R - Attachment 2.1 - First Submission of the United States - Legal Arguments, 
T. 108 et seq. pý 
Actually, SCMA Art. 27.13 only provides that "the provisions of Part III (actionable subsidies) 
do not apply to subsidies granted within and directly linked to a privatization programme of a 
developing country". 
36 United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products originating in the United Kingdom- Report of the Panel 
(23.12.1999). WTDS 13 8/11 , paras 6.64-6.65. 
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product. Nor, in the opinion of the panel, can the investigation be confined to the 
person that received the subsidy at the date of bestowal of the financial 
contribution. On the contrary, the text of Art. 1.1 and Art 21 (on review of 
countervailing duties) makes it clear that the establishment of both the existence 
of financial contribution and benefit must refer to the relevant period of 
investigation and review. 37 As regards Art. 27.13 the panel noted that its scope 
was strictly limited to the particular case of the privatization of companies in 
developing countries and could not be applied to the more general question of 
persistence of the benefit originally bestowed in change in ownership cases. 38 
From the foregoing, the panel drew the conclusion that the continued 
existence of a benefit must be demonstrated with reference to the successor 
companies in private ownership that exported goods to the USA during the 
periods of investigation (POIs) covered by the subsequent administrative reviews. 
In the panel's view, change in ownership by itself is certainly not enough to 
extinguish the subsidy since the "non-recurring" financial contribution can be 
deemed to have been invested in the productive assets acquired by private 
ownership companies, which, therefore, could indirectly receive the benefit 
embodied in those assets. However, when fair market value is paid for all 
productive assets and goodwill acquired by the exporting companies in private 
holding, a benefit cannot be deemed to exist because, as argued by the European 
Communities, the purchaser is not better off with regard to the terms of the 
market. 
39 
The panel, therefore, concluded that the methodology applied by the 
United States in the administrative reviews at issue violated Article 10 of the 
SCMA and, pursuant to Art. 19.1 of the Agreement. recommended that the US 
"Ibid., para 6.71-6.74. 
381bid., para 6.76. 
391bid., paras 6.80-6.8 L 
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should bring the measures imposed on the imported British products into 
conformity with the SCM Agreement. 40 However, the panel did not accede to the 
request of the Communities to suggest that the United States amended its 
countervailing duty laws to recognise the principle that privatization at market 
price extinguishes subsidies, holding that there was no provision of US law that 
required the imposition of countervailing duties in the circumstances of the 
dispute. 41 
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's fmcling that no benefit was 
conferred on the private ownership companies, UES and BSplc/BSES as a result 
of the financial contributions made to BSC, having regard, however, to "the 
particular circumstances of this case". 42 This seems to indicate that in the AB's 
opinion, an arm"s length and fair-market value transaction is not by itself and in 
all circumstances enough to offset the benefit bestowed by the financial 
contribution to the original owner. 
Lthe US courts: the Delverde case The first rgaonse o 
A few months after the panel report the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed a decision of the Court of International Trade which upheld a 
final determination of the USDOC on imports of pasta produced by Italian 
firms . 
43 The case concerned the take-over of an Italian company, this time in 
private ownership, which had received subsidies from the government. The 
Federal Circuit stated that the Tariff Act as amended does not allow Commerce to 
presume that the subsidies granted to the prior owner of corporate assets 
automatically pass through to the firm that runs the business following a change in 
401bid., para. 6.8 1. 
"Ibid., para. 6.82. 
12 WT/E)S 13 8/A B/R, paras. 67-74.. 
43 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 FR 
30288june 14,1996. %%, eb. lexis-nexis. com/professional/. 
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ownership. Rather, the Tariff Acts requires that the administering authority 
should make such a determination by examining the particular facts and 
circumstances of the sale. 44Thus, according to the Court, if section 771(5)(F) 
makes it clear that a subsidy cannot be considered to have been extinguished by 
an ann's length transaction, it does not provide for the opposite either. Nor does 
the provision direct Commerce to use any particular methodology. The section 
simply prohibits a "per se rule" either way, and with regard to ann's length 
transactions confirms the general requirement that Commerce should determine 
that a government provided both a financial contribution and benefit to a person, 
either directly or indirectly, before imposing countervailing duties. 45 
Applying this reasoning to the facts in "Delverde", the Federal Circuit 
concluded that since the repayment/reallocation methodology boils down to a "per 
se rule" according to which a subsidy is deemed to pass through to a new entity, 
though pro quota, it contravened the CVD statute and section 1677 (5)(F) in 
particular. 46 It must be noted that the Court of Appeal declined to give deference 
to Commerce's interpretation of the statute, as provided by the Chevron decision, 
because, in its opinion, the meaning of the statute was unequivocal and the 
approach of the Department fell outside the range of permissible interpretations. 47 
The Federal Circuit Court also pointed out that the statutory context had changed 
from that on which its previous Saarstahl decision was based, since the Tariff Act 
as amended by the URAA gives a definition of subsidy, which includes both 
financial contribution and benefit. The claim of the Italian company, therefore, did 
44 Delverde, SRL and Delverde USA. Inc. v. United States, 202 F3d 1360,1365 (2000)web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional. 
'3 Ibid., 1366. 
46 Ibid., 1368 
47 Ibid., 1367. 
261 
not concern the effect of an already granted subsidy, but the continuous existence 
of the benefit and, therefore, of the subsidy itself 
Thus, although the Federal Circuit stressed that its decision was 
exclusively based on US statutes and that it did not consider the relevance of the 
WTO panel's decision, both the WTO and the Federal Circuit essentially agreed 
that Commerce cannot presume a benefit. in order to find a subsidy in the 
privatization context. 
48 
Chan-ge in ownership at arm's length. fair market value under WTO scrutiny: second round 
The Department of Commerce continued to apply the Gamma method for 
a certain while, but from 2001 adopted a more elaborate "same person" 
methodology, which, however, led to equivalent results. This method, which was 
first applied in Grain Oriented Electrical Steel from Italy, provided for a two-step 
test. 49 The first step consisted of an analysis of whether the post-privatization 
entity was the same legal person that received the original subsidy before 
privatization. For this purpose, the USDOC examined the following non- 
exhaustive criteria: 1) continuity of general business operations; 2) continuity of 
production facilities; 3) continuity of assets and liabilities; and 4) retention of 
personnel. If, as a result of the 'application of these criteria, the USDOC 
concluded that no new legal person was created, the analysis of whether a benefit 
exists stopped there, and the Department of Commerce did not assess whether the 
privatization was at arm's length and for fair market value. If, applying the above- 
listed criteria, the administering authority concluded that the post-privatization 
entity was a new legal person, distinct from the entity that had received the 
"' Julie Dunne, "Delverde and the WTO's British Steel Decision Foreshadow more Conflict where 
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, Privatization, and United States Countervailing Duty Law 
Intersect", Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 17 (2001)79. 
49 Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review: Grain Oriented Electrical Steel 
from Italy, 66FR 2885, January 12,200 l. www. ia. ita. doc. gov/frn/o 10 1 fm/'O 1-975. txt 
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subsidy prior to privatization, the USDOC would not impose duties on goods 
produced after the take-over. 
The European Communities filed a WTO challenge to twelve affirmative 
determinations adopted in the course of both new investigations and 
administrative and sunset reviews, applying in ten cases the Gamma method and 
in two cases (the above-mentioned Grain Oriented Electrical Steel from Italy and 
Cut-to-length Carbon Steel Plates ftorn Sweden) the "same person" method. 
Once again the panel pointed out that in original investigations as well as 
in administrative and sunset reviews, the US administering authority, having been 
informed of the privatizations by the interested producers and by the European 
Communities, was obliged to re-examine whether the privatized producer 
continued to receive any benefit from the prior subsidization before reaching any 
conclusion that countervailing duties should be continued. 50 
The panel, rejecting the US contention - consistent with the "same person" 
methodology - that the company as a productive and legal entity must be 
distinguished from its owners - reiterated that if upon privatization, fair market 
value is paid for productive assets and goodwill of the government-owned 
company "the privatized producer will not have received a benefit or any 
advantage, because it has received nothing for free: all assets which it has 
acquired, further to the privatization transaction, have been fully paid for under 
normal market conditions, and it is those market conditions that serve as a 
benchmark for assessing the benefit to the privatized producer, as envisaged in 
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement". 51 
50 United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities - Report of the Panel (3 1 i7/2002). WT/DS212, R. paras. 
7.70,7.96-7.98 and 
ara. 7.1 11. 
WT/DS212/R. paras. 7.72.7.76. 
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Going a step further, the panel also reversed its statement in -US -Lead and 
Bismuth II", and argued that section 771(5)(F) is not consistent with the SCMA 
requirements if viewed in the context of the US CVD system as a whole. In the 
panel's opinion, the section's statutory language on its own would not mandate 
any violation of the SCM and WTO Agreements. However, the legal history of 
the section, the SAA, as well as the Federal Circuit's judgement in Delverde, 
which in a common law system is binding on subsequent cases, show that section 
771(5)(F) must be interpreted as preventing a "per se" rule that privatization at 
arm's-length and for fair market value extinguishes the benefit for the privatized 
producer. Therefore, according to the panel, the Department of Commerce is 
prevented from developing any methodology implementing the section whereby it 
is required to find that the benefit from a prior financial contribution is 
extinguished vis-a-vis the privatized producer solely by ann's-length 
privatizations at fair market value. The panel, therefore, held that the aggregate 
effect of the legislative history, object and purpose of section 771(5)(F), the SAA, 
and the interpretation of that legislation by the Federal Circuit is to mandate an 
application of Section 771 (5)(F) that is inconsistent with Articles 10,14,19, and 
21 of the SCM Agreement and that the United States has, thus, failed to ensure 
conformity with the SCM Agreement as required by Article 32.5 of the 
Agreement and Article XVIA of the WTO Agreement. 52 
In the appeal, which did not involve the "gamma method" issue, the 
viewpoint of the Appellate Body partially diverged from the opinion of the panel. 
The AB affirmed the panells finding that the "same person " method is 
inconsistent with the SCM requirement of the existence of proof of benefit, 
because it prescribes the conclusion that, when the CVD investigation determines 
52 Ibid., pams7.156-7.158. 
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that no new legal person is created as a result of privatization, the newly- 
privatized enterprise continues to receive the benefit of a previous financial 
contribution without any ftu-ther analysis, and irrespective of the consideration 
paid by the new owners. 53 On the other hand, clarifying what it had just hinted 
at in "US- Lead and Bismuth 11" the AB overturned. the panel's conclusion that 
privatization at arm's length and fair market value automatically entails the 
extinction of subsidy and that, consequently, sect. 771 (5)(F) of the Tariff Act by 
not providing unconditional recognition of such effect is inconsistent with the US 
obligation under the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. 54 
The Appellate Body in the first place noted that every privatization 
process takes place within the concrete circumstances prevailing in the market in 
which the sale occurs and the outcome of such a process, namely the price that the 
market establishes for the state-owned enterprise, will reflect those circumstances. 
On the other hand, governments may impose policies that, "albeit respectful of the 
market's inherent functioning, are intended to induce certain results from the 
market". "In such circumstances, the market's valuation of the state-owned 
property may ultimately be severely affected by those govenunent policies, as 
well as by the conditions in which buyers will subsequently be allowed to enjoy 
property. "55 From the foregoing the Appellate Body inferred that the panel's 
absolute rule of no benefit from an arm's length and fair market value transactions 
is defensible in the context of transactions between two private parties taking 
place in reasonably competitive markets. However, it "overlooks the ability of 
governments to obtain certain results from markets by shaping the circumstances 
and conditions in which markets operate" and by influencing "the circumstances 
53 United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products ftom the European 
Communities - AB-2002-5- Report of the Appellate Body (9/12/2002). WTrDS212, ABIlý, 
146. 
Ibid. para. 158. 
55 WT/DS212/AB, IR, para. 123. 
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and the conditions of the sale so as to obtain a certain market valuation of the 
enterprise". 56 In the AB's opinion, therefore, the effect of arm's length 
privatization is just to shift to the investigating authority the burden of identi(N-inp- 
evidence which establishes that the benefit from the previous financial 
contribution passes-through. On the other hand, there is no inflexible rule 
requiring that investigating authorities automatically determine that a benefit from 
pre-privatization financial contributions has expired, since this depends on the 
facts of each case. 
57 
Relying on such a conclusion, the Appellate Body held that as the SCNI 
Agreement itself allows investigating authorities to evaluate evidence directed at 
proving that the new private owner may enjoy a benefit from a prior financial 
contribution bestowed on a state-owned enterprise, regardless of privatization at 
arm's length and for fair market value, the Agreement does not conflict with 
section 771(5)(F) which expressly provides for such an inquiry. 58 Nor was there 
any question that section 771(5)(F) could mandate a particular method of 
determining the existence of a benefit contrary to the SCM Agreement, simply 
because the section does not prescribe any specific methodology. 59 
The second tS rgMons 
The "per se rule" test was reapplied by the US courts with regard to the 
ubsame person" methodology. The case concerned one of the 12 companies 
subjected to the investigations referred to the NVTO DSB: the state-owned French 
company, Usinor, Ugine S. A.. xvhich the govemment began privatizing in 1995 
through sale of stocks to the French and intemational public. as well as to 
Ibid., para. ] 24 
Ibid.. para. 120- 
ig Ibid., pan, . 158. 59 Ibid., para. ] ý9 
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employees and stable shareholders. The sale was completed by 1998 at a price 
considered to be in accordance with fair market value. In June 1999 the 
Department of Commerce issued a final CVD determination applying the gamma 
method, but, following the Delverde decision invalidating such methodology, the 
same person method was applied. 60 
The Federal Circuit, affinning the CIT's decision, held that the same 
person methodology violated section 771 (5)(F) as well as the Delverde precedent 
because it relies on a "per se" rule, grounded on the alleged identity of the pre and 
post privatization enterprises, rather than assessing the continuous existence of the 
subsidy case-by-case. 61 The Court also rejected the appellant's contention that the 
privatization in question, unlike in Delverde, involved a sale of stocks, rather than 
of assets, arguing that the statute requires the evaluation of sales of assets and 
stocks on equivalent terms by mentioning them in the alternative: "a change in 
ownership of all or part of the foreign enterprise, or the productive assets of a 
foreign enterprise". It also pointed out that the literal argument also finds support 
in the legislative history of the section. 62 Even more important, rejecting the 
argument of one of the appellees, Allegheny Ludlum, the Federal District focused 
on the scope of section 771(5)(F) and finally reversed the premise underlying the 
preceding jurisprudence both in the US courts and in the WTO: the equivalence 
between arm's length and fair market value. The Court explained that the 
argument that arm's length transactions necessarily occur at fair market value, 
conflates two very distinct concepts, the fonner of which refers to dealings 
6OFinal Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Stainless Sheet and Steel in Coil from 
France, 64 FD 30774, June 8.1999. ia. ita. doc. gov/h*9906fmý/99-608c. txt. 
61 Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F3d 1339,1344 (2004) web. lexis- 
lexis. com/professional/. 
62 367 F3d, 1346. 
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between non-related parties, while the latter concerns the point at which demand 
and supply intersect on the open market and in an arm's length transaction. 63 
Even before the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Commerce once again 
changed its methodology, exploiting, somewhat unfairly, the message of the AB 
report. 64 According to Commerce, the new methodology is based on the "baseline 
presumption" that non-recurring subsidies can benefit the recipient over a period 
of time normally corresponding to the average useful life of the recipient's assets. 
However, an interested party may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that 
during the allocation period privatization occurred in which the government sold 
its ownership of all or substantially all of a company or its assets, retaining no 
control of them, and that the sale was an arm's length transaction for fair market 
value. 65 Clearly, this shifts the burden of proof on the privatised firm, in contrast 
with the statement of the Appellate Body. 
In analysing whether the transaction was for fair market value, the 
administering authority will consider whether the full amount that was paid for the 
company or its assets (including the value of any subsidy benefit) was the correct 
value under prevailing market conditions. In this regard Commerce will normally 
examine whether the government maximised its return, taking into account factors 
such as the execution of an objective analysis in determining the appropriate sale 
price, the imposition of restrictions on foreign purchasers or purchasers from other 
domestic industries, and the grant of discounts or other benefits in exchange for 
promises of additional future investments that private investors would not 
normally consider. 
63367 F3d, 1348. 
64 International Trade Administration. Notice of Final Modification of Agency Practice under 
Section 123 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act. 68 FR 37125, June 23,2003. 
ia. ita. doc. gov/ftn/0306fim/03-15795. txt. 
65 68 FR 37127. 
&. 68 
However, even if it is proved that the transaction was at ann's length and 
at market value, the parties can demonstrate that at the time of the privatization 
"the broader market conditions were severely distorted by the government and 
that the transaction price was meaningfully different from what it would otherwise 
have been absent distortive government action". Factors such as obstacles to the 
P-- - free interplay of supply and demand, the lack of sufficient safeguards against 
collusive behaviour and the absence of adequate enforcement of contracts and 
property rights will be considered together with the bestowal of legal and fiscal 
incentives to Prospective buyers. 66 In short, Commerce claims to be the ultimate 
judge of the market conditions in which a privatization transaction takes place. 
Where a party gives proof of distortive govermnental action, the baseline 
presumption will not be rebutted and any unamortized amount of pre-sale subsidy 
benefit will continue to be countervailable. 67 
As expected, this new methodology has not marked an end to the dispute 
between the EC and the US. The United States started new investigations under 
section 129 of the URAA to comply with the DSB's decision. 11 Three sunset 
reviews led to fin-ther application of countervailing duties. The Communities 
lodged a ftirther complaint under Art. 21.5 of the DSU claiming, among other 
things that the United States failed to determine properly whether there was 
continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury, because it did not examine 
the nature of the privatizations in question and their impact on the continuation of 
the alleged subsidization. 69 The panel pointed out that under Art 21.3 of the 
Agreement, the sunset review must determine whether the privatization was at 
66 Ibid. 
'7 Ibid., 37128. 
"68 FR 64858, November 17,2003. Notice of implementation under Section 129 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Steel Products from the 
European Communities. /ia. ita. doc. gov/fm/031 I fm/03-28668. txt. 
69 United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products 
from the European 
Communities - Recourse to Art. 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities - 
Final Report of 
the Panel (17/8/2005) WTDS212, 'RW, paras. 4.9 and paras. 4.17 - 4.19. 
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arm's length and for fair market value and whether the benefit from the non- 
recurring subsidies bestowed on the state-owned producer extinguished the 
benefit for the privatized company, and held that in two of the contentious cases 
the US administering authority had failed to carry out such analysis. 70 
The morale of the story seems, at first sight, quite simple. The Department 
of Commerce first worked out the "gamma" methodology which, after having 
permitted the imposition of heavy countervailing duties on unfortunate successor 
companies for quite a few years was held to contravene both the WTO provisions 
and the United States statute. Then the Department tried again with the "same 
person" method which was soon rejected for analogous reasons at national and 
multilateral levels. But the consistency of section 771 (5) (F) of the Tariff Act 
with the relevant WTO rules was upheld in the DSB forum. FinallY, Commerce 
worked out a new methodology, but failed to bring the whole of its investigations 
in line with the decision of the DSB. Therefore , it 
is easy to conclude that the 
villain was the US Executive, while the US statute is a flexible instrument which 
does not contravene multilateral provisions. An overzealous panel pointed its 
finger at both US statute and administrative practice, but was promptly rebuked 
by the Appellate Body, which argued that, at least as far as privatization is 
concerned, an arm's length transaction for fair market price is not always enough 
to guarantee the extinction of non-recurrent subsidies. 
But what if the first Appellate Body's proposition. according to which 
change in ownership at fair market value is a multifaceted case and privatization 
of a state-owned firm has its ov. -n special characteristics, does not stand up to 
closer scrutiny" 
paras 2 and p- 8 0. 
-"' 70 
Let us try to give substance to the apparently convincing general statement 
of the Appellate Body that relies on the particular economic and political sway of 
governmental authorities in shaping the privatization transaction enviromnent. 
Certainly governments have a dominant position as well as particular interests 
with regard to the sale of state-owned companies, many of which are public 
monopolies, or play a pivotal role in the provision of financial services or in the 
management of key sectors of the manufacture industry. It is submitted, however, 
that this is not enough to exclude the fair market value effect with regard to 
changes in ownership. There are four hypotheses to which a subsidy pass-through 
test can be applied. 
1) In spite of the dominant position of the governmental counterpart, the private 
buyer succeeds in paying a price that, in keeping with the perspective of a 
competitive market, takes into account assets and liabilities of the public bid, 
including the subsidies received by the company to be privatized. In such a case 
the general rule applies: there is no passed-through subsidy, as recognised by the 
Federal Circuit in "Alleghany Ludlum". 
2) As for private companies, government authorities exploit their dominant 
position to impose a higher sale price than the fair market value. In such a case 
not only the non-recurring subsidy is not transferred to the buying company but 
the latter pays a premium, that is, a tax on the purchase. 
3) On the other hand, as often happens, governments exploit their dominant 
position to favour certain prospective buyers vis-, i-vis others, who end up paying 
a lower price than their competitors would offer if a really competitive bid 
occurred. This happens, for instance, when the government does not want that 
key sectors of the national economy go into foreign hands. In such a case. 
however, we are not dealing with a level playing field. Thus, it is rather doubtful 
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whether the parties in the negotiations are dealing at arm's length; and clearly 
what the buyer actually pays is not the fair market value but something less, 
which, therefore is not enough to cancel all or part of the subsidy. Simply, the 
conditions that prevent the pass-through are not present. 
4) There is a more complex and subtle version of the third hypothesis, which takes 
place when the state-owned company is sold through a fair market value 
transaction, but the government bestows some financial or fiscal incentives to the 
buyer, whether directly or indirectly by the intennediary of the sold enterprise. 
The prospective buyer can obtain a soft loan to be invested in the acquisition; or 
the companies involved in the transaction must pay a lower registration duty or 
lower stamp duty. In such a case, however, the benefit to the buyer is brand new, 
though linked to the acquisition. Thus the administering authority must deal with 
a new subsidy and not with the old non-recurring subsidy bestowed on the old 
enterprise. 
If a closer economic analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no 
special place for privatization cases and, therefore, the arm's length for fair 
market value principle is applicable to every change in ownership case, then the 
WTO panel was right in holding that section 771 (5)(F) - as it was then 
interpreted by US lawmakers and trade courts - contravenes the SCM requirement 
that a subsidy, with all its elements, must be proved. Indeed, the root of the 
problem lies in the interpretation of the article that allows, or rather solicits the 
administering authority to look at factors other than arm's length transaction and 
fair market value. This approach prevents the investigating authority from giving 
a straight answer to the simple question: is the new company receiving a benefit 
from a previous non-recurring financial contribution and to what extent? 
'772 2 
To rescue the US statute - erroneously considered to encompass both 
arm's length and fair market price - the Appellate Body embarked on a 
convoluted interpretation of what constitutes market conditions, increasing the 
number of factors to be taken into account to assess a benefit beyond the scope of 
SCMA Art. 14. Two years later the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
finally made it clear that section 771(5)(F) refers only to arm's length negotiations 
and does not take into consideration fair market value. One can, therefore, easily 
infer that it is just the former element that is not necessarily enough to prevent 
subsidy pass-through. However, in the meantime Commerce had already adopted 
an apparently new "change in ownership" methodology which: 1) reaffirms the 
old and repeatedly condemned presumption of subsidy pass-though, though 
explicitly making it rebuttable, with a consequent inversion of the burden of proof 
on the defendant; and 2) introduces into the analysis factors other than market 
conditions. 
One can only agree with the opinion of an American scholar according to 
whom the various methodologies adopted by the Department of Commerce to 
justify the position that certain kinds of arm's length transaction could somehow 
result in the subsidy being transferred along with the assets to the new buyer 
demonstrate that the US CVD law "continues to be more concerned with 
protectionism than with righting the supposed trade distorting impact of foreign 
behaviour". 71 
4) The US perspective of entrustment and direction under WTO scrutiny 
Some aspects of the US administrative practice addressing the question 
of the entrustment and direction of private bodies to carry out government 
" Gregory Husisian, " When a New Sheriff Comes to Town: The Impending Showdown Between 
the US Trade Courts and the World Trade Organization-. SiJohn's J L. Comm, I 7(2003), pp. 464, 
468. 
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Progranunes have been subjected to review in one of the last WTO disputes on 
countervailing duties. 72 The controversy turned on various kinds of credit 
assistance obtained by a Korean exporter of dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors (DRAM) and DRAM modules. In the affirmative countervailing 
duty determination the Department of Commerce held that an uncreditworthy 
group of companies, Hynix, had obtained loans and other forms of financial 
assistance, specifically as debt restructuring, from public authorities and private 
73 banks, thanks to the active involvement of the Government of South Korea. In 
the CVD investigation the USDOC distinguished between public bodies, 
goverrunent-owned or govemment-controlled private creditors, and private 
creditors not owned or controlled by the Korean government, classified 
respectively as Group A, B, and C creditors. 74 
The Department of Commerce drew three factual inferences from the 
records of the investigation: 1) the government of Korea maintained a policy of 
supporting Hynix's financial restructuring and thereby avoiding the finn's 
collapse; 2) the goverment exercised control or influence over Hynix's creditors 
necessary to implement this policy; and 3) at times it used this control/influence to 
pressure Hynix's creditors to continue supporting the financial restructuring of the 
group. On the basis of these inferences, the Department drew the conclusion that, 
with the exception of Group A creditors, which were part of the govermnental 
structure, virtually all of Hynix's creditors had provided financial support under 
the entrustment or direction of the South Korean government, and, therefore, held 
72 United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on 
Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea - Report of the Panel (2 1 t2'2005). WT/DS2%/R. 
73 Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68FR44290, July 28,2003. 
74Figure US4 submitted by the United States to the Panel. 
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that their credit assistance fell within the remit of section 771 (5) (B) (iii) of the 
75 Tariff Act of 1930, as amended . 
Examining the US affinnative determination in the light of article 
1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, the panel. citing the "US - Export Restraint- 
case, already examined in the previous chapter. pointed out that the act of 
entrusting an that of directing involve three elements: 1) an expli I and 
affirmative action, be it delegation or command; 2) that the act be addressed to a 
particular party; and 3) that the object of the action be a particular task or duty. '6 
It, therefore, argued that the action of the govermnent must contain a notion of 
delegation (in the case of entrustment) or of command (in the case of direction ). 
77 
The panel acknowledged that the DOC could properly have established that the 
Government of Korea had a policy to save the group, ý, N-hich might well explain 
the participation of public bodies in the financial rescue, and had a certain 
capacity to influence the other creditors, whether privately owned or government 
control e. 78 It held, however, that such capacity is not enough to claim that the 
Korean government actually entrusted or directed the latter group of creditors to 
participate in the financial contributions in compliance with the standard set forth 
in Article 1.1 (a)(1)(i,,, -) of the SCM Agreement. The panel, therefore, considered 
that the DOC could not properly have found that there was sufficient e-vidence to 
support a generalized finding of entrustment or direction with respect to private 
bodies over the period of investigation. 79 
The rationale put fonvard by the panel was overturned by the Appellate 
Body, whose decision Nvidens the meaning of the terms "entrusts" and -directs- in 
I 'SC § 1677 (5)(13)(iiii). 
WT DS, 296 R. para. 7.30- 
Ibid.. para. -. ', I- 
Ibid., para. -. 175 
Ib id.. para. 7.1 i 
SCMA Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv), and conversely narrows the mesh of the net in which 
dirigiste behaviour of governments can be caught as a subsidy. 
The Appellate Body sets out with the remark that the terms "entrusts" and 
"directs" refer to instances where seemingly private conduct may be attributed to 
a government for the purposes of determining whether there is a financial 
80 
contribution. . It holds, however, that these instances are not only linked to 
delegation and command. Specifically, in the AB's view, delegation is only one 
of the means by which a government gives responsibility to a private body to 
carry out one of the functions listed in paragraphs (i) to (iii) of Article 1.1 (a) of 
the SCMA, i. e., direct transfer of funds, forgoing of revenue and provision of 
goods and services. 8 1 As regards the tenn "direct" the Appellate Body recognises 
that the term implies the provision of authoritative instructions, thus emphasising 
the notion of the authority of an entity, in such a case the goverment, over 
another. However, such authority can be exercised by means that "may be more 
subtle than a command or may not involve the same degree of compulsion". 82 
The Appellate Body does not give examples of what could constitute 
alternative forms of entrustment and direction. However, it points out that the 
provision of paragraph iv applies not only when there is an explicit and 
affirmative governmental action but whenever a government exercises its 
authority to induce a private body to act as its proxy in providing a financial 
contfibution. 
83 
80 United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea - AB 20054 - Report of the Appellate Body (27/6/2005). 
WT/DS296/AB/I; ý para. 108 
81 Ibid., para. 110. 
82 Ibid. para. I 11. 
" Ibid., para. 115. 
However, it must be noted that the AB's extensive interpretation of the terms -entrust" and 
"direct" is not entirely confirmed by their translation into the other WTO offficial languages: 
64 encomendar" and ", charger" as respectively Spanish and French synonyms of entrust (see 
WT/DS296/AB/k footnote 172) and "ordenar" and "ordonner" Spanish and French synonyms of 
"direct" (see WT/DS296/AB/R. footnote 175). 
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The consequences of the overturning of the panel's interpretation of 
SCMA Art. 1.1 (a) I (iv) are far-reaching. The panel, starting from the premise that 
positive action by goverment is needed for a subsidy to be granted, in the review 
of the evidence taken into account in an administering authority's affirmative 
decision, argued that each piece of circumstantial evidence should be considered 
individually in order to assess a finding of entrustment or direction. " In contrast, 
the Appellate Body, considering that what is relevant is the effect of the exercise 
of governmental authority over the activity of private parties, held that a global 
assessment of all pieces of evidence is required. Thus, in the AB's opinion a piece 
of evidence that, viewed in isolation might be of little or no probative value, 
"when placed beside another piece of evidence of the same nature, could form 
part of an overall picture that gives rise to a reasonable inference of entrustment or 
direction"85 
The decision of the Appellate Body turns by 180 degrees the playing field 
in which the competitive game takes place between Western countries, nominally 
committed to a free market economy and their more recently industrialised trade 
partners, particularly in the Far East, whose governments pursue export-oriented 
In particular the French synonyms cast doubts on the interpretation preferred by the Appellate 
Body. 
If instead of referring to Le Nouveau Petit Robert (The New Little Robert) the AB had consulted 
the Grand Larousse de la Langue Frangaise (Great Larousse of the French Language), it would 
have noted that the word "charger" has several, separate meanings only three of which fit the 
context of Art. 1.1 (a) I of the SCMA: to burden somebody ... with something; to 
impose something 
on somebody; to charge somebody with a crime, to bring evidence against ... ; and 1) to entrust 
somebQgN with an office or duly. 2) to entrust somebody with the care of something, 3) to entrust 
somebgdy with the task of doing something... 
Likewise the word "ordonner"has three meanings, only one of which fits Art. 1. l(a)l: to arrange, 
to organize; to appoint, to institute and to order or command. 
In shoM the French terms seem to fit better with the interpretation put forward by the panel. 
The Diccionario de la lengua espanola, Dictionary of the Spanish Language cited by the 
Appellate Body, defines "encomendar"' as encargar a a1guien que haga algo o que cuide de algo o 
de a1guien i. e., to give somebody the job of doing , or to entrust somebody with the care of 
something or somebody. The "Diccionario"defines "ordenar" as mandar que se haga 
algo ... encaminar y 
dirigir a un fin, i. e.. to order, to tell to do something ... to guide, to 
direct to a 
certain goal. Here too the majority of the meanings do not support the interpretation of the English 
text by the Appellate Body. 
" Ibid., para. 7.175-7.178. 
85 WT/DS296/A BIR, para. 154. 
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industrial policies, and maintain rather opaque links with the private sector of the 
economy. In other words, policies that were considered outside the reach of WTO 
rules (except by the United States and later the EU) are now likely to fall within 
the scope of the SCMA as long as private body's activities coincide with one of 
the hypotheses listed in Art. 1.1 (a)(1) of the Agreement. 
As far as the DRAMs case is concerned, one can easily expect that the 
dirigiste policy of the South Korean goverranent would escape the rigour of the 
SCM Agreement if the panel's viewpoint prevailed, whereas they would be found 
to be contravening its provisions under the Appellate Body's decision. However, 
it is arguable that it is not only South Korea, but also Japan and probably China 
that must be prepared for hardships. Besides, even though the decision refers to 
CVD remedies, since it concentrates on one of the building blocks of subsidy it 
can be extended to multilateral remedies. 
The Appellate Body' report in "US-DRAMs" seems to run counter to the 
WTO panel's perspective in "US-Export Restraints", which kept certain forms of 
governmental management of the economy out of the scope of Aft. 1.1 (a) I (iv). 86 
The Appellate Body, however, makes a distinction between the two cases. 
Remarking that, as acknowledged by the panel in "US - Export Restraints" 
entrustment and direction do not cover situations in which the result of 
govenimental intervention in the market depends on factual circumstances and the 
decision of the actors in that market. 87 The argument, however, fails to note that 
the hypotheses of governmental intervention in the market covered by the "US - 
Export Restraints"' case entailed: a) the exercise of sovereign authority (in 
particular, fiscal and customs power), b) which was designed to achieve certain 
economic objectives (for instance, promoting the export of processed goods over 
" See Chapt. VL sect. 2. 
'7WT/DS296/AB/R. para. 114. 
278 
the export of primary commodities), c) relying on the rational choice of private 
actors in that market. On the other hand, in cases such as "US DRAMs", private 
parties do not accept to act as proxy for governmental measures just out of "metus, 
reverentialis" but because of rational choices based on economic interest. In short, 
the distinction between the two hypotheses is not as clear-cut as the AB argues. 
5) Injury and "de minimis"issues 
US-DRAMs from Korea also examined injury within the countervailing 
duty regime framework. The analysis of the panel, however, focused exclusively 
on the facts of the controversy and refrained from engaging in a more general 
examination of the US CVD injury regime, mostly relying on previous decisions 
on twin dumping rules. 
In particular, with regard to the causal relationship between subject 
imports and injury under Art. 15.5 of the SCMA, Korea relied on the safeguards 
regime, arguing that the term "causal relation" is nearly identical with the term 
"causal link" found in the causation language of article 4.2(b) of the Agreement 
on Safeguards, and, therefore, necessarily implies a correlation between import 
trends on the one hand, and industry performance on the other. In contrast, the 
United States contended that the criteria provided by the Agreement on 
Safeguards are not useful in examining causation in a different type of 
investigation with a different object and purpose. 88 The US pointed out that, as 
held by the Appellate Body in "US-Lamb", serious injury is a much higher 
standard than material injury and therefore, there is no basis for importing a 
causation standard associated with a "serious" injury requirement into a 
go WT/DS296/R. paras 7.3 09-7.3 10 and para. 7.3 13. 
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countervailing duty investigation, %,. -hich is governed by a "material" injury 
requirement. 89 The panel, however, did not consider it necessary to tackle the 
distinction between the causality parameters in the Safeguards Agreement and in 
the SCM Agreement, because with regard to the dispute at issue the Republic of 
Korea had failed, in any event, to prove in the first place the alleged absence of a 
coincidence between import volume and injury to the United States domestic 
industry. 90 
Likewise, with regard to the obligation not to attribute to the imports Linder 
investigation injury caused by other factors, under the mentioned article 15.5, the 
WTO panel started its analysis by noting that in two Antidumping Code cases 
("US-Hot Rolled Steel" and "European Communities-Tube or Pipe Fittings") the 
Appellate Body had clarified that the investigating authorities must appropriatelý, 
assess the injurious effects of those other factors in order to prevent that "injuries 
caused by the dumped imports and those caused by other factors are not "lumped 
together" and made indistinguishable" The panel noted, however, that the AB had 
concurrently stated that the investigating authority was free to choose the 
methodology it would use to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of other 
tactors from those of the subsidized imports. 91 From this premise it found that, 
contrary to Korea's claim, the United States had, as a matter of fact, analysed all 
the known concurrent factors listed by the Republic (non-subject imports, 
capacity increases by other suppliers, decline in demand, and technological and 
production difficulties of' American competitors), though the USITC's approach 
had led the Commission to exclude or limit their impact on the difficulties 
encountered by US domestic producers. 'ý2 
39 " 11 lbid-para. T. 
40 lbid.. para. 7. ' 19. 
91 Ibid.. para. 7.352. 
Q2 Ibid., paras 
7.3ýý-- -'-7 1. 
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Finally, the panel declined to verify the consistency of the methodology 
adopted by the US to define domestic industry and imports subject to 
investigation with SCMA Art. 15.2 and 15.4. Korea complained that in the 
investigation at issue the International Trade Commission had considered 
assembly activities by an entity in the US as sufficient for those activities to be 
treated as domestic shipments, even if the DRAMs 'were manufactured in a third 
country, whereas DRAMs produced in the US and assembled by a third country 
entity were still considered as US domestic products. According to Korea this 
inconsistency resulted in an artificially reduced volume of non-subject imports, 
and an artificially increased volume of domestic production. 93 
The panel remarked that the inconsistency identified by Korea v,, as a 
consequence of the ITC's definition of the domestic industry as those producers 
that fabricate DRAMs in the US and those producers that assemble DRAMs in the 
US, and that in order to remedy this inconsistency Korea would have to challenge 
the ITCs definition of domestic industry by filing a claim under Article 16 of the 
SCM Agreement. As no claim of this kind had been filed there was no basis on 
which to consider that the ITC's definition of domestic industry was inconsistent 
94 
with the SCMA . 
In "US - Carbon Steel". however, the DSB addressed not only the 
administrative practice with reference to a single affirmative determination. but 
dealt with the consistency of the US law with WTO rules. The US statute ýxas not 
censured this time either. 
In chapter VI Nve reported that the Statement of Administrati,, e Action 
pointed out that the new one percent -, de minimis" requirement introduced by 
section 703(b)(4)(A) of the TarlIfAct in compliance with SCNIA Art. 11.9 is only 
93 
Ibid. Para-7.3384 94 
Ibid. para. 7,38". 
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applicable to initial CVD investigations and does not extend to reviews of CVD 
orders, for which Commerce will continue its practice of waiving the collection of 
estimated deposit if the deposit rate is below 0.5 percent ad valorem. 95 In August 
1993, the USDOC determined that certain German producers of carbon steel 
- benefited, at a total rate of 0.60 percent ad valorem, from five countervailable 
subsidy programs, and in the course of the sunset review - self-initiated by the 
Department in September 1999, pursuant to section 751 (c) of the Trade Ac t96 _ 
Commerce determined that revocation of the countervailing duties "would be 
likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy" 
whose likely rate was determined by USDOC to be 0.54 percent ad valorem. 
Thus, following an affirmative determination of the likelihood of continuation or 
the recurrence of injury by the US International Trade Commission, Commerce 
published a notice of continuation of the countervailing duties. 97 The European 
Communities claimed that the US statute, as interpreted by the SAA, and its 
accompanying regulations (sunset regulations) conflicted with the SCM 
Agreement, because it provided for an automatic self-initiation of sunset reviews 
and by failing to apply in such reviews the "de minimis" standard of I percent 
set out in Article 11.9 of that Agreement. 
In the first place, the WTO panel and the Appellate Body held that the 
compulsory self-initiated review provided by section 751 (c) of the Tariff Act 
was not in conflict with Art. 21.3 of the SCM Agreement, dealing with the so- 
called "sunset review", as the SCMA article does not make the ability of 
investigating authorities to self-initiate a sunset review conditional on compliance 
" See Chp. VI, sect. 6. 
96 19 USC § 1675 (c ). 
97to Continuation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain Carbon Steel 
Products from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, Poland. Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and the United Kingdom", 65FR78469. 
December 15,2000.. 
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with the evidentiary standards set forth in article II of the SCM Agreement for 
the initiation of a new investigation, and does not prescribe any other evidentiary 
stmdard. 98 
As regards the "de minimis" rule, the panel argued that the rationale for 
the standard set out in article 11.9 is clearly that countervailing duties are to be 
used to counter injurious subsidisation, and the threshold set out in this provision 
demarcates the level below which subsidisation is deemed to be so small as to be 
non-injurious for the imposition of CVDs purposes. 99 From the foregoing the 
panel concluded that the "de minimis" standard must also be applicable to sunset 
reviews, as findings otherwise would compromise one of the main objects of the 
SCM Agreement, which is the establishment of a disciplinary framework for the 
imposition of countervailing measures. 100 Accordingly, it held that US CVD law 
and the accompanying regulations were inconsistent with the SCM Agreement in 
respect of the application of a de minimis standard to sunset reviews. 10 1 
The Appellate Body reversed the finding of the panel arguing that the original 
investigation and the sunset review have different goals as the latter specifically 
aims at establishing whether the revocation of the duty is still likely to lead to the 
continuation or recurrence of the injury to domestic industry. According to the 
AB, while in an original investigation the authorities must investigate existence, 
degree and effect of any alleged subsidy in order to determine whether a subsidy 
exists and whether such subsidy is causing injury to domestic industry, in a sunset 
review, the authorities must only focus their inquiry on what would happen if an 
98 United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion- Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Germany-AB 20024-Report of the Appelate Body (28/11/2002). WT/DS213/AB/R, para 
116. 
" United States-Countervailing duties on Certain Corrosion-resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Germany-Report of the Panel (3/7127002). WT/DS2]3/, paras. 8.62-8.67. 
100 Ibid., para. 8.79. 
101 Ibid., para-8-80. 
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existing countervailing duty were removed. 102 From this difference in ends and 
approach it follows that the automatic termination of a countervailing duty due to 
the fall of the subsidy below the **de minimis" threshold may be considered 
undesirable. 1 
03 
Although the Appellate Body did not consider it strictly necessary to have 
recourse to the supplementary means of interpretation identified in Article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention, it found further support for its conclusions in the 
negotiating history of the SCM Agreement, noting that the application of a 
specific de minimis standard in investigations, and the introduction of a time- 
bound limitation on the maintenance of countervailing duties were the subject of 
protracted negotiations that resulted in a carefully negotiated compromise on the 
final texts of article 11.9 and of article 21.3 of the Agreement. Thus, the balance 
of rights and obligations attained by the parties to the negotiations would be upset 
if the "de minimis" standard provided by the former article were extended to the 
latter. 104 
The Appellate Body's opinion has been compared to its opinion in "Canada - 
Autos" in which the AB held that SCMA Art. 3.1 (b) also covers contingency in 
tact notwithstanding the omission of the relevant language from the text, thus 
apparently reaching contradictory results. Meagher argues that. although the final 
outcome differed, the Appellate Body's approach in the two cases was consistent. 
even if it may seem that in -US - Carbon Steel" rely on a more literal approach to 
the text than in "Canada - Autos". 
105 According to the scholar, in both cascs the 
Appellate Body ý, vas willing to read omitted text in a provision but onh. - if to do so 
"is consistent xvith the context of the pro,, ision and the object of the agreement 
10, \k"F, DS2]3 AB R. paras 86-87. 
101 Ibid- Para. So. 
104 Ibid., para. 90. 
'()5 Mall P. Meagher, -The Sound ofSilence", op. cit. p. 475. 
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and it does not alter, on balance, the rights and obligations of WTO members". 106 
And, unlike the issue of contingency in law and in fact under Art. -1.1. (b) in 
"Canada - Autos", reading a "de minimis" requirement in Art. 21.3 of the SCNI 
Agreement would have altered such a balance. 
It must be noted, however, that the comparability of Article 3.1 (a) and 3.1 (b) 
on one side and Articles 11.9 and 21,3 on the other cannot be taken for granted. 
Indeed, the text of SCMA Art. 3.1 (a) provides for contingency in laýv or in fact, 
whereas Art. 3.1 (b) is silent with regard to both kinds of contingency. In contrast, 
SCMA Article 11.9 provides for the termination of any investigation when the 
amount o th subsidy is "de minimis", whereas Art. 21.3 of the agreement simply 
does not reproduce this requirement with reference to sunset review proceedings. 
Thus, the AB in "US - Carbon steel" cannot be accused of being inconsistent ý. vith 
the wording of the relevant articles in the SCM Agreement. 
However, the Appellate Body fails to explain why to imply a "de minimis" 
standard into Art. 21.3 -would uPset the balance of rights and obligations attained 
by the parties in the negotiations", thus taking on itself a political function that 
was not granted by the parties to the Agreement. It seems, at any rate, that 
although the rationale developed by the Appellate Body could be considered well 
grounded, being based on the distinct function and approach of the investigations 
under Art. II and 23, it could lead to results that are not consistent vith equity. As 
pointed out by the AB itself, an automatic time-bound termination of 
countervailing duties that have been in place for five years, from the original 
investigation or a subsequent comprehensive revieNv, is the rule, and its 
continuation is the exception and thus "there must be persuasive evidence that 
revocation of the duty would nevertheless lead to injury to the domestic 
I ký, Itild. P. 420. 
industryr). 107 Yet, according to the AB's interpretation of SCMA Art. 23, a factor, 
such as "de mu'u'mis". that would be decisive in bringing the original investigation 
to an end, is no longer sufficient to repeal countervailing duties at the end of the 
five year period. 
6) the Byrd Amendment and the boundary of the CVD regime 
If, rightly or wrongly, the US statute has been acquitted in the "change in 
ownership" controversy, the United States statute has been convicted without 
extenuating circumstances in the Byrd Amendment dispute. However, until now 
the death sentence has not been carried out because of the stubborn resistance of 
the American lawmakers. 
For a long time members of Congress had tried to push through a law 
allowing the direct distribution of antidumping and countervailining duties to 
domestic producers. Just a few days before the presidential election of November 
2000, they finally succeeded in passing a bill that, in the words of Movsesian, is a 
clear example of interest group strategy, aimed at transferring financial resources 
. V-- - 108 from one firm to another at the expense of the consumer. 
The new section 754 of the Tariff Act of 1930, introduced by the 
Amendment, provides that duties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order 
or an antidumping order shall be distributed on an annual basis to the affected 
domestic producers for qualifying expenditures. However, under the section the 
affected domestic producer is not the whole domestic industry injured by imports 
107 WT/IDS213/AB/R, para-88. 
log Mark 1. Movsesian and edited by David D. Caron, "International Decisions: United States - 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act", A. JLL., 98(2004), p. 154. 
The legislative history bears out Movsesian's opinion that the "Amendment" was a coup de main 
of its proponent, Senator Robert Byrd, at the time chairman of the Senate Appropriation 
Committee. Indeed, the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000 - 
commonly known as Byrd Amendment - was enacted as Title X of the Agricultural, Rural 
Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies -Appropriation (P. L. 106- 
387), just preceding a Title whose heading, more in tune with the Act is "conservation of farmable 
wetland". 
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of subsidised or dumped products but only the manufacturer, producer, farmer, 
rancher or worker representative who 1) petitions for an antidumping or 
countervailing duty order and 2) remains in operation. Qualifying expenditures 
comprise any expenditures incurred, after the issuance of the antidumping or CVD 
order, on equipment and manufacturing facilities, R&D, acquisition of 
technology, personnel training, pension and health care benefits to employees, 
acquisition of raw materials and other inputs and working capital. In other words, 
since the distribution of funds concerns money already appropriated by the US 
Treasury, it has the nature of a financial contribution, which besides this is also 
aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of those firms that file a petition vis-a-vis 
both the unfairly competing foreign producer and those domestic enterprises that 
fail to support the petition. It could, therefore, be argued that it has a trade 
distorting potential. The United States never denied that the CDSOA bestows 
subsidies, though section 1002 of P. L. 106-387 states that the aim of the payments 
to domestic firms is to offset the negative effect of "the continued dumping or 
subsidisation of imported products after the issuing of antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders". 109 In short, in the US view, the measure is a subsidy 
aimed at counteracting the continuation of unfair foreign trade practices. 
Yet, the argument that the CDSOA can be considered as an actionable subsidy 
played only a limited role in the "jumbo complaint" lodged by eleven countries in 
the WrO against the provision-110 In particular, the panel dismissed Mexico's 
claim that the measure constitutes a specific subsidy on the procedural ground that 
Mexico had not argued that the CDSOA - which was the only measure at issue in 
the proceeding, rather than the disbursement made thereunder - "per se" explicitly 
109 See United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Report of the Panel 
(16/9/2002). WT/DS2]7/R- WT/DS234/R, para. 4.245. 
110 The complainants were Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, 
India. 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand. There were also five third-party participants: 
Argentina, Costa Rica. Hong Kong, Israel and Norway. 
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limits access to offset payments to an enterprise, industry or group of enterprises 
or industries. ' 11 The panel also noted that Mexico had not succeeded in 
demonstrating that the CDSOA causes "adverse effects" within the meaning of 
Art. 5(b) of the SCM Agreement, because it had failed to prove either a 
"violation" or "non-violation" nullification or impairment of its rights under the 
WTO Agreement. ' 12 
However, the panel condemned the CDSOA as a non-allowable remedy to 
counter dumping and subsidisation practices. The claims of the parties and the 
rationale of the panel and of the Appellate Body related to the dispute on the 
Antidumping Act of 1916 ("US - 1916 Act"), which provided for criminal 
penalties and private damage actions against persons importing any articles at a 
price higher than the market value of such articles in the country of their 
production. 1 13 In particular, in "US - Antidwnping Act of 1916" the AB held in 
the first place that according to Art. 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement any 
"specific measure" dealing with dumping can only be applied in conformity with 
Art. VI: 2 of GATT 1994 as interpreted by the Antidumping Code and, 
consequently, in accordance with the procedure established by that Agreement. 
Secondly, it noted that the penalties and damages provided by the 1916 Act were 
specifically aimed at countering dumping. It concluded, therefore, that since Art. 
18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement makes antidumping duties, applied in 
conformity with GATT Art. VI: 2, the only antidumping remedy permitted under 
111 WT/][)S217/R- WT/DS234/R, pam7.115 
112 WT/DS217/R- WT/DS234/, para. 7.132. 
1'3 See Meredith Schutzman, "Antidumping and Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000. A Renewed Debate". Cardozo J Int'l & Comp. L., 11 (2004) p. 1072. web. lexis- 
nexis. com/professional. 
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WTO law, the alternative measures under the US statute of 1916 were 
inconsistent both with GATT Art-VI. and with the Antidumping Agreement. 114 
Relying on these premises, and extending them to the SCM Agreement, the 
Panel concluded that the CDSOA is a non-permissible specific action against 
durnping and a subsidy, contrary to ADA Article 18.1 and SCMA Article 32.1,115 
and, therefore, also in violation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article VI of GATT 
1994.1 16 The panel also held that by requiring support for the petition as a 
prerequisite for receiving offset payments, the CDSOA in effect mandates 
domestic producers to support the application and consequently frustrates the 
purpose of AD Article 5.4 and SCM Article 11.4, which is to limit the initiation of 
investigations to those instances where the domestic industry has a genuine 
interest in the adoption of anti-dumping and countervail measures. ' 17 
The panel, therefore, suggested that the United States should bring the 
CDSOA into conformity with its obligation under the AD Agreement, the SCM 
Agreement and GATT 1994 by repealing the Act. 118 
The Appellate Body, affirming the panel's, opinion that the CDSOA is a 
non-permissible specific action under ADA article 18.1 and SCMA Art. 32.1, 
started with the analysis of the expression "impermissible specific action against 
dumping or a subsidy, " developing a three-pronged standard, which focused on 
66specific action", "adverse bearing", and "pemiissibility". ' 19 
114 United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 - AB 200-5 - Report of the 
Appellate 
Body(28/8/2000). WT/DS 136/AB-R - WTIDS162/AB-R, paras. 120-126 and para. 136. 
115 Art. 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement provides: "No specific action against dumping on 
exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 
1994, as interpreted by this Agreement". 
Art. 32.1 of the SCM Agreement provides: "No specific action against subsidy on exports from 
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as 
interpreted by this Agreement". 
116 WT/E)S217/R- WT/DS234/, pam7.5 1. 
117 Ibid., para. 7.65. 
"s Ibid., para. 8.6. 
119 Claire Hervey, "The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Policy and the WTO". Hastings 
'17 (2003) p. 139 Int I& Comp. L. Rev.. J. 
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The Appellate Body defined specific action as a measure taken only in 
situations presenting the specific character of dumping or a subsidy. 120 It held, 
however, that, in contrast with the US opinion, this criterion does not imply that 
A- - me measure must explicitly refer to the constituent elements of dumping or 
subsidy, nor does it rely on whether dumping and subsidisation trigger the 
application of the measure. What is relevant is the correlation between the 
measure and the elements of dumping or subsidy, whiCh, therefore, are the 
necessary conditions for the countering action. ' 21 
As regards the second test, i. e. adverse bearing, the Appellate Body rejected 
the US contention that the term "against dumping or subsidy" in articles 18.1 of 
the ADA and 32.1 of the SCMA implies that the antidumping and CVD measures 
must operate directly on imported goods. Such interpretation would have left the 
CDSOA outside the remit of the antidumping and countervailing duty provisions, 
as the provision is not concerned with imported goods but with duty revenue 
distribution. The Appellate Body held that articles 18.1 and 32.1 refer to measures 
that act against dumping and subsidisation as such and are not confined to tariff 
measures against dumped or subsidised products. Indeed, the offset payments are 
financed from duties paid by foreign producers; they are received by domestic 
producers who compete with the foreign exporter, and improve the competitive 
edge of the domestic producer by being invested in qualifying expenditures 
related to the production of competing products. 122 
Having determined that the CDSOA is a specific action against dumping or 
subsidisation, the Appellate Body focused on its pennissibility under the 
Antidumping Code, the SCM Agreement and Art VI of GATT 1994. Relying on 
120 United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000- AB 2002-7 Report of the 
Appellate Body (16/1/2003). WT/DS217/ABiR-%7/DS234, AB/R. para. 242 
12 Ibid., para. 244 
122 ibid., paras 247-255. 
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the rationale of US - 1916, ýntidumping Act, the AB held that the CDSOA cannot 
figure among the permissible responses to dumping, which only include 
antidumping duties, provisional measures and price undertaking. 123 
The US contended, however, that because the decision on the Antidumping 
Act of 1916 only refers to dumping and, given certain textual differences between 
the Agreements, the antidumping rationale should not be extended to measures 
against subsidisation. 124 The Appellate Body objected that the structure and 
terminology of SCMA Art. 32.1 is identical with Art. 18.1 of the Antidumping 
Code except for the reference to subsidy. Therefore. as vvith antidumping, WTO 
countervailing rules do not provide an open-ended response against subsiding 
practices, but under Art VI: 3 of GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement allow only 
four kinds of responses to countervailable subsidies: definitive countervailing 
duties, provisional measures, price undertaking and multilaterally sanctioned 
countermeasures under the Dispute Settlement system 125 In short, as regards 
responses to subsidisation, according to the AB, the Byrd Amendment is 
definitely a countervailing measure, which, however, is not countenanced by 
WTO rules. 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's conclusion that the 
Byrd Amendment constitutes an action against dumping or subsidization because 
of the incentives that it creates for domestic producers, noting that WTO rules 
alýow domestic firms to petition their goveniments for relief from unfair trade 
practices, and a measure could not be considered against dumping or a subsidy 
simply because it facilitates or induces the exercise of rights that are %VFO- 
consistent. 
126 
123 Ibid., paras 203-205. 
Ibid.. para. 2()7. 
Ibid.. para. 268 
Ibid.. para. 281. 
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In the spring of 2003, the United States and the complaining parties entered 
into WTO arbitration regarding the timetable and form of implementation of the 
nding. The parties disagreed on what constituted a reasonable period of time for 
implementation: the United States sought a fifteen-month period, whereas the 
complainants sought a six-month time period, dating from the decision of the 
Appellate Body on January 27 th . 2003. The complaining parties argued that 
"prompt compliance" was required under the DSU, and that delay of 
implementation beyond the end of the U. S. fiscal year (September 30'h. 2003) 
would irreparably harm the parties because annual disbursements are scheduled to 
occur within 60 days of the end of the fiscal year. The parties also disagreed as to 
whether full repeal of the Byrd Amendment, or just an amendment to its offset 
distribution section was required. The arbitrator ruled that the form of compliance 
was up to the United States, but no matter its form - repeal or modification - 
compliance was to be made by December 27h. 2003.127 
In 2003, an American commentator argued that compliance was very unlikely, 
as roughly two-thirds of the Senate responded to the Appellate Body's ruling by 
signing a letter voicing support for the Byrd Amendment, and that, although 
President Bush had called for the repeal of the measure, he was unlikely to force 
the matter as the Amendment enjoyed substantial support in steel-producing 
states, whose vote was crucial in the elections of 2004. Besides, since the Byrd 
Amendment merely re-routed duties already collected by the U. S. Customs, its 
repeal would not directly lower prices on imports and consequently there were 
weaker incentives, in this particular instance, for domestic constituencies to lobby 
for compliance with the WTO's ruling. ' 28 
127 United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - Arbitration under Article 
21.3(c ) of the Understanding on Rules and procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
Award of the Arbitrator ( 13, '6/2003). Wt/DS217/14 - WT/DS2341,2'7, paras. 50,83. 
128 See Mark I. Movsesian, "International" op. cit., p. 154. 
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Nor did the US courts take particular note of the WTO rulings, probably also 
because the precision and unequivocal tenor of the incriminated statute leaves 
little room for a construction of the text in accordance with international rules. In 
March 2003 the Court for Appeals of the Federal Circuit, affirmed a decision of 
the Court of International Trade that had, correctly, rejected the contention of a 
Chinese exporter that the Byrd Amendment fundamentally alters the antidumping 
law into a statute imposing a penalty by directing payment of antidumping duties 
to the domestic industry. The Federal Circuit, however, in its rationale pointed out 
that the Amendment "far from rendering the antidumping statute penal in 
nature... actually enhances its remedial nature", also noting that "congressional 
findings supporting the Amendment underscore the statute's continued focus on 
assisting domestic producers and levelling competitive conditions through the 
negation of the unfair advantage gained by the price difference of the imported 
products". 129 It is extremely difficult not to find such a statement quite out of line 
with the perspective of the DSB. 
As expected, the majority of the complainants, among which Japan and the 
European Communities, requested authorization, under Article 22.7 of the DSU to 
suspend the application to the United States of tariff concessions and related 
obligations under GATT 1994, in the form of the imposition of additional import 
duties on products originating in the United States, at a level not exceeding every 
year a percentage (in many cases up to 72%) of the amount of CDSOA 
disbursements relating to anti-dumping or countervailing duties. 
It was foreseeable that sooner or later the provision was going to be 
repealed, and that this would be greeted as a further accomplishment of the new 
Dispute Settlement regime. Indeed, in February 2006 the US delegation reported 
129 Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. v. United States, 322 F. 3d 1369,1380-81,2003, web. lexis- 
lexis. com/professional/. 
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that the US Congress had "'approved the Deficit Reduction Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act, which includes a provision that repeals the CDSOA. " and that 
A- - 13 the Act would promptly be signed into law by the President. 0 The other parties 
in the dispute, though welcoming the announcement as step taken by Congress 
towards the actual repeal of the CDSOA, disagreed that the new statute had 
brought its measures fully into conformity with the DSB' recommendations and 
rulings and, therefore, 'went on suspending their concessions. 
It is also uncertain whether the Byrd Amendment has had a significant 
impact on the ever-widening trade deficit of the United States. Yet, there is one 
historical certainty: the scheme, which results in a patent violation of the 
multilateral CD and antidumping regimes, and entails a form of subsidisation, was 
introduced when the US economy was looking for a soft landing after seven years 
of good performance; it was still there when a recession followed; it did not quit 
the stage when a robust recovery, accompanied by a growing fiscal and trade 
deficit, took over, while most US trading partners still struggled to get their 
economies on track; and it is arguable that it was not fully repealed when the 
recovery finally spread to the US trade partners. In short, if the introduction of the 
Byrd Amendment contravened the SCMA and the Antidumping Code, together 
with GATT 1994, its claimed repeal, which has failed to convince the other 
parties, is far from the "reasonable period" criterion on which the main DSU 
remedy - officially, the only true remedy - rests. 
Conclusion 
The picture provided by the foregoing is not entirely negative but overall is far 
from being encouraging. Certainly, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have 
130 United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. Status Report by the 
United States- Addendum (T'2 "2006). WTIDS217,116. dd. 24. 
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often been extremely severe in respect of single measures and specific aspects of 
US administrative practice. However, with the conspicuous exception of the 
"Byrd Amendment" case the tendency, one could even say the policy, of the 
Appellate Body has been to uphold the US statute as much as possible. 
In "Corrosion resistant carbon steel from Germany" the Appellate Body held 
that the SCMA does not prevent the strict construction of the "de minimis" rule 
advocated by the SAA, as the "de minimis" standard does not extend to sunset 
reviews. Therefore, both the US statute and its implementation in CVD 
investigations were legitimate. The practical results, however, are quite odd. 
Indeed, the sunset review, which should prove the exceptional need for ftu-ther 
application of countervailing measures, ends up allowing a standard that could be 
less favourable to the foreign exporter subjected to countervailing duties than the 
standard in the initial investigation. 
In "US-DRAMs" the Appellate Body has endorsed the rather wide US 
perspective on what constitutes entrustment or direction of private bodies by 
governmental authorities. The approach upheld by the AB will allow investigating 
authorities to countervail allegedly interventionist practices involving the private 
sector, even though there is no evidence of any explicit and affirmative 
governmental action imposing any particular duty. The question is going to be 
where to draw the line. 
The privatization cases are more complex, also because they encompass the 
examination of the measure concerned from the US statute angle, but have similar 
characteristics. In this instance the DSB and the US courts have censured the 
methodology applied by the Department of Commerce to ascertain the pass- 
through of previously bestowed subsidies. However, the administrative practice 
stems from the construction of the US statute by the SAA and the US trade courts. 
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It is almost paradoxical that if the harassment of unfortunate non-subsidised 
foreign companies is finally going to end, this will be more the result of a new 
stricter construction of section 771 (5)(F) by the Federal Circuit than by the action 
of the DSB in defence of the multilateral regime. Nevertheless, it is ten years 
since the controversial section sailed through Congress. It is likely that in the 
course of this period many non-subsidised private-owned companies have 
sustained tariff barriers they should not have borne, not to mention the legal 
expenditures they incurred to fight their battle in US trade courts. The series of 
US "-change-in-ownership" methodologies has its root in a faulty interpretation of 
the US statute that the Appellate Body has failed to counter. These 
"methodologies" have facilitated the imposition of extra duties on competitors 
that threaten US domestic industry in structural difficulties. All the cases 
involving EU firms concerned the steel sector. It is very likely that without the 
help of CVD affirmative determinations the US would have resorted to safeguard 
measures somewhat earlier than 2002; and, as we know, safeguard proceedings 
are more visible, politically contentious even within the country that applies them, 
and attract a much swifter reaction from trading partners as further proved in 
2002-2003 by the "US - definitive safeguard measures" case. Thus, the 
privatization cases are a reminder that countervailing duty law can easily turn into 
a protectionist instrument. Even more so if one does not forget that the United 
States claims to be the champion of privatization all over the world. 
We see the same results, but under different circumstances, in the Byrd 
Amendment dispute. In this case the panel and the Appellate Body have 
condemned the scheme voted by US Congress, but the US lawmakers have paid 
only a tardy attention to the decision of the DSB and to the appeals of their own 
President, actually passing the buck to their trading partners worldwide, who were 
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thus compelled to decide whether to impose -suspension of concessionil , that is. 
higher duties on American products or to take care of domestic consumers. It 
seems, therefore, that ývhen it is a question of measures that are of particular 
interest for economic groups on the support of which la,. N-makers are dependent 
along with the executive, full implementation of DSB's recommendations, within 
a reasonable period of time, turns out to be rather an idealistic remedy. On the 
other hand, agreement on compensation is often impracticable, and the imposition 
of tariff sanctions can be counterproductive for the countries that have recourse to 
it, and, in every case, is trade distorting. 
If the Byrd Amendment and the "change-in ownership" methodologies are 
protectionist in intent and effects, looking at them as a whole we find this 
scenario: private-owned firms that have never received a %ent" from the public 
purse are subjected to extra duties simply because they have taken over subsidised 
publicly- owned companies; and to add insult to injury the "booty" collected by 
the US Treasury is promptly passed on to their US competitors. Certainly, not the 
best of both worlds. 
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CHAPTER Vill 
THE DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS: NEGOTIATING ISSUES AND 
THE STANCE OF THE PARTIES 
1) An overview of the Doha Round negotiations on subsidies and 
countervailing measures. 
Though more than five years have passed since the opening of the Doha 
Round, for an outsider it is too early to guess what is going to be the compromise 
subsidy and CVD text that will be agreed upon by the WTO members. Instead, the 
analysis of the proposals tabled by the parties to the negotiation has a historical 
value as a way to know the state of art of the still unresolved questions over the 
regime, most of which date back to the period preceding the signature of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. 
th. )00, The Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 14 - states that the 
aim of the negotiations on Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures agreements is "to clarify and improve disciplines while preserving the 
basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these agreements, while taking 
into account the needs of developing and least-developed participants". The text is 
a carefully drafted compromise between those members who want to preserve the 
regime and those -vvho want to transform it. Hoxvever, as regards subsidies and CV 
measures the question remains whether in the course of the negotiations the 
pendulum would sNving towards improvement and clarification of countervailing 
rules, thus putting into question the success laboriously achieved by the United 
States during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, or towards a NvIder and more 
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stringent discipline of government practices impending on the free play of the 
market, which was the long proclaimed goal of the United States. 1 
The former outcome was considered by US lawmakers as a threat to be 
strongly resisted, the latter as an opportunity to be eagerly pursued. The mandate 
of the Trade Act of 2002, by which Congress granted "trade promotion authority" 
to the Executive states unequivocally: "The principal negotiating objectives of the 
United States with respect to trade remedy law are - (A) to preserve the ability of 
the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, 
countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements that lessen the 
effectiveness of domestic and international discipline of unfair trade and (B) to 
address and remedy market distortions that lead to dumping and subsidization"2 . 
Thus, in its communication on "basic concepts and principles of trade remedy 
rules", the United States argued that the mandate of the Doha Ministerial was that 
WTO members should focus on preserving the fundamental principles of existing 
trade remedy rules and ensure that they remain effective in addressing the 
problem of unfair trade. At the same time the US claimed that the Doha 
Declaration called for enhanced discipline of trade distorting practices as the root 
cause of unfair trade. 3 Therefore, according to the United States, not only is the 
Doha mandate far from allowing any weakening of existing trade remedy rules, 
but it also calls for the strengthening of the discipline of trade-distorting 
goverment policies. 
' The subsidy negotiations comprise three subcategories - general subsidy discipline, rules for 
countervailing measures and a sector specific discussion of environmentally harmful fishery 
subsidies, which is not covered by this outline. 
2 U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News. 107'hCongress - Second Session - 2002. 
Trade Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-2 10), sec. 2102 (14). 
3 Negotiating Group on Rules. Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules - 
Communication from the United States (TN/RL/W/27 - 22 October 2002). 
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The proposals put forward by the other WTO members can be divided into 
two categories: those that like the United States aim at expanding the scope of the 
subsidy regime, and those that aim at limiting the advantage for the complainant 
both in WTO disputes and in countervailing proceedings either by closing some 
loopholes in the basic concepts, or by securing some exemptions with regard 
either to certain groups of countries or certain kinds of subsidies, or by rendering 
less easy the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation. Thus, although up to 
December 2005 progress in the debate on subsidies and CV measures has been 
much slower than in the antidumping field and, as noted by the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration, there is still "a need to deepen the analysis on the basis of 
specific textual proposals", four main areas of interest for the parties to the 
negotiations can be singled OUt. 4 Within these broad areas, as one would expect, 
most of the proposals focus on the contentious issues we have examined in the 
previous chapters. 
1) Deflnition of subsidy and specificity 
a) indirect subsidisation 
In a subsequent communication on "subsidy disciplines requiring 
clarification and improvement" the United States has focused on "those distorting 
practices that take the form of indirect subsidies to specific companies or 
industries in which govermnents act through govenunent- owned, government- 
controlled or government-directed private entities to provide financial support, 
which would either not be available from the private sector or would not be 
available on the same term,,. 
5 In this context the United States considers it 
4 See Doha Work Programme. Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005 - Annex D 
p. 7. www. wto. org/english/thewto - 
e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e. htm 
Negotiating Group on Rules. Subsidies Disciplines Requiring Clarification and Improvement - 
Communication from the United States (TN/RLV/78. - 198'. March 2003). 
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necessary to clarify the "entnist or direct" provision of SCMA Art. I. I (A)(1)(iv) 
in those cases where government action, though not explicitly documented, can 
very much influence the course of the event by which a company or an industry 
obtains an advantage. 
The United States has found an ally in the European Communities, which 
argues that the terms of the current Agreement make it extremely difficult to act 
against entities which may be providing the subsidy "under the covert direction of 0 
governments (e. g. the granting of loans and other financial support through 
financial institutions which are acting on non-commercial terms)". The European 
Communities acknowledges that current WTO rules can be construed only to 
cover such actions if there is a clear and unambiguous showing of "direction" by 
the govenunent, which is often very difficult to prove. Thus it suggests that to 
prevent circumvention of subsidy discipline, article I of the SCM Agreement be 
amended to cover those entities which are effectively controlled by the state and 
acting on non-commercial terms, or to cover situations where the public direction 
is less apparent but nevertheless led to non-commercial behaviour in terms of the 
financial operations in question. 6 
It is easy to guess that the "improvement" of the text of SCMA Art. I 
sought by the United States and the European Communities was especially 
motivated by certain practices of Korean financial institutions (reported in 
Chapter VII) that, on government "encouragement", were providing financial 
support to an "uncreditworthy" group of companies engaged in the highly 
competitive semiconductor market, and which were already undergoing 
countervailing duty investigations. 
6Negotiating Group on Rules. WTO Negotiations Concerning the WTO Agreements on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures - Proposal by the European Communities (TN/RUW/30 -2 1'. 
November 2002). 
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At the other end of the spectrurn, Canada has argued for the need for 
stricter rules in the assessment of indirect subsidisation with specific regard to 
pass-through, when the recipient of a financial contribution and the recipient of 
the resulting benefit are different entities. Canada suggests that, in keeping with 
WTO jurisprudence, the reformed text of the SCM Agreement should clarify that 
an investigating authority cannot assume that the benefit of subsidies provided to 
producers of upstream input products passes-through to producers of downstream 
products, especially if there is recorded evidence that the transactions occurred at 
arms-length, but must establish, according to guidelines agreed upon by the WTO 
members, whether, and to what extent, upstream subsidies benefited downstream 
producers. 7 Once again at the basis of the proposal there is a controversy: the 
softwood lumber case. 
b) specificiiy 
As regards specificity, Canada remarks that the SCMA does not provide 
clear guidance on the meaning of enterprise and industry, nor on how the 
respective groupings are circumscribed. It, therefore, suggests that Art. 2.4 of the 
SCM Agreement be amended by providing that any determination of specificity 
must be in accordance with international standard industrial classification. 8 
Secondly, Canada suggests that the weight of the "de facto" specificity factors in 
Art. 2.1 (c) of the SCMA (i. e., use of subsidy programmes by a limited number 
of enterprises, predominant use of the programme by certain enterprises, 
disproportionate amount of subsidies to certain enterprises and exercise of 
discretion) be made more explicit. According to Canada the amended article 
7 Negotiating Group on Rules. Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and 1h 




should clearly state that the factors in question must be evaluated based on the 
totality of the facts, avoiding giving decisive guidance to one or several of them. 9 
c) caRital infusion 
Another US suggestion, which, however, has not found a great response 
among the other negotiating parties, concerns the direct transfer of funds. With 
respect to the provision of equity capital, the United States submits that the 
standard set forth in article 14(a) of the SCMA needs "clarification". ' 0 According 
to the US, while the benchmark provided by the mentioned article is the 
consistency of government provision of equity capital with usual investment 
practices of private investors in the territory of WTO members, the real question 
in assessing the benefit should be whether govermnents should be investing and if 
so under what circumstances. In the US view, while government investments 
could be allowed in "lesser developed" countries, given the weakness of their 
capital market, there can be no such justification for developed countries. For the 
latter, therefore, if the marketplace in the country of investment determines that 
the company will not generate a "sufficient return", investment should only be 
allowed subject to stringent requirements, such as prior notification to the WTO 
Subsidies Committee, by which the capital providing government explains the 
consistency of its decision with the practices of private investors. In other termsý 
what the US is suggesting is the acceptance of its approach in countervailing duty 
investigations by the trade Community, bolstered, this time, by a set of obligations 
towards a WTO body. 
In a subsequent communication the United states also suggests that equity 
infusions, including debt-to-equity conversions. be included in an expanded 
" TN/RUW/78. - 19'h. March 2003. 
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category of prohibited subsidies, under the assumption that governments are 
positioned to ignore normal private sector profit-maximisation imperatives and to 
pursue governmental priorities irrespective of market signals, except if the 
government concerned in describing the terms of the transaction in its notification 
shows that the investment is consistent with the usual practice of private 
investors. 11 
The US proposal clearly shift the burden of proof onto the govemment 
accused of subsidising, whereas the present wordings of SCMA Art. 14 with 
regard to countervailing proceedings goes on the opposite direction by providing 
that the investigating authority cannot consider goverment provision of equity 
capital as conferring a benefit, unless the investment decision can be regarded as 
inconsistent with the usual investment practice in the territory in which it takes 
place. On the other hand, the communication is also an implicit admission of the 
doubts of the United States over the consistency of its approach in CVD 
investigations on equity infusion with the present multilateral regime. 
2)Prohibited and actionable subsidies 
a) New discipline for prohibited and dark amber subsidies 
As regards prohibited subsidies, the United States tries to extend the scope 
of the SCM Agreement by turning a tactical failure into a strategic success. As 
noted in chapter IV, the creation, under SCMA Art. 6.1, of a "dark amber" 
category of subsidies that entail rebuttable presumption of serious prejudice was 
the trade off for recognition by the US of non-actionable subsidies under Art. 8 of 
the Agreement. Both provisions lapsed in December 1999. The United States 
10 Ibid. 
" Negotiating Group on Rules. Paper from the United States Expanding the Prohibited "RedLight- 
Subsidy Category. TN/RLGEN94 (16 January 2006). 
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suggests that the existing category of prohibited subsidies be expanded to include 
those instances of government intervention that have a similarly distorting impact 
on competitiveness and trade. Among them the proposal lists the main hypotheses 
of "dark amber" subsidies, such as large domestic subsidies, subsidies to cover 
operating losses, and direct forgiveness of debt. In short, the United States aims to 
achieve the long pursued goal of extending the ban on subsidies to domestic 
subsidisation, or at least some of its forms. 
The European Communities has joined the United States in calling for an 
expansion of the prohibited subsidy category to tackle effectively the 
multiplication of government practice that, according to the EC, favour domestic 
industries. 12 In particular, the EC proposal focuses on those measures that make 
available to domestic users some important inputs at a price substantially lower 
than the international market price and on those subsidies that, although falling 
outside the purview of the present text of SCMA Article 3.1 (b) referring only to 
subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, 
notwithstanding their inconsistency with the National treatment requirement under 
Art. III of GATT 1994. The EC proposal also requires the prohibition of 
government financing on terms inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs 
of the loan when such measures benefit exported goods. 
b) Serious prejudice 
The United States, though recognising that one of the ma or subsidy j 
discipline advancements of the Uruguay Round is clarification of what 
constitutes serious prejudice, argues that such a remedy needs to be ftu-ther 
strengthened. In particular, the US submits that rather than looking for the 
12 Negotiating Group on Rules. Subsidies - Submission of the European 
Communities. TN/RUGEN 135 (24 April 2006) 
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elimination of adverse effect the amended agreement should directly provide for 
the repeal of the subsidising measure, thus equating its treatment to that of 
prohibited subsidies. 13 
Canada joins the United States in calling for a strengthening of the serious 
prejudice discipline. Canada, however, suggests that the lapsed dark amber 
category in Art. 6.1 of the SCMA be reinstated and that the cost-to government 
approach prescribed in Annex IV to the Agreement for calculation of the ad 
valorem subsidisation under Art. 6.1 be replaced with the benefit-to-the recipient 
methodology. 
14 
0 exlport subsidies 
On the other hand, both Australia and Canada consider that there is a lack 
of clarity in the rules relating to the prohibited subsidies contingent "in fact" upon 
export performance and, therefore, more objective and verifiable criteria are 
needed on the question of conditions or facts which give grounds for a conclusion 
of export contingency. " In particular, the proposals argue that, as pointed out by 
WTO case law, it is not sufficient to demonstrate solely that a government 
anticipated that exports would result but that the governinent granted the subsidy 
contingent upon export performance; the mere knowledge that a recipient's sales 
are export-oriented does not demonstrate, in the absence of other factors, that the 
granting of a subsidy is tied to actual or anticipated exports; export orientation 
13 TN/RUW/78. - 19'h. March 2003 14 TN/RUW/ 112 - 6h. June 2003. 
, 
ýotiating Group on Rules. Serious prejudice - Communication from Canada (TN/IU-/GEN/14 - N! 
15 , September 2004). '3 Negotiating Group on Rules. Further Contribution to the Discussion of the Negotiating Group 
on Rules on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Submission from 
Australia (TN/RUW/ 139 - 18'h. July 2003). 
Negotiating Group on Rules. Prohibited Export Subsidies - Communication from Australia 
(TNIRUGEN/22 - 19'h. October 2004). 
Negotiating Group on Rules. Improved Disciplines under the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and the Antidumping Agreement - Communication from Canada 
(TN/RUW/I - 15. April 2002) 
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may be taken into account as a relevant fact provided that it is one of several facts 
and not the only fact supporting a finding. These elements, however, are not 
explicitly set forth in the text of Art. 3 and footnote 4 of the SOMA. The 
communications also contend that the present rules relating to prohibited subsides 
are discriminatory in favour of large economies, as a subsidy provided to a 
product by a WTO Member with a large domestic market for that product may be 
actionable but carries little risk of being found to be export contingent, ý. vhereas 
the same subsidy provided by a country with a relatively small domestic market is 
likely to be found contingent on export performance given a much higher export 
orientation imposed by the size of the market. To overcome these shortcomings 
the proposals call for better guidance in the SCMA text on what kinds of facts 
must be taken into account in deten-nining export contingency, while making it 
clear that export propensity should not be a factor taken in isolation. Here too one 
can easily detect that the proponents had some disputes in mind, such as 
Australian automobiles, where most of the subsidised output was destined to be 
exported given the limited scope of the domestic market. 
d) export credits and guarantees 
A specific aspect of the discipline of export subsid-v is the subject of a 
communication from Brazil. ) ,. -hich 
is one of the protagonists in the long-lasting 
dispute on international aircraft bids assisted by robust public financial support 
and export credit in particular. 16 Brazil, calling for a reform of the present 
discipline based on greater flexibility, contends that the current rules that concem 
the granting of export credits and guarantees (i. e., items 0) and (k) in Annex I to 
the SCMA illustratiNe list of export subsidies) derive from proNisions that were 
first introduced in the sixties, and thus refer to outdated benchmarks that put 
16 Negotiating Group on Rules. E\pori Credits in the Nk TO - Paper bý Brazil (TN Rl W5- 26 
April "002) 
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developing countries at a disadvantage. 17 In particular, as regards item (k) on 
export credits Brazil argues that the general rule that 'Nlembers must not finance 
exports at rates below their cost of funds, except if they do not secure a --material 
advantage" is a source of inequity as the costs of funds of WTO Nlembers are 
different and should not be a parameter for determining compliance with export 
subsidy discipline. On the other hand, the safe harbour accorded to the OECD 
Arrangement on export credits favours members of the Paris Organization and 
introduces asymmetries in the capacity of WTO members to compete on an equal 
footing in the field of export credits. 
Analogous difficulties apply to the "break even" requirement in item 0), which 
bans the provision of premium rates that are not adequate to cover long-term costs 
and losses for the insurance company. In Brazil's view, this provision could be 
interpreted as allowing WTO members to offer guarantees that bring transaction 
rates under usual market levels, thus penalising developing countries that cannot 
match these terms, even if they offered similar guarantees. Consequently, as 
sovereign credit ratings differ considerably even among homogeneous economies, 
in a membership so diverse as that of the WTO, the -break even" requirement of 
item 0) falls quite short of ensuring a level playing field among Members, with a 
clear disadvantage to those that enjoy lower credit ratings. 
In contrast, the European Communities, while taking note of the concerns 
of developing countries that are not members of the OECD, not only suggests that .1 
a i-evision of items 0) and (k) should not prejudice existing rules, but argues that 
the Arrangement on Official Support for Export Credits should not be applied 
oiiIN, to interest rates but could be used as a benchmark for all forms of export I 
18 
financing under the SCNI Agrcement. 
See Chapt. I V, P. 14 1. 
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e) discil2line of direct and indirect taxes for subsidies and CVD pl! Mgses 
In its March 2003 communication, the United States recognises that the 
GATT/WTO subsidy rules have historically disciplined direct and indirect taxes 
differently and that under the existing Agreement there is greater likelihood for 
direct tax concessions related to export activities to be found to be an export 
subsidy. The US, however, argues that the current distinction ignores the potential 
trade-distorting effect of some practices involving indirect taxes and calls, 
Al- - therefore, for greater equalization in the treatment of various tax systems. 
As one should expect, the other parties to the Doha talks have carefully 
avoided showing any sort of reaction to the stone thrown by the US delegation. 
3) Dyf'erential treatmentfor developing countries 
As expected, proposals aimed at some exceptions from the current rules on 
subsidies have been put forward by numerous developing countries. 19 The 
developing members point out that subsidisation in general is necessary to secure 
development objectives and, in particular, subsidies contingent upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods are crucial to the process of industrialization and 
development and any prohibition on such use would finther disadvantage these 
countries. India claims that the prohibition on export subsidies should not apply to 
subsidies granted by developing countries where they account for less than 5 per 
cent of the f. o. b. value of the product. Likewise, all developing countries should 
be exempted from the prohibition on import substitution subsidies. Venezuela 
19 Negotiating Group on Rules. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures/Antidumping Agreement - Submission by India (TN/RL/W4-25". April 2002). 
Negotiating Group on Rules. Egyptian Paper Containing Questions and Comments on the 
Contributions Submitted in the Framework of the Doha Negotiations on the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement. (TN/RU W/57 - 10 1h . February 
2003). 
Negotiating Group on Rules. Proposals by Venezuela and Cuba on Improved Rules under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures- Non Actionable Subsidies - 
(TN/RUW/41 -10 December 2002). 
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submits that the bestowal of subsidies by developing country members should be 
considered in the context of the reintroduction of the green light category. 
The industrial countries obviously take quite a different view. In particular 
the European Communities calls for stricter and more operational rules on exports 
contingent upon use of domestic over imported goods, with no exemption for any 
WTO member. Specifically, the European Communities contends that the present 
rules impose too high a threshold of proof on the complainant especially as 
regards "value-added requirements" as, in its opinion, under SCMA Art. 3.1 (b) it 
is necessary not only to show that an import substitution programme exists, but 
also to explicitly demonstrate that, in order to obtain the subsidy, the actual use of 
domestic over imported goods is required on a case-by-case basis. 'O 
4) callsfor a reform of the CVD regime 
Developing country members and industrialised ones, however, unite in 
calling for a thorough reform of the CVD regime, designed to protect foreign 
exporters against the interests of competitors in importing countries and to 
eliminate perceived bias in CVD investigation proceedings. Thus, the EC 
proposes higher initiation standards coupled with a swift control mechanism that 
should make the initiation of an investigation separately challengeable before the 
DSB .21 Brazil points out that under current rules 
(Art. 11.4 of the SCMA) an 
application for countervailing proceedings can be filed with the support of those 
representing only a minority (25%) of the total domestic production of the like 
product in the importing country. It, therefore, suggests that the level of minimum 
2OTN/RUW/30-21'. November2002. 
21 Negotiating Group on Rules. Negotiations on Antidumping and Subsidies - Reflection Paper of 
the European Communities on a Swift Control Mechanism for Initiation (TNIRL/W, '67 - 8'b. 
March 2003). 
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domestic support be brought to 50%. 22 Brazil, along with other newly- 
industrialised countries, stresses the need for a provision which clearly defines the 
scope of the product under investigation so as to prevent investigating authorities 
from grouping under a single heading products destined for different market 
segments under a single heading. 23 India, pointing out that the share of 
countervailing duty actions against developing countries is disproportionate to 
their weight in international trade, calls for the following amendments to Art. 27 
of the SCM Agreement: 1) a 7% of total imports negligibility threshold under 
which developing countries' products should be excluded from CVD proceedings, 
2) an increase of the "de minimis" level above the current 3% ad valorem, 3) the 
imposition of countervailing duties only to the amount by which the subsidy 
exceeds the "de minimis" level. 24 As regards countervailing duty reviews, Brazil 
remarks that the SCM Agreement does not provide guidance on the extension of 
requirements and methodologies applied to initial investigations, thus making it 
possible for the investigating authorities to apply methodologies that are not 
25 
consistent. Indeed, the validity of the Brazilian observations seem to be borne 
out by the "US-corrosion resistant carbon steel from Germany" decision on the 
non- applicability of the "de minimis" requirement" in sunset reviews. Brazil also 
calls for a mandatory "lesser duty" rule, under which the fully calculated amount 
of subsidisation would not be fully offset by CVD duties whenever the 
investigating authorities identify an "injury margin" lower than the subsidy 
margin. 26 In turn, the European Communities argue that the presumption in 
cuffent rules towards expiry of CVD proceedings after 5 years is being 
22 Negotiating Group on Rules. Countervailing Measures: Illustrative Major Issues - Paper by 
Brazil (TN/RL/W/ 19 - 7d. October 2002) 23TN/RUW/ 19 - 7'h. October 2002. TN/RL/W/ 104 - 60ý. May 2003. 24TN/RUW/4 -25h. April 2002. 23TN/RUW/ 19 - 7th. October 2002. 261bid. 
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circumvented by the initiation of unsubstantiated reviews, thus prolonging the life 
of measures and, therefore, claims that there is the need to spell out more clearly 
27 the requirements for extending the life of a measure for a further period . 
Conclusion 
An American scholar has argued that most of the reform proposals tabled 
so far (in practice, the bulk of the proposals put forward by WTO members other 
than the United States) are "weakening" the effecti-veness of the SCM trade 
regime and thus can be viewed as fostering trade distorting subsidisation. 28 
Though the scholar has a point in noting that many of the proposals are motivated 
by specific policy interests or by being on the losing side in disputes decided 
under present SCM rules, his argument takes it for granted that all form of 
subsidies are actually or potentially trade distorting, which as noted above, is the 
official philosophy of the United States; he also takes it for granted that there are 
no niches for subsidisation that are not covered by the text of the present 
multilateral rules and that countervailing proceedings are immune from 
exploitation for protectionist ends. 
At any rate, the alleged conflict between the hard-line stance of the United 
States and the attempt of the other parties to weaken the regime established by the 
Uruguay Round is not bome out by the negotiating proposals. 
The United States, having entered unwillingly the negotiations on 
subsidies and countervailing measures within the Doha Round, has nevertheless 
exploited the opportunity offered by the talks to renew its Uruguay Round efforts 
to expand the number of' prohibited subsidies. extending the ban to those 
- EN RI- \V 3,0 -- 21'. November 2002. 
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previously included in the no longer in force dark amber category. The United 
States also tries to obtain multilateral recognition of approaches long established 
in its CVD regime, such as those concerning equity infusion. But other developed 
countries, prominent among which is the European Communities, are also calling 
for the strengthening of the present subsidy regime and for the extension of its 
purview. Many industrial countries, however, also call for a clarification of some 
component parts of the subsidy definition in the SCM Agreement and of its export 
subsidy provisions. In any case, most parties to the Doha Round negotiations 
other than the United States call for a reform of the countervailing duty regime 
that could prevent the perceived bias in favour of domestic producers in the 
importing country. 
It seems, however, that the Round has not yet produced unified groups of 
proposals and even less a compromise between the various proposals that could 
open the door of an agreement by creating a trade-off between competing 
interests. In particular, the United States has no interest in swapping a significant 
reform of the countervailing duty regime that could limit its room for manoeuvre, 
whether for protectionist goals or for the sincere search of a level playing field, 
with a more favourable regime for direct taxation benefits, whose achievement 
through negotiation has been thwarted by the unfavourable decisions of the 
Dispute Settlement Body. After all, making allowances for a successful 
conclusion f the Doha Round, no progress or limited results in the negotiations on 
subsidies and countervailing measures would not be viewed with deep 
disappointment by the United States as the main mandate for the US negotiators 
was the defence of the regime established by the previous round. On the other 
hand, subsidy/CVD talks are just part of the negotiations going on within the 
28 John R. Magnus, World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is This the "Retrenchment 
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Negotiating Group on Rules along, among others, with antidumping talks. In the 
latter sector progress towards the reform of the present regime has been more 
rapid and could spill over in the contiguous negotiating area. In particular, the 
adoption of the "lesser duty" rule, which is presently debated in the antidumping 
negotiations, could significantly curb the possibility of exploiting countervailing 
measures for protectionist ends since any extra duty would be strictly correlated to 
the injury caused by the subsidised imports under investigation. 




The above analysis leads us to a final synthesis and some closing remarks. 
In the introduction we noted that the interaction between the US regime 
and the multilateral rules on subsidies and countervailing measures can be divided 
into two strands: on the one hand, the specification of certain fundamental 
concepts of the multilateral regime and the regulation of specific sectors of 
particular interest for the US, such as taxation of exported products and export 
credit. On the other hand, the countervailing duty regime as a possible tool for 
protectionist ends. The point of contact is the definition of what constitutes a 
subsidy. This definition is of quite recent origin, being adopted by the SCM 
Agreement to establish an all encompassing benchmark. Yet, the difficulty of 
pinpointing the scope and nature of subsidy in economic analysis is no less 
challenging in the legal field. In final analysis many aspects of the definition of 
subsidy in the SCMA resulted from a compromise and were affected by it and 
bound to be subject to dispute. The United States prevailed in shaping the 
multilateral rules on subsidies but, in contrast to prevailing views, the victory was 
. 0- -- r_. - far from complete. 
The United States achieved at least a potential victory when the Uruguay 
Round SCM Agreement accepted the American viewpoint that subsidies must be 
assessed with reference to the benefit for the recipient and that the benchmark for 
this assessment must be the market. The United States was also successful in 
extending the category of prohibited subsidies to those subsidies that are 
contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods and in definitively 
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attracting domestic subsidies under multilateral regulation. Yet, in contrast with 
the US perspective, export and import substitution subsidies are not prohibited 
merely because they are bestowed on exported products or import substitute 
products. As confirmed by the Appellate Body in Canada Aircraft, the ban is 
conditional on a functional relationship between the grant of the subsidy and the 
destination of the product concerned. Likewise, certain domestic subsidies that the 
United States wanted to capture among the prohibited subsidies remain simply 
actionable. The main Achilles' heel of the US turned out to be the fiscal treatment 
of revenue from exports where the United States suffers from an initial handicap. 
Whereas the exemption or the remission of duties or taxes bome by like products 
destined for domestic consumption is "ope legis" deemed not to be a subsid-y, if 
the product is exported, no equivalent exemption or remission is granted on direct 
taxation of income originating from export activities. The initial handicap , vas 
exacerbated by the fact that the United States laid its income tax net beyond 
domestic borders catching, under Subart F of the Internal Revenue Code certain 
defined income of controlled foreign subsidiaries. The DISC regime was a failed 
attempt to overcome the obstacle by establishing an endless deferral of taxation of 
export income. But such an attempt did not escape the Illustrative List's provision, 
although its condemnation was for long neutralised by the concurrent conviction 
of the regime of some EC member states, deemed to have equivalent economic 
results. 
The more complex FSC regime, at any rate, was more likely to escape the I 
sanctions of the Illustrative List being based not on the open exemption or deferral 
of an income whose taxation was provided by the general rules. but on the 
establishment of an -apparently autonomous" regime conditional on the creation 
of a foreign corporation whose relationship with its US parent docs not 
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necessarily coincide, from a strictly legal angle, 'with that of a Subpart F 
subsidiary. It must be noted, however. that in the first stage of the WFO dispute 
the United States argued that the complexity of the underlying tax issue meant the W 
matter should be discussed in other fora, i. e. in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development or in the competent authority process under the 
relevant bilateral tax treaties. ' Besides, the Panel could resort to the binding 
opinion of the permanent group of experts under SCMA Art. 7 but preferred to 
rely on its own judgment, focusing its analysis on the relevant provisions of the 
SCMA but failing to address in sufficient depth the complex and often interwound 
rules of the American tax regime on foreign source income. 
The US was more successful in protecting another sector of major interest 
for its export promotion policy from the general purview of subsidy regulation: 
government supported export credit. Here, together with the other OECD 
members and in particular the European Communities, the US secured a special 
regime for interest rates in line with the provisions of the Arrangement on 
guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, which otherwise were likely to 
be considered as prohibited export subsidies. The success is partially strengthened 
by the broad interpretation of the exception by the DSB, which encompasses those 
factors directly affecting the interest rate, such as the loan duration and the grace 
period for interest and principal repayment. Unsurprisingly, the priNileged 
position actually given to OECD members is strongly resented by those I 
developing countries like Brazil that have problems in obtaining funds in the 
international market at conditions comparable to those of their industrial 
competitors. 
1 L' S-FýSC. \VF DS 108 R. S. 10.1999, para -. 12. 
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The scenario on the other side of the coin, the countervailing duty regime. 
is not less complex. 17he previous chapters pro,., ide no positive answer to the 
general question of whether the CVD regime is protectionist per se, at least if we 
respect the due process principle. Regarding the United States, as noted in the 
introduction, there can be factors that could tilt the balance towards a verdict of 
protectionism, such as the membership of the International Trade Commission 
and its voting system, the high cost of judicial proceedings before American trade 
courts, or the imposition of countervailing duties along with antidumping duties 
on the same products, which clearly seem aimed at providing defence for 
domestic industries losing ground against foreign competitors. But each of these 
factors could be a potential component part of the protectionist weaponry or the 
upshot of exogenous circumstances. They are not by themselves causal factors. 
On the other hand, countervailing proceedings cannot claim to be the 
shining path to the optimal utilization of resources in the international market 
against distortions brought about by subsidizing measures or to the creation of a 
level playing field against unfair competition by subsidised products. 
Protectionism is a relative concept and its ascertainment must be treated 
comparatively. As regards countervailing measures. the essence of protectionism 
is the imposition of extra duties on exports that could avoid such burden or the 
imposition of a higher extra duty than that otherwise allowable. This quite often 
results from applying more severe parameters than other benchmarks that could 
also be legitimately applied. The choice of criteria could change according to the 
political envirorurnent and the business situation in the importing countrý-. An 
early and conspicuous example is given by the specificity requirement developed 
in the US CVD regime as a first test to countervail Ibreign products. The 
specificity requirement Nvas firstly adopted as a means to protect tiOreign exporters 
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from the indiscriminate application of measures that could curtail their ability to 
have access to the US market. Venr soon, however, the specificity test was 
applied more restrictively. The approach developed in the Cabot case led to 
evidence of specificity and, consequently, of subsidisation even where the 
prevalent usage of public financial contributions by a limited number of firms or 
industries was due to fortuitous factors and to the structure of the market. 2 Later 
on the Department of Commerce and the US trade courts relied on a case-b-,, -case 
approach, which was adopted by the SCMA. 3 Another example can be found in 
the idea, supported by the US Congress when foreign competition started to bite 
in the 1980s, that subsidies bestowed on a firm necessarily pass-through, ,, N-hether 
with regard to upstream subsidies, those provided on products used as inputs for 
exported goods increasing the competitive margin of the latter, or to subsidies 
bestowed on a corporation that is taken over by another firm. 
The US CVD regime, whose main features were mostly developed in the 
aftermath of the Tokyo Round Agreement, relied on the following: 
1) the submission to countervailing duty of subsidies not prevalently contingent 
on the export performance of a country but which still have an impact on it, that 
is, domestic subsidies. 
2) The requirement of specificity to countervail foreign products benefiting bý- 
domestic subsidies. 
3) The idea that the market must be the primary benchmark in assessing existence 
and amount of subsidisation. 
S See Chapt. I 11. sect 
Ibid. 
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The US pattern prevailed in establishing the key concepts of the SCM 
Agreement, both with reference to the general identification of subsidy in Art. I 
of the SCMA and in Part V of the Agreement. In particular, it is not the load on 
the budget that is taken into account in assessing occurrence and amount of the 
benefit. The benchmark is what private parties would pay and receive in the 
marketplace, or the provision of a more favourable fiscal and tariff regime to 
specific firms or industries. It does not necessarily follow that the acceptance of 
the American model by itself fostered protectionism. The bestowal of a benefit 
principle, measured with reference to ordinary market conditions, is perhaps more 
severe but certainly not more potentially biased than the charge to the budget 
principle. On the contrary, the latter does not give due relevance to the higher 
costs often borne by developing countries. We need only remember the higher 
cost of debt and funding in the international market for these WTO members. 
Why then are the criteria endorsed by the SCMA often accused of 
protectionism and of having stimulated an upsurge in countervailing duty 
proceedings outside the United StateS? 4 The point is that the benchmarks 
adopted by the Agreement does not provide a precise parameter to ascertain 
existence and amount of the benefit. As shown in the previous chapters and 
repeated above, since the relevant articles of the SCMA have failed to provide 
any exact assessment method, states initiating CVD proceedings can take as 
parameter conditions that are harder to establish than others, thus making it 
possible to catch otherwise legitimate practices. In contrast, the charge to the 
budget criterion is not multitaceted and can be easily applied. 
' Paul Waer and Fd,. k in Vermulst. -EC Antisubsidy La%k and Practice after the Uruguaý Round, A 
Wolf in Sheep's Clothing". J. W. T.. 13 ( 1999). P. 18. 
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With particular reference to the post Marrakesh US CVD regime room for 
protectionism can be found in the following administrative practice: 
a) With regard to the provision of goods and services the US bases its 
investigations on the idea that only a market free from state interference in the 
exporting country can be taken as a benchmark, whereas it seems to ignore 
oligopolistic conditions and restrictive practices by private firms both in the 
exporting and in the importing country. 
b) The United States follows quite a restrictive perspective in ascertaining the 
consistency of capital infusion into govenunent-owned companies with the 
investment decision standard for ordinary private investors. According to the 
United States, the benchmark should be the choice made by external investors 
interested in short-term profitability. Rational choices of investors that already 
have a stake in the company are not taken into account. Therefore capital 
infusions that would be perfectly legitimate from a wider market perspective if 
decided by private investors, are viewed as a form of subsidisation if decided by 
the govenunent and are, therefore, countervailable. Besides the sanction is unduly 
severe, as the total amount of the investment is considered a grant. The United 
States, having realised that its perspective does not necessarily fit the SCMA 
provisions, in the Doha Round negotiations asked for a clarification of Art. 14 of 
the Agreement, which should obviously uphold its point of view. 
c) The Department of Commerce adopted a set of methodologies ("gamma" and 
"same company") which easily led to the conclusion that non-recurring subsidies, 
mostly bestowed on goverrunent-owned corporations, pass-through to those 
privately- owned companies that have the misfortune of taking over the former at 
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fair market price. 5 This finding is not consistent with economic logic andý 
therefore,, has protectionist effects. Each of these methodologies was found to be 
inconsistent both with the SCM Agreement and with the US statute. Yet, 
Commerce has promptly replaced each flawed methodology with another 
methodology that has the same economic result, and thus has been able to go on 
imposing CVD duties on companies that have received no benefit whatsoever. 
d) During the brief period of effectiveness of SCMA Art. 8, the US administering 
authority, giving a formalistic interpretation to the requirement of Art. 8.2(b)(ii) 
and of the implementing provisions of the URAA, succeeded in considering as 
actionable measures aimed at promoting investments in areas that were 
disadvantaged. The protectionist bias of such an approach is even more striking if 
we take into account that the final text of Art. 2 of the SCM Agreement does not 
consider as specific, and therefore countervailable, subsidies that are bestowed 
directly by local authorities, with exactly the same goals and effects as those 
subject to countervailing duties when provided by central authorities. 
e) The United States does not extend to sunset reviews the "de minimis" subsidy 
requirement to initiate a CVD investigation with the odd result that it can 
continue imposing countervailing duties on imported products, even though their 
subsidy content has fallen below the threshold required to initiate an 
investigation. 
0 DOC allocates non recurring subsidies according to the average useful life 
(AUL) of the physical assets of the firm under investigation as set forth in the 
Internal Revenue Service Class Life Depreciation Range System, for fiscal 
purposes, thus imposing a methodology applicable to US industries to firms 
whose exports are often produced in very different industrial envirotunents. 
5 See Chapter VII 
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Only some of the above listed protectionism-biased US rules and 
administrative practices have till now undergone the scrutiny of the Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
Given the ambiguity of many of the WTO rules with which the 
consistency of the American regime must be ascertained, the panels have given 
priority to the object of limiting as far as possible the room for manoeuvre in 
exploiting CVD proceedings for protectionist ends, often attacking both the 
administrative practice and statutory provisions of the countervailing country. The 
attitude of the Appellate Body, which often has overturned the panels' opinions, 
has been quite different. The AB has exploited the ambiguity of the multilateral 
rules on subsidies and countervailing measures, to engage in judicial activism, of 
which, in contrast to many other cases, it has openly recognized the political 
nature. 6 Considering itself confronted with the dilemma of whether to favour fight 
against subsidization or to counter use of countervailing measures for protectionist 
ends, it privileges the first goal, overlooking the fact that the latter can be as trade 
disruptive as the former. With the only, though relevant, exception of the "Byrd 
Amendment" case, the Appellate Body, while condemning the US administrative 
practice under review in several cases, refrains from condemning or even 
countenances the US statute implementing the SCM Agreement, as supplemented 
by the SAA and the 1998 Final Rule, which is at the root of the condemned 
administrative practice. Summing up what has been illustrated in Chapter VII, the 
Appellate Body has widened the administering authority's room for manoeuvre as 
follows: 
60n the general attitude of the Appellate Body in a multilateral legal environment characterised by 
often recurring indeterminate provisions, see Sol Picciotto, "The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal 
Formalism as Legitimation of Global Governance", Governance, 18 (2005) n. 3 
323 
1) Going beyond the wording of Art 14 (d), it allows the replacement of the 
domestic market as a benchmark for assessing subsidization if it is abnormally 
affected by the dominant position of public authorities. 
2) While recognising that the subsidy pass-through is eliminated in transactions 
between private parties at arm's length and fair price, it argues that the rule does 
not work when one of the parties involved in the negotiation is government 
controlled, since governments can alter the conditions of the sale together with the 
signals given by the market. Thus there is a double standard for private sales and 
for sales of goverrument-owned finns, as for the latter the purchase could even 
take place, quite puzzlingly, at the fair market price, which, however, has die 
original sin of being established in a market whose conditions are distorted by the 6. 
dominant position of the State. At least in countervailing proceedings the final 
judge of such an occurrence is the administering authority in the importing 
country. 
3) By extending to the utmost the idea of entrustment and directive to private 
bodies in SCMA Art 1.1 (a)(1)(iv), the AB has included among the financial 
contributions listed in the article financial support provided by private finns 
whose decision has somehow been conditioned by governmental authority. 
Obviously, this gives great leeway to national administering authorities in 
determining when private bodies act as proxy for the government. 
4) Giving preference to a literal approach in interpreting the text of Art. 21 on 
sunset review, or more specifically in giving a meaning to an omission in the 
wording of the provision, the AB held that the " de minimis" requirement under 
Art 11.9 for the initiation of an investigation does not apply to sunset reviews. The 
decision of the Appellate Body is, perhaps, consistent with the text, as noted in 
Chapter VII, but the AB justifies its opinion politically, referring to the risk of 
324 
unduly altering the delicate balance of the negotiated SCM Agreement Ho%,,, e, %, er. 
the Appellate Body fails to explain why the extension of a requirement, vvhich is 
perfectly consistent with economic logic and probably with equity, should alter 
the delicate balance of the Agreement and in ý, vhich ,. vay. The result is that %VTO 
members can go on imposing extraduties after the five year time limit provided by 
Art. 21.3, although according to Art. 11.9 the initial investigation could not be 
started. 
This research made it clear that it has no pretence at being normative and 
that its approach is simply positive. Even normative ambitions should indeed 
recognise that there is no simple answer and no single solution given the context 
of present multilateral rules, the impact of certain AB's opinions and the different 
attitudes of the parties concerned. 
An obvious solution would be that WTO members should reassert their 
sovereign prerogatives in reshaping the SCM Agreement test and eliminating the 
ambiguities and loopholes characterising present rules. In so doing the members 
could trade off the reform of some measures in which they have a particular 
interest with the restructuring of other measures of greater interest for other 
parties in the negotiation. For instance, the United States could have an interest in 
trading an amendment of Art. 1.1 (a)(1)(ii) on revenue foregoing with a more 
restrictive definition of private intervention in carrying out subsidising policy 
under Art. or with an amendment of Art. 21.3 providing for "de 
minimis" requirement also in sunset re'views. 
Unfortunately the modifications to be traded off are not uniform. In Art. 
21.3 a simple supplement to the text could achieve the desired results. However, 
in cases like Art. 14(a) an amendment to the present text. requiring. as suggcsted 
by the United States. more specific criteria than the present reference to the usual 
investment practices in the exporting country with regard to capital infusion, 
could help strengthen protectionist biases. In other cases, such as Art. 14(d) on the 
provision of goods and services, the parties to the negotiation should agree when 
the criterion of the market conditions in the exporting country should be 
abandoned and which other terms of reference should be adopted. No easy task. 
The ugly fact is that favourable chances for possible trade offs are few, 
because, as lamented by the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the dialogue on 
subsidies (and countervailing measures) has made little progress, while disputes 
before the DSB have been going on. It is, therefore, more apposite and, perhaps, 
more interesting to stick to the positive approach and investigate which factors 
hinder the negotiating process for the rebalancing of the Agreement and what 
chances there are for substantial progress. 
There are three main obstacles: the ambiguity of key articles in the present 
SCMA text; judicial activism, sometimes beyond the boundaries of the text, from 
the Appellate Body, encouraged and, to a certain extent, imposed by the 
mentioned ambiguities and the slow start of the negotiating process; the different 
weight of WTO members in the world economy and, therefore, their different 
ability to oppose or delay the implementation of the DSB's decisions. The 
interaction between these factors has rendered the need for serious bargaining less 
compelling. 
The United States certainly has been foiled in its hopes to rebalance the 
disadvantages for export income inherent in its corporation tax regime especially 
vis-i-vis its EU trade partners and has failed in its attempt to transform the 
countervailing and antidumping regime in a new form of subsidization for its 
companies. And yet, due to its sway in international trade it has been able to turn a 
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rapid phase-out of its measures condemned by the DSB in a long phase-down. K- 
The United States has dragged its feet for over five years on the FSC saga: the 
second DSU Art. 21.5 decision of the DSB was circulated in March 2006, while 
A- - 1999.7 une first panel opinion dates back to Likewise, in April 2007, that is seven 
years after the adoption of the Byrd Amendment, the European Communities was 
still notifying the imposition of extra duties on American products in retaliation 
8 for the delayed repeal of the Act. On the other hand, the Appellate Body has 
found most US CVD "statutory" rules consistent with the SCMA and GATT 
1994. This does not mean that many US administrative practices have been 
stricken down, but, as shown above, the underlying planks of the American 
regime have been upheld. There is, therefore, no need for the US to bargain 
multilateral rules referring to countervailing measures, which have not weakened 
the American regime, against some concession on the provisions for subsidy 
identification, prominent among which those on fiscal measures as financial 
contributions. 
The other members seem unable or unwilling to establish a united front. 
This can be attributed to the fact that a growing number of them have become 
active users of countervailing proceedings to protect their industries against 
foreign competition, whether fair or unfair. Secondly their perspective on 
subsidies and some forms of them are quite different. India considers subsidies an 
essential tool to offset the disadvantage imposed by the market on developing 
countries. Brazil strongly criticises the safe harbour for export credits in line with 
the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits as conferring an 
7 United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporation s".. Appe I late Body Report and 
Panel Report pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Action by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
WT/DS108/36. March 17,2006. 
8 United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offsect Act. Communication from Japan. 
WT/DS217/50 of 24 August 2006 
Communication from the European Communities. WT/DS2]7i5l of 24 April 2007). 
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unjustified advantage to the OECD industrial countries, but it is much more 
lenient with regard to its own export subsidising practices, viewed as necessary to 
overcome the constraints imposed by international financial markets on 
developing countries. The European Communities, within its borders, has adopted 
increasingly stringent policies on subsidisation from member states. Thirdly, in 
this context many proposals for reshaping subsidy rules are related to ongoing 
disputes rather than a wider perspective. 
Members other than the US are more united in calling for a review of the 
multilateral CVD regime. Many proposals circulated in the Doha negotiations 
concern procedural improvements to guarantee that countervailing proceedings 
.4. 
are introduced by firms actually representing the majority of domestic production 
or aimed at introducing multilateral early monitoring mechanism over the 
initiation of CVD investigations. Others address some of the issues above listed, 
such as the extension of the "de minimis" requirement to sunset reviews. 
Unsurprisingly, developing countries ask for special treatment implying an 
increase of the "de minimis" level, and a higher imports negligibility threshold. 
Of particular salience is the call for rendering compulsory rather than 
hortatory the imposition of lesser duties whenever the "injury margin" identified 
by the investigating authorities is lower than the subsidy margin. The proposal 
tabled by Brazil is one the hottest topics in the parallel negotiations on 
antidumping and could have an impact not less severe than the reform of the key 
rules on subsidy identification and countervailing measures in limiting the room 
for manoeuvre to exploit CVD proceedings for protectionist ends. It is particularly 
so if the new criterion were coupled with a strict implementation of the causal 
. requirement 
in injury assessment, which subjects the imposition of countervailing 
duties to the demonstration that subsidised imports are causing injury and also 
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provides that injury caused by other factors must not be attributed to them. It 
follows that countervailing duties could not be imposed beyond the quantified 
damage directly referable to subsidized imports if not to the subsidy itself. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the ongoing negotiations on subsidies and 
countervailing measures could result in substantial changes in the system that 
has taken shape in the last fifty years, with a strong acceleration in the Uruguay 
Round and its aftennath. The present division between prohibited and actionable 
subsidies - which since January 2000, has replaced the three-way classification 
also comprising non- actionable subsidies - is not destined to be significantly 
challenged. 
This classification does not reflect any particular economic theory. For 
instance, as noted in chapter 1, export subsidies, which are prohibited, could be 
viewed as a misallocation of resources by the subsidising state and may squeeze 
out more efficient third-country producer, but for the importing country in most 
cases they entail more available products at lower prices. Likewise, quite a few 
subsidies are addressed at offsetting market distortions or at remunerating some 
externalities that are not recognised by the invisible but sometimes blind hand of 
the market. 
As argued in Chapter L the choice to grant subsidies and to counter them, 
whether through international proceedings or, unilaterall-y', by countervailing W 
measures, is determined by factors that do not fit into the perspective of static 
comparative advantage or the establishment of a level playing field. Factors like 
the consumption variable, that is, the capacity of an economy to absorb the 
external benefit provided by an industrý, either through upstream or downstream 
flows, and the internalisation variable, that is, the cxtcnt to which competitive 
9 See Chater 1. section 1. 
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benefits generated by subsidisation measures can spread beyond national borders 
and be exploited by industries in foreign countries are taken in account by the 
main players in the high technology sectors. And prominent among them is the 
United States. For instance, the United States along with Japan and the European 
Communities have heavily countervailed allegedly subsidised imports from 
Korea of dynamic random access memory semiconductors, after having lost in 
the 1980s large shares of the world market for semiconductors to Japanese giant 
conglomerates like Fujitsu, Hitachi and Toshiba enjoying the support of the 
MITI. 10 Likewise, the United States is still the main user of countervailing 
measures, along with antidumping measures against steel imports, a sector in 
which the United States lost ground since the early 1970s. 11 One could argue 
that the use of countervailing measures and the call for stricter rules on 
subsidisation measures simply reflects the fact that the United States does not 
consider subsidies as legitimate measures while most other countries consider 
them as a legitimate instrument of economic policy. However, the distinction is 
not so clear-cut as it might seem at first sight. Estimates prevalently based on the 
1980s indicate that subsidisation as a percentage of GDP was 2.98% in most 
industrialised countries while the average rate of the US was 0.5%, but if defence 
12 
procurement are taken into account the rate jumps to 2% . Indeed, public 
support, if not subsidies, has been lavishly provided to the aircraft industry, 
which grew up as a strategic sector. 13 In 1992 the United States and the European 
Communities reached a bilateral agreement on aircraft subsidies, regulating and 
consequently recognising the right of the two customs areas to provide public 
10 See Peter H. Lindert, "Twentieth-Century Foreign Trade and Trade Policy". in Stanley 
Engerman, ed., The Cambridge Economic History of the United States Vol. III(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 448. 
11 Ibid. p. 424 et seq. 
1212 Michael Trebilcock and Robert House, The Regulation of International Trade 
13 Peter H. Lindert, "Twentieth-Ccntury, op. cit., p. 445. 
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support to the sector. The fact that the European consortium steadily eroded the 
US supremacy and possibly the fact that the Communities and the four member 
states engaged in the Airbus venture went beyond the terms of the agreement led 
the United States to lodge a WTO complaint against alleged launch subsidies to 
the EU company. 14 The European Communities in turn lodged a complaint 
contending that the American rival Boeing had received illegal aid benefitting in 
particular from overpriced defence procurement contracts as well as preferential 
access to military and aeronautical defence programmes. 5 Thus, the question is 
whether the two parties will be able to reach an eleventh hour negotiated deal 
before the circulation of the opinion of the Panel and, as de rigueur, of the 
Appellate Body. The likely outcome is a reissue of the 1976 DISC case: both 
sides will lose before the DSB and neither will want to come into compliance. 
But as we have seen in the previous chapter, in spite of the claimed 
predominance of prompt compliance with the decisions of the Dispute Settlement 
Body and the consequent repeal of subsidising measures or at least of their 
effects, also the present WTO mechanism gives WTO members wide room for 
manoeuvre to defend their dominant interests delaying compliance with the 
decision as long as it is economically convenient and politically feasible. It is 
quite possible that the two litigants at the end of the day will find convenient to 
make a new bilateral agreement. 
In short, the long-standing agreement on aircraft subsidies and the likely 
outcome of the ongoing dispute bears witness of the predominance of realism 
over the ideal of undistorted market. We give to the term realism a Waltzian 
" European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States (WTDS316/6. II April 
2006). 
15 United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. Request 
for the Establishment 
of a Panel by the European Communities (WT; DS317/5.23 January 2006). 
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meaning. 16 Realists see states as those units whose interaction forms the structure 
of international political systems and consider them as rational and unitai-y actors 
which pursue their individual interests. When fundamental interests are at stake 
the main actors in the international economic arena, except for lip service, do not 
care about the pursue of free trade and optimal worldwide allocation of 
resources, which instead seem to have a particular appeal to legal theorists and, 
sometimes, to the WTO Appellate Body. The same can be said for countervailing 
duties, which do not aim at defending free trade or creating a level playing field, 
but simply at rebuilding the protection wall fixed in the schedules of 
concessions, whose effectiveness is eroded by subsidised imports. The 
mechanism is not designed to allow a reduction of the protective barrier: only an 
increase is possible, if it is used for protectionist goals. 
In the medium run, therefore, no significant changes in the system can be 
expected. What we can expect is only some minor alterations that fit the interests 
of some of the main parties involved in subsidising and counteracting 
subsidisation measures, along with some limited improvements in regulating the 
use of subsidies and making exploitation of countervai ling measures for 
protectionist ends more difficult. 
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